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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
1.  Introduction
The European Union and the world economy have wit-
nessed a deep economic crisis. Global competition has 
become tougher as a result of the slump in demand and 
the built-up of over-capacities on the supply side. Over 
a longer-term perspective, the competitiveness of EU 
businesses on the quickly evolving world markets will 
remain the key determinant of EU prosperity.
That is why the European Economic Recovery Plan, 
while boosting demand through a coordinated fiscal 
stimulus, is accompanied by a commitment to acceler-
ate structural reforms. Based on the Lisbon Partnership 
for Growth and Jobs, it in particular aims to boost future 
EU competitiveness by investing in a more innovative, 
highly skilled and low-carbon economy.
In order to underpin discussions about future priorities, 
this year’s edition of the annual Competitiveness Report 
looks first at the possible short-term implications of the 
economic downturn for productivity developments 
— the key factor for competitiveness in the long run — 
and second at some of the main future determinants of 
the EU competitiveness position on the world markets: 
the evolving characteristics of the BRIC (Brazil, Russia, 
India and China) economies; the role of migration, in par-
ticular impact of its skill structure on EU productivity; the 
extent to and conditions under which training can boost 
productivity, with a particular emphasis on the role of 
Information and Communication Technologies (ICT) as 
a magnifier of training benefits; and the role of product 
and labour market regulations in influencing ICT invest-
ment and their joint relationship with productivity.
2.  Overall competitiveness 
performance
The crisis thwarted the recovery from the 2001 slow-
down
The bursting of the large real-estate and stock-market 
bubble in the US and in some European countries has 
put a halt to the robust growth seen since 2006. The 
wealth contraction associated with the bubble burst 
has negatively affected consumption and, by extension, 
almost all economic activity. The situation has been fur-
ther exacerbated by the financial crisis and the contrac-
tion in international trade. The combination of these 
factors has yielded a downturn unprecedented in both 
magnitude and scope.
Output has been falling markedly in durables and 
equipment goods’ sectors
The crisis has particularly affected demand for consumer 
durables as a result of reduced consumption saving by 
households. This lower demand is in turn, along with the 
uncertainty normally associated with turmoil, leading 
firms to freeze employment and investment projects. 
As a consequence, at sectoral level the classical pattern 
is observed where consumer non-durables, energy and 
services are contracting less than consumer durables 
and investment equipment goods. By mid-2009, manu-
facturing and services had contracted by about 20 and 
10 per cent, respectively, on an annual basis. Within 
manufacturing, the contraction in electrical equipment 
and fabricated metal products exceeded 20 per cent and 4
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for motor vehicles and basic metals even 30 per cent. 
In addition, the construction sector, directly affected by 
the real-estate bubble and usually one of the first sec-
tors where employment drops, is set to undergo a major 
adjustment.
Employment has not yet hit the bottom
By mid-2009 the rise of unemployment was still mode-
rate given the magnitude of the reduction in output and 
the adjustment in construction and services (in the order 
of two or three percentage points) probably due to the 
wide application of short term working schemes. Hence, 
one may expect a further contraction in employment in 
manufacturing and less markedly in services.
Key features of recent trends in the EU economy prior 
to the crisis
From a longer term perspective, two salient features 
stand out when examining sectoral trends.
First, the outsourcing of services from manufacturing 
has recently intensified and partly explains why pro-
ductivity in manufacturing has grown faster than in 
services1, maintaining a strong share of manufacturing 
in value added despite a contraction in employment. 
Outsourcing may also constitute an important part 
of the explanation for the increasing share of services 
in the economy, as value added previously recorded 
as manufacturing now appears as part of services. The 
quantitative importance of the inter-linkages between 
manufacturing and services in the EU is illustrated by the 
estimate that manufacturing “pulls” on average 17 per 
cent of its total production from services (uses services 
as input) and “pushes” an average 8 per cent of its total 
supply into the services sector.
Second, within manufacturing, the most recent EU 
enlargements have had a significant impact on EU indus-
trial structure. Open international trade has increased 
access to export markets as well as the pressure on EU 
companies to remain internationally competitive. In 
high-tech products the EU is facing notable pressure 
from emerging countries but is maintaining a com-
petitive position in this market segment: the EU has the 
highest international market share in high-tech exports; 
furthermore, it is improving its competitive position as 
reflected by increasing revealed comparative advantage 
indices, contrasting with the deteriorating position, both 
in absolute and relative terms, for the US and Japan.
1  Over the period 1995-2007, productivity in manufacturing grew at an aver-
age 3.2 per cent, i.e. much faster than in other sectors.
Recessions may boost competitiveness
The impact of a large recession on productivity in the 
medium and long term may have both positive and nega-
tive aspects. Indeed, contrary to what one might expect, 
historical experience does not indicate any systematic 
negative impact of a recession on long-term growth.
Despite a negative impact in the short term…
In the very short term, a downturn has a “mechanical” 
negative impact on productivity due to changes in the 
intensity of use of factors, which are however difficult to 
measure.
For a number of reasons, firms are well-advised not to   
lay off their workers in the wake of a temporary slump 
in production. Thus, labour-hoarding or work-sharing 
schemes typically help to keep employment fairly stable 
in the early months of a recession. This is particularly true 
in manufacturing. The reasons are multiple. In a labour 
market with asymmetric information on both vacancies   
and job seekers, labour-hoarding preserves good matches 
that may be difficult to reproduce. Further, if there is an 
important learning-by-doing component in a worker’s 
productivity, labour-hoarding may also   preserve firm-spe-
cific human capital that will be costly to rebuild. Finally, 
if despite the above-mentioned reasons for firms not to 
lay off workers, firms decide to downsize their workforce, 
they may still be held back by labour market regulations 
and the resulting firing costs. As a consequence, the same 
number of employees produce less output and measured 
productivity thus drops. However, this does not reflect 
technical change and may explain why, once employ-
ment starts to fall, measured productivity recovers so 
quickly well before the recession is over.
... And some long-term risk factors… 
Nevertheless, there are also real long-term effects on 
productivity. Understanding their mechanisms is impor-
tant to design right policies during a recession.
Productivity will be negatively affected by firms having 
to freeze investment projects, particularly if they are 
liquidity- or credit-constrained. Postponed investment 
projects will decrease future productivity by extending 
the life of relatively obsolete equipment while missing 
the opportunity to improve productivity through bet-
ter reorganisation of the production process and the 
improvement in quality embodied in new investment 
goods. The destruction of supply-chain and distribution 
networks — organisational capital — may negatively 
affect productivity directly but also divert resources 
from firms to rebuild these commercial relations. How-
ever, while these networks are not restored, the effect 5
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will be to depress total factor productivity and labour 
productivity.
In the labour market, when employment starts to con-
tract, lay-offs will cause firm-specific human capital to be 
lost while unemployment, particularly long-term unem-
ployment, is associated with a strong depreciation in 
human capital. 
Finally, in bad times, many firms turn to aggressive cost-
saving strategies and a usual target is innovation and, in 
particular, R&D expenditure. 
… Other mechanisms may boost productivity and com-
petitiveness 
Other firms, particularly those whose business models rely 
on innovation, will intensify innovative activities as a way 
forward in an increasingly competitive environment. 
A recession can also help in adopting the most produc-
tive technologies and business practices. The selec-
tion mechanism is closely related to the impact of the 
restructuring that often comes together with a crisis. 
There are gains from selecting more productive firms 
and reallocating resources to best performers. In close 
connection with this mechanism and the notion of crea-
tive destruction, a recession may induce firms to develop 
or adopt better technologies in order to be better fit to 
survive the downturn. Those who fail to adapt will face a 
higher probability of disappearing.
Less intensive use of physical capital may signifi-
cantly decrease the rate of depreciation of the stock 
of machines. At the same time, on the human capital 
side, a recession may also be an opportunity to inten-
sify the accumulation of human capital, both in the for-
mal education sector and on-the-job: younger people 
may decide to postpone entry into the job market by 
extending their period of education while firms facing 
low levels of activity may encourage workers to engage 
in on-the-job training.
Momentum for reforms
All in all, it is not evident that a recession will necessarily 
have a negative impact on long-term productivity and 
therefore GDP growth. Policies that help enterprises 
invest in innovation and reap emerging market oppor-
tunities, and which boost investment in human capital, 
are key to turning challenges into opportunities. But 
perhaps the strongest positive impact on productivity 
comes from the momentum that a crisis may provide for 
structural reforms. 
That is why the European Economic Recovery Plan 
(EERP) is embedded within the Lisbon Partnership   
for Growth and Jobs and reconciles short-term action 
with long-term priorities. On the one hand, the task is 
to preserve the Single Market and integrate the EU fur-
ther in international markets. It is indeed a temptation 
in bad times to turn to protectionism in order to shield 
those most affected by the recession through exposure 
to trade, but such measures also hamper recovery and, 
if perpetuated, can hinder future growth. On the other 
hand, public intervention has been devised in order to 
comply broadly with the strategic aims of the Lisbon 
Strategy: investing in the right skills; energy efficiency; 
clean technologies to speed up the transition to a low-
carbon economy; support for small and medium-sized 
enterprises; better regulation and investing in infrastruc-
ture and interconnection in network grids in order to 
promote efficiency and innovation.
Many of these interventions reinforce mechanisms that 
have a positive impact on productivity, as mentioned 
above. For instance, measures to speed up the transition 
to a low-carbon economy create incentives to innovate. 
Many Member States have facilitated the adoption of 
work-sharing programmes in order to avoid unemploy-
ment but also to preserve the human and organisational 
capital of firms.
3.  External dimension of EU 
competitiveness: challenges 
and opportunities presented 
by BRICs
Competition in world markets is both a test of the com-
petitiveness of an economy and a chance to further 
enhance economic performance. Understanding the 
trends on fast changing international markets is there-
fore crucial. In this context, the quickly evolving competi-
tiveness position of the so-called BRIC (Brazil, Russia, 
India and China) countries stands out. 
While the immediate impact of the global crisis was a 
deep contraction in BRICs’ foreign trade and, more wor-
ryingly, growing protectionist tendencies to support 
domestic industry, such as the “buy Chinese” initiative, 
the catching-up process in the BRICs is expected to con-
tinue, creating new opportunities as well as numerous 
challenges for the rest of the world and for the EU in 
particular. 
Despite a common label, the engines of economic 
development in the BRICs are very different
All the BRICs have large populations and display fast   
economic growth, resulting in expanding markets. 
However, despite these common features, each indi-6
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vidual BRIC country has a different economic develop-
ment model: Brazil is a domestically oriented service 
economy; the Russian economy is heavily dependent 
on energy exports; the Indian economy is essentially 
service-led, supported by exports; and China’s eco-
nomic development is driven by manufacturing exports 
and investment. Regarding energy, rising and poten-
tially competing demand is coming from China and 
India, especially for oil and to a much lesser extent for 
gas. Russia and Brazil, on the other hand, are suppliers 
of energy. 
China has shown clear signs of technological upgrading 
Since 2000, the Triad (EU, US and Japan) has lost market 
shares in global markets to the BRICs and in particular 
China, which has become the second largest exporter of 
goods. Despite the EU’s relative success in keeping high 
market shares, it has trade deficits with all BRICs except 
India.
Technology-driven industries increasingly dominate EU 
imports from China. In 2007, the share of these indus-
tries in EU imports from China was already higher than 
in intra-EU imports while high-skill industries recorded 
rapidly rising shares between 2000 and 2007, providing 
evidence for China’s technological upgrading. Moreover, 
China (as well as India and even Russia) has been   
successful in price competition in high-skill industries 
and gained market shares in the EU. In a longer-term 
perspective, this striving for “industrial upgrading” poses 
the most serious challenge to the EU in maintaining its 
competitive advantages in high value-added products 
and services.
Several factors contribute to China’s strong export 
performance. One is that trade and investment of the 
Triad countries have provided China with the necessary 
capital goods, technology and know-how to diversify 
and upgrade domestic industrial and export capaci-
ties. A distinctive feature of Chinese trade is its increas-
ing involvement in the global supply chain. In addition, 
foreign investment firms account for more than half of 
Chinese exports. Indeed, much evidence suggests that 
China’s bilateral trade balances and comparative advan-
tages reflect to a large extent the competitiveness of 
foreign firms exporting out of China. 
The EU emerges as the largest provider of FDI for BRICs, 
guided by market-seeking opportunities
In this context, it is significant that although the share 
of EU FDI going to the BRICs still remains small – and 
has increased only moderately since 2002 – the EU is the 
largest provider of FDI in each of these countries. As in 
the case of global outward FDI, EU FDI stocks owned in 
the BRICs are skewed to the services sector confirming 
the importance of direct investment in the internationa-
lisation of services. Indeed, as services are much less 
tradable than goods, settling in BRICs (through FDIs) is 
the main alternative for EU companies to get access to 
those fast-growing markets.
Based on investors reported motivations, investment deci-
sions appear to be largely guided by the growth of the 
host market, more than by production costs. This suggests 
a longer term perspective for investment in these markets, 
as likely wage increases and associated rising costs will not 
deter investors, but may rather attract them further due to 
growing demand.
However, fully reaping these opportunities hinges upon 
the willingness of the BRICs to address the many impedi-
ments for doing business that still exist, in particular in 
sectors that are considered to be less advanced, where 
there is a state monopoly or which are declared as “stra-
tegically important”.
Challenges for the EU to enhance its economic rela-
tions with the BRICs and to reap opportunities 
Further advancing trade relations with the BRIC coun-
tries presents tremendous opportunities for the EU in 
terms of access to large and fast-growing markets and in 
terms of savings from a better global division of labour. 
However, in line with the above-mentioned specificities 
of each of the BRICs, the challenges and opportunities 
differ for each of them. In a nutshell, the biggest chal-
lenges for EU policies will concern manufacturing with 
regard to China, services with regard to India, agriculture 
(including biofuels) with regard to Brazil, and energy 
(especially gas) in relations with Russia. However, manu-
facturing is going to play an increasing role in relations 
with India, Brazil and probably Russia as well, and the 
outsourcing of services will gain importance with China. 
Main challenges for building mutually beneficial eco-
nomic relations with the BRICs arise from the still weak 
regulatory framework and various institutional impedi-
ments linked, for example, to uneven enforcement of 
laws, continuing non-tariff barriers to trade (including 
certification procedures and standards) and the low 
standards built into environmental regulations and 
labour laws, which moreover often discriminate against 
foreign companies. Prominent examples are intellectual 
property rights protection and its enforcement in China, 
labour legislation in India and Russia, and environmental 
regulations in both Russia and China.
In addition, the strong state interference in the BRIC 
economies – taking the form of various subsidies, 
privileged access to bank loans or raw materials, or tax 7
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preferences, especially for the state-owned enterprises – 
makes BRICs’ exports to the EU cheaper, impairing the 
competitiveness of EU companies on both home and 
third markets. State interference is particularly high in 
Russia and China, which poses great challenges for the 
EU in particular in view of the export-driven character of 
the Chinese economy.
Finally, in the light of new development plans and 
current industrial policies in the BRICs – with a focus 
on improving infrastructure and diversification of the 
economy – policy areas such as public procurement and 
public-private partnerships (particularly in Russia) will 
gain importance. Moreover, the restructuring and tech-
nological upgrading of the BRICs will increase demand 
for investment goods, where the EU has, and is expected 
to keep, a comparative advantage with respect to the 
BRICs. As in the case of consumer goods, special sup-
port for SMEs with regard to market research and direct 
investment would encourage more European enter-
prises to tap new distant markets.
In the EU’s energy relations with China and India, sup-
porting energy efficiency and the use of renewable 
energy sources will be important. In the case of Russia, 
energy security in connection with the EU’s internal 
energy market regulations and energy transit represent 
the major challenges. With respect to Brazil, important 
issues are the standardisation of biofuels (which should 
facilitate trade), subsidisation, and tariff barriers.
4.  Migration, skills and 
productivity
As global competitors move up the value chain, and 
as immigration and emigration barriers decrease, the 
capacity to build human capital and to attract and retain 
the most qualified workers is increasingly becoming the 
key factor for economic success. 
In this context, two challenges are of a pressing char-
acter: attracting qualified migrants and fostering skill 
upgrading in the EU. Evidence that EU countries have 
a lower share of highly qualified migrants than high-
migration non-EU OECD economies and that the pro-
vision and quality of training varies widely in the EU 
signals the need for both the EU as a whole and for indi-
vidual EU countries to do more.
Making use of the rich skill potential of migrants 
In comparison with other receiving countries the EU 
economies attract – on average – a relatively lower share 
of the highly skilled migrants from source countries. 
Most EU-27 countries have undertaken steps in recent 
years to change immigration rules in order to better tar-
get highly skilled migrants, which has resulted in a grow-
ing share of high-skilled migrants settling in the EU. 
At the same time, there is rising labour market demand 
for low-skilled workers, who often enter the EU labour 
market as temporary or seasonal workers or even illegal 
migrants. While international competition for migrants 
is focusing primarily on the high-skilled, comprehen-
sive migration policies therefore need to address future 
labour market needs across the full skill spectrum. 
With respect to high-skilled migrants, evidence shows 
that increasing the selectivity of migration regimes alone 
will not suffice to attract more highly skilled foreign 
labour. This is because high-skilled migrants are sensi-
tive to impediments, such as the still fragmented nature 
of EU labour markets, which hinder both the mutual rec-
ognition of qualifications and the transparent portability 
of entitlements to social security systems. 
Initiatives that enable migrants to work within the entire 
EU and which focus on the highly skilled, such as the “blue 
card”2, but also the creation of European networks with 
the aim of cross-linking national agencies and providing 
job exchange platforms are good examples of measures 
that could provide substantial returns in this respect.
The EU is also weak in using the potential of high-skilled 
migrants. In contrast to less-skilled workers, highly 
skilled migrants have lower labour market participation 
rates, higher unemployment rates and lower employ-
ment rates than natives with comparable qualifications, 
and face a substantially higher risk of being employed in 
jobs that do not fit their skill profiles. In almost all fields 
(except the health sector) and all countries, migrants 
also tend to receive less training than non-migrants.
Therefore, there is a need for increased efforts to inte-
grate highly skilled foreign-born workers into the labour 
market in particular as regards highly skilled women. 
Aside from measures to improve the language skills of 
migrants, the mutual acceptance of professional quali-
fications, and training and action to fight discriminatory 
practices in the workplace, a number of EU-27 countries 
acknowledge that improved integration requires a more 
broad-based approach backed by measures to improve 
the social, cultural, regional and political integration of 
foreign-born workers.
Finally, it should be noted that, quite apart from highly 
skilled migrants from third countries, migrants within 
the EU are also often faced with a sizeable “transferabi-
lity discount” on their human capital, which is reflected 
in higher rates of over-qualification and lower employ-
2  Cf. Council Directive 2009/50/EC of 25 May 2009.8
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ment rates. This applies to migrants moving from one 
EU-15 country to another, but even more so to migrants 
from the new Member States to the old Member States, 
who (even after correcting for differences in age and 
gender structure) face an over-qualification risk 29.6 per-
centage points higher than for natives, while medium 
skilled migrants from the new Member States have an 
over-qualification risk 19.6 percentage points higher 
than that of natives.
Policy instruments to reduce over-qualification among 
EU migrants clearly should follow similar lines as ini-
tiatives targeting third-country migrants (i.e. giving 
high priority to formal and informal transferability of 
qualifications, language proficiency and training). With 
respect to these intra-EU migrants, the role of the Euro-
pean Union in devising policy instruments, programmes 
and supervising their effective implementation could be 
particularly important.
Ensure higher training uptake and a higher impact of 
training on productivity 
According to survey evidence from 2006, the proportion 
of workers trained was much higher in the old Member 
States than in the new EU Member States. However, 
there seems to be a trade-off between the length of 
training and the proportion of people benefiting from 
training. While more workers are trained in the EU-15, 
trainings in the new Member States tends to be longer. 
In almost every EU country, lower-skilled and older work-
ers are less likely than other workers to receive training. 
This is due to the individuals themselves, but also to the 
reluctance of employers to invest in such workers. For 
instance, older people are less likely to enrol in training 
because they are closer to retirement, and their employ-
ers or they themselves expect a lower return on train-
ing. More generally, barriers to training are generated 
by three main types of factors: a person’s situation in life 
at a given time, institutional factors (high fees, entrance 
requirements, etc.) or psychological factors. Research on 
the topic suggests that policies can be put in place to 
counter those barriers. Since older people have a lower 
training uptake, they can be encouraged to engage 
more in training by stressing the tangible benefits they 
can expect, by making the purpose of training clearer 
or by closely linking training to specific employment 
opportunities.
In addition, available analysis on training take-up sug-
gests that the longer an employee has been in a job 
the higher the probability of undertaking on-the-job 
training. This implies that labour market systems that 
promote long-term relationships between firms and 
workers might have positive impacts on human capital 
accumulation. 
Finally, the available analyses find that, for training to 
result in a sustained increase in labour productivity, the 
combination of training and ICT investment is essential, 
in particular in countries with a more “academic” gen-
eral education system. Considering the pervasiveness 
of ICT, general training provision backed by ICT capital 
has in many cases more impact than training alone. Con-
versely, training appears to have a direct impact on the 
adoption and efficient use of ICT, although this impact 
is gender-, age- and skill-specific. This is consistent with 
recent research emphasising the role of organisational 
changes and retraining of the workforce to underpin the 
diffusion of new technology.
5.  Regulation,  
ICT and productivity
Empirical evidence indicates that it is the flexibility of the 
US economy in adapting to major changes – such as the 
IT revolution – that has given it a temporary productivity 
advantage, while predicting at the same time that the 
EU will start realising enhanced IT-driven productivity 
growth over the next few years.
As excessive or inadequate regulations are believed to 
be a constraint on European competitiveness, the ques-
tion should be asked whether excessive regulation may 
have negatively affected the adoption of ICT and hin-
dered the effective translation of investment into pro-
ductivity gains. 
Regulation is found to constrain ICT investment and 
productivity
The available analyses shows that at the aggregate econ-
omy level, restrictive regulatory regimes3 for product 
markets both hinder ICT investment as such and lower 
the impact of ICT capital input on productivity and that 
this impact is bigger for ICT investment than for non-
ICT investment. From a sectoral perspective, product 
market regulation has a negative and significant effect 
upon investment in IT, software and other machinery 
and equipment. 
With regard to labour market regulation4, there is some 
evidence that employment protection legislation may 
impede ICT capital accumulation and productivity since 
it may hinder enterprises to make the shift towards high- 
skilled workers. It might however also be an indication 
3  Product market regulation indicators (from OECD) relate to state control, bar-
riers to entrepreneurship and barriers to trade and investment.
4  Labour market regulation indicators cover a number of factors including 
unionisation, social security systems, employment protection, labour compensa-
tion and taxation.9
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that enterprises do not or cannot provide for sufficient 
or adequate training to their employees.
Finally, account should be taken of the potential com-
plementarities between product and labour market 
regulations. Some evidence is found that benefits from 
deregulating product markets in terms of ICT investment 
may be larger if labour markets have a certain degree of 
flexibility that allows firms to reorganise their factors of 
production in a more efficient way. 
Further regulatory reforms are an opportunity to 
improve Europe’s competitiveness 
The importance of reducing administrative burdens, 
introducing flexibility in the labour markets and liberalis-
ing key sectors in the economy to reap the full poten-
tial of ICT technologies is thus clear. While significant 
product market reforms have been introduced over the 
last few years, their potential benefits are likely to be 
reduced if labour markets remain too rigid.
6.  Implications
The analysis of the European Competitiveness Report 
2009 confirms that if the crisis is used to trigger momen-
tum for structural reforms it can become an opportunity 
to increase productivity growth and boost EU competi-
tiveness. 
Enhancing trade and investment relations with the 
BRICs and reaping the emerging opportunities will play 
a key role. In this context, besides the need to constantly 
reassert the EU’s own competitive advantages, it will be 
crucial to push for improvements to the weak regulatory 
frameworks and the enforcement of laws in these coun-
tries, as well as addressing the strong state interference, 
including the build-up of non-tariff barriers to trade.
The EU labour market, in particular employment, merits 
special attention in getting out of the crisis and its after-
math. The priority areas, as mentioned by the June Euro-
pean Council, include promoting mobility, upgrading 
skills and matching labour market needs. In this context, 
re-thinking its migration policies could also strengthen 
the productivity performance of the European Union, as it 
seems to attract relatively few highly qualified migrants. 
In parallel, the labour market integration of high-skilled 
third country migrants needs to be improved.
Moreover, adequate training is a concrete solution for 
mobility, skill upgrading and labour mismatch. A highly 
skilled workforce is a source of long-term European 
comparative advantage. But not all training has the 
same impact and not all individuals that could benefit 
from training actually enrol. Maximising the impact of 
training therefore calls for the right policies to be put 
in place to target the right persons and offer training 
(including the use of ICT) that best matches the needs 
of the economy.
Besides the growing need for ICT training, the EU can 
do better in reaping the potential of ICT investments. 
In this context, improving the quality of regulatory 
regimes, including market liberalisation, is likely to gene-
rate incentives for further investment and provide solid 
ground for future growth.Table of Contents
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Introduction
This is the twelfth edition of the Commission’s European 
Competitiveness Report since the 1994 Industry Council 
Resolution called on the Commission to produce such 
a report every year. Competitiveness is understood 
to mean a sustained rise in the standards of living of a 
nation or region and as low a level of involuntary unem-
ployment as possible. For an industrial sector, the main 
competitiveness criterion is maintaining and improving 
its position in the global market.
As in previous years, the Report approaches the issues 
using insights from economic theory and empirical 
research and its ambition is to contribute to policy-
making by bringing to attention relevant trends and 
developments and by discussing policy options. Its main 
subjects continue to be topics related to productivity, 
as the most reliable indicator for competitiveness over 
the longer term, and other microeconomic issues in the 
context of the Lisbon Partnership for Growth and Jobs.
The 2009 edition of European Competitiveness Report 
reviews the EU’s overall competitiveness performance 
as well as the external and internal aspects of competi-
tiveness. It looks at the external dimension of competi-
tiveness by analysing the consequences of the recent 
developments among the BRIC countries (Brazil, Russia, 
India and China) in the global arena. This year’s edition 
also investigates some other determinants of competi-
tiveness of a more domestic character: the role of migra-
tion and in particular the impact of the skill structure of 
migration on productivity; the extent to and conditions 
under which training can boost productivity, with a par-
ticular emphasis on the role of Information and Com-
munication Technologies (ICT) as a magnifier of train-
ing benefits; and the role of product and labour market 
regulations in influencing ICT investment and their joint 
relationship with productivity5.
5  The analysis of external and internal aspects of competitiveness is based on 
a number of background studies prepared for this year’s Competitiveness Report 
(see Annex “List of background studies to the European Competitiveness Report 
2009”).
Chapter 1 provides a snapshot of recent developments, 
puts them into perspective compared with earlier reces-
sions and analyses the likely impact on European com-
petitiveness. The economic contraction may not neces-
sarily have a negative impact on long-term productivity 
growth, and therefore growth of GDP, as there are pow-
erful mechanisms boosting productivity as well. Indeed, 
the crisis can also have a positive impact on productivity 
to the extent that it provides the momentum for struc-
tural reforms. In fact, the challenge is to reconcile short-
term action with long-term competitiveness, which 
means that the exceptional measures taken to tackle the 
crisis should be consistent with the EU’s medium-term 
structural reforms.
The external dimension of EU competitiveness is con-
fronted with the new challenges and opportunities 
presented by the BRIC countries. These countries have 
recently increased their role in world trade and bilateral 
trade with the EU. Though all have large populations and 
have in recent years displayed fast economic growth, 
resulting in quickly expanding markets, each individual 
BRIC country has followed a different economic devel-
opment model. Thus, they also pose quite different chal-
lenges and opportunities for the EU, which are discussed 
in Chapter 2. 
Chapter 3 addresses the issue of migration, skills and 
productivity, based on the notion that people are the 
cornerstone of a competitive EU. Considering that com-
petition for talent is more and more a global pheno-
menon, and that immigration and emigration barriers 
have fallen, the EU needs to retain and attract the most 
qualified people. At the same time, improving the labour 
market integration of high-skilled migrants is essential, 
as they face higher unemployment rates and a higher 
risk of being over-qualified. This holds not only for third 
country migrants, but also for migrants from the new 
Member States to the EU-15.
This second aspect is further analysed in more details in 
Chapter 4 on education, training and productivity. This 16
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part starts out from the notion that ensuring the right 
qualifications for all participants in the labour market 
and matching these qualifications with the needs of the 
economy is of crucial importance. Training is one way 
of improving this match between skills and economic 
needs. Adequate training can generate higher produc-
tivity, and a skilled workforce is a source of long-term 
comparative advantage for the EU. And ICT, among other 
factors, may play an important role in such training.
Chapter 5, on regulation, ICT and productivity, analyses 
the importance of ICT for broader productivity gains in 
the economy. It explores the extent to which regulation 
in both the product and labour markets has affected 
investment in ICT versus non-ICT capital, but also inves-
tigates whether excessive regulation not only may have 
negatively affected the adoption of ICT, but also may 
have hindered the effective translation of investment 
into productivity gains.17
CHAPTER 1  
Competitiveness and the crisis
1.1.  Introduction
The crisis has brought about an unprecedented contrac-
tion in economic activity in both magnitude and scope. 
The bursting of a large real estate and stock market bub-
ble in the US and some European countries has marked 
a dramatic downturn, further exacerbated and spread 
by the subsequent financial crisis and the contraction 
in international trade. The rate of growth in EU GDP per 
capita fell from 2.7 per cent in 2006 to 0.5 per cent in 
2008. Forecasts for 2009 are negative and large in abso-
lute terms: down to –4 per cent in 20096.
6  Autumn Forecast, November 2009, DG Economic and Financial Affairs, Euro-
pean Commission.
Figure 1.1: Growth of GDP per capita
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In this chapter we review the impact of the crisis on com-
petitiveness7, looking at short-term developments but 
also taking a broader longer-term perspective. While 
these developments are expected to have a negative 
impact on competitiveness in the short-term, there are 
also reasons to expect a rapid recovery in productivity. 
Not least because the crisis provides momentum for struc-
tural reforms that can boost future competitiveness.
7  Competitiveness relates to the ability of an economy to provide its citizens 
with sustained growth in living standards and broad access to jobs for those will-
ing to work (see Box 1.1).18
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Box 1.1 Competitiveness
Competitiveness refers to the overall economic performance of a nation measured in terms of its ability to provide 
its citizens with growing living standards on a sustainable basis and broad access for jobs to those willing to work. 
At the roots of competitiveness we find the institutional and microeconomic policy arrangements that create con-
ditions under which businesses can merge and thrive and individual creativity and effort are rewarded. Of equal 
importance are macroeconomic policies to promote a safe stable framework for business activity and the develop-
ment of a strategic vision for a low-carbon economy to ensure environmental sustainability. To the extent that the 
notion of living standards encompasses many social aspects, this broad definition of competitiveness 8 comprises 
elements of all the three pillars of the Lisbon Strategy: prosperity as well as social and environmental issues.
This paper focuses on productivity and employment to provide a picture of the state of the European industry, 
both recent developments and from a longer-term perspective. Hence, attention is mostly restricted to three key 
indicators:
•	 Productivity,	that	is,	value	added	per	hour	worked;
•	 The	employment	rate,	the	percentage	of	the	working-age	population	that	is	in	employment;
•	 	 The unemployment rate, the percentage of active population, people willing to work, that is out of employment.
Average labour productivity reflects the state of technology in a broad sense; the ability to produce goods and 
services per hour worked. At the aggregate, productivity growth is the only source of sustained growth of income 
per capita, the backbone of growing living standards 9. The employment and unemployment rates reflect, in turn, 
the ability of an economy to provide everyone with the opportunity to share the fruits of increasing productivity. 10 
At a sectoral level, both productivity and employment indices provide useful information to display and interpret 
the evolution of the different branches of the European industry.
It should be noted that in other contexts the same word “competitiveness” might mean something very different; 
see Box 1.2 below on external competitiveness.
1.2.  Macroeconomic environment8910
The years 2008 and 2009 have been marked by the 
emergence of an unprecedented recession. Decreas-
ing rates of economic activity have coincided with a 
large contraction in employment. The drop in revenues 
together with rising expenditure due to automatic stabi-
lisers and stimulus packages are putting public finances 
under considerable strain.
1.2.1.  Key indicators in an interrupted strong recovery
After a disappointing first half of the current decade, 
the year 2006 seemed to represent the end of the slow-
down triggered by the 2001 recession in the US and the 
8  Common notions of competitiveness are usually narrower. For instance, the 
Global Competitiveness Report 2008-2009 (Sala-i-Martin et al. (2008)) of the World 
Economic Forum only mentions “raising prosperity” with no reference to jobs or 
sustainability .
9  Even if we accept income per capita as a crucial component of living stand-
ards, the latter ought to include many other dimensions influencing welfare; see 
COM(2009) 433 “GDP and beyond. Measuring progress in a changing world” or the 
so-called Stiglitz report (2009). 
10  More details on the labour markets or the social dimension of employment 
can be found in the Employment in Europe Report published regularly by the DG 
Employment, Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities.
subsequent relatively slow recovery11. Indeed, real GDP 
per capita in the EU had been following a fast growth 
path, even surpassing the rapid pace of recovery in the 
US (see Table 1.1). On average, European economies 
grew in 2006 at more than double the average growth 
rate in 2001-05, with Germany as the largest economy 
outperforming the first half of the decade by a factor of 
more than five. Among the smaller economies, the New 
Member States (NMS) saw an impressive take-off sug-
gesting a fast catch-up with the rest of the European 
Union, a process reinforced by their accession to the EU 
in 2004. The only exception among the EU economies 
was Ireland, but only because its previous performance 
was already above the average, while in 2006 it returned 
to normal growth rates. The same pattern can be seen 
in the evolution of the labour market. Table 1.2 shows 
that the employment rate rose slightly due to increases 
in the labour participation rate, but also because of the 
reduced unemployment rate. In the EU-27 the unem-
ployment rate decreased on average from 9 per cent at 
the beginning of the decade to 7 per cent in 2007. Total 
employment as a share of the working-age population 
11  In particular, employment in the US took longer than usual to recover. The 
data are analyzed in Potter et al. (2004) while Schweitzer (2004) suggests “business 
restructuring” as a main reason for the slow recovery.19
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Table 1.1: Annual growth rates of real GDP per capita
  1996-2000* 2001-05* 2006 2007 2008
BE 2.49 1.17 2.31 1.99 1.17
BG -0.21 6.44 6.59 6.17 6.01
CZ 1.60 3.82 6.45 5.38 2.50
DK 2.44 0.95 3.00 1.22 -1.72
DE 1.88 0.53 3.08 2.59 1.46
EE 7.19 8.25 10.61 6.52 -3.53
IE 8.59 3.72 3.11 3.50 -4.09
EL 2.91 3.85 4.08 3.62 2.52
ES 3.65 1.73 2.31 1.80 -0.44
FR 2.35 0.98 1.56 1.56 0.22
IT 1.87 0.31 1.46 0.82 -1.89
CY 2.49 1.42 2.15 2.93 2.65
LV 6.36 8.84 12.85 10.55 -4.16
LT 5.47 8.32 8.49 9.52 3.55
LU 4.70 2.35 4.78 3.58 -2.64
HU 4.25 4.51 4.28 1.23 0.65
MT 3.88 0.44 2.60 2.70 1.00
NL 3.43 0.82 3.22 3.23 1.73
AT 2.82 1.12 2.77 2.65 1.41
PL 5.42 3.13 6.31 6.69 4.79
PT 3.68 0.25 1.03 1.67 -0.19
RO -1.05 6.50 8.11 6.45 7.29
SI 4.35 3.54 5.53 6.19 2.44
SK 3.25 4.97 8.42 10.31 6.13
FI 4.54 2.24 4.50 3.76 0.46
SE 3.23 2.19 3.66 1.81 -1.00
UK 3.13 1.98 2.21 2.69 0.25
EU-15 2.57 1.12 2.38 2.11 0.14
EU-27 2.70 1.43 2.73 2.45 0.48
US 2.94 1.33 1.82 1.04 0.19
* Geometric average.
Source: AMECO database, Commission services.
rose from 64 to 67 per cent moving closer to the Lisbon 
target of 70 per cent.
However, by the beginning of 2007, early signs of the 
current crisis could already be observed in the US12.   
An increase in subprime mortgages defaults triggered 
a spiral of events that left the economy in a state of 
considerable uncertainty by the end of the year. These 
events were not restricted to the financial sector; they 
had already an impact on real economic activity and 
were reflected in the annual accounts for 2007. The 
EU-27 as a whole did not show a marked change in 
trend, with growth barely dropping from 2.7 to 2.4 per 
12  For a chronology of events see the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) 
annual reports for June 2008 and June 2009. For a chronology of events in the 
financial markets, see Brunnermeier (2009).
cent, partly because of an increase in employment. Indi-
vidual countries, however, showed signs of a slowdown, 
with Ireland’s GDP per capita growth rate dropping from 
4.3 to 3.5 per cent or Estonia’s declining from 10.6 to 6.5 
per cent. In the US real GDP growth fell from a modest 
1.8 to a worrying 1.0 per cent.
The overall positive developments apparent in 2006 
definitively came to an abrupt halt in 2008 when major 
economic indicators peaked in most European coun-
tries. This was followed by an unprecedented contrac-
tion both in size and in scope, subsequently turning into 
the worst global crisis in many decades.20
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1.2.2.  The downturn
The year 2008 was marked by the largest contraction 
in economic activity in the post-WWII period, not only 
in the EU but worldwide. Seven Member States — see 
again Table 1.1 — experienced negative growth rates 
of GDP per capita while those economies that were still 
growing did so roughly at half the 2006-2007 pace.
The current recession was preceded by a large real estate 
and stock market bubble in the US but also in the EU, 
notably in Ireland, UK and Spain13. As in previous simi-
lar bubble bursts, the drop in housing prices induced a 
contraction in household wealth, in turn causing a con-
13  On both sides of the Atlantic, the bubble has its origin in a classical combina-
tion of a period of sustained income growth, fiscal incentives that fostered specu-
lative housing purchases and, since 2001, a lax monetary policy that maintained 
the interest rate so low, given housing inflation, as to render the real interest rate 
virtually close to zero; see, for instance, Gjerstad and Smith (2009) or, for an early 
warning, chapter II in the IMF World Economic Outlook 2004.
Table 1.2: Annual growth rate of employment 1)
  1996-2000 2) 2001-05 2) 2006 2007 2008
BE 1.14 0.67 1.40 1.82 1.63
BG -0.26 1.53 3.34 2.82 3.27
CZ -0.84 0.35 1.56 2.20 1.16
DK 0.85 -0.07 1.24 2.01 1.23
DE 0.78 -0.14 0.69 1.72 1.43
EE -2.00 1.17 6.22 1.40 0.29
IE 5.72 2.91 4.30 3.56 -0.88
EL 0.59 1.33 2.10 1.29 1.21
ES 3.86 3.26 3.90 2.97 -0.47
FR 1.40 0.64 0.96 1.66 0.89
IT 0.98 1.54 1.64 1.18 0.31
CY 1.24 3.08 1.76 3.25 2.63
LV -0.54 1.66 4.70 3.58 0.74
LT -1.12 0.86 1.83 2.78 -0.48
LU 1.91 1.52 1.91 2.26 2.70
HU 1.26 0.23 0.73 -0.10 -1.19
MT 0.75 0.81 1.29 2.97 1.12
NL 2.52 0.30 1.85 2.50 1.52
AT 0.92 0.68 1.40 1.80 1.76
PL -0.36 -0.57 3.27 4.10 4.01
PT 2.11 0.28 0.51 0.05 0.44
RO -1.89 -1.35 0.69 0.44 0.26
SI -0.29 0.36 1.50 2.98 2.87
SK -0.42 1.07 3.85 2.42 3.42
FI 2.29 0.85 1.77 2.06 1.35
SE 0.82 0.22 1.69 2.16 0.94
UK 1.26 0.93 0.87 0.68 -0.67
EU-15 1.46 0.90 1.46 1.63 0.58
EU-27 1.00 0.69 1.62 1.78 0.86
US 1.78 0.68 1.87 1.10 -0.47
1) Employment in persons; total economy (National Accounts).  
2) Geometric average.
Source: AMECO database, Commission services.
siderable downturn in consumption and, by extension, 
in all economic activity. Solow (2009) mentions data 
from the Fed estimating the loss of household wealth in 
the US at 20 per cent between mid-2007 and the end of 
2008. Using a rule of thumb, and abstracting from other 
factors such as increasing uncertainty or the role of the 
financial system, Solow estimates that this contraction 
in wealth led to a 5 per cent drop in consumption over 
little more than a year14.
The recession was exacerbated and spread by a finan-
cial sector overexposed to mortgage-related risk. Brun-
nermeier (2009) describes recent changes in the sec-
tor that explain the current financial crisis. First, new 
developments in credit derivatives (and their ratings) 
and credit default swaps allowed banks to write off 
14  See also Reinhart and Rogoff (2008, 2009). This crisis is unprecedented not 
because there were no similar contractions in the past but because of the combi-
nation of its magnitude and global scope.21
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Table 1.3: Annual growth rate of real labour productivity 1)
  1996-2000 2) 2001-05 2) 2006 2007 2008
BE 1.90 0.80 1.18 1.27 -0.06
BG 1.68 3.47 3.17 2.78 2.69
CZ 1.94 4.47 5.22 3.86 2.45
DK 1.08 1.18 0.94 -1.95 -2.46
DE 2.01 1.29 2.48 0.61 -0.01
EE N/A 6.43 5.22 5.66 -2.32
IE 5.35 3.09 1.67 2.73 -1.43
EL 2.86 3.23 -0.97 1.63 2.41
ES 0.25 0.75 0.86 1.77 2.13
FR 2.12 1.44 2.39 0.48 -0.17
IT 0.89 0.11 0.29 0.22 -0.52
CY 2.08 0.96 1.46 1.47 0.92
LV N/A 7.06 7.19 7.95 -4.80
LT 4.56 6.59 6.89 4.70 1.86
LU 2.61 1.67 3.06 0.29 -5.13
HU 2.53 3.22 3.96 1.44 1.71
MT N/A -1.24 2.59 0.52 0.32
NL 1.75 1.58 1.52 0.84 0.42
AT 1.79 1.14 2.87 2.15 0.08
PL 6.17 3.61 3.21 2.58 0.82
PT 3.41 0.75 0.51 3.74 -0.37
RO N/A N/A 6.20 N/A N/A
SI N/A 3.38 5.32 3.68 0.70
SK 4.93 4.87 5.75 7.91 3.93
FI 2.80 2.01 3.36 2.16 -1.53
SE 2.48 2.80 2.88 -0.59 -1.76
UK 2.53 1.93 2.39 2.27 0.55
EU-15 1.76 1.22 1.66 1.11 0.20
EU-27 N/A N/A 1.68 N/A N/A
US 2.18 2.38 0.95 1.32 N/A
1) GDP at 2000 prices over total hours worked.  
2) Geometric average.
Source: AMECO database, Commission services.
risky assets from their balance sheets, eluding classi-
cal capital holding requirements. Second, in recent 
years banks switched to shorter maturity instruments 
to finance their asset holdings. As a consequence, the 
entire financial system became exposed to macroeco-
nomic risk, while banks, in particular, had become espe-
cially vulnerable to a liquidity drought. Once foreclos-
ures started to surge, uncertainty about who was liable 
with respect to whom and liquidity hoarding plunged 
the financial system into an otherwise classical banking 
crisis.
The crisis was further spread by the corresponding 
contraction in international trade. In an increasingly 
globalised world, economies are more and more inter-
connected and thus vulnerable to the economic con-
ditions of trade partners even if a particular economy 
does not suffer from any fundamental imbalance. Total 
EU imports or exports (extra- and intra-EU trade) in the 
first months of 2009 were roughly 20 per cent below 
the level a year before15. The implications of this drop 
in trade are clearer if one keeps in mind that economies 
have become more integrated than ever in recent his-
tory: between 2005 and 2008 world trade increased by 
80 per cent16. The downturn in international trade has 
been of the same order of magnitude elsewhere. For 
instance, in the US total imports dropped by more than 
45 per cent and total exports by 33 per cent in a few 
months from mid-2008 to the beginning of 2009.
15  Eurostat short-term external trade indicators.
16  However, these increasing flows of commodities reflected not only trade for 
final consumption but also an increasingly globalised supply chain. As an illus-
tration, 65 per cent of extra-EU imports, excluding energy and raw materials, are 
intermediate goods that enter the EU’s own production processes. See the report 
EU performance in the global economy, European Commission 2008.22
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Figure 1.2: Comparison with previous recessions: level of GDP per capita
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The graphs use quarterly series of real GDP levels and represent the percentage deviation from the peak level reached before each 
downturn. The horizontal axis represents the number of quarters before (negative values) and after (positive) the peak.
Source: Eurostat data.23
Chapter 1 — Competitiveness and the crisis
The depth of the recession can be assessed by com-
paring the evolution of the levels of income per capita 
and employment with previous downturns. As an illus-
tration, Figure 1.2 compares the last three large reces-
sions for the UK, US, Italy and France, countries for 
which detailed quarterly data are available. The figure 
plots percentage deviations in real GDP per head from 
the peak level preceding the downturn. The magnitude 
of the contraction for the US is unprecedented: in 1980, 
GDP per head dropped by a maximum of 2 per cent, 
but in the current downturn, since the second quarter 
of 2008, it has dropped by 3.3 per cent. In Europe some 
countries seem particularly affected. For instance, Italy, a 
country that has never lost more than 2 per cent of GDP 
in recent recessions, lost 6 per cent of real GDP by the 
first quarter of 2009 with respect to the peak value a year 
before. A similar situation was seen in France. Although 
not included in the figure, particularly abrupt was the 
halt to the ongoing catch-up process in the NMS. In 
hardly one year Lithuania, Latvia or Slovakia lost 10 per-
centage points of real GPD relative to peak levels.
Other European countries, however, have experienced 
similar contractions in recent decades. Notably the UK 
for which the current recession so far does not seem to 
be worse than that of 1980, although this is hardly com-
forting if one keeps in mind that the UK economy then 
took four years to regain the peak level of GDP per cap-
ita and eight years to regain the level of employment. 
A similar pattern was observed in the 1990 recession. 
This longer time required to regain the level of employ-
ment can be seen in Figure 1.3 and is a common fea-
ture of large recessions as noted by Reinhart and Rogoff 
(2009).
The sharp contraction in economic activity has increased 
the unemployment rate, in some cases dramatically. This 
is particularly true for countries affected by real estate 
bubble and the subsequent drop in activity in the con-
struction sector. A case in point is Spain, which saw 
unemployment reach 18 per cent by mid-2009. The NMS 
are the other group with high levels of unemployment, 
for instance Lithuania with 16 per cent.
The Autumn Forecast 2009, issued by DG Economic and 
Financial Affairs, depicts a dismal scenario with EU GDP 
contracting 4.1 per cent in 2009, private consumption 
dropping by 1.7, investment by 11.4, and the unem-
ployment rate close to 10 per cent and exceeding this 
percentage in the next two years. Recovery packages 
(see section 1.5 below) are likely to produce a positive 
growth rate in public consumption, of around 2 per cent 
per annum, but government debt is expected to climb 
to 80 per cent of EU GDP by 2011.
1.2.3.  Impact of the crisis in the medium-term
Historical experience shows that employment reacts with 
a lag and takes longer to recover. It is difficult to foresee 
the future evolution of the crisis although the relative 
depth of the current downturn may help predict roughly 
the length of the recovery. In downturns of this nature, 
GDP per capita takes from two to four years to regain its 
Figure 1.3: Employment recovery from a recession
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former peak level. Employment, in turn, reacts with a lag 
and takes roughly twice as long to recover17.
Breaking down output by broad categories does not 
reveal major surprises. By May 2009 manufacturing and 
services contracted 20.2 and 10.5 per cent respectively 
on an annual basis18. Capital goods, intermediate goods 
and consumer durables have been the most strongly 
hit branches of economic activity19. This is not the case 
for consumer non-durables, which entered a trough 
only during the 1992-93 downturn20. Electrical equip-
ment and fabricated metal products contracted by more 
than 20 per cent and motor vehicles and basic metals by 
more than 30 per cent. This can also be seen in Figure 1.4 
which shows that durables are contracting while non-
durables are remaining fairly constant. In times of uncer-
tainty, household investment in durables is typically 
delayed in very much the same way that investment by 
firms freezes. Non-durables and energy are more stable, 
since their consumption cannot easily be postponed or 
substituted. The reaction of employment is still moderate 
but is expected to be similar to that of output as regards 
the sectoral pattern of the contraction21.
17  This can be seen by comparing the charts in Figure 1.2 and Figure 1.3 and has 
been noted in European Commission (2009a) and elsewhere in the literature.
18  All these figures are from the note “Impact of the economic crisis on key indus-
trial sectors of the EU – the case of the manufacturing and construction industries. 
May 2009 update,” European Commission, DG Enterprise and Industry, 19 May 2009.
19  See “EU Industrial Structure 2009” report by DG Enterprise and Industry.
20  Idem.
21  One can expect the pattern to be similar to previous downturns and to that 
of the US. Hall (2005, Table 2.4) shows how the average contraction in employment 
across sectors in recessions over the period 1948-2001 has always followed a similar 
pattern with employment in durables falling 11.4 per cent compared to 4.2 per cent 
in non-durables, or construction falling 5.85 per cent compared to 1 per cent in 
retail.
Figure 1.4: Evolution of real industrial production in the EU-27; Index, 2005=100.
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Source: Eurostat data, Short-term business statistics.
1.2.4.  Impact of the crisis in the long-run
In periods of turmoil, short-term measured productiv-
ity conveys little information on the abstract long-term 
notion of productivity as the capacity to produce value 
in an hour of work with a given state of technology. This 
is because employment lags GDP throughout the reces-
sion and the subsequent recovery. Initially, the fall in GDP 
dominates and measured productivity drops. This explains 
the negative growth rates in Table 1.3. Then GDP per 
capita recovers faster and the drop in employment (and 
therefore in hours worked) starts to dominate leading 
measured productivity to recover relatively fast22. Hence, 
short-term data tells us little about future developments 
in productivity. Section 1.4 below contains a speculative, 
rather than quantitative, discussion on the potential real 
impact of a recession on productivity in the longer term.
1.2.5.  A comparison with the United States
The US economy is a good benchmark for evaluating 
comparative performance as it is the world’s largest sin-
gle economy and the one most similar to the EU.
Nevertheless, there are marked differences, in both the 
short- and long-term performance of these two eco-
nomic areas. In the short-run, the US economy seems 
to be characterised by a higher degree of flexibility, a 
22  This phenomenon is more likely to be associated with economies with a 
relatively sluggish labour market. Compare the recovery of employment in the US 
versus the UK, Spain or France in Figure 1.3. See also Cole and Ohanian (1999) and 
Conesa et al. (2007).25
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Figure 1.5: GDP in PPS per head and per hour worked
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key factor in the midst of a recession: US employment 
and output tend to fall less dramatically and recover 
after recessions much faster than in the European econ-
omies (see again Figure 1.2 and Figure 1.3). But it is in 
the labour market where the greatest differences lie: in 
the UK employment fell by 6 per cent and took up to 
32 quarters to recover to the peak level that preceded 
the 1980 and 1990 recessions; in the US, the drop was 
around 1 per cent and the time taken to recover from 
the 1980, 1990 and 2001 recessions was less than 10 
quarters. These differences in short-term reactions are 
connected with a short-term dimension of competi-
tiveness, which is influenced by many factors; some 
relatively easy to target by structural reforms, like the 
relatively more generous European unemployment 
insurance schemes (see Blanchard (2004)), others more 
difficult to change: Gáková and Dijkstra (2009) argue, for 
instance, that the differences in per capita income con-
vergence across states in the US versus regions in the 
EU are directly related to a greater mobility of labour in 
the US. This greater mobility may also explain why the 
US labour market recovers so quickly from recessions 
compared to the EU. And yet, these differences in geo-
graphical mobility are related to language and cultural 
differences that are to a large extent beyond the influ-
ence of economic policies.
Nevertheless the European economies not only differ 
from the US in short-term flexibility, but also exhibit 
differences in long-term behaviour; the US consist-
ently achieves higher income per capita than Europe, 
a phenomenon always worth exploring because it may 
signal structural inefficiencies in European economies. 
Figure 1.5 compares levels of income per head and per 
hour worked as measured by GDP in purchasing power 
standards (PPS) so as to permit international-level com-
parisons. The gap in income per head between the US 
and the EU is still sizeable: the average US income rep-
resents almost 160 per cent of the average of the EU-27 
with virtually no Member State reaching this level with 
the exception of Luxembourg. However, differences 
in per capita income can be due to differences in pro-
duction per worker or differences in labour force par-
ticipation. The picture is thus slightly different when we 
focus on output per hour worked: the US economy then 
stands at 132 per cent of the EU-27 average, with some 
Member States like Belgium, France and the Netherlands 
above the US level. The explanation lies in the difference 
in hours worked per person in employment and, to a 
lesser extent, in different employment and unemploy-
ment rates.
Indeed, while in 2006 the average American employee 
worked 1775 hours per year, the corresponding figure 
for Belgium was 1571, for France 1540 and for Germany 
1431. Compared with these European countries, US 
workers work between 12 and 24 per cent more than 
their European counterparts23. When extracting policy 
implications from these figures, one has to keep in mind 
23  Other European countries, particularly those with lower GDP per capita, work 
more hours. In 2006, the only countries where average hours worked exceeded 
American hours are the New Member States, with the exception of Slovakia, plus 
Ireland, Greece and Italy (Eurostat data).26
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that public intervention is justified only if these low Euro-
pean hours reflect an impediment for European workers 
to work more hours rather than different preferences. 
There is an ongoing debate on the reasons for these dif-
ferences but in a preliminary look at income per capita 
compared to hours worked the US stands out as an out-
lier. Although European economies have quite heteroge-
neous labour market institutions, Figure 1.6 shows that 
they have a clear negative relationship between income 
and hours worked reflecting a negative income-elasticity 
of labour supply. The US, together with Ireland, stands 
out as working much more than its expected level given 
its income. Although some reasonable theories have 
been put forward, so far the debate is still open24.
In any case, even in terms of output per hour worked, 
the EU is still significantly below the US level and many 
individual Member States lag well behind the European 
average. Even if the sample is restricted to the EU-15, 
income per capita in PPS represents 85 per cent of US 
income per capita.
One of the explanations refers to the differences in 
higher education and in R&D expenditures. In the US 
24  Extending this graph to all OECD countries yields a similar pattern so this 
negative relation does not seem to be specifically European. The seemingly outlier 
character of the US in Figure 1.6 has been extensively discussed. See again Blan-
chard (2004). Prescott (2004) has suggested the impact of transfers to households 
within the European welfare state as an explanation, while Michelacci and Pijoan-
Mas (2007) suggest that career prospects may determine a large part of the US-EU 
differences, exploring in this context the role of (higher) earnings inequality (in the 
US relative to the EU) and the degree of tightness of the labour market.
Figure 1.6: GDP per head and hours worked per employee
BE
BG
CZ
DK
DE
EE
IE
EL
ES
FR
IT
CY
LV
LT
LU
HU
MT
NL
AT
PL
PT
RO
SI
SK FI
SE
UK
EU-15 EU-27
US
1300
1400
1500
1600
1700
1800
1900
2000
2100
2200
30 50 70 90 110 130 150
GDP per head PPS (EU-27=100)
H
o
u
r
s
 
w
o
r
k
e
d
 
p
e
r
 
e
m
p
l
o
y
e
e
Income is GDP per head for 2006 in PPS, EU-27 = 100. Hours worked is the 2002-2006 average of average hours worked per person in 
employment. Luxembourg has been excluded from the graph for the sake of a clear scale; for this country income stands at 266 and 
average hours 1577.
Source: AMECO database, Commission services.
2.9 per cent of GDP is invested in higher education con-
trasting with a 1.2 per cent in Europe25. In terms of R&D, 
European universities and government spend roughly 
as much as their American counterparts26. The differ-
ence between the EU and the US is to be found in the 
business enterprise sector R&D: in 2006 (OECD data) the 
figure for the EU is 1.17 percent whereas for the US it is 
1.87 percent27. Indeed, if we focus on the percentage of 
R&D expenditures financed by the business enterprise 
sector, only Germany, Sweden, Finland and Luxembourg 
score above the US average. Additionally, the high-tech 
industry is also about 20 per cent more research-inten-
sive in the US than in the EU, amounting to 0.47 percent 
of GDP in the EU and 0.75 percent in the US28. These dif-
ferences in R&D in the business enterprise sector and 
in the high tech sector are very likely reflecting a more 
dynamic business environment in the US relative to the 
EU, an environment in which it is easier to profit from 
business opportunities. Incidentally, this dynamism may 
also constitute a factor determining the greater ability of 
the US economy to recover from a recession.
25  Data from the New Cronos Eurostat database. For details, see “An agenda for 
a growing Europe – Making the EU Economic System Deliver”, a report by A. Sapir 
to the European Commission, 2003.
26  According to OECD data, EU-25 universities spend 0.39 percent of GDP 
against 0.36 percent in the US, but American statistics do not include capital 
expenditures or research in humanities; once the figures are corrected to be com-
parable, the percentage is roughly equal. R&D intensity in the government sector 
is equivalent in the EU and the US: 0.65 percent and 0.66 percent of GDP respec-
tively.
27  See the “Science, Technology and Competitiveness report 2008/2009” of the 
European Commission.
28  See Wilén (2008).27
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1.3.  Sectoral performance, productivity and 
unit labour costs
An assessment of external competitiveness (see Box 1.2) 
requires sectors to be examined individually.
Three stylised facts shape the evolution of economic 
activity in Europe. First, there is a sustained difference in 
productivity growth between manufacturing and serv-
ices; where the faster growth in manufacturing goes 
together with a secular decline in the share of manu-
facturing in employment, very much in line with what 
is observed in all major industrialised countries; Table 
1.4 shows how manufacturing outperforms services in 
terms of productivity, while all subsectors record nega-
tive employment rates. Second, the share of services in 
value added is increasing at the expense of manufactur-
ing. Finally, the EU is consolidating its position vis-à-vis 
the US and Japan in high-tech manufactures in the inter-
national markets. The picture is mixed across sectors 
and Member States but in an increasingly globalized 
world high-tech production in the EU is overall holding 
up relatively well compared to the US and Japan: the 
EU has the highest market share with 17.2 per cent of 
world exports of high-tech commodities and the last 
years have seen a substantive improvement in revealed 
comparative advantage29 (RCA, see box 1.3) for this class 
of commodities.
1.3.1.  Labour productivity
Labour productivity can be measured as value added 
per hour worked. Hence, it is a measure of the average 
amount of value that an hour worked can produce given 
factors such as capital, labour skills, organisational capi-
tal or the state of technology.
Faster productivity growth in manufacturing is explained 
by its higher capital-intensity. Thus, labour in manufac-
turing profits from the increasing quality of equipment 
goods30. But there are other important factors explaining 
this acceleration of productivity in manufacturing, nota-
bly the outsourcing of services by manufacturing firms 
(see ten Raa and Wolff (2001)). First, value added previ-
ously recorded as manufacturing now appears as part 
29  See European Commission (2008) as well as table 5 in European Commission 
(2009e). The EU loses some international market share in high-tech goods but less 
than the average for all other commodities, and hence the RCA index improves 
while for the US and Japan it deteriorates.
30  What the literature has come to call embodied technical change (ETC). For the 
long-term impact of ETC see Gordon (1990, 2005) and Greenwood et al. (1997).
Box 1.2 External competitiveness
In the literature the word “competitiveness” conveys a different meaning when applied to an individual firm or 
an individual sector or economic activity within a country or region. An industry’s competitiveness refers to the 
competitive position of this industry in the world market relative to the same industry in other countries. Industry-
specific external competitiveness is captured by indices like:
•	 	 Revealed	comparative	advantage	(RCA),	which	measures	the	share	of	a	given	industry’s	exports	relative	to	the	
average exports in the rest of the world;
•	 	 Relative	trade	balance	(RTB),	compares	the	trade	balance	of	a	particular	commodity	to	the	total	volume	of	
trade, exports plus imports;
•	 	 Relative	unit	labour	costs	(RULC),	which	measures	the	cost	of	labour	in	a	given	industry	relative	to	its	productiv-
ity (unit labour costs) and relative to the corresponding index in another country (see Box 1.3).
While RCA and RTB reflect the position of individual industries in the world market, RULC reflects the ability to 
remain competitive. Changes in these indices will show in which industries Europe is developing a comparative 
advantage or disadvantage. However, they have to be interpreted with care: from the aggregate point of view, 
the loss of competitiveness in an individual industry may well reflect the outstanding export performance of other 
domestic industries. For example, appreciation of the Euro may worsen the competitive position of a given indus-
try, but may just reflect strong productivity growth in other industries, and hence strong exports and an increasing 
demand for the euro. Another issue is that of the domestic content of exports. For example, any country involved 
in electronics’ assembly will record a high share of electronics’ exports that will not reflect the actual production 
structure of the country, artificially inflating the RCA index; see again Box 1.3 for details.
At this point it may be also worth noting that our notion of the competitiveness of a country as described in 
Box 1.1 is not related to the notion of competition. Firms compete in the market just as industries in different 
countries compete in the world market, but, given the nature of international exchanges, the notion of competing 
countries does not make sense (see Krugman (1994)).28
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Table 1.4: EU real labour productivity (annualized) growth in 1995-2007
NACE –  
31 sector  
classification
Sector Labor 
productivity 
growth  
(1995-2007)
Value added 
growth  
(1995-2007)
Employment 
growth  
(1995-2007)
in % in % in %
A Agriculture, hunting and forestry 2,8 0,7 -2,0
B Fishing -0,3 -1,7 -1,4
C Mining and quarrying -0,1 -3,9 -3,9
D Manufacturing 3,2 2,7 -0,5
DA Food products; beverages and tobacco 1,3 1,1 -0,2
DB Textiles and textile products 1,5 -1,2 -2,7
DC Leather and leather products 0,0 -3,4 -3,4
DD Wood and wood products 2,2 1,4 -0,8
DE Pulp, paper and paper products; publishing and printing 2,5 1,5 -0,9
DF Coke, refined petroleum products and nuclear fuel 2,5 0,4 -2,0
DG Chemicals, chemical products and man-made fibres 5,2 4,2 -1,0
DH Rubber and plastic products 2,3 2,9 0,6
DI Other non-metallic mineral products 2,9 1,9 -1,0
DJ Basic metals and fabricated metal products 2,5 2,7 0,2
DK Machinery and equipment n.e.c. 2,9 2,5 -0,4
DL Electrical and optical equipment 6,8 6,5 -0,3
DM Transport equipment 2,4 3,0 0,6
DN Manufacturing n.e.c. 1,9 1,7 -0,2
E Electricity, gas and water supply 2,0 0,5 -1,5
F Construction -0,1 1,3 1,5
G Wholesale and retail trade; repair of motor vehicles 1,3 2,6 1,3
H Hotels and restaurants -0,2 2,3 2,5
I Transport, storage and communication 3,3 4,0 0,7
J Financial intermediation 2,7 3,5 0,8
K Real estate, renting and business activities -1,0 3,4 4,5
L Public administration and defence 0,3 0,9 0,6
M Education -0,2 0,9 1,2
N Health and social work 0,3 2,1 1,8
O Other community, social, personal service activities 0,1 2,3 2,2
TOTAL 1,4 2,5 1,0
Source: EU Industrial Structure 2009.
of services, thus contributing to the increasing share of 
services in value added. Second, when a firm outsources 
part of its activity, it is more likely to sub-contract those 
tasks that do not fall within its core business, so there 
is an efficiency effect from focusing on its proper line 
of activity following the outsourcing of these activities. 
The quantitative importance of this phenomenon is illus-
trated by Grilo and Irigoyen (2009) who estimate that 
manufacturing “pulls” on average 17 per cent of its total 
production from services and “pushes” an average 8 per 
cent of its total supply into the services sector. Offshore 
outsourcing is another factor explaining the acceleration 
of manufacturing productivity, in that it typically covers 
the least productive steps in the manufacturing process 
(e.g. assembly in electronics).
Table 1.4 displays the evolution of labour productivity 
by NACE 1-digit sectors, while manufacturing is in turn 
broken down into 2-digit categories. The gap between 
manufacturing and services in productivity growth is 
readily seen in the first column: with the exception of 
Transport, Storage and Communication, no other sector 
of activity achieved the 3.2 per cent productivity growth 
in manufacturing over the period 1995-2007.
Within non-tradables, the performance of the Finan-
cial Intermediation sector is especially remarkable. 
Its productivity growth relied basically on an average 
increase of 2.7 per cent in value added, while employ-
ment increased at a significantly lower pace of 0.8 per 
cent. This gain in productivity is likely to be linked to the 
ongoing liberalisation process, the importance of ICT 
diffusion in this sector and the simultaneous deepening 
of the integration of the European market for financial 
services. The construction sector, at the other extreme, 
saw a negative productivity growth due to a significantly 
high growth in employment, supported by considerable 
low-skilled immigrant inflows.29
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To interpret the categories within tradables, one has to 
keep in mind the trade patterns of the EU. For instance, 
positive productivity growth in Textiles and Textile Prod-
ucts has not prevented this sector from shrinking in terms 
of both value added and employment31. This reflects a 
comparative disadvantage in inexpensive textiles with 
regard to China, Morocco, Bangladesh or Turkey.
In section 1.3.3 labour productivity is compared to nomi-
nal labour costs and to the US situation. This will shed 
some more light on the performance of European sec-
tors of activity.
31  Table 1.2 shows that for the 1995-2007 period, with almost no exception, 
total employment increased. Hence, a negative growth rate for a given sector in 
Table 1.4 automatically implies a fall in the share of the corresponding sector in 
total employment.
1.3.2.  Unit labour costs
Productivity is only half of the story when it comes to 
assessing the external competitiveness of European 
industry. For internal competitiveness, one ought to 
compare productivity with labour compensation, while 
for external competitiveness a further comparison with 
the situation of the EU’s trade partners is required.
Unit labour costs (ULC) are measured as the average 
cost of labour input per unit of value added (a detailed 
introduction can be found in Box 1.3). In the short-
run, ULC constitutes a useful index that may signal 
pricing tensions or exchange rate movements. In turn, 
in order to be able to say something about external 
competitiveness the information needs to be broken 
down to sector level. Indeed, sectoral ULC may help 
to identify sectors where the EU has a comparative 
advantage or disadvantage.
Box 1.3 Labour costs and comparative advantage
Unit labor costs (ULC) is a closely followed index as it may signal inflationary tensions or exchange rate move-
ments. Indeed, dividing both labour compensation and value added by total hours worked, ULC can be seen as 
the ratio of the hourly wage to productivity. An increase in ULC over its average value would signal excessive 
remuneration of labour relative to productivity, creating pressure on producer prices (Sbodorne (2002)) and by 
extension on exchange rates (Dullien and Fritsche 2007).
Hence, at the aggregate level ULC is related to: (a) domestic competitiveness, to the extent that it may signal a 
relative underperformance in terms of productivity growth, and (b) external competitiveness, since it may reflect 
a loss of cost-competitiveness for exporting firms leading to a trade deficit that may be difficult to correct within 
a monetary union.
In the long-term, however, aggregate ULC does not tell us much about external competitiveness as described in 
Box 1.2 because it is not the aggregate level of ULC but rather comparative advantage and economies of scale 
that drive international trade. For external competitiveness, sectoral ULC indices are needed as they can reveal 
interesting patterns associated with specialisation due to international trade. Since all sectors within an economy 
compete for workers in the same labour market, wages in each sector will reflect the average level of productivity 
in the economy. If there is a sector where we have a comparative advantage, we should expect wages to grow 
more slowly than productivity, hence lowering ULC. As a consequence, sectoral ULC may point to comparative 
advantages and disadvantages vis-à-vis our trade partners without looking at trade flows.
Comparative advantage can be explored using trade flows by means of the index of revealed comparative advan-
tage (RCA), which measures the extent to which the EU is specialised in a given sector. For each sector, the share 
of exports in total exports is computed and then compared to the “world” share. For a given sector, a RCA index 
greater than one signals that this is a sector where Europe exports relatively more than the world average, and is 
interpreted as Europe having a comparative advantage in this sector. In the EU Industrial Structure 2009 report, 
Europe is EU-25 and the “world” is the EU-25 plus 38 other countries; the source is the UN COMTRADE database.
As noted in box 1.2, like any measure of external competitiveness, it has to be interpreted with care. The RCA for 
China and high-tech manufacturing may reflect the integration of China in the global supply chain; for example, in 
the assembly of electronic components. Koopman et al. (2008) estimate the domestic content of Chinese exports   
at less than 50 per cent, a very low share compared to other countries, and even lower for high-tech manufactur-
ing, where the domestic content of Chinese exports is around 20 per cent. Another factor to keep in mind is the 
location of China on the quality ladder: Schott (2007) notes that the increase in Chinese electronics exports involves 
in fact low-quality exports, a dimension of trade flows that is difficult to uncover just looking at raw trade data.30
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1.3.3.  Unit labour costs and revealed comparative 
advantage
Consider a European industry whose productivity 
growth is ahead of the European average. One should 
expect two things to happen: first, since wages reflect 
average productivity, labour compensation in this sec-
tor is going to grow more slowly than value added, thus 
lowering ULC relative to other sectors; second, as the 
gap with other sectors of the European economy grows, 
a comparative advantage is more likely to emerge in 
this particular sector, which will be the case if this gap is 
higher than in the economies of our trading partners.
This mechanism seems to be at work when one com-
pares ULC with RCA as is done in the European Union 
Industrial Structure 2009 report. Figure 1.7 shows a 
roughly negative relationship between the rates of 
change for the two indicators. 
1.3.4.  Relative unit labour costs
In Figure 1.7 the two outliers are the Office Machinery 
and Computer sector and Radio, TV and Telecommuni-
cations Equipment. The very favourable developments 
in ULC in these sectors have not materialised in external 
competitiveness as measured by RCA. The reason is to 
be found at least partially in ULC developments in these 
sectors in the US.
Indeed, absolute lower ULC levels do not automatically 
translate into a comparative advantage, because the 
Figure 1.7: ULC growth rate in 1996-2008 and RCA changes in the EU 1996-2006
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levels abroad may be low in absolute terms as well. This 
can be better understood if we reason in terms of prices: 
from the perspective of prices, decreasing unit labour 
costs create a cost advantage. These lower production 
costs decrease pressure on prices, and lower prices in 
tradable markets are likely to increase a sector’s exports, 
generating a higher RCA for the sector, unless its ULC 
decreases even further abroad. That is precisely the use-
fulness of relative unit labour costs (RUCL), an index that 
considers ULC relative to major trade partners.
Using the EU KLEMS database Kang et al. (2009) exam-
ines RUCL in Europe with respect to the US. While the 
paper focuses on NACE 1-digit industries, for manufac-
turing they present more detailed results. Appendix – 
Table 1.5 shows that in Electrical and Optical equipment 
and Machinery n.e.c. (categories that include computers 
and radio and TV equipments) the average European 
ULC has increased significantly relative to the US and 
relative to other sectors over the period 1995-2001 com-
pared to 2001-2005. This would explain why these two 
particular subsectors appear as outliers in Figure 1.7. The 
rapid growth of productivity appears to be more than 
compensated by the evolution of labour costs and pro-
ductivity in the US.
The relationship between ULC and RCA is relevant when 
the motive for trade is comparative advantage, whether 
originating in technological differences or in different 
factor proportions. The EU and the US, however, are 
two economies with very similar characteristics so it is 
not surprising that most of their trade is intra-industry 
trade. In this context ULC is less informative because 31
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such trade is motivated by product differentiation and 
economies of scale, not comparative advantage. Except 
for extreme differences in relative productivity, as in the 
sectors mentioned above, no clear structure in sectoral 
ULC emerges from EU-US trade relationships. Figure 1.8 
illustrates how RULC is close to one in most broad cate-
gories with the exception of Manufacturing, Energy and 
Wholesale and Retail Trade. 
The larger deviations below one, indicating a European 
cost-advantage, are for services like Financial Intermedi-
ation. This may explain the higher European world mar-
ket share for services: 26.9 per cent versus the US with 
19.7 per cent and Japan with 6.1 per cent.
Figure 1.8: Labour costs, productivity and RULC – EU-15 relative to US 1995-2001
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Two sectors, Manufacturing and Wholesale and Retail 
Trade, display somewhat surprising results. Within trada-
bles, EU ULC levels in Manufacturing seem to be much 
higher than those in the US. The large economies of the 
EU, such as Germany, France or the United Kingdom, are 
responsible for driving RUCL so high in manufacturing32.
Within non-tradables, the EU has lower ULC levels in Whole 
sale and Retail Trade which seems to go against common 
wisdom as this is a very dynamic sector across the ocean. 
The explanation may lie in the restrictions on opening 
32  See Kang et al. (2009) for details on Member States, in particular for figures 
similar to our Figure 1.8 for each country.32
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hours and the less flexible labour markets in Europe. Large 
retailers in the US are open more days per year, requiring 
more labour to serve the same number of customers, and 
have access to relatively cheap labour in a flexible labour 
market. In contrast, European retailers meet the same cus-
tomer needs in fewer days per week (and hence less hours 
worked) and cannot afford to become labour-intensive in 
a labour market with higher wages and more restrictions 
when it comes to resizing the labour force.
1.4.  Productivity and the impact of a 
recession
This section speculates on the potential impact of the 
recession on competitiveness in the medium- to long-
term. Even if the impact will depend on the length of 
the recession and on eventual policy measures, some 
general mechanisms are expected to be at work.
1.4.1.  Measurement of productivity
As noted above, during economic turmoil the indexes 
that are normally used to assess competitiveness and, in 
particular, productivity, convey poor information about 
real changes in the ability of an economy to provide its 
workers with the capacity to produce value. The behav-
iour of these indexes is relatively mechanical and due to 
changes in the intensity of the use of factors, which are 
difficult to measure. But it does not reflect actual tech-
nical change, whick explains why productivity and total 
factor productivity drop so sharply at the beginning of a 
recession but recover relatively quickly.
The behaviour of labour productivity is due to labour 
market rigidities combined with the optimal behaviour 
of economic agents during a recession. Recessions are 
associated with increasing uncertainty about future 
business conditions. If resizing the labour force entails 
adjustment costs, instead of adapting immediately to 
lower demand, firms will react by hoarding labour: first, 
in a labour market with asymmetric information about 
both vacancies and job seekers, labour hoarding pre-
serves good matches that may be difficult to reproduce; 
second, if there is an important learning-by-doing com-
ponent in a worker’s productivity, labour hoarding may 
also preserve firm-specific human capital that will be 
costly to rebuild; finally, tight regulation of the labour 
market may induce firms to maintain the labour force 
unchanged. It should be noted that this behaviour is 
often encouraged by active labour market policies, like 
labour sharing schemes aimed at keeping workers in 
employment.
The final impact on productivity is clear: the level of 
activity of the firm falls by a larger extent than the labour 
force, inducing a sharp short-term drop in productivity.
In a second stage, even in the presence of signs of recov-
ery, firms may postpone any new hiring or investment 
projects, delaying recovery from the recession. Indeed, 
the increase in unemployment and the length of the 
recovery can be further explained by the reaction of 
firms to the increasing uncertainty typical of any reces-
sion. Bloom (2009) explores the possibility that firms 
optimally choose a wait-and-see strategy when uncer-
tainty about business conditions coincides with adjust-
ment costs33. This no-action strategy affects both the 
labour force and investment. If labour hoarding explains 
the initial drop in productivity, the reluctance to hire 
new workers will explain both the increase in unemploy-
ment, the duration of the recession in the labour market, 
and the surge in productivity before the peak level of 
employment is regained.
The theory is consistent with the observation by Hall 
(2005) that the rise in unemployment during recessions 
is less related to massive layoffs than to a freeze in new 
hirings, i.e. a drop in the matching rate.
The initial fall in labour productivity will also be influ-
enced by the intensity of the use of capital. Again, in 
the presence of capital adjustment costs, firms will find 
it optimal to keep the installed capacity but use it less 
intensively or leave part of it idle. This reaction will not 
only reduce labour productivity but, since capital utili-
sation is difficult to measure, will also cause a drop in 
measured total factor productivity because labour and 
capital will react much less than output.
Finally, changes in the composition of production may 
affect average productivity. For instance, if sectors pro-
ducing durables are more productive than those produc-
ing non-durables, the relatively deeper fall of durables 
consumption will increase the share of the less produc-
tive sectors at the expense of the more productive.
1.4.2.  Effective changes in productivity
The firm behaviour described above may alter measured 
productivity in the short-run but will also have a real 
impact on productive efficiency. On the positive side, 
labour hoarding will preserve firm-specific human capital 
and the organisational network within the firm. Less cap-
ital utilisation will lead to slower physical depreciation.
On the negative side, postponed investment projects 
will decrease future productivity. It will extend the life of 
relatively obsolete equipment while missing the oppor-
33  Even without the classical explanations for labour hoarding, the no-action 
strategy can be optimal if there is uncertainty surrounding business conditions and 
resizing capital or labour comes at a cost. In such a case, for a sufficiently high level 
of uncertainty, inactivity may yield higher expected returns than hiring or firing. This 
is particularly true during recession, when there is a high degree of level of uncer-
tainty about the size and length of the demand shocks perceived by the firms.33
Chapter 1 — Competitiveness and the crisis
tunity to improve productivity through better reorgani-
zation of the production process and foregoing any 
eventual improvement in the quality embodied in new 
investment goods34.
However, the impact of lower investment is potentially 
unequal across sectors: less innovation and obsoles-
cence are more likely to be relevant in high-tech sectors 
with fast technical change or in sectors that use high-
tech equipment as an input. The negative impact of low 
investment in other sectors may be partially offset by the 
drop in capital utilization, leading to less depreciation.
1.4.3.  Selection mechanism
There are also productivity gains via the selection of 
more productive firms and the reallocation of resources 
to best performers, very much in the same way that 
international trade may drive out the worst performing 
firms as in Melitz (2003). For instance, Bresnahan and 
Raff (1991) argue that the restructuring of the car indus-
try in the US during the Great Depression fostered the 
rise of large firms using more efficient mass production 
techniques to the disadvantage of smaller, less efficient 
firms35.
In close connection with this mechanism and the notion 
of creative destruction, a recession may induce firms 
to develop or adopt better technologies in order to be 
better fit to survive the downturn. Furthermore, job 
destruction entails a reallocation of labour to the sur-
viving (more productive) firms that will increase overall 
total factor productivity; see, e.g., De Loecker and Kon-
ings (2006) for evidence from the Slovenian transition to 
a market economy.
1.4.4.  R&D intensity and innovation
Two opposing forces determine the innovative behav-
ior of firms. On the one hand, a recession can be seen 
as a period of tough competition where innovation 
is the way to stay ahead of competitors. On the other 
hand, the short-run need to cut costs is more likely to 
affect activities with uncertain or no immediate returns. 
The second force seems to dominate when we observe 
R&D expenditures and, in general, innovative activities. 
Such activities indeed seem to be procyclical with the 
reduction of R&D expenditures being driven by the cost-
34  In some sectors this has direct consequences for European policy priorities. 
For instance, the energy and transport sectors have been particularly hit by the 
crisis compromising investments that are necessary to reduce future greenhouse 
gas emissions.
35  Geroski and Gregg (1997) tone down the selection argument noting that 
short-term conditions unrelated to technological efficiency, such as cash-flows or 
leverage, may play an important role in determining which firms are going to dis-
appear. Along these lines, OECD (2009) stresses the failure of the selection mecha-
nism in demand- versus supply-driven recessions.
cutting strategy usually followed by firms during reces-
sions36.
The Innobarometer 2009 (European Commission 
(2009b)) finds that 59 per cent of surveyed firms do not 
report any changes in innovation-related spending dur-
ing the beginning of the downturn, 22 per cent reported 
a cut-back in expenditures and only 9 per cent, mainly 
in high-tech sectors, indicate an increase in innovation. 
More interestingly, the survey finds a strong correlation 
between innovation-related spending and financial suc-
cess, supporting the hypothesis that it is cost-saving that 
drives the decrease in average expenditures37. These 
results are consistent with previous evidence such as 
that in Geroski and Gregg (1997), reporting similar find-
ings from an extensive survey of UK firms. Firms engaged 
in innovative activities during the 1990 recession in the 
UK were also those less affected and those who believed 
the recession was over. Aghion et al. (2007) corroborate 
this connection between procyclicality and credit con-
straints for French enterprises.
1.4.5.  Sectoral shifts and networks
Changes in the composition of production may affect 
productivity if it involves sectors with different intensi-
ties in skilled labour. For instance, if production shifts 
from a low-skilled labour-intensive sector to a high-
skilled labour intensive sector, productivity in the latter 
may drop because of the lower skills of the new work-
ers. In close connection with this mechanism, a poor 
skill match may depress productivity for a relatively long 
period until skills are built-up with experience.
Another channel through which productivity can 
decrease is the loss of organisational capital: as firms fail 
along the production chain, the productivity of the sur-
viving firms will be directly and negatively affected but in 
addition they will have to devote time and resources to 
rebuild providers’ networks or distribution channels if it 
is retailers that fail38. This is not technical change strictly 
speaking because once the networks are rebuilt produc-
tivity would be expected to be back to normal; neverthe-
less, the effect is real and will depress total factor produc-
tivity and labour productivity in the medium-term.
36  Even in the case in which it may be optimal for R&D expenditures to be pro-
cyclical, Barlevy (2007) argues that they may be too procyclical in the presence 
of externalities. That would be a case for government support to R&D in times of 
crisis.
37  Cost saving is more important in small and low-revenues firms. Among those 
firms that innovate, when asked about the reasons for doing so, large firms declare 
energy efficiency to be a major motive. That is to say, even when innovation takes 
place, it seems to be directed to cost-saving. To have an idea of the orders of mag-
nitude, a recent study DEFRA (2007) estimates a 0.6 per cent of GDP potential gain 
from low-cost/no-cost improvements in resource efficiency for the UK.
38  See Ohanian (2001) and references therein.34
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1.4.6.  Impact on labour supply
The impact of a recession on productivity is also chan-
nelled by the consequences for workers and their reac-
tion to the recession. In those countries where reces-
sions are characterised by high rates of unemployment, 
an obvious negative effect is linked to the depreciation 
and loss of human capital. In addition, to the extent 
that the unemployed become outsiders, they have less 
power in wage-setting processes which may in turn 
explain why they become long-term unemployed thus 
exacerbating the loss of human capital39. On the posi-
tive side, however, human capital accumulation can be 
expected to intensify during a recession. Younger peo-
ple may decide to postpone entry into the job market by 
extending their period of education, while firms facing 
low levels of activity may encourage workers to engage 
in on-the-job training.
All in all, a recession does not necessarily have a negative 
impact on long-term productivity growth and therefore 
GDP growth; there are powerful mechanisms boosting 
productivity as well40. Furthermore, a good understand-
ing of these mechanisms may help clarify policy targets 
during a recession in order to keep an eye not only on 
the recovery but also on future developments41. This is 
precisely the rationale behind the second pillar of the 
European Economic Recovery Plan discussed in the next 
section.
1.5.  Getting out of the crisis
Exceptional times require exceptional measures. This 
crisis has triggered the largest and most widely coordi-
nated policy reaction among countries and institutions 
in decades.
1.5.1.  A resolute response
The current crisis is characterised by the dangerous   
combination of a real recession with a banking crisis. 
However, decisive intervention by the European Central 
Bank from the outset of the crisis as well as action by 
national governments to back financial institutions seem 
to have prevented any major breakdown in the Euro-
39  In Blanchard and Summers (1989) this is one of the hypotheses behind the 
theory of hysteresis in unemployment. The Great Depression in the US, as an 
extreme natural experiment, provides evidence in this direction: Cole and Oha-
nian (1999) note how wages in manufacturing were unusually high throughout 
the entire period. 
40  Historically structural breaks in the path of growth are rare. Nordhaus (2004) 
concludes that for the entire post-WWII period, only the crisis of the 1970’s caused 
a change in the growth trend of our economies; the so-called “productivity slow-
down”.
41  Along these lines, European Commission (2009a) examines in detail the pos-
sible impact of the crisis on potential output, and how active policies can lead to 
quite different long-run scenarios.
pean financial system42. Two years after the outbreak of 
the crisis monetary policy continues to be lax and inter-
est rates remain at historically low levels, the focus being 
on providing liquidity to the system and restoring credit 
conditions. National governments have intervened 
directly to strenghten the financial system: guarantee-
ing deposits, lending to banks to recapitalize them and 
launching programmes to purchase bad assets.
There is a growing consensus on countering moder-
ate recessions with an active monetary policy targeting 
the interest rate and a passive fiscal policy allowing the 
automatic stabilizers to work. In deep recessions like the 
current one, however, most households make consider-
able adjustments to their consumption-savings plans, so 
monetary policy alone is ineffective and automatic sta-
bilisers are not sufficient to boost short-term demand. 
Being exceptional, the current crisis has consequently 
triggered substantial public intervention in terms of 
both scope and magnitude.
1.5.2.  The European Economic Recovery Plan
In December 2008 the European Commission proposed 
and the European Council agreed the European Eco-
nomic Recovery Plan (EERP), a call for action to face 
the crisis which is guiding public intervention all across 
Europe 43.
The plan is inspired by a guiding set of principles 
grouped in two pillars. The first pillar is a major injection 
of purchasing power in order to stimulate demand. The 
plan recommended a fiscal package of 1.5 per cent of 
EU GDP over the period 2009-10, 1.2 per cent from the 
Member States and 0.3 per cent from European institu-
tions. By mid-2009 the fiscal stimulus exceeded this tar-
get and was around 2.1 per cent. Taking into account the 
effect of automatic stabilisers, the size of the package is 
5 per cent of EU GDP or some €600bn over 2009-1044.
The second pillar aims to reconcile short-term action 
with long-term competitiveness. That is to say, excep-
tional measures taken to tackle the crisis should be con-
sistent with the EU’s medium-term structural reform 
42  The reaction of governments and European institutions to the crisis was 
faster than in previous instances; Hoshi and Kashyap (2008) warn of the difficulties 
in dealing with a banking crisis, but comparing the US response today to that of 
Japan in the 1990s, conclude that decisiveness is playing a key role in the incipient 
recovery in credit conditions.
43  “Communication from the Commission to the European Council: A European 
Economic Recovery Plan,” Brussels, 26.11.2008. For a detailed description of the 
EERP and the Member States” response, see European Commission (2009d).
44  See the “Letter from the President of the European Commission to the Presi-
dent of the European Council,” 15 June 2009, the note “Progress on the Imple-
mentation of the European Economic Recovery Plan” prepared for the European 
Council of 18-19 June 2009 and again European Commission (2009d).35
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agenda 45. The emphasis at this point is to preserve the 
Single Market and integrate Europe further within inter-
national markets. It is indeed a temptation in bad times 
to turn to protectionism in order to shield those most 
affected by the recession through exposure to trade, 
but these measures would also hamper recovery and, 
if perpetuated, could hinder future growth. In contrast, 
the exceptional measures taken in Europe have been 
inspired by the idea of using the crisis as an opportunity 
for openness and reform46. In short, the current ongoing 
public intervention complies broadly with the strategic 
aims of the Lisbon Strategy: investing in R&D, the right 
skills, energy efficiency, clean technologies to speed-up 
the transition to a low-carbon economy, support for 
small and medium enterprises, and investing in infra-
structure and interconnection in network grids in order 
to promote efficiency and innovation.
These two pillars are complemented by the determina-
tion to protect the most vulnerable and to avoid long-
term unemployment and the associated damages such 
as lasting scarring effects on young unemployed.
1.5.3.  EERP tools
The principles above have inspired the policies actually 
put in place and determined the tools chosen. Spilim-
bergo et al. (2008) recommended that the response 
should be: diversified, combining direct spending, 
transfers and tax cuts; lasting, because of the uncer-
tainty about the length of the recession; and revisable 
upwards, if the conditions require it, to show a commit-
ment to help economic agents regain confidence.
The EERP is inspired by these principles, and is further 
coordinated to avoid “stowaway” effects and to profit 
from positive spillovers. It is being monitored by the 
European Commission to ensure that all measures taken 
comply with the Single Market principles.
Public spending is considered the most effective way 
to stimulate demand while preserving or even creat-
ing employment in the sectors directly affected. Conse-
quently, and accordingly under the second pillar of the 
EERP, many public interventions take the form of direct 
investment or subsidies for investment in green ener-
gies or in network grids. Transfers are being directed to 
45  This vision is shared by many other government bodies and institutions. See, 
for example, the UK ministerial document The Future of EU Competitiveness. From 
Economic Recovery to Sustainable Growth, Department for Business, Innovation and 
Skills, June 2009. Combining short-term macroeconomic recovery and stabilization 
policy with longer-term institutional reform was also endorsed by the academ-
ics participating in the Global Crisis Debate on VoxEU.org (CEPR) summarised in   
http://voxeu.org/index.php?q=node/3354. See also the OECD paper “Strategies for 
Aligning Stimulus Measures with Long Term Growth”.
46  For instance, the OECD (2009) mentions the opportunity to reform the car 
industry to produce cleaner means of transport, which is also the rationale behind 
most public incentives to invest in green energy. Note that this is in close connec-
tion with the discussion in section 1.4.3 above.
low-income households, more likely to actually spend 
the money, in line with the aim of protecting the most 
vulnerable and take various forms across the EU. For 
instance, many Member States have enacted special 
unemployment insurance schemes for those not cov-
ered by or extended of the regular subsidies.
Finally, fiscal incentives are being used to promote green 
energy and cleaner technologies while at the same time 
supporting critical sectors like the car industry. Small and 
medium-sized enterprises (SME) are targeted by measures 
to ease access to finance, shorten payment delays, and 
offer temporary reductions in social charges conditional 
on employment creation47. These measures also aim to 
protect workers and are complemented by the action to 
encourage flexible working-time to avoid lay-offs and to 
improve job placement and life-long learning48.
1.5.4.  Recovery plans of the EU’s main trading partners
The scale of these interventions is proportional to the 
magnitude of the recession. Above, a figure of 5 per cent 
of GDP was mentioned for the EU, but similar figures can 
be found for most OECD countries. As for the compo-
sition of the fiscal package, most countries have com-
bined spending and revenue in a fairly balanced way49.
In particular, the fiscal package in the US amounts to a 
total of $787bn (€562bn) over the next ten years, with 75 
per cent of the package falling in the 2009-10 period. As 
in Europe, this package goes hand in hand with deeper 
structural reforms, notably in education and training 
($53bn), health care ($59bn) and infrastructure and sci-
ence ($111bn). A sizeable share of the package ($43bn) 
is devoted to the electricity grid to foster more efficient 
and environmentally friendly power distribution.
1.5.5.  Reforms for the future and EU coordination
As noted in Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) and elsewhere, 
most major financial crises are preceded by financial lib-
eralisation. In this instance, however, it was a de facto 
liberalisation: the development of new financial instru-
ments (e.g. credit derivatives) and institutions (e.g. hedge 
funds) outgrew the regulation in force. It is not surprising, 
then, that the current emphasis in the discussion of long-
47  See again the note “Progress on the Implementation of the European Eco-
nomic Recovery Plan” prepared for the European Council of the 18-19 June 2009. 
It may be recalled from the discussion in section 1.4 that cash-constrained SMEs 
are the most vulnerable firms during a recession.
48  See the note to the Economic Policy Committee: “First Preliminary Assessment 
of Employment and Social Policies to Soften the Impact of the Crisis,” ECFIN/B3/
GC-FP/D(2009)REP/51628.
49  With some exceptions like New Zealand, UK, the Netherlands or Ireland, 
which have relied mostly on tax cuts and other revenue measures; see the OECD 
note “Policy responses to the economic crisis to restore long-term growth: results 
of the OECD questionnaire,” DSTI/IND/STP/ICCP(2009)/ADD/FINAL.36
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term reforms is on the regulation of financial markets. On 
one hand, the focus is on the regulation of alternative 
investment funds and on the transparency of derivatives 
markets. On the other hand, proposals have been made 
to strengthen supervision and to set up a cross-border 
framework to deal with financial institutions in distress50. 
The aims are a robust risk management and a macro-pru-
dential approach to mitigate procyclical effects.
The depth and scope of the crisis have strengthened the 
case for EU policy coordination. In the short-term sup-
port to banks and firms hit by the crisis but operating 
across the entire EU entailed a risk of distorting the 
Internal Market; EU state-aid rules and Commission 
supervision provided the framework and the necessary 
action to prevent this possibility; national fiscal stimuli 
are complemented and boosted by accelerated trans-
fers of Cohesion Funds and efforts to increase absorp-
tion capacity. 
If the EU has successfully coordinated the response to 
the crisis, it should now coordinate an orderly exit and 
any steps towards the prevention of future crisis51. Struc-
tural reforms in product and labour markets should not 
only restore confidence in the short-term but put the 
basis for future sustained growth. For instance, in the 
labour market Member States have tried to maintain 
existing jobs through short-time working allowances, 
reduced social charges, and so on. However, the reces-
sion also provides a reminder of the rigidities that affect 
labour markets in many Member States. Reforms seem 
important at these times, not only to boost long-term 
competitiveness but to actively promote the recovery of 
employment (recall Figure 1.3 discussed in section 1.2.2). 
The emphasis here is on flexicurity, the combination of 
flexible hiring and firing with strong social protection for 
those in unemployment.
The current conjuncture stands as well as an opportunity 
to ease the transition to a sustainable low-carbon econ-
omy and to stimulate the creation of green jobs. Stimulus 
packages can be directed to renewable energies or to 
support R&D expenditures in resource efficiency 52. These 
efforts can be complemented by indirect incentives like 
conditional subsidies or green public procurement. 
Indeed, the EERP puts the emphasis on a rapid take-up of 
green products and energy efficiency. The idea is to sup-
port and reinforce current initiatives like the Ecodesign or 
the Energy Labelling directives aimed at improving the 
environmental performance of products or help consum-
50  See the Presidency Conclusions of the European Council of the 
18-19 June 2009.
51  See again European Commission (2009d) and the report European Economy 
2009 “Economic crisis in Europe: causes, consequences and challenges”.
52  During recessions firms are already likely to engage in innovation efforts in 
resource efficiency in processes for the sake of cost-cutting; recall section 1.4.4 
above.
ers make better choices respectively53. Resource efficiency 
in products is promoted through the goal of improving 
energy efficiency in buildings or the aim of developing 
clean technologies for cars and construction.
1.6.  Conclusions
The crisis has lead to an unprecedented contraction in 
economic activity. The bursting of a large real-estate and 
stock-market bubble in the US but also in some Euro-
pean countries, notably the UK, Ireland and Spain, has 
put a halt to the strong growth path regained in 2006. 
The wealth contraction associated with the bubble burst 
has negatively affected consumption and, by extension, 
almost all economic activity. The crisis has been further 
exacerbated and spread by the financial crisis and the 
contraction in international trade.
At the sectoral level, we observe a strong impact in man-
ufacturing and to a less extent in services. As in previous 
recessions, non-durables, energy and services contract 
less than durables and investment equipment goods, 
the latter being more affected by the adjustements 
made to savings and investment by households and 
firms respectively.
The potential impact of such a large recession on pro-
ductivity in the medium- and long-term is ambiguous. 
Productivity will be negatively affected by firms freezing 
investment projects. Lay-offs will cause a loss of firm-
specific human capital while unemployment is often 
associated with a depreciation of human capital. The 
destruction of supply-chain and distribution networks 
may divert resources from firms in order to rebuild these 
commercial relations, which will have a negative impact 
on productivity until the networks are restored. In addi-
tion, in bad times many firms turn to cost-saving strate-
gies, usually reducing innovation activities. On the posi-
tive side, some firms, particularly those whose business 
model heavily relies on innovation, may intensify innova-
tive activities as a way forward. A recession can also help 
in selecting the most productive technologies and busi-
ness practices, thus boosting long-term productivity.
The crisis can also have a positive impact on productivity 
to the extent that it provides the momentum for struc-
tural reforms. The European Economic Recovery Plan is 
guided by two principles: to stimulate demand but also 
to make short-term action compatible with the structural 
reform agenda as set out in the Lisbon Partnership for 
Growth and Jobs. A large share of the stimulus package 
is devoted to fostering flexicurity in labour markets, clean 
technologies to speed-up the transition to a sustainable 
low-carbon economy, the promotion of green energy, 
and investment in network industries including broad-
53  See the communication “on the Sustainable Consumption and Production 
and Sustainable Industrial Policy Action Plan” COM(2008)397.37
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band data networks and the electricity grid. All these 
measures aim to boost productivity and make the EU a 
front-runner in sectors and technologies of the future.
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CHAPTER 2 
EU and BRICs: Challenges and opportunities  
for European competitiveness 
2.1.  Introduction
The term BRICs54, is the common label for the four larg-
est fast growing emerging countries: Brazil, Russia, India 
and China. Their common features include a large ter-
ritory and population, low income levels, but also fast 
economic growth resulting in the emergence of a pros-
perous local middle class. Notwithstanding the current 
global crisis, their catching-up process is expected to 
continue, creating both new opportunities and numer-
ous challenges for the rest of the world and for the Euro-
pean Union in particular. This chapter shows that, while 
sharing common features, the individual BRIC countries 
are in fact fairly heterogeneous, posing quite different 
challenges and calling for specific policy responses on 
the side of their partners, especially the EU55. Opportu-
nities for trade and investment in the large and rapidly 
expanding BRIC markets are obvious, and companies 
from the EU are already well positioned there. Major 
challenges include cost competition in product markets, 
changing patterns in global commodity flows (energy, 
metals and food), non-tariff barriers to trade, regulatory 
deficiencies, e.g., concerning intellectual property rights, 
and various institutional impediments to foreign invest-
ment. Distinct political systems, especially as far as state 
involvement in the economy is concerned, also require 
different policy responses towards individual BRICs. 
This chapter is organised as follows. Section 1 deals 
with foreign trade in goods and services and with FDI 
and knowledge flows between the BRICs and the EU. 
For comparative purposes, the corresponding flows 
between the BRICs and the rest of the world, in particu-
lar with the US and Japan, are reported as well. Section 2 
contains a summary of four country studies briefly ana-
lysing the key features of the economic development 
models of the individual BRICs. Section 3 focuses on 
Russia and Brazil and their respective roles in the EU’s 
54  First used in 2001 by Jim O’Neill, chief economist at the investment bank 
Goldman Sachs (see Goldman Sachs 2003 and 2007).
55  For more details see the background study prepared for this chapter.
energy import needs. The final section concludes and 
discusses some policy implications.
2.2.  Trade in goods and services, FDI and 
knowledge flows 
2.2.1.  Trade in goods
This section starts with the overall position of the EU 
and the BRICs in world trade and moves subsequently 
to a more detailed analysis of regional, commodity and 
industry-specific trade specialisation patterns. 
2.2.1.1.  Global Trade in goods
The EU is the world’s leading exporter of goods. In 2007, 
extra-EU exports amounted to about 17% of total world 
exports. The EU is also the second largest importer, closely 
behind the US. The rapid growth of Chinese exports over 
the past two decades has made China advance to second 
place a as world exporter. The global market shares of the 
Triad (EU, US and Japan) have all significantly decreased 
over the period 1995-2007 (see Figure 2.1).
The decline in the Triad’s global market shares coin-
cides with the emergence of new players on the world 
markets. These new players include all four BRICs. With 
regard to goods’ trade, the prominent role of China as 
an exporter stands out.
2.2.1.2.   Bilateral trade relations between Triad countries and 
the BRICs
The EU’s leading role in international trade also extends 
to bilateral relations between the Triad and the BRICs. 
EU companies make intensive use of this trade channel 
to serve the BRICs markets and are also quite successful 
as compared to the US and Japan. Russia has become 42
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Figure 2.1: Global market shares in goods 
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Source: IMF, Directions of Trade, wiiw calculations. Calculation of market shares is based on extra-EU exports only.
the EU’s main export partner among the BRICs, China 
the main import partner. However both the EU and the 
US have a large bilateral trade deficit with China. There 
are several factors contributing to China’s strong export 
performance. One is that the Triad countries are provid-
ing China with the necessary capital goods, technology 
and know-how to diversify and upgrade domestic indus-
trial and export capacities. 
With a share of 17-18% in world trade, the EU is indeed 
a trading giant. Yet about two thirds of EU trade repre-
sent intra-EU trade, which is not included in the above 
percentages. With intra-EU trade included in the trade 
analysis, the BRICs accounted for just 6% of total EU 
exports in 2008 – less than EU exports to the US (6.2 %) 
–although their share has doubled since 200056. The 
growing importance of the BRICs is even more visible in 
EU imports (11.6% of total EU imports in 2008), largely 
due to China (5.9%). The analysis of trade statistics shows 
that China and Russia are the EU’s main trading partners 
among the BRICs and thus represent key challenges. The 
higher share of BRICs in some EU countries’ exports and 
imports results largely from their trade exposure to Rus-
sia. These differences may have important implications 
for the formulation of common EU policies: Member 
States with less exposure have a lower stake in policy 
formulation regarding particular BRICs and/or may be 
guided less by purely commercial interests than by other 
56  The rest of this section is based mainly on data from Eurostat’s Comext data-
base. The subsequent analysis covers total EU trade (both intra- and extra-) in order 
to look not only at the EU as a whole but also at the performance of individual EU 
countries (e.g. new Member States relative to BRICs). Table A1 in Annex provides 
an overview of EU trade with individual BRICs, the Triad and the rest of the world 
(RoW) during the period 2000-2008.
issues (security and environmental concerns, human 
rights, etc)57. Conversely, the EU is the most important 
trading partner for the BRICs – especially for Russia, 
  Brazil and India (Figure 2.2).
2.2.1.3.  Sectoral composition of EU-BRICs goods trade
About 90% of overall EU exports of goods represent 
manufacturing industry products. In goods exports to 
the BRICs, the focus on manufacturing is even more pro-
nounced. The only exception is exports to India where 
the share of manufacturing amounted to just 78% of 
total EU exports in 2007. EU imports from the BRICs are 
somewhat more diversified, although manufacturing 
prevails as well, especially in imports from India and 
China. Apart from manufacturing, imports of mining 
products are important in particular from Brazil (17.8% 
of EU imports in 2007) and especially from Russia (52.1 % 
of EU imports from Russia mostly crude oil and natural 
gas). Imports from China consist almost exclusively of 
manufacturing products, while agriculture plays a more 
prominent role only in EU imports from Brazil.
EU manufacturing exports are underrepresented in 
trade with the BRICs (in terms of differences in individual 
industries’ shares relative to the structure of overall EU 
exports in 2007) in food products and beverages (NACE 
15, except with Russia ), in coke and refined petroleum 
(NACE 23) and in chemicals (NACE 24). On the other hand, 
57  The Baltic states and several other NMS may serve as an example: despite 
their strong trade exposure to Russia they are less prone to compromise on trade 
for the sake of other policy issues.43
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Figure 2.2: Shares of the Triad in BRIC goods imports (in % of total imports)
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the EU has a strong specialisation (above-average export 
shares) with regard to the BRICs in exports of machinery 
and equipment (NACE 29) and in other transport equip-
ment (NACE 35). China is also an important market for EU 
exporters of electrical machinery and apparatus (NACE 
31), see Figure 2.3a. As shown in Figure 2.3b, the struc-
ture of EU imports from BRICs is dominated by just a few 
industries: food and beverages (NACE 15) from Brazil and 
coke and refined petroleum (fuels: NACE 23) along with 
basic metals (NACE 27) from Russia (note that this is in 
addition to unprocessed energy products such as oil and 
gas). Office machinery (NACE 30) and radio, TV, commu-
nication equipment (NACE 32) dominate imports from 
China. Imports from India show a relative specialization 
on textiles (NACE 17), wearing apparel (NACE 18) and fur-
niture (NACE 36). Already at this level of detail one can 
see the impressive technological upgrading of China’s 
exports compared to other BRICs.
Figure 2.3a:   Structure of EU manufacturing exports to the BRICs by NACE* 2-digit industries 
(differences from the structure of total EU exports in pp, 2007)
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Source: Eurostat Comext, wiiw calculations.
* NACE Rev. 1.144
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Figure 2.3b:   Structure of EU manufacturing imports from BRICs by NACE* 2-digit industries 
(differences from the structure of total EU imports in pp, 2007, note different scale)
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* NACE Rev. 1.1
Figure 2.4a:   EU-27: Imports by industry groups (Taxonomy I)
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Source: Eurostat Comext, wiiw calculations.
The analysis of EU trade at the more detailed (NACE 
3-digit) level employs a classification of industries 
according to factor inputs (Taxonomy I) and labour skills 
(Taxonomy II see Peneder 2003)58. Figure 2.4a shows 
the structure of EU imports by industry groupings clas-
58  The list of 3-digit NACE industries and their allocation to industry groupings 
according to both taxonomies can be found in the Annex. The structures of EU 
exports are not discussed here because there are no large differences between 
the BRICs and other regions (technology-driven, capital-intensive and mainstream 
industries prevail in EU exports – the data are shown in the Annex).
sified according to factor inputs and the shares of indi-
vidual groupings in total EU imports (Taxonomy I). In 
EU imports from Brazil and Russia the capital-intensive 
industries prevail, just as labour-intensive industries 
prevail in imports from India. However, the share of 
these groups of industries in EU imports from China is 
much lower whereas the technology-driven industries 
are increasingly dominating: in 2007, the share of this 
group of industries in EU imports from China was already 
higher than in intra-EU imports. 45
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Figure 2.4b:   EU-27: Imports by industry groups (Taxonomy II)
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Source: Eurostat Comext, wiiw calculations.
The low-skill industries dominate in EU imports from 
Brazil and India (Figure 2.4b), medium-skill industries 
in imports from Russia (refined petroleum is included 
here). EU imports from China are divided into low- and 
medium-skill industries (both with declining shares) 
while the group of high-skill industries recorded rapidly 
rising shares between 2000 and 2007 again providing 
evidence for China’s technological upgrading. The labour 
skills structure of EU imports from China is becoming 
increasingly like the structure of intra-EU trade.
2.2.1.4.  Revealed comparative advantages of BRICs and the EU
All BRICs have revealed comparative advantages (RCAs) in 
trade with the Triad in labour-intensive industries59. They 
also have positive RCAs in marketing-driven industries 
(except for Russia in trade with the EU and the US, and for 
Brazil in trade with Japan). In the case of China, the RCAs 
point towards a (small) comparative advantage in technol-
ogy-driven industries. The trade specialisation patterns of 
59  The RCA analysis here is again based on the industry classifica-
tion by Peneder (2003). Not captured is the possibility that within, for 
example, a technology-intensive industry, the labour-intensive produc-
tion steps are located in the BRICs with the aim to re-export the out-
put.  The  UN  Comtrade  database  is  used  for  computing  BRIC  RCAs. 
RCAs are calculated according to Balassa (see Balasssa, 1965):
∑
∑
⋅ =
i
ci
i
ci
M
X
ci
ci
ci
M
X
RCA ln 100 ,
  - where X (M) are exports (imports), c denotes a partner country and i the 
respective industry-grouping (RCAs were calculated from individual 3-digit NACE 
industry trade data). Positive (negative) RCA values indicate a comparative (dis)
advantage. The use of a different RCA index (e.g. Lafay’s – see Baumann and di 
Mauro 2007) would lead to similar conclusions regarding comparative advantages.
the BRICs are far from identical: Brazil has positive RCAs in 
marketing-driven (food processing) and in labour-inten-
sive (textiles) industries. Russia has positive RCAs only in 
capital-intensive industries, mostly due to strong exports 
of refined petroleum and diverse metal products. Russia is 
an exception among the BRICs in this respect, since it has 
a comparative disadvantage in labour-intensive industries 
in trade with the EU and the United States. The relative 
strength of China in exporting technology-driven indus-
tries is fully in line with other findings on Chinese trade60 
as well as with other studies on the trade effects of glo-
balisation (e.g. Baumann and di Mauro, 2007). India’s dis-
tribution of RCAs is very similar to those of Brazil. 
From the EU point of view, the RCA patterns in trade with 
the BRICs are also rather diverse. There are positive RCAs in 
mainstream and technology-driven industries in EU trade 
with Brazil and India both in 2000 and in 2007. There are 
also positive RCAs in all industry groupings except capital-
intensive industries in EU trade with Russia. Last but not 
least, negative RCAs in both labour-intensive and mar-
keting-driven industries persisted in EU trade with China 
between 2000 and 2007. Moreover, the initial (small) posi-
tive RCA in technology-driven industries turned negative 
between 2000 and 2007 – another sign of China’s techno-
logical upgrading. 
Competition patterns in EU markets are also analysed by 
looking at changes in import prices (so-called unit value 
60  China’s exports are found to be technologically more advanced than its level 
of income would suggest (Rodrik, 2006) and its export bundle is more similar to 
those of developed countries than those of countries with similar income levels 
(Schott, 2006).46
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ratios – UVRs – see Box A1 in the Annex to this chapter) 
and market shares during the period 2000-2007 for the 
same industry groupings used above. For this purpose, 
the average changes in UVRs and market shares for each 
country (group) for the periods 2000-2002 and 2005-2007 
have been calculated in order to smooth out possible 
outliers. The results for selected industry groupings are 
shown in Figure 2.5a (technology-driven industries) and 
in Figure 2.5b (high-skill industries).
China, but also India and even Russia (as well as the new 
Member States) have been successful in price competi-
tion in high-skill industries and gained market shares in 
the EU. China has recorded the most impressive market 
share gains in virtually all industry groupings with falling 
UVRs. Moreover, China has also been quite successful in 
the technological upgrading of exports and is emerging 
as the main competitive challenge for the EU.
A distinctive feature of Chinese trade is the high share of 
parts and components, particularly on the import side. In 
contrast, this form of trade integration is much less devel-
oped in Russia and also in India61. The split-up of trade 
according to broad economic categories, which reflect dif-
ferent stages of production, also shows that China’s and 
India’s trade is characterised in contrast to Russia’s by a 
very low share of imports of consumption goods. Chinese 
data document that since 2002 more than half of Chinese 
61  For an analysis of the role of trade in parts and components in shaping Chi-
nese trade patterns see background study, section 1.1.8. In a similar contrast to 
China, the role of intra-industry trade in Russia is extremely low – see Fertö and 
Soos (2008).
exports can be attributed to the activity of foreign invest-
ment firms. The impact of the activities of multinational 
corporations (MNCs) on Chinese foreign trade has to be 
borne in mind when interpreting export patterns. In the 
context of competitiveness it certainly makes a difference 
whether EU firms lose or actually relocate export shares to 
their Chinese affiliates or whether these market shares are 
truly lost to “genuine” Chinese manufacturers. The share 
of the EU in China’s inward foreign direct investment 
(FDI) is only 7%-10%62. Nevertheless the EU is, together 
with the Asian newly industrialised countries (NICs) (14%) 
and Japan (7%), one of the major FDI investors in China, 
once FDI from Hong Kong and off-shore centres is sub-
stracted63. Indeed, much evidence indicates that China’s 
bilateral trade balances and RCAs reflect to a large extent 
the comparative advantages and competitiveness of 
foreign firms exporting from China. Previous analysis 
of “genuine” Chinese exports, i.e., excluding exports by 
foreign investment firms suggests that their skill content 
has not changed substantially so China in some sense 
continues to specialize mainly in labour-intensive goods 
(Amiti and Freund, 2008). A considerable part of Chinese 
economic activity in manufacturing is accounted for by 
foreign-owned firms, which may influence the develop-
ments of revealed comparative advantages.
62  Figures are the average for the period 2004-2007 according to Chinese data 
(7 %) and combined Eurostat/UNCTAD data (10%).
63  If FDI from Hong Kong (likely to be predominantly round-tripping capital) 
and FDI from offshore centres, whose ultimate source country remains unknown, 
is subtracted, the relative shares of the EU and other major FDI investors are about 
double the shares indicated because Hong Kong and offshore centres account for 
about half of total Chinese inward FDI. For more details see section 1.3.2 (Box 1.3.2) 
of the background study.
Figure 2.5a:   Competition on the EU market in technology-driven industries  
changes in import prices and market shares, 2000-02 compared to 2005-07
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Source: Eurostat Comext, wiiw calculations.47
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Figure 2.5b:   Competition on the EU market in high-skill industries  
changes in import prices and market shares, 2000-02 compared to 2005-07
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2.2.2.  Trade in services
Trade in services is much less important than trade in 
goods, as measured by both absolute volumes and 
shares in GDP (in the EU, on average less than 10% of 
GDP compared to 32% for goods trade)64. The BRICs’ 
share in global services trade is much lower than that 
of the EU. China and India are the biggest services trad-
ers among the BRICs – together they account for almost 
60 % of total BRICs services trade. Japan is the only coun-
try where the share of BRICs in services imports is rela-
tively high (see Table 2.1). In the EU and US, the shares of 
the BRICs in services imports are only about 4%, which is 
lower than their share in goods imports. However, if we 
compare BRIC services trade with extra-EU imports, then 
the share of BRICs increases to about 9%. The new Mem-
ber States (NMS) import relatively more services from 
BRICs than do the old Member States (EU-15): the share 
of the BRICs in total NMS services imports is 4.2%, which 
is 0.5 percentage points higher than in the EU-15. 
All BRICs have been increasing their services exports 
much faster than the EU, the US or Japan. India is the 
64  Some caution is necessary when comparing trade in goods with trade in serv-
ices since there is a risk of bias in favour of goods’ trade. Some «trade in goods» 
contracts might include also a service component (e.g. R&D), especially when mul-
tinational companies are involved, leading trade in goods in the official statistics to 
be slightly overestimated and services underestimated. Also, when the source data 
for trade in goods is foreign trade statistics, because it includes processing trade 
on gross basis and processing might be understood as a service rather than trade 
in goods, it again somewhat inflates the trade in goods data making it not com-
pletely comparable with Balance of Payments data which are the source for trade 
in services. These biases are however far from changing the higher magnitude of 
trade in goods relative to services.
absolute leader in terms of growth rates – its annual serv-
ices export grew more than five-fold during 2000-2007. 
Services exports by China and Russia increased four-fold 
during that period.
From the BRICs’ perspective, the EU is quite an impor-
tant market for service exporters (the shares of the EU in 
services exports range from 13% for Hong Kong to over 
40% for Russia), and in the case of China and Hong Kong 
the EU’s share has been growing. The importance of the 
BRICs for EU service exporters has been increasing as well: 
in 2007, the share of BRICs in total EU services exports 
exceeded that of the NMS (4.6% versus 4.2%), while the 
share of BRICs in extra-EU services exports reached 11%.
China and Russia specialise in transport services on the 
EU market, with Russia having acquired an additional 
strong specialisation in construction services. The cur-
rent pattern of BRICs’ specialisation on the NMS mar-
ket is similar to that on the EU-15 market. However, 
in contrast to the EU-15, the pattern of specialization 
has changed noticeably on the NMS market since 
2000, when China and India specialized in exports of 
other business services. These trends in specialisation 
together with the much faster development of intra-EU 
services trade (extra-EU trade of the NMS actually having 
fallen during 2003-2007)65 may indicate that the recent 
EU enlargement has resulted in strong trade diversion 
effects for services, possibly due to the decrease in bar-
65  In NMS extra-EU services imports decreased by 24% and exports by 22% 
while intra-EU services exports increased by 264% and exports by 276% in the 
period 2003-2007.48
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Table 2.1: Geographical structure of services imports in 2007, %
Importers 
by columns
Brazil China Hong 
Kong*
India Russia Japan US EU-27 EU-15 NMS-12
Brazil - … 0,4 … 0 0,2 0,8 0,4 0,4 0,1
China … - 23,7 … 0,3 5,1 0 1 1,1 1
Hong Kong … 25,8 - … 0,1 3,8 1,4 0,8 0,8 0,2
India … … 0,9 - 0,4 0,4 2 0,5 0,6 0,1
Russia … … 0,2 … - 0,3 0 0,9 0,8 2,8
Total BRICS … 25,8 25,2 … 0,8 9,7 4,2 3,7 3,7 4,2
Japan 1,6 6,4 7,6 2,2 0,5 - 5,3 1,3 1,4 1
US 26,8 7,9 13,2 18,2 5,2 27,2 - 12,5 12,9 6,5
EU-27 23,7 18,8 12,6 19,5 43,5 16,7 38,7 63,3 72,2 63,9
EU-15 23,3 18,6 12,5 19,2 34,7 16 37,4 59 59,2 57,1
NMS-12 0,5 0,2 0,1 0,3 8,8 0,8 1,2 4,9 4,2 15,1
Other 48,3 41,2 41,6 60,4 58,7 47,1 53,1 23,5 22,9 31,2
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
* Data are for 2005.
Source: TSD, own calculation.
riers to services trade with the EU in the NMS after their 
EU accession.
2.2.3.  FDI flows between the EU and BRICs
The magnitude of EU outward FDI flows reflects the ability 
and propensity of EU firms to internationalise their busi-
ness activities. FDI is therefore a valuable indicator of the 
corporate competitiveness of firms in the EU vis-à-vis for-
eign competitors. At global level, the EU emerges as the 
most important investor. In 2007 extra-EU FDI by EU firms 
increased to EUR 484 billion (in comparison, US and Japa-
nese FDI amounted to EUR 229 billion and EUR 54 billion, 
respectively). The EU has also been the largest recipient 
of FDI, attracting EUR 360 billion from outside the EU in 
2007, more than twice the amount of the inflows into the 
US economy. Since the competitiveness of the EU crucially 
depends on the corporate competitiveness of both domes-
tic and foreign firms operating in the EU, there is a positive 
relationship between inward FDI and the competitiveness 
of the EU. Bilateral FDI flows document the coincidence of 
two forms of competitiveness: corporate competitiveness, 
i.e., high relative productivity of firms in the source coun-
try, and locational competitiveness, i.e., the relative attrac-
tiveness of the host country’s economy for potential FDI 
investors. The EU is the world’s most important provider 
of FDI and has 55 of the 100 largest non-financial MNCs 
domiciled on its territory (UNCTAD, 2008a).
2.2.3.1.  FDI relations with the BRICs
The share of EU FDI going to the BRICs remains small, 
and has increased only moderately since 2002. But the 
EU is an important source of FDI for all BRICs (mirror-
ing the situation with trade). The EU is by far the most 
important investor in Russia and Brazil, accounting on 
average for 57% and 53%, respectively, of the total FDI in 
the period 2004-2007. For the Asian BRICs, the share of 
the EU is much lower, ranging from 31% in India to only 
10% in China. This is explained by the large intra-regional 
FDI flows and by the importance of off-shore centres and 
round-tripping. Based on the number of investment 
projects, the role of the EU is more significant.
The BRICs have large and growing domestic markets and 
have made efforts, albeit to varying degrees, to improve 
the investment climate in their economies. These factors 
have advanced the BRICs to the top five most attractive 
locations for FDI in recent UNCTAD surveys (UNCTAD, 
2008). Consequently, EU FDI flows to the BRICs increased 
steadily over the period 2001-2007, particularly to Russia 
and Brazil (see Annex Table A4). In terms of the number 
of projects recorded in “FDI Intelligence from Financial 
Times Ltd” (the fDi database), the development is even 
more dynamic and continued in 2008 the world-wide 
slump of FDI66. China and India, lagging behind in terms 
of the amounts received, emerge as the main targets in 
terms of number of projects. This difference is mainly 
due to the fact that FDI projects in Russia and Brazil are 
more capital-intensive, which in turn is explained by the 
industry distribution of inward FDI.
2.2.3.2.  FDI position in the BRICs
Among the Triad, the EU emerges as the largest pro-
vider of FDI in each of the BRICs. In Russia and Brazil, 
66  This section is based on two major sources of data: the Eurostat Foreign 
Direct Investment Database (Eurostat) which records realised FDI flows according 
to balance of payments principles, and FDI Intelligence from Financial Times Ltd, 
which is based on information from press reports and can thus be taken as invest-
ment commitments.49
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the amounts invested by EU firms were seven to eight 
times the amount of FDI undertaken by US firms in these 
countries (average 2005-2007). The average flows from 
the EU to China over the same period amounted to 
EUR 6.6 billion, more than twice the amount from the 
US. Japan, which has a strong Asian focus in its outward 
FDI, recorded average FDI flows of EUR 4.9 billion to 
China during the same period. It is interesting to note 
that the EU has a stronger position as an investor in the 
BRICs than as an exporter.
While the strong FDI links between the EU and Russia 
are to be expected due to the proximity of the two mar-
kets (and is also found in trade in goods and services),   
a favourable position of EU firms in Brazil compared to 
US firms is also patent, and in contrast to the findings for 
services trade. The strong position of the EU in the BRICs 
is confirmed by the fDi database, which also shows the 
EU to be the major investor in the BRICs, way ahead of 
the United States67.
Germany and the United Kingdom are the EU’s main FDI 
investors in the BRICs, followed by France and the Neth-
erlands. In terms of the amounts invested, Spain also 
ranks among the top five investors. The strong presence 
of EU firms in Brazil is mainly the result of FDI from Spain, 
a country with close historical links with South America, 
and Germany, which is a major and geographically well 
diversified provider of FDI. When looking at the number 
of projects, Italy also emerges as an important investor 
for the BRICs, whereas Spain appears to be less active. 
Portugal, the former colonial power in Brazil, does not 
show up there as a major investor in terms of value, but 
has the highest number of investment projects.
2.2.3.3.  Sectoral structure of FDI in the BRICs
As with global outward FDI, the EU’s FDI stocks owned in 
the BRICs are overall skewed to the services sector (see 
67  In the analysis based on the fDi database, the EU comprises only the EU-15. 
Since investment activities by the new EU Member States in the BRICs are very low, 
this does not cause major distortions.
Annex Tables A5). However, FDI in manufacturing con-
tinues to play an important role especially in China and 
India. In terms of both the number of projects and accu-
mulated stocks, the manufacturing sector accounts for 
approximately one third of total EU stocks owned in the 
BRICs, whereas the share of the services sector is around 
60%. The dominance of services over manufacturing is 
in line with the structure of the EU economy, but in stark 
contrast with the relative importance of these two broad 
sectors in international trade, confirming the impor-
tance of direct investment in the internationalisation of 
services. Indeed, as services are typically more difficult 
to trade across borders, settling in BRICs through FDIs is 
the main means for EU service companies to get access 
to BRIC markets. In this context, the importance of FDI in 
financial intermediation stands out. 
2.2.3.4.  Foreign investors target mainly local regional markets
Of the more than six thousand EU investment projects 
covered by the fDi database, 1382 provided informa-
tion concerning the markets that the activity serves. 
One third targeted only the domestic market of the 
host country, another third the Asia-Pacific market, and 
7 % had a global reach. Only 63 projects aimed to serve 
European markets, which shows that outsourcing (the 
relocation of production with the intention to re-export 
back to Europe) motivated only a small fraction of EU 
investment projects in the BRICs. Most projects serving 
the EU market were located in Russia, geographically the 
nearest of the BRICs.
The reported motives for EU investments in the BRICs 
related to market conditions in the host country and sales 
location (Figure 2.6). Of the 1445 projects that supplied 
information, 45% chose the location due to the growth 
potential of the destination market, 17% due to the prox-
imity to customers and only 7% due to low costs. The 
motivation of investors and the markets for their products 
reveal that European FDI in the BRICs is primarily market-
seeking. It is more the growth of the market, and less the 
production cost, which motivates the decision to invest 
abroad. This motivation structure suggests that wage 
Figure 2.6: Motives of EU-15 investors in the BRICs
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increases will not deter investors due to rising costs, but 
may rather attract them due to growing demand.
2.2.3.5.  FDI of the BRICs in the EU
Outward FDI undertaken by multinational firms of 
emerging markets, including the BRICs, is a rather new 
phenomenon. The growth of FDI outflows from the 
BRICs began to accelerate markedly only at the begin-
ning of the new millennium. Accordingly, all of the BRICs 
are relative latecomers with regard to outward FDI. Rapid 
growth in outward FDI flows has made Russia the most 
important investor among the BRICs in 2007, with out-
ward FDI flows reaching EUR 33 billion. A strong pick-up 
is also observable for China and India, which recorded 
outward flows of EUR 16 billion and EUR 10 billion, 
respectively. Brazilian global outward FDI is rather vola-
tile but shows a clear positive trend as well. Much less of 
an upward trend is discernible in the FDI flows from the 
BRICs to the EU, with the important exception of Russia. 
Rather than following a steady upward trend, inflows 
from Brazil, India and China into the EU show only single 
peaks in different years. In most years, however, BRIC FDI 
flows to the EU have remained at a low level. Hong Kong 
used to be an active FDI investor in the EU markets, but 
has lost this position due to disinvestments over the past 
three years. The combined amount of FDI flows received 
by the EU from the BRICs stood at EUR 5.4 billion in 2006 
and EUR 12.3 billion in 2007, which was due to excep-
tionally high FDI from Russia (EUR 9.1 billion).
This implies that the BRICs are only a minor source of FDI 
for the EU, accounting for only 5.5% of extra-EU inward 
FDI flows during the period 2002-2007. The BRICs are 
underrepresented in the EU market in terms of FDI flows 
when compared to their share in global FDI. One major 
explanation for this pattern is that a major part of the 
BRICs’ outward FDI, particularly from China and India, is 
resource-seeking, directed predominantly at the resource-
rich countries of Africa, South America and Asia.
2.2.3.6.  FDI, modes of market entry and competitive positions
The fact that BRIC FDI activity in the EU is very low 
implies that the local presence of firms from the BRICs is 
still the exception rather than the rule. Despite isolated 
examples, MNCs from the BRICs generally exert only 
very limited competitive pressure on EU firms via sub-
sidiaries established in the EU. For manufacturing this is 
evidenced by the very low sales volumes of foreign affili-
ates of BRIC MNCs in the EU. Competition from the BRICs 
on the EU market is much fiercer via the trade channel. 
The low levels of FDI and the almost complete absence 
of foreign affiliate sales by BRIC firms in the EU can be 
seen as a competitive advantage for EU manufacturing 
firms. At the same time, however, this also means that 
BRIC FDI activities hardly create any additional employ-
ment in the EU.
In contrast, FDI in the BRICs has led to a strong local 
presence of EU firms in these markets and EU firms seem 
to compete intensively there via the sales of affiliates. 
For several EU Member States, sales by foreign affiliates 
of manufacturing firms in some BRIC markets already 
surpass their exports. For example, the sales of German 
manufacturing affiliates in Brazil (EUR 23 billion in 2006) 
exceed by far German merchandise exports to Brazil 
(EUR 6 billion in 2006). This shows that for EU firms FDI 
(together with subsequent sales by subsidiaries) is a 
major mode of entry and channel of competition in the 
BRIC markets.
2.2.3.7.  Impact of the crisis on EU-BRIC FDI relations
The current global economic crisis, which among other 
things is expected to cause a 13% contraction of world 
trade during 2009 (OECD, 2009), will most likely trig-
ger a drop in FDI due to falling global demand, excess 
capacities, difficulties with investment financing and 
a drop in subsidiary profits. Overcapacities will hinder 
FDI and cause its volume to shrink perhaps even more 
than the volume of global trade. The BRICs may have a 
privileged position in many respects. First of all, they are 
large economies where FDI is mainly attracted by local 
markets with growth expectations above the world 
average, with the possible exception of Russia. Local 
economic growth will allow FDI to grow if companies 
from crisis-hit countries are in a position to invest there. 
European multinationals may just concentrate on the 
very few countries in the world where they can expand 
sales, such as China, India or Brazil and shift investments 
there. A second likely consequence of the current crisis 
could be a gain in the relative importance of the BRICs’ 
outward FDI at global level and also in the EU. Due to 
the crisis, there will be a lack of capital for expansion, 
which will negatively impact mergers and acquisitions. 
In contrast, if BRIC companies fare better than their Euro-
pean counterparts and their financial situation remains 
more robust, they may even invest in relatively cheap 
EU companies.
2.2.4.  Knowledge flows between the EU and BRICs
The previous sections have analysed FDI and trade pat-
terns between the EU and the BRICs. In the empirical 
literature on technology diffusion, FDI and trade have 
been found to increase the productivity of the receiving 
country. Therefore, they have been considered as chan-
nels for international technological diffusion or techno-
logical spillovers (Keller 2004). This section adds to the 
analysis presented above by exploring information on 
other channels for knowledge transfer: through analy-51
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sis of international payments of royalties and licence 
fees, the international mobility of tertiary students, the 
international mobility of professionals, and the cross-
border patent inventions. This section also evaluates the 
absorptive capabilities of BRICs, i.e., their ability to inter-
nalise and exploit knowledge developed elsewhere.
By and large, knowledge transfer ties between the EU 
and the BRICs are becoming increasingly important. The 
BRICs, in particular China, have also been drawing from 
the global pool of knowledge. China has become one of 
the major investors in R&D in the world68. Moreover, the 
country has also considerably intensified its knowledge 
ties with the world as well as with the EU. Even though 
knowledge ties between each of the BRICs and the EU 
have become stronger, the impressive pace of China and, 
to a lesser extent, India have resulted in an increase in 
their relative importance with respect to the EU, overtak-
ing, in turn, the traditionally privileged position of Russia.
Regarding trade in royalties and licence fees (RLF), 
the US was in 2006 both the main provider and a net 
exporter. The EU, the second biggest RLF provider, was 
a net importer. However, with respect to BRIC countries, 
the EU enjoyed growing surpluses, with most know-
ledge flows to the BRICs through the RLF channel hav-
ing an EU origin. Additionally, EU imports of RLF from 
BRIC countries have been declining, while EU exports to 
the BRICs have been increasing. Even though the BRICs 
represent a relatively small share in EU exports (4.5%), 
the EU has succeeded in attracting a higher proportion 
of the BRICs’ growing demand for RLF. This has been 
largely due to the EU’s success in attracting demand 
from China, which, among the BRIC countries, has been 
the major purchaser of EU RLF as well as the EU export 
destination with the highest growth rate.
Turning to the international mobility of students, the EU 
was the main destination for Russian students, though 
other BRIC students still prefer more often to enrol in 
68  Chinese R&D expenditures more than doubled as a share of GDP between 
1996 and 2006 (to 1.42% of GDP in 2006).
US universities. In particular, the US hosted the bulk of 
the Indian, Chinese and Brazilian students. However, 
this pattern might change in the future since the EU has 
succeeded in attracting an increasing proportion of BRIC 
enrolments. BRIC student demand for tertiary education 
increased at the impressive average annual rate of 20% 
during the period 1999-2003. Among the BRICs, China 
registered the highest number of enrolments, the high-
est growth rate, and the highest mobility ratio. Among 
European countries, the UK hosted the largest number 
of BRIC students, in particular from India and China69.
With respect to the international mobility of profes-
sionals, the US is undoubtedly the preferred country of 
residence for highly qualified foreign workers. This espe-
cially applies to BRIC migration. Except for Russians, the 
US was the preferred location of highly educated BRIC 
workers, attracting 83% of the highly qualified Chinese 
workers, 82% of Indians, and 50% of Brazilians.
Among the BRICs, India was the major country of origin 
for highly qualified workers both in the Triad and in the 
EU (mainly in the UK for the latter). On the basis of Euro-
stat labour surveys, BRIC skilled migrants employed in 
the EU grew at an annual average rate of 10% over the 
period 2000-2007 – mainly due to the increase in skilled 
migration to Spain from Brazil. Given the importance of 
professional mobility in explaining “tacit” knowledge 
transfer internationally comparable data would provide 
important insights. 
Overseas innovation activities by MNCs are analysed 
by gathering data on patents where the country of the 
owner (applicant) differs from the country of the inven-
tor. The data reveal that the majority of patents owned 
by EU firms are also invented in the EU. Knowledge crea-
tion is still much less internationalised than the produc-
tion of goods. EU patents originating outside the EU 
mostly come from the US, Switzerland, Canada, and 
69  A more general and thorough discussion of the implications of highly skilled 
migration to the EU can be found in the separate chapter on migration in this 
Report.
Table 2.2:   Trade in royalties and licence fees with the EU-25, 2006 (USD million)
Partner  Exports 2006  Exports 2006 share  Exports growth rate (2003-2006)  Trade balance 2006 
World  49,334  100% 12% -16,922
EU-25  19,881  40% 10%
BRICs  2,238  4.5% 31%  2,128 
Brazil  364  0.7% 30%  350 
China  1,342  2.7% 33%  1,301 
India  230  0.5% 23%  204 
Russia  302  0.6% 29%  273 
Source: Balance of Payment Statistics, OECD Statistics on International Trade in Services 2008, Volume II, Detailed Tables by Partner 
Country.52
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Figure 2.7:   Distribution of BRIC students among   Figure 2.8: Distribution of BRIC students  
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Table 2.3:   Foreign-born workers from BRICs in the Triad, year 2000
Country of 
residence 
Number of foreign 
born workers, 
1000 persons
Share in the Triad, % Highly qualified 
foreign workers, 
1000 persons 
Share of highly 
qualified workers in 
the Triad, %
Ratio of highly 
qualified to  
foreign-born, %
EU 1,105 27 183 15 17
US 2,575 63 994 80 39
Japan 393 10 66 5 17
Triad 4,073 100 1,243 100 31
Source: OECD Migration Database, wiiw calculations.
Figure 2.9:   Share of patents originating outside the European Union in all EU-27 patent applications, 
1999-2005
0%
1%
2%
3%
4%
5%
6%
7%
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
S
h
a
r
e
 
o
f
 
a
l
l
 
E
U
 
p
a
t
e
n
t
 
a
p
p
l
i
c
a
t
i
o
n
s
BRICS
US-CA
NON EU EUROPE
NON-BRICS ASIA
Source: European Patent Office, own calculations.53
Chapter 2 — EU and BRICs: Challenges and opportunities for European competitiveness
Japan. The share of the BRICs in all patented inventions 
of the EU is just 1%, but rising fast. This increase is mainly 
due to activities in China.
The share of the other BRICs in EU patented inventions 
has remained constant over the past several years. Pat-
ents owned by BRICs but invented in the EU are still rare 
and conclusions are based on small numbers. With all 
due care, it can be concluded that Brazil and Russia are 
more oriented towards the EU, while India and China 
tend to use more inventions in the US.
2.3.  BRICs’ economic development models 
and implications for EU-policies
The BRICs show both similarities and differences in 
their interactions with the EU, the differences stem-
ming largely from their different economic develop-
ment models. Brazil is a domestically oriented service 
economy; the Russian economy is heavily dependent 
on energy exports; the Indian economy is essentially 
service-led, supported by exports; and China’s economic 
development is driven by manufacturing exports and 
investment. The recent economic policies pursued by 
the BRICs and their plans for the future suggest a cer-
tain “convergence” in their development strategies. This 
section analyses the main economic characteristics and 
determinants of development for each individual BRIC 
country, focusing on parameters relevant to external 
relations, in particular with the EU. The final subsection 
gives a brief overview of the impacts of the current glo-
bal financial and economic crisis on the BRICs and the 
measures taken to fight the crisis. Table 2.4.1 provides 
an extensive list of indicators for the individual BRICs, 
allowing for cross-country comparisons.
2.3.1.  Common features of the BRIC economies
The BRICs are characterised by large territories and pop-
ulations, relatively low income levels and fast economic 
growth. However, significant variations with respect to 
these common characteristics exist and further common 
features can be identified. In terms of territory, Russia is 
by far the largest country on earth, China ranks 3rd or 4th 
(area rank is disputed with the US), Brazil 5th and India 
7th. In terms of population, China leads with 1.3 billion 
inhabitants, closely followed by India with 1.1 billion. 
Brazil, with a population of 190 million, ranks 5th, and 
Russia with 143 million ranks 9th. Both India and Brazil 
have a very young and fast growing population, while 
the Russian population is declining and the Chinese 
population is growing slowly. The latter two countries 
face ageing problems similar to Europe’s. 
Income and wage levels in the BRICs are all significantly 
lower than in the EU, but the range is wide: Russia and 
Brazil classify as “upper-middle-income countries”, 
according to the definition of the World Bank; China is a 
“low-middle-income country”; and India is a “low-income 
country”. In terms of GDP per capita (measured in PPP), 
Russia stood at 50% of the EU-27 average, Brazil 32%, 
China 18% and India 8.5% in 2007. Average monthly 
gross wages (at exchange rates) amounted to EUR 418 
for Brazil, EUR 388 for Russia, EUR 207 for China and only 
EUR 71 for India. In terms of GDP converted at exchange 
rates, China is by far the biggest market among the 
BRICs. Chinese GDP amounted to EUR 2467 billion in 
2007, about 20% of EU-27 GDP, comparable to Ger-
many. The combined share of the other three BRICs was 
only 20%, each about 7% of EU-27 GDP. Over the period 
2000-2007, the BRICs’ GDP expanded significantly faster 
than the EU’s. The annual average growth rate for China 
was 10.1%, for India 7.6%, for Russia 5.3%, and for Brazil 
3.4%. Over a medium-term perspective, the catching-up 
process in the BRICs is expected to continue and their 
role in the global economy will further increase.
Income distribution is very unequal in all BRICs (Gini 
coefficients range from 0.37 in India to 0.57 in Brazil). 
The top 10% income earners receive more than 30% of 
all incomes and a sizeable, prosperous middle class is 
emerging. This leads to very fragmented markets, which 
European companies doing business in the BRICs have 
to bear in mind.
The role of the state in all BRIC economies is substantial, 
with frequent direct and indirect state interventions. In 
general, the state plays a much more prominent role 
in Russia and China than in India or Brazil. At the same 
time, the BRICs score relatively low when it comes to 
regulatory quality, rule of law, control of corruption and 
political stability (see “Institutional and policy frame-
work” indicators in Table 2.4.1). 
Inward FDI is considered an important means to sup-
port the catching-up process, and the BRICs represent 
an attractive location for foreign investors. However, 
various restrictions, such as controls on the extent and 
proportion of shares held or the existence of protected 
sectors are still in place, although to varying degrees 
and changing over time. Outward FDI stocks held by 
the BRICs are still small, but rising rapidly. Average tariff 
levels in the BRICs are low, but tariff peaks still exist and 
numerous non-tariff barriers (NTB) have gained impor-
tance. Brazil, India and China are members of the World 
Trade Organisation (WTO). Russia’s WTO membership is 
still pending.
All BRICs are important regional economic players, 
and are also global players in certain fields (e.g. Brazil 
in biofuels, Russia in energy supply, India in IT serv-
ices and China in manufacturing). Finally, all BRICs aim 
to upgrade their industrial structures towards higher 
value-added and technology-intensive products, fre-54
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quently supported by government programmes and 
specific industrial policies. A trend towards increased 
R&D expenditures can be observed. 
2.3.2.  Different models of economic development
2.3.2.1.  Brazil
Brazil is currently following the model of a domestically 
oriented service-driven economy, with a relatively large 
private sector and foreign direct investment playing an 
important role. The private sector generates more than 
80% of GDP. In 2007, the country was the second larg-
est recipient of FDI among emerging markets, just after 
China. FDI inflows amounted to EUR 24 billion and the 
stock of FDI reached 19% of GDP. A large part of this 
stock goes back to the privatization wave in the 1990s, 
including the privatisation of public services and tele-
communications but several large industrial complexes 
as well.
After travelling down a bumpy road for many years, 
the Brazilian economy has entered a more sustainable 
growth path since the beginning of the new millen-
nium, backed by an IMF stabilisation programme first 
and the prudent macroeconomic policy of the Brazilian 
government later on. A credit boom, allied with various 
social programmes, has increased the purchasing power 
of many low-income earners. The subsequent rise in 
household consumption together with an increase in 
investments and public spending explain to a large part 
the significant GDP growth in the period 2000-2007. On 
the supply side, the expansion was largely supported 
by domestic services. In 2007, the services sector had a 
dominant share of 66% in GDP. Industry had a share of 
28% and is highly concentrated70 in a few competitive 
technology-intensive sectors, such as aerospace, biofu-
els and automotives (none of them very prominent on 
EU markets). The share of exports of goods and services 
in GDP is relatively small, amounting to just 12% and 
1.7 % of GDP, respectively.
The neglect of infrastructure, persistently high income 
inequality, a large informal sector, low productivity and 
little innovation are important drawbacks. To tackle 
some of these problems, the Brazilian government has 
launched two important initiatives, which have also con-
sequences for external economic relations. In May 2004, 
the government announced a new “Industrial, Techno-
logical and External Trade Policy”, intended to create a 
more favourable environment for industrial develop-
ment and facilitate entrepreneurship. In the short term, 
70  In 2004, SMEs represented 99% of the number of firms and 65% of all for-
mal employment in the country, but their value added amounted to only 35%. By 
comparison, the US had a similar proportion of SMEs (98%), but with a value added 
amounting to 65% (FIESP, 2005).
the government aims to reduce existing restrictions on 
trade. In the medium to long term, it intends to foster 
the development of key activities and technologies that 
would increase Brazil’s international competitiveness 
(DIEESE, 2005)71. In 2008, the government announced 
new tax incentives for investment, R&D, and exports. The 
new programme also contains four macro-targets: (i) to 
increase the ratio of investment to GDP; (ii) to stimulate 
innovation via an increase in private R&D; (iii) to increase 
the share of Brazilian exports in world exports; and (iv) 
to increase the number of SME exporters. To reach these 
targets, horizontal policies, sectoral programmes and 
public support focusing on long-term “strategic themes”, 
such as strengthening SMEs, regional integration, inte-
gration with Africa, etc., will be used72.
The long-term prospects of the Brazilian economy look 
relatively bright. The most accepted scenario before the 
current global crisis was annual average GDP growth 
between 3% and 4% in the next ten years (Ernst & 
Young, 2008; IEA, 2006). But it may grow faster if the 
above mentioned reforms are implemented successfully 
and less if the current global economic crisis slides into a 
prolonged recession.
Regional economic cooperation and relations with the EU
Brazil plays a key role within Mercosur and in the nego-
tiation of free trade agreements with third countries 
(including the EU). The EU is currently negotiating a free 
trade agreement with Mercosur.
2.3.2.2.  Russia
The Russian economic development model has under-
gone significant changes in the past two decades during 
the transition from a centrally planned to a market econ-
omy. A phase of excessive liberalisation in the 1990s was 
followed by a phase of “recentralisation” after 1998 and 
a strengthening of the role of the state. In 2007, the pri-
vate sector generated 65% of GDP, a similar proportion 
as in China. The rapid expansion of the economy during 
the period 2000-2008 was largely due to surging inter-
national commodity prices, in particular for oil and gas, 
which pushed up export revenues, incomes, employ-
ment and thus domestic consumption, and to a lesser 
extent investment as well. On the supply side, growth 
was supported by services and by residential construc-
tion whereas industry and agriculture expanded rela-
tively less. FDI supported growth and economic restruc-
turing as well, but the stock of FDI is still small due to 
many sectoral restrictions (e.g. in energy and other min-
erals) as well as a number of institutional impediments. 
71  The main measures announced in the PITCE industrial policy can be found in 
DIEESE (2005).
72  For details of the new industrial policy, see MDIC (2008) or IEDI (2008).55
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The large windfall gains from high world market prices for 
energy and metals enabled the government to repay most 
of its outstanding debts and to accumulate large foreign 
exchange reserves, to initiate several national develop-
ment projects targeting infrastructure, housing, the health 
sector, education and agriculture and, after prolonged dis-
cussions, to implement industrial policy measures aiming 
at the modernisation and diversification of the economy.
The shadow sides of the commodity price boom were 
(apart from growing nationalism and a revival of certain 
Soviet stereotypes): high inflation, strong appreciation of 
the rouble without a corresponding increase in produc-
tivity, and rising inequality. However, the main shortcom-
ing of the model has been the high dependence on the 
oil price. The main challenge for the Russian economy 
in the medium and long run is whether it will succeed 
in replacing energy exports as the key growth driver by 
developing other sectors and how it will cope with the 
acute demographic crisis (the population is projected to 
decline by about 8 million in the coming decade).
Major threats to sustained growth are a consistently low 
oil price (for instance due to a prolonged global recession) 
and institutional bottlenecks hindering the implementa-
tion of the New Industrial Policy. Failed diversification 
may lead to a gradual erosion of international competi-
tiveness, due to real appreciation, rising wage costs and 
sluggish improvements in labour produc  tivity. Russia’s 
pending membership in the WTO has been repeatedly 
delayed. With falling export revenues in the aftermath of 
the global financial crisis, the envisaged ambitious mod-
ernisation and restructuring investment plans will have to 
be scaled down. Forecast GDP growth for 2009 fluctuates 
between -8% to +2% (the consensus average is -4%), but 
a modest recovery is expected for 2010. In the medium 
and long run, GDP is expected to grow by 4-6% on aver-
age (Development Centre, 2009).
Regional economic cooperation and relations with the EU
Russia is a leading member of the Commonwealth 
of Independent States (CIS), which includes 12 of the 
former 15 Soviet Republics (excluding the Baltic States). 
With the EU, Russia concluded a “Partnership and Coop-
eration Agreement” in 1995, which expired in 2007 but 
was prolonged automatically. In parallel, negotiations 
on a “Strategic Partnership Agreement” are taking place. 
Major challenges for the negotiations include energy 
issues, EU (and NATO) Eastern enlargement and the EU’s 
(Eastern) Neighbourhood Policy, where EU and Russian 
interests clash.
2.3.2.3.  India
India has a highly diverse and extremely complex social 
structure and economy, extending from labour-intensive 
handicraft to a wide range of modern industries, from 
low-productivity informal services to highly skilled and 
capital-intensive “new” services. Linguistically, it has the 
most diverse population in the world, with 14 official lan-
guages other than English and social divisions extending 
beyond religious and ethnic groups to caste divisions.
The phase of high growth in India began in the 1980s. 
Since then, development has been essentially service-
led and supported by services exports, which have a 
much higher share in GDP (8%) than in the other BRICs. 
The boom in services was triggered by private (market) 
services rather than public services, comprising a vast 
mass of differentiated, but largely unorganized low-
productivity activities. Services exports were driven by 
software, IT and other business services. With a share of 
66% (in 2006) in total services exports India has become 
the world’s top exporter of computer and information 
services73. Despite recent growth, merchandise exports 
are still relatively low (10% of GDP) and export success 
has been restricted to a few sectors (see section 1). There 
are some signs that India is becoming part of the “Asian 
supplier network”74.
The rapid development of the Indian economy was sup-
ported by various government measures to liberalise the 
economy, both internally and externally. These include 
the privatisation of state assets (while leaving a sub-
stantial proportion under state control), various trade 
liberalisation measures, a shift to market-determined 
exchange rates and the liberalisation of current account 
and some capital account transactions, including the 
easing of rules for FDI. Changes in the FDI regime were 
substantial, with the government moving from fairly 
strict controls to a much more liberal regime based on 
relatively easy permissions and a small “negative list”. 
Foreign ownership up to 100% is allowed under the 
automatic route, without approval, in most sectors and 
activities. But the FDI stock is still low and much of the 
new investment inflow is not “greenfield” investment but 
acquisition by private equity firms, making it essentially 
portfolio investment.
The negative sides of the Indian economic develop-
ment model include a high surplus of labour, a large 
informal sector, very low wages, a low level of general 
education and technical qualifications in particular, and 
a shortage or even lack of all types of infrastructure. The 
increase in employment is due mainly to self-employ-
ment, especially in the countryside, and only a tiny 
minority (around 5-6%) of India’s workforce is employed 
under formal work contracts in the organised sector. Yet 
73  However, there is a high degree of concentration of such exports to just a few 
countries (the US accounting for 61% and the UK for 18% of India’s IT-BOP export 
revenues in 2006-2007 – see Reserve Bank of India, 2009).
74  The most dramatic increase in manufacturing exports has been to China, in 
supplying metals and other intermediates for further processing for the US and 
European markets.56
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despite very low school enrolment at all levels, India’s 
population is sufficiently large to make even the small 
minority of highly educated workers appear significant 
by international standards. There are at least a hundred 
million actual or potential young workers in urban and 
semi-urban areas with some skills or qualifications that 
can be tapped for productive work75.
To tackle some of these problems and to sustain growth 
in the future, the Indian government has significantly 
increased funding for education and is pushing infra-
structure investment as well. Several new government 
programmes support the ailing rural economy. The most 
prominent example is the National Rural Employment 
Guarantee Act, which promises 100 days of employment 
to every rural household. It has now been extended to 
cover all districts of India after demonstrating its enor-
mous potential and the possibility of very large positive 
multiplier effects in several parts of India76. The so-called 
Bharat Nirman programme is devoted to expanding 
rural infrastructure.
India’s longer-term growth prospects will largely depend 
on whether it can reap its potential “demographic divi-
dend”. The essential source of this dividend is the decline 
in dependency ratios and an increase in worker-popula-
tion ratios, which, even in the case of little or no increase 
in labour productivity, would lead to improved output 
performance and growth. However, this will depend 
crucially on the ability to educate and find productive 
employment for India’s bulge of young people.
Regional economic cooperation and relations with the EU
India is a member of the South Asian Free Trade Agree-
ment, it has signed bilateral FTAs with Thailand and Sri 
Lanka and is looking for closer links with the ASEAN Free 
Trade Area. Negotiations for an FTA with the EU are cur-
rently in progress.
2.3.2.4.  China
China’s economic system is a “socialist market economy”, 
with markets occupying a pivotal role, but public own-
ership, a direct government role in the economy (e.g. 
subsidies, credit controls, export licences) and industrial 
policy being an integral part of the system. Currently, 
the private sector is estimated to produce about 65% 
of GDP. China’s fast economic growth has been driven 
mainly by manufacturing exports and investment. FDI 
plays an important role, especially for exports (more 
than 50% of exports are produced by companies under 
75  In particular, because much of higher education is conducted in English, 
there is a significant body of educated workers proficient in English.
76  There are already calls for extending the Employment Guarantee Act to the 
urban areas as well. 
foreign ownership). In 2007, goods exports accounted 
for a share of 36% in GDP, the highest of all BRICs, with 
more than 90% of this taken up by manufacturing 
(see section 1). However, a large part of these exports 
is “processing trade”, based on imported intermedi-
ates. The share of investment in GDP is extremely high 
(42% in 2007) and infrastructure investment accounts 
for an important part of this. The most decisive step in 
China’s opening-up policy was the country’s accession 
to the WTO in December 2001: tariffs were slashed and 
investment rules were eased. But with lower tariffs, non-
tariff barriers have gained in importance and significant 
restrictions on FDI have remained with regard to the 
proportion of shares held and the field of activity77. Also, 
China has not yet joined the WTO “Agreement on Gov-
ernment Procurement” (GPA).
As exports have been rising much faster than imports, 
China runs massive surpluses (mainly with the US and 
the EU) and has accumulated huge foreign exchange 
reserves. To counter these imbalances, in July 2005 
China abandoned the dollar peg and shifted to a system 
of managed float, with reference to a basket of curren-
cies in which the dollar still has big weight. In particular, 
70% of Chinese foreign exchange reserves are held in 
dollar-denominated assets. In September 2007, with 
the aim of investing its foreign exchange reserves more 
effectively, the Chinese government set up a so-called 
“sovereign wealth fund”. As with other sovereign wealth 
funds, for instance that of Russia, this has roused con-
cerns in other countries that investment strategies will 
favour the wider strategic goals of the Chinese govern-
ment rather than purely commercial interests. In addi-
tion, direct investment by Chinese public and private 
enterprises is being promoted by the so-called “go 
abroad” policy. So far, the most spectacular Chinese 
investments have been made outside Europe, mainly to 
acquire raw material resources, but there are examples 
of acquisitions of European companies as well78.
Despite generating fast growth for over three decades, 
the Chinese system has come under criticism recently 
because of rising income inequalities, environmental 
degradation, rapidly increasing energy demand and 
large external imbalances. A new model of “qualitative 
growth” has been propagated by the Chinese govern-
ment since 2003, emphasising domestically oriented 
growth, industrial restructuring towards higher value-
added industries, cleaner and more energy-efficient 
technologies, and more balanced regional and sectoral 
77  The government regularly publishes the so-called “Catalogue for the guid-
ance of foreign investment industries”. The catalogue classifies industries for 
potential investment as prohibited, restricted (for instance, only permitted in a 
joint venture with a Chinese partner) or encouraged (investment the government 
wants to support, sometimes with incentives). Investment that does not fit into 
one of these three categories is considered permissible, but there are no policy 
support incentives.
78  Low asset prices due to the current financial and economic crisis will prob-
ably make European companies more attractive for Chinese investors.57
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development. To support this policy, a revised “Industrial 
Restructuring Catalogue” and a new “Catalogue for the 
guidance of foreign investment industries” have been 
drafted, to encourage, for instance, investment in mod-
ern agriculture, resource conservation and environmental 
protection, advanced technologies and new materials.
China’s long-term growth prospects are predominantly 
positive, as there is a long list of opportunities in sup-
port of high growth, such as continued urbanization, 
improvement of the institutional and regulatory frame-
work, restructuring and technological upgrading of 
industry, new fields for industrial activity (e.g. renewa-
ble energy, environmental technologies) and increased 
regional trade resulting from closer regional economic 
cooperation. Depending on the weights attached to the 
different challenges and opportunities, assessments of 
the future outlook for the Chinese economy vary. How-
ever, most current estimates of China’s long-term GDP 
growth until 2020 range between an annual 6% and 9% 
average79. This is also in line with the Chinese govern-
ment’s growth target of 7-8% per year. The question 
is whether and how the current global crisis will affect 
these estimates. If the crisis is over in one or two years, 
little will change, but if the world slides into a prolonged 
recession, this will probably result in 1-2 percentage 
points less growth in China than otherwise – still an 
impressive performance.
Regional economic relations and relations with the EU
China is an important regional player engaged in various 
regional cooperation programmes within the ASEAN+3 
(Japan, Rep. Korea, China) framework. In 2010, a free 
trade agreement between China and ASEAN will become 
effective. China’s relations with the EU are still based on 
the “EEC-China Trade and Economic Cooperation Agree-
ment” from 1985. Since 2007, the two parties have been 
negotiating a “Partnership and Cooperation Agreement” 
(PCA). Major issues on the Chinese side include: the EU’s 
arms embargo and restrictions on “dual use technolo-
gies” (in force since 1989), full market economy status, 
and antidumping and other discriminatory practices 
applied by the EU against China.
2.3.3.  Impacts of the global crisis on the BRICs
Initial hopes that the BRICs would be able to “de-couple” 
from the economic slowdown in the Triad countries have 
79  IMF (2004) estimated a GDP growth rate of 7.6% for the period 2002-2020; 
Justin Lin Yifu, chief economist of the World Bank, forecast a long-term growth rate 
of about 8% when he was still head of Beijing University’s China Center for Eco-
nomic Research in 2007 (quoted from Harvard Business Review’s Chinese edition 
in China Daily, 2-4 May 2008). A growth model estimated by Chinese researchers 
suggests growth rates between 6.7% and 9.3% for the period 2008-2020, depend-
ing on different policy options, such as government sector reform, investment in 
education, and improvement of the social security system (see Wang, Fan and Liu 
(2009), quoted in Wang and Fan (2009a)).
not materialised. The main mechanism of transmission 
has been rapidly declining exports and the correspond-
ing multiplier effects: decreasing FDI and plummeting 
stock prices. In some countries (Russia, India and Brazil), 
there has been a significant outflow of financial capital 
as well. China is the BRIC country most dependent on 
foreign trade, with exports reaching a GDP share of 36 % 
in 2007. Nearly half of Chinese exports go to the Triad. 
In the early stages of the crisis China was successful in 
penetrating new markets including the other BRICs to 
substitute for declining demand from the Triad, but with 
the crisis turning global this strategy is no longer sus-
tainable80. The Russian economy is highly dependent on 
energy exports and thus has suffered in particular from 
the declining real demand and falling prices for oil in the 
wake of the crisis. India and Brazil are both more domes-
tically oriented economies with exports representing 
only around 10% of GDP, and were thus less severely 
affected by the fall in external demand.
To fight the crisis, all countries have adopted financial 
and/or fiscal measures. Brazil is focusing on financial 
measures to shelter its currency and to secure credit 
supply, but has introduced cuts in taxes on capi-
tal goods and durable consumer goods to stimulate 
domestic demand as well. Russia has launched a com-
prehensive rescue package for domestic banks, and 
supports the exchange rate and consumption by draw-
ing on its accumulated reserves and raising new debt 
(the combined costs of these measures amount to some 
10% of GDP). India is trying to keep credit supply alive 
in order to support domestic demand and to speed up 
infrastructure investment. China has adopted a massive 
fiscal stimulus package and various rescue measures, 
including increased expenditures on infrastructure, 
consumer subsidies and support for its ailing export 
industries.
Russia is so far the most affected economy because of 
both declining demand and lower prices for oil. China 
appears to be least affected due to its massive stimu-
lus policies and the huge domestic market. In the short 
term, the crisis may delay restructuring processes in the 
BRICs, but in the medium and longer term it is likely to 
reinforce existing development plans and make these 
economies stronger and more independent. The latest 
IMF forecasts in July 2009 suggest a growth rate in 2009 
of -1.3% for Brazil, -6.5% for Russia, 5.4% for India and 
7.5% for China. But national forecasts are more optimis-
tic for Brazil, India and partly China as well (the reverse 
is true for Russia). Several statistical indicators suggest 
80  In 2007, the share of the BRICs in Chinese exports reached 5.2%. In 2008, it 
went up to 5.8% but in the first five months of 2009, down again to 4.9%. However, 
Brazilian exports to China (Chinese imports from Brazil) boomed: according to Bra-
zil’s industrial and foreign trade authorities, the country’s export to China in March 
2009 amounted to USD 1737 billion, a 134.6% leap from a year earlier. That means 
China has surpassed the US and become Brazil’s largest export market. The value 
of China-Brazil trade increased to USD 3.2 billion in April 2009, more than Brazil’s 
trade of USD 2.8 billion with the US (China Daily, 20 May 2009).58
European Competitiveness Report 2009
that three of the BRICs economies might be bottoming 
out earlier than the advanced economies, whereby gov-
ernment stimulus measures seem to be playing a cru-
cial role. In the case of Brazil, for instance, sales of dura-
ble consumer goods have returned to pre-crisis levels, 
investment in the first quarter of 2009 was up 19%, and 
money from abroad is flowing in again. On the supply 
side, construction is doing well and industry is recover-
ing. In India, industry is showing signs of revival as well, 
and the government is continuing with tax cuts and 
other incentives for corporations. In China, the strong-
est positive signal comes from fixed asset investment, 
boosted by public expenditures. Investment increased 
by about 30% in the first quarter of 2009, faster than in 
the same period last year. Private consumption, which 
slowed significantly at the beginning of the year, is pick-
ing up as well. Industry, which suffered the heaviest 
slump of all sectors in the economy, seems to have hit 
bottom at last. A significant rebound in stock prices can 
be observed in all BRIC countries.
Table 2.4.1: BRIC List of Indicators Year 2007 (if not mentioned otherwise)
Brazil Russia India China 1)
MACRO INDICATORS
Size of the economy
Land area, 1000 km² 8515 17075 3288 9600
Population, average, mn 189 2006 143 2006 1110 2006 1321 2006
- Population aged 0-14, % of total  27.6 2006 14.9 2006 32.5 2006 21.1 2006
- Population aged 15-64, % of total  66.2 2006 71.4 2006 62.4 2006 71.1 2006
- Population aged 65 and above, % of total  6.3 2006 13.7 2006 5.0 2006 7.8 2006
GDP in EUR at exchange rates, EUR bn 973 946 759 2467
GDP in EUR at exchange rates, EU27=100 7.9 7.7 6.2 20.0
GDP in EUR at PPP per capita 7839 12400 2108 4464
GDP in EUR at PPP per capita, EU27=100 31.5 49.8 8.5 17.9
Distribution
Gini coefficient (based on all household incomes) 0.56 2006 0.40 2002 0.37 2005 0.47
Share of top 10% income earners, % of total 44.9 2005 30.6 2002 31.1 2005 34.9 2004
Role of the state
Private sector, % of GDP 83 2) 2006 65 80 65
Employees in private enterprises, % of total 96.1 2006 56.4 95.4 75.0
Demand side factors, foreign trade
Exports of goods, % of GDP 12.0 27.4 9.6 36.0
Imports of goods, % of GDP 9.0 17.3 14.5 28.3
Exports of services, % of GDP 1.7 2006 3.0 8.2 3.6
Imports of services, % of GDP  2.6 2006 4.6 4.7 3.8
Current account, % of GDP 0.1 5.9 1.6 11.0
Share of Investment, % of GDP 17.7 24.7 39.7 42.3
Share of final consumption, % of GDP 80.7 66.5 46.0 48.8
Effectively applied tariff, % 12.2 8.3 14.0 8.8
Foreign direct investment
FDI inward stock, EUR bn 172 34 52 516
FDI inward stock, % of GDP 19.0 3.6 7.3 22.5
FDI outward stock, EUR bn  43 21 54
Human resources and research
Total number of persons employed, mn 87 68 450 770
Average gross monthly wages, EUR  418 388 71 207
School enrolment secondary, % of relevant age group 106 2006 91 2006 54 2006 76 2006
School enrolment tertiary, % of relevant age group 24 2006 70 2006 11 2006 22 2006
Number of researchers, per 10000 persons employed 10 2004 63 2006 3 2000 16
R&D expenditures, % of GDP 1.11 1.07 2006 0.75 1.49
IT expenditure, % of GDP 6.4 2006 3.2 2006 6.1 2006 5.4 200659
Chapter 2 — EU and BRICs: Challenges and opportunities for European competitiveness
Brazil Russia India China 1)
Physical Infrastructure
Roads, total network, km per 1000 km2 188 2006 55 1020 373
Rail-lines, total route, km per 1000 km2 3 5 33 8
Air transport, registered carrier departures worldwide, mn 560838 2006 421170 2006 453921 2006 1542564 2006
Fixed and mobile phone subscribers, per 100 population 84 146 23 69
Internet subscribers, per 100 people 4 21 1 11
Institutional and policy framework
Regulatory quality, (score -2.5 to + 2.5) -0.04 -0.44 -0.22 -0.24
Rule of law, (score (-2.5 to + 2.5) -0.44 -0.97 0.10 -0.45
Control of corruption, (score -2.5 to + 2.5) -0.24 -0.92 -0.39 -0.66
Political stability index, (score -2.5 to + 2.5) -0.22 -0.75 -1.01 -0.33
Economic freedom index, (score 0-100; top=100) 3)  56.7 50.8 54.4 53.2
Country risk ranking, (1-157), rank 4) 63 61 59 54
SECTORAL INDICATORS
Share of agriculture, % of GDP 6.0 4.1 16.3 11.3
Share of industry, % of GDP 28.1 33.1 26.7 48.7
Share of services, % of GDP 66.0 51.1 55.7 40.1
Market services, % in total services 66.0 77.5 75.0 61.0
DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS
Population projection for 2020
- Total population, mn  209 135 1367 1431
- Population aged 0-14, % of total  20.1 16.7 26.7 18.7
- Population aged 15-64, % of total  70.4 67.9 67.0 69.6
- Population aged 65 and above, % of total  9.6 15.4 6.3 11.7
Average annual growth rates, %
- GDP( 2000-2007) 3.4 5.3 7.6 10.1
- Agriculture (1995-2007) 4.1 1.4 3.2 3.9
- Industry (1995-2007) 2.3 4.3 6.1 11.2
- Services (1995-2007) 2.9 . 8.7 10.2
GDP growth, 2009 (IMF forecast), %5) -1.3 -6.0 4.50 6.5
Notes: 1) Excluding Hong Kong and Macao – 2) Total revenues of private enterprises, share in % – 3) 100-80: free; 79.9-70: mostly free; 
69.9-60: moderately free; 59.9-50: mostly unfree; 49.9-0: repressed – 4) Euromoney country risk rating, March 2008. Rank 1 represents 
the lowest and rank 157 the highest risk – 5) IMF, World Economic Outlook, April 2009 and July 2009.
2.4.  The role of the BRICs in the EU’s future 
energy needs: partners and competitors
2.4.1.  Global oil and gas demand
Oil and gas demand is forecast to continue to rise over 
the next few decades. Scenarios from the IEA’s latest 
World Energy Outlook (2008 edition) envisage a rise in 
global oil consumption from 4 billion tonnes of oil equiv-
alent (btoe) in 2006 up to around 5 btoe in 2030. Slightly 
more than half of that increase is predicted to come 
from China and India, which, together, may be consum-
ing over 1 btoe by 2030. However, a small decrease is 
forecast for both the EU and the US. The picture for nat-
ural gas is somewhat different. Total demand is forecast 
to rise more strongly in relative terms (approximately by 
50% as compared to 25% for oil), bringing total demand 
from around 2.4 btoe in 2006 to around 3.6 btoe in 2030. 
The other major difference is that China and India are, 
and are predicted to remain, only quite modest con-
sumers. The growth in gas consumption up to 2030 is 
forecast to occur primarily in the Middle East. In all, the 
economic rise of China and India is leading to a substan-
tial re-distribution in relative market shares for oil, but 
not for gas.
2.4.2.  EU net import demand and the 20-20-20 
Initiative
The 20-20-20 Initiative calls for the EU, by the year 2020, 
to achieve a 20% cut in greenhouse gas emissions as 
compared to 1990 levels, a 20% improvement in energy 
efficiency, and “a 20% share” of renewables in the energy 
mix. According to various scenarios, the EU’s demand for 
net imports of oil, gas and coal under the initiative should 
be at levels similar to those seen in 2005 by the year 2020. 60
European Competitiveness Report 2009
This represents a major departure from even very recent 
energy demand scenarios, and the change is particularly 
significant for natural gas. Without the initiative, demand 
for net imports of natural gas is predicted to be in the 
range of around 380-450 billion cubic metres (bcm) per 
year by 2020 (depending on mid-term oil price scenarios 
ranging from USD 61 to USD 100 per barrel). With the 
Initiative, that range narrows and falls to a range of 284 
to 337 bcm, as compared to 298 bcm in 2005.
2.4.3.  Russian oil and gas reserves and production
Russia holds around 6.4% of the world’s oil reserves and 
around 25% of the world’s gas reserves. Furthermore, it 
is the world’s biggest gas producer and the second big-
gest oil producer. Russia has so far benefited greatly from 
being outside OPEC, as it was able to take full advantage 
of soaring oil prices and increased production over the 
1999-2007 period. However, the expansion of production 
has declined markedly in recent years, reaching a peak of 
9.44 million barrels per day (mbd) in 2007. In 2008, the 
country’s oil production even fell slightly, to 9.36 mbd. 
Further growth would require large-scale investments 
in distant and challenging locations (notably in eastern 
Siberia). The partial re-nationalization of the oil sector 
has also hampered efficiency in the sector.
Inefficiencies are even more characteristic of the strongly 
monopolised Russian natural gas sector, which is domi-
nated by the state-controlled Gazprom. The deple-
tion of Gazprom’s mature gas fields, and delays in the 
exploitation of new fields have led some observers to 
predict that Gazprom’s production might plunge mark-
edly in the next decade. At the same time, there are a 
number of factors arguing against the “supply crunch” 
scenario: future extraction from new fields; the possibil-
ity of increasing supplies from Central Asia; the sizeable 
potential for energy saving within Russia; the possibility 
of reducing leakages and flaring; and the likely increased 
readiness of the Russian authorities to attract foreign 
capital, technology and know-how, as the current crisis 
is biting into Gazprom’s financial resources.
2.4.4.  EU-Russia energy relationship
Although Russia signed the EU Energy Charter back in 
1994, it has never ratified it, giving grounds to claims 
that the country is not bound by its provisions. This 
effectively closes the Russian pipeline network to foreign 
investment. In addition, the energy sector in Russia is 
defined as “strategic”, imposing official limits on foreign 
participation in this particular area. Conversely, Russian 
investments in the EU energy sector has been generally 
constrained as well. That said, there are important Euro-
pean investments in the Russian energy sector, notably: 
a venture to develop the Shtokman offshore gas deposit; 
the production-sharing agreement Sakhalin-2; and the 
development of the Yuzhno-Russkoye gas deposit. Sub-
stantial Russian investments in the EU include partici-
pation in the gas sector of Hungary, Slovakia, Germany 
and Italy. There are also important gas pipeline projects, 
in particular Nord Stream (a joint venture between 
Gazprom, EON, BASF and Gasunie) and South Stream (a 
joint venture between Gazprom and ENI). 
In addition, three important issues deserve special 
attention: (1) the possible creation of a “gas OPEC”; 
(2) the possibility of Russia cooperating with OPEC in 
the current environment of low oil prices; and (3) Rus-
sia’s efforts towards diversifying its energy exports away 
from Europe to Asia. Due to regional fragmentation of 
the market for natural gas, any worldwide gas cartel is 
unfeasible, while any cartel confined to the EU would 
require numerous (and difficult) renegotiations of exist-
ing long-term contracts. Russia’s participation in OPEC 
proper (the oil cartel) is almost equally problematic. The 
recent history of Russia-OPEC relations has been essen-
tially a history of non-cooperation. Also, half of the Rus-
sian oil industry is privately owned, which makes it more 
difficult for the government to coordinate its efforts 
with those of the OPEC governments. As for Russia’s 
publicly-stated aspirations to diversify its energy exports 
away from Europe (most notably to Asia and particu-
larly China) this has limited potential as well. Currently, 
there are only minor oil exports to China (just 0.3 mbd), 
although some new transport infrastructure is under 
construction or planned. The prospects of Russian gas 
exports to China are less encouraging, as the Chinese 
side insists on gas prices that are too low compared to 
Russian production costs.
The EU’s gas market is de facto segmented along national 
lines. This segmentation is further strengthened by the 
domination of pipeline-bound imports and long-term 
supply contracts. This structure yields a lock-in effect, 
which makes liberalisation of the EU’s internal gas mar-
ket difficult to achieve, as a blocking minority of Mem-
ber State governments have felt that (full) liberalisation 
would make their situation less favourable. This phenom-
enon was noted when the European Commission tried to 
introduce ownership unbundling and the “third country 
clause” in late 2007. While a compromise solution has 
now been found, the debate on unbundling suggests 
that bilateral relations between some Member States and 
Russia may continue to dominate over broader arrange-
ments between the EU as a whole and Russia.
The Second Strategic Energy Review is another major 
institutional development on the EU side. Many aspects 
of the Review have the prospect of further disruptions of 
Russian supplies firmly in mind, and the particularly vul-
nerable NMS occupy an important place in the Commis-
sion’s vision for infrastructure investments. In particular, 
the need for such investments was illustrated by the 61
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heavy economic losses incurred by Bulgaria during the 
latest supply cut-off in January 2009. The most recent 
and potentially most far-reaching change on the EU side 
is, however, the Joint Declaration signed on 23 March 
2009 between the European Commission, the Govern-
ment of Ukraine, the EBRD, the EIB and the World Bank. 
Russia has strongly criticised the EU-Ukraine agreement, 
and has in essence argued that it makes little sense to 
make decisions on gas transit infrastructure without the 
agreement of the supplier (see also CEPS, 2009).
2.4.5.  Biofuels and the EU-Brazil energy relationship
Bioenergy is among the renewable energy sources often 
considered to play a key role in the short run in reduc-
ing carbon emissions. Global production of biofuels 
amounts to 62 billion litres, equal to about 1.8% of total 
global transport fuel consumption in energy terms. Brazil 
and the US account together for almost three-quarters 
of global biofuels supply. The main biofuel produced 
in Europe is biodiesel, representing 80% of production. 
Europe is the world’s biggest producer, accounting for 
almost two-thirds of world output. Germany, France and 
Italy are the largest biodiesel producers and users. The 
EU’s biofuels sector has undergone very rapid growth 
with a 28.2% annual production increase since the year 
2000. In Brazil, bioethanol represented 40% of the light 
fuels consumed (gasoline plus bioethanol) in 2005. In 
that year, total installed production capacity was 18 bil-
lion litres of bioethanol. The country has also received a 
huge inflow of FDI in this area. From 2002 to 2007, more 
than EUR 1.6 billion was invested by foreigners in the 
Brazilian bioethanol sector.
Biofuels production and trade are, however, subject 
to quite significant support policies at national level 
in many countries. The use of biodiesel is much more 
dependent on public support than the use of bioetha-
nol. According to an OECD study (OECD, 2008), the 
removal of these policies would substantially affect the 
(private) profitability of biofuel production and use in 
those countries where production costs are particularly 
high. Bioethanol production would be less affected, 
given the more efficient industries in the US and par-
ticularly in Brazil. By contrast, world biodiesel produc-
tion (dominated by the EU industry) would decline by 
more than a quarter after removal of all support policies 
and grow much more slowly thereafter. Consequently, 
three core issues will affect the future of biofuels pro-
duction and trade for the European Union. One is the 
ongoing work on standardisation (together with Brazil 
and the US) which should facilitate trade; the second is 
the extent to which the EU and its Member States will 
continue to support domestic production and in what 
ways; the third is the extent to which the EU will con-
sider lowering trade barriers for imports of biofuels, with 
Brazil as a potential major source country.
2.5.  Conclusions
Both the increasing weight of the BRIC economies and 
their rising and varying scope of interactions with the EU 
call for special policy treatment, in particular regarding 
industrial and trade policies, energy security, intellec-
tual property rights, etc81. The type and scale of the chal-
lenges for EU policies are largely shaped by each BRIC’s 
model of economic development.
The foremost challenge for the EU is the strong role 
of the state in the BRIC economies (taking the form of 
various subsidies, privileged access to bank loans or raw 
materials, or tax preferences, especially for the state-
owned enterprises), which makes BRIC exports to the 
EU more competitive and impairs the competitiveness 
of EU companies on both home and third markets. State 
presence is particularly high in Russia and China, and has 
increased recently also in reaction to the global crisis. 
Dumping on EU and third markets is a greater challenge 
in the case of an export-driven economy like China, 
while in domestically oriented economies like India and 
Brazil, unfair competition on the home markets figures 
prominently. These issues have to be raised emphati-
cally in the ongoing dialogues with the BRICs, such as 
the negotiations of a new “Partnership and Cooperation 
Agreement” between the EU and China or the new EU-
Russia “Strategic Partnership”.
Other challenges arise from the weak regulatory frame-
work and various institutional impediments in the BRICs, 
such as the uneven enforcement of laws, non-tariff bar-
riers to trade including certification procedures and 
standards, and environmental regulations and labour 
laws that often discriminate against foreign (EU) compa-
nies. Thus, the implementation of rules, as much as the 
rules themselves, poses a major challenge for EU policy. 
Prominent examples are intellectual property rights pro-
tection and its enforcement in China, labour legislation 
in India and Russia, and environmental regulations in 
both Russia and China. To improve the situation, the EU 
should continue to share its experience in these fields 
and its methods of implementation with the BRICs.
81  This is reflected in the numerous EU strategies and policy papers relating 
to individual BRICs, the ongoing negotiations for a “Partnership and Coopera-
tion Agreement” (PCA) with China and a “Strategic Partnership” (SP) with Brazil 
and the aim of upgrading or replacing the existing PCA with Russia with an SP. 
With India, after conclusion of an SP in 2004, a “Free Trade Agreement” has been 
under negotiation since 2007. In addition, there are various joint committees, 
high-level dialogues and negotiations as well as scientific and technical coopera-
tion programmes. The EU’s New Industrial Policy, “Implementing the Community 
Lisbon Programme: A policy framework to strengthen EU manufacturing towards 
a more integrated approach for industrial policy” (COM(2005) 474 final), includes 
several cross-sectoral initiatives on competitiveness, energy and the environment, 
intellectual property rights, better regulation, industrial research and innovation, 
market access, skills and managing structural change. In addition, the Commission 
has proposed seven new initiatives targeting specific sectors, e.g. information and 
communication technologies, mechanical engineering and biotechnology, with 
the aim of supporting adaptability and structural change in order to boost the 
competitiveness of EU manufacturing “especially in the light of increasing strong 
competition from China and Asia”. 62
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Although FDI is welcome in all BRICs, many impediments 
to doing business still exist, in particular in sectors that are 
considered less advanced, where there is a state monop-
oly or when they have been declared “strategically” impor-
tant. Typically, the services sector (in particular banking, 
insurance and telecommunications), raw materials (oil, 
mining of minerals) and certain high-tech sectors related 
to defence (e.g., airplane, space or nuclear technologies 
in Russia) pose the biggest problems. Restrictions on FDI 
are frequently linked to “National Development Plans”, a 
national “Industrial Policy”, as in China, or “national secu-
rity” as in Russia. Recently, new comprehensive industrial 
policies have been launched in both Brazil and Russia 
with the aim of using public-private partnership tools. 
India, has implemented new ambitious development pro-
grammes that will bear fruit in the years to come. These 
plans offer opportunities for EU companies as well.
Judged by the relative weight of the sectors, the biggest 
challenge for EU policies is probably industry (especially 
manufacturing) with regard to China, business services 
with regard to India, agriculture (and biofuels) with 
regard to Brazil, and energy imports and transit (espe-
cially gas) in relations with Russia. But manufacturing is 
going to play an increasing role in relations with India, 
Brazil and probably Russia as well, and outsourcing of 
services will gain importance with China. In a longer-
term perspective, “industrial upgrading” efforts in all 
BRICs pose the most serious challenge for EU policies, 
including R&D policies at national and bilateral level. 
Infrastructure investment and related policy areas, such 
as public procurement, and the above-mentioned pub-
lic private partnerships (particularly in Russia), will gain 
importance in the light of the BRICs’ new development 
plans and industrial policies, with a focus on improving 
infrastructure and diversification of the economy. Envi-
ronmental regulations and energy policy issues may play 
a role in this context as well.
Regarding energy relations, rising and potentially com-
peting demand for energy resources is coming from 
China and India, especially for oil and to a much lesser 
extent for gas. Russia and Brazil, on the other hand, are 
relevant suppliers of energy (oil, gas and to a minor 
extent biofuels as well). In the EU’s energy relations with 
China and India, supporting energy efficiency and the 
use of renewable energy sources will therefore be impor-
tant. In the case of Russia, energy security, in relation to 
the EU’s internal energy market regulations, and energy 
transit issues represent the major challenges, also for EU 
external (Neighbourhood) policies. With respect to Bra-
zil, important issues are the standardisation of biofuels 
(which should facilitate trade), subsidisation, and tariff 
barriers.
Enhanced regional economic cooperation, especially in 
Asia, will pose new challenges for EU policies with the 
BRICs in future as well. This is particularly relevant not 
only in Asia, where regionalism is on the rise, but also 
in the EU’s Eastern Neighbourhood. A free trade agree-
ment between China and ASEAN will become effective 
in 2010 and India is seeking closer links with the ASEAN 
Free Trade Area (AFTA) as well. Geopolitical strategies, 
in particular the contest for influence on the post-Soviet 
space, will play an important role in shaping EU relations 
with Russia, and the successful conclusion of the ongoing 
negotiations for a Free Trade Agreement between the EU 
and Mercosur will not only facilitate economic relations 
with Brazil but also challenge Brazil’s privileged posi-
tion in Latin America. The ongoing bilateral negotiations 
between the EU and the individual BRICs should help 
avoid impending trade diversion and potential conflicts.
The ongoing catching-up process in the BRICs and 
their rising population (with the exception of Russia) 
will lead to a greater demand for more sophisticated 
and high-quality consumer goods, which will provide 
ample opportunities for EU exports and market seeking 
FDI in these fields. However, small and medium (SME) 
European enterprises in particular may lack appropriate 
information on far-away markets and also typically face 
more problems in investing in more distant locations 
than larger companies. Thus, special SME support for 
market research and investment similar to that provided 
in the EU Asia-Invest programme would be of great ben-
efit where the BRICs are concerned82. In particular, with 
a broadening of the range of products exported, non-
tariff barriers to trade such as unnecessary trade-restrict-
ing regulations and procedures or different norms and 
standards, will gain in importance. The BRICs should thus 
be encouraged to adopt existing international standards 
or to seek common approaches on standards and norms 
with trading partners where possible.
On the import side, competition from the BRICs in high 
value-added and technology-driven manufacturing 
products will increase on both the EU market and on 
third markets. This chapter again confirms that China 
has already set off on this path (see also Baumann and 
di Mauro, 2007). The new outward-looking policy in 
Brazil and the new industrial policy in India, with ambi-
tions to become part of the “Asian supplier network” and 
to diversify the economy, point in the same direction. 
Due to rising R&D expenditures in the BRICs (especially 
in China), competitive pressure on the EU may also 
increase in certain high-tech areas where the individual 
BRICs choose to specialise. But on the other hand, new 
opportunities for technical and scientific co-operation 
and for knowledge flows between the EU and the BRICs 
will emerge. To stay ahead, EU companies will have to 
accelerate their technological development. In this con-
82  The Asia–Invest Programme was launched in 1997 as an initiative of the 
European Union to promote and support business co-operation between the EU 
Member States and Asia.63
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text, EU initiatives to support innovation and to promote 
investment in R&D will be indispensible.
On the positive side, the envisaged restructuring and 
technological upgrading of the BRICs will absorb a 
large amount of investment goods, where the EU has a 
comparative advantage with respect to the BRICs and is 
expected to keep it in the future. As in the case of con-
sumer goods, special support for SMEs with regard to 
market research and direct investment would encourage 
more European enterprises to tap new distant markets. 
Also, all BRICs have ambitious plans to increase infrastruc-
ture investment, such as transport infrastructure in Bra-
zil, Russia and India and investment to increase energy 
efficiency and protect the environment in China and for 
power generation and telecoms in India. This will open up 
many new opportunities for EU suppliers in these fields. 
However, foreign enterprises are often discriminated in 
public procurement processes. The alleged preferential 
treatment of domestic bidders by China as part of its 
“stimulus package” hit the headlines only recently83. The 
EU should thus support China’s accession to the WTO 
Government Procurement Agreement (GPA) as soon as 
possible. Also, for investment goods even more than in 
the case of consumer goods, the insufficient protection of 
IPR is an important issue, particularly in China. Appropri-
ate EU policies to secure IPR protection thus seem essen-
tial for the further expansion of EU exports in this field.
Finally, China evidently intends to follow a more domes-
tically oriented development model in the future, which 
is expected to somewhat reduce its competitive pres-
sure in international markets and provide additional 
opportunities for EU exporters. But Brazil, India and 
Russia, on the other hand, are striving for a more out-
ward-oriented policy in the years to come, which may 
increase competitive pressure from their side. This has 
to be taken into account from a longer-term EU policy 
perspective as well.
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Annex
Table A1: Overview of total EU goods trade
EU-15
Exports Imports Trade Balance
EUR bn shares EUR bn shares EUR bn
Partner 2000 2007 2008 2000 2007 2008 2000 2007 2008 2000 2007 2008 2000 2007 2008
Brazil 16.6 20.7 25.5 0.7 0.6 0.7 17.6 31.3 34.1 0.7 0.9 0.9 -1.0 -10.6 -8.6
Russia 19.9 74.0 85.1 0.8 2.1 2.4 45.7 109.0 126.0 1.8 3.1 3.4 -25.8 -35.0 -40.9
India 13.4 28.4 30.1 0.5 0.8 0.8 12.4 24.9 27.5 0.5 0.7 0.8 1.0 3.5 2.6
China 25.5 69.2 75.3 1.0 2.0 2.1 70.3 211.0 223.7 2.8 6.0 6.1 -44.8 -141.8 -148.4
BRICs 75.4 192.3 216.0 3.0 5.5 6.1 146.0 376.2 411.3 5.8 10.7 11.3 -70.6 -184.0 -195.3
Japan 44.9 42.5 41.0 1.8 1.2 1.1 87.1 72.0 68.3 3.5 2.0 1.9 -42.2 -29.5 -27.3
USA 232.5 253.3 241.0 9.3 7.3 6.8 199.0 175.2 179.5 7.9 5.0 4.9 33.4 78.0 61.5
RoW 477.6 675.8 710.9 19.0 19.4 19.9 513.4 685.3 739.9 20.3 19.4 20.2 -35.8 -9.5 -29.0
EU-15 1556.1 2065.2 2073.9 62.1 59.2 58.1 1478.7 2012.8 2014.9 58.6 57.0 55.1 77.5 52.4 58.9
NMS-12 121.3 260.7 277.3 4.8 7.5 7.8 100.2 215.5 231.0 4.0 6.1 6.3 21.1 45.2 46.0
EU-27 1677.4 2324.5 2359.8 66.9 66.6 66.1 1578.9 2223.1 2255.9 62.5 62.9 61.7 98.5 101.4 103.9
exEU-27 830.4 1163.8 1208.9 33.1 33.4 33.9 945.6 1308.7 1399.0 37.5 37.1 38.3 -115.2 -144.9 -190.1
WORLD 2507.9 3488.2 3568.7 100.0 100.0 100.0 2524.5 3531.8 3654.9 100.0 100.0 100.0 -16.6 -43.5 -86.2
NMS-12
Exports Imports Trade Balance
EUR bn shares EUR bn shares EUR bn
Partner 2000 2007 2008 2000 2007 2008 2000 2007 2008 2000 2007 2008 2000 2007 2008
Brazil 0.3 0.6 0.9 0.2 0.2 0.2 1.0 1.4 1.5 0.5 0.3 0.3 -0.8 -0.8 -0.6
Russia 2.8 15.1 20.1 1.9 3.8 4.6 18.1 35.0 47.3 9.5 7.5 9.1 -15.2 -19.9 -27.2
India 0.3 1.1 1.4 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.5 1.4 1.9 0.3 0.3 0.4 -0.2 -0.3 -0.5
China 0.4 2.7 3.1 0.2 0.7 0.7 4.4 20.6 24.0 2.3 4.4 4.6 -4.0 -17.8 -20.9
BRICs 3.7 19.5 25.5 2.5 4.9 5.8 23.9 58.3 74.7 12.6 12.5 14.4 -20.2 -38.8 -49.2
Japan 0.6 1.3 1.4 0.4 0.3 0.3 5.0 6.2 6.5 2.6 1.3 1.3 -4.4 -4.8 -5.1
USA 5.7 8.1 8.3 3.9 2.0 1.9 7.3 6.1 6.9 3.8 1.3 1.3 -1.5 2.1 1.4
RoW 19.0 56.4 64.6 12.8 14.2 14.6 23.4 54.9 63.7 12.3 11.8 12.3 -4.4 1.6 0.9
EU-15 99.0 236.2 252.7 67.1 59.3 57.2 111.2 267.6 281.5 58.7 57.4 54.3 -12.2 -31.4 -28.8
NMS-12 19.6 76.9 88.6 13.3 19.3 20.1 18.8 74.1 84.3 9.9 15.9 16.3 0.8 2.8 4.3
EU-27 118.7 312.8 341.8 80.4 78.6 77.4 130.0 341.0 366.4 68.6 73.1 70.7 -11.4 -28.2 -24.6
exEU-27 29.0 85.4 99.8 19.6 21.4 22.6 59.5 125.4 151.8 31.4 26.9 29.3 -30.5 -40.0 -52.0
WORLD 147.6 398.3 441.6 100.0 100.0 100.0 189.5 466.5 518.2 100.0 100.0 100.0 -41.9 -68.2 -76.6
EU-27
Exports Imports Trade Balance
EUR bn shares EUR bn shares EUR bn
Partner 2000 2007 2008 2000 2007 2008 2000 2007 2008 2000 2007 2008 2000 2007 2008
Brazil 16.9 21.3 26.3 0.6 0.5 0.7 18.7 32.7 35.5 0.7 0.8 0.9 -1.8 -11.4 -9.2
Russia 22.7 89.1 105.2 0.9 2.3 2.6 63.8 144.0 173.3 2.3 3.6 4.2 -41.0 -54.9 -68.2
India 13.7 29.5 31.5 0.5 0.8 0.8 12.8 26.3 29.4 0.5 0.7 0.7 0.8 3.2 2.1
China 25.9 71.9 78.4 1.0 1.9 2.0 74.6 231.6 247.6 2.7 5.8 5.9 -48.8 -159.6 -169.2
BRICs 79.1 211.8 241.4 3.0 5.4 6.0 169.9 434.6 485.8 6.3 10.9 11.6 -90.8 -222.8 -244.4
Japan 45.5 43.8 42.4 1.7 1.1 1.1 92.1 78.1 74.8 3.4 2.0 1.8 -46.6 -34.4 -32.4
USA 238.2 261.4 249.4 9.0 6.7 6.2 206.3 181.3 186.3 7.6 4.5 4.5 31.9 80.1 63.1
RoW 496.6 732.2 775.4 18.7 18.8 19.3 536.8 740.1 803.7 19.8 18.5 19.3 -40.2 -7.9 -28.3
EU15 1655.2 2301.4 2326.6 62.3 59.2 58.0 1589.9 2280.4 2296.5 58.6 57.0 55.0 65.3 21.0 30.1
NMS12 140.9 337.6 365.8 5.3 8.7 9.1 119.0 289.6 315.5 4.4 7.2 7.6 21.9 48.0 50.3
EU27 1796.1 2637.3 2701.7 67.6 67.9 67.4 1708.9 2564.1 2621.9 63.0 64.1 62.8 87.2 73.2 79.8
exEU27 859.4 1249.2 1308.6 32.4 32.1 32.6 1005.1 1434.1 1550.7 37.0 35.9 37.2 -145.7 -184.9 -242.1
WORLD 2655.5 3886.5 4010.3 100.0 100.0 100.0 2714.0 3998.2 4172.6 100.0 100.0 100.0 -58.5 -111.7 -162.3
Note: differences in EU27 and the sum of EU15 and NMS12 are due to reporting errors.
Source: Eurostat-Comext, wiiw calculation.66
European Competitiveness Report 2009
Box A1 Unit value ratios to calculate quality positioning
The calculation of relative unit values of traded products is based on the COMEXT trade database at the most 
detailed 8-digit level. Denoting the value of exports to the EU of commodity i by country c in year t by 
c
it v  and 
the quantity (measured in tons) by xit
c , the export unit value is defined as
uit
c = vit
c /xit
c   (1)
The unit values of country c’s exports to the EU are then compared to the unit values of total EU imports (from the 
world, including intra-EU trade) by calculating the logs of the unit value ratios
rit
c = Ln uit
c /uit
EU ( )   (2)
where  uit
EU  denotes the unit value of total EU imports for a particular commodity i in year t. Taking the logarithm 
of  uit
c /uit
EU ( )  ensures a symmetric aggregation across products for ratios larger and smaller than 1 (see below). 
In logs, the ratio is thus larger (smaller) than zero if the export unit value of country c is larger (smaller) than the 
unit value of total EU imports.
Information is not presented here at the very detailed (8-digit) product level but the unit value ratios are aggre-
gated to the level of (3-digit NACE) industries and further to industry groupings. This is done by constructing a 
weighted sum of the unit value ratios rit
c
 across the products belonging to a particular industry j (or an industry 
group). The weight used for a particular commodity i in such an aggregation is the share of its export value in the 
industry’s exports of country c. Denoting the set of commodities i belonging to an aggregate j (industry or indus-
try grouping) by  I(j) , the weights are calculated as
wit
c =
vit
c
vit
c
i∈I( j) ∑
  (3)
The unit value ratio for a particular aggregate j is then
rjt
c = rit
c
i∈I( j) ∑ wit
c
  (4)
This measure can be interpreted analogously to the unit value ratios for a particular commodity as mentioned 
above.
Source: Landesmann and Wörz (2006).67
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Table A2:   Taxonomy used in industry classifications (by factor and skill intensities)
Taxonomy I Taxonomy II
NACE Rev. 1.1 factor inputs labour skills
Meat products 151 4 1
Fish and fish products 152 4 1
Fruits and vegetables 153 4 1
Vegetable and animal oils and fats 154 4 1
Dairy products; ice cream 155 4 1
Grain mill products and starches 156 4 1
Prepared animal feeds 157 4 1
Other food products 158 4 1
Beverages 159 4 1
Tobacco products 160 4 1
Textile fibres 171 3 1
Textile weaving 172 2 1
Made-up textile articles 174 2 1
Other textiles 175 1 1
Knitted and crocheted fabrics 176 1 1
Knitted and crocheted articles 177 1 1
Leather clothes 181 2 1
Other wearing apparel and accessories 182 2 1
Dressing and dyeing of fur; articles of fur 183 2 1
Tanning and dressing of leather 191 4 1
Luggage, handbags, saddlery and harness 192 4 1
Footwear 193 4 1
Sawmilling, planing and impregnation of wood 201 2 2
Panels and boards of wood 202 2 2
Builders carpentry and joinery 203 2 2
Wooden containers 204 2 2
Other products of wood; articles of cork, etc. 205 2 2
Pulp, paper and paperboard 211 3 3
Articles of paper and paperboard 212 1 3
Publishing 221 4 3
Printing 222 4 3
Coke oven products 231
Refined petroleum and nuclear fuel 232 3 3
Nuclear fuel 233
Basic chemicals 241 3 3
Pesticides, other agro-chemical products 242 5 3
Paints, coatings, printing ink 243 1 3
Pharmaceuticals 244 5 4
Detergents, cleaning and polishing, perfumes 245 4 3
Other chemical products 246 5 3
Man-made fibres 247 3 3
Rubber products 251 1 1
Plastic products 252 1 1
Glass and glass products 261 1 1
Ceramic goods 262 2 1
Ceramic tiles and flags 263 3 1
Bricks, tiles and construction products 264 2 1
Cement, lime and plaster 265 3 1
Articles of concrete, plaster and cement 266 1 1
Cutting, shaping, finishing of stone 267 2 1
Other non-metallic mineral products 268 1 1
Basic iron and steel, ferro-alloys (ECSC) 271 3 1
Tubes 272 1 1
Other first processing of iron and steel 273 3 168
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Taxonomy I Taxonomy II
NACE Rev. 1.1 factor inputs labour skills
Basic precious and non-ferrous metals  274 3 1
Structural metal products 281 2 2
Tanks, reservoirs, central heating radiators and boilers 282 4 2
Steam generators 283 2 2
Cutlery, tools and general hardware 286 4 2
Other fabricated metal products 287 1 2
Machinery for production, use of mechanical power 291 1 4
Other general purpose machinery 292 1 4
Agricultural and forestry machinery 293 1 4
Machine-tools 294 2 4
Other special purpose machinery 295 1 4
Weapons and ammunition 296 1 4
Domestic appliances n.e.c. 297 1 3
Office machinery and computers 300 5 4
Electric motors, generators and transformers 311 1 3
Electricity distribution and control apparatus 312 5 3
Isolated wire and cable 313 1 3
Accumulators, primary cells and primary batteries 314 1 3
Lighting equipment and electric lamps 315 1 3
Electrical equipment n.e.c. 316 2 3
Electronic valves and tubes, other electronic comp. 321 5 3
TV, and radio transmitters, apparatus for line telephony 322 5 3
TV, radio and recording apparatus 323 5 3
Medical equipment 331 5 3
Instruments for measuring, checking, testing, navigating 332 5 3
Optical instruments and photographic equipment 334 5 3
Watches and clocks 335 4 3
Motor vehicles 341 5 2
Bodies for motor vehicles, trailers 342 2 2
Parts and accessories for motor vehicles 343 3 2
Ships and boats 351 2 2
Railway locomotives and rolling stock 352 2 2
Aircraft and spacecraft 353 5 4
Motorcycles and bicycles 354 1 2
Other transport equipment n.e.c. 355 1 2
Furniture 361 2 2
Jewellery and related articles 362 2 2
Musical instruments 363 4 2
Sports goods 364 4 2
Games and toys 365 4 2
Miscellaneous manufacturing n.e.c. 366 4 2
Taxonomy I      
factor inputs      
1.Mainstream      
2.Labour-intensive industries      
3.Capital-intensive industries      
4.Marketing-driven industries      
5.Technology-driven industries      
Taxonomy II      
Labour skills      
1.Low-skill industries      
2.Medium-skill/blue-collar workers      
3.Medium-skill/white-collar workers      
4.High-skill industries      
Source: Peneder (2003).69
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Table A3:   Trade in services in 2007, EUR billion
Services exports Services imports
Brazil 17.4 27
China 88.9 94.6
Hong Kong 61.8 31.1
India 65.5 38.2
Russia 28.7 43
Total BRICs 262.2 233.9
EU-27 1177.7 1024.7
NMS-12 85.2 69.1
EU-15 1092.6 955.6
EU-27-extra-EU 513.3 427
NMS12-extra EU 23.5 19.7
EU-15-extra-EU 489.8 407.3
US 359.8 275.9
JPN 110.9 115.7
Source: TSD.
Table A4:   FDI flows from the EU in the BRICs
FDI flows from the EU-27 to the BRICs (in EUR billion) Share in total extra-EU 
outward FDI stocks
EU share in total FDI flows 
to the BRICs (in %)
Destination country 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2003 2007 average 2005-2007
Brazil 2.1 5.7 8.4 6.5 15.3 2.9 3.1 53.2
Russia 7.7 6.0 9.7 10.8 16.7 0.7 2.3 56.9
India 0.8 1.6 2.5 2.5 5.4 0.3 0.6 30.9
China  3.2 3.9 6.1 6.7 7.1 0.9 1.2 10.4
Hong Kong  3.8 11.3 3.8 3.6 7.2 4.2 2.8 20.5
BRICs 17.6 28.5 30.6 30.0 51.7 9.2 10.1
EU-15 investment projects in the BRICs  
(Number of projects)
EU share of total projects in the BRICs (in %)
Destination country 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2003 2007 2008 average  
2005-2007
Brazil 140 115 66 57 58 107 48.4 38.2 43.7 38.2
Russia 216 217 270 212 211 303 50.6 57.3 54.0 57.3
India 139 202 160 346 264 358 30.8 38.3 37.4 38.3
China 298 367 371 435 427 481 22.5 35.9 32.4 35.9
Hong Kong 35 36 38 60 56 62 38.5 38.4 30.7 38.4
BRICs 828 937 905 1,110 1,016 1,311 32.1 39.9 38.0 39.9
Remark: EU is EU-25 for 2001-2003 and EU-27 for 2004-2007 in Eurostat; EU is EU-15 in fDi database. China excludes Hong Kong. BRICs 
in this table includes Hong Kong.
Source: Eurostat, UNCTAD, US Bureau of Economic Analysis, FDI Intelligence from Financial Times Ltd.70
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Table A5:   EU outward FDI stocks in the BRICs by economic activity in 2006, in EUR million
Brazil Russia India China Hong Kong
Agriculture and fishing 36 23 2 5 1
Mining and quarrying 714 9268 376 1223 121
Manufacturing 21898 15376 5901 15214 2447
Food products 4307 2682 1177 825 109
Textiles and wearing apparel 409 45 37 194 84
Wood, publishing and printing 299 916 177 483 39
Refined petroleum products and other treatments 652 7777 632 384 220
Manufacture of chemicals and chemicals products 2986 823 1120 2796 182
Rubber and plastic products 1004 509 107 696 153
Metal products 4234 344 210 975 141
Mechanical products 1591 236 807 2169 1055
Office machinery and computers 13 -5 35 108 77
Radio, television, communication equipments 360 89 208 1166 13
Vehicles and other transport equipment 4406 825 573 2973 146
Electricity, gas and water 863 270 146 278 10
Construction 386 380 22 55 97
Services 52877 24492 5559 14797 83333
Trade and repairs 2015 2867 356 1958 2551
Hotel and restaurants 216 357 251 18 61
Transport and storage 1254 89 294 577 109
Telecommunications 205 913 88 28 1285
Post and courier activities 148 53 77 6 -402
Financial intermediation 26572 12664 3413 6771 72345
Real estate and business activities 21908 7164 1026 5363 7209
Real estate 241 312 8 167 91
Renting of machinery and equipment 92 76 1 15 4836
Computer activities 195 146 323 123 143
Research and development 381 8 18 313 3
Other business activities 20997 6621 677 4742 2134
Total 78330 50226 12308 86401 86401
Remark: EU is EU27. China excludes Hong Kong. Economic activities according to Eurostat nomenclature. Numbers do not add up to 
Total because of non-allocated activities. FDI outwars stocks are classified according to the activities of the non-resident enterprise, i.e. 
the enterprise in the respective BRIC country.
Source: Eurostat.71
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Table A6:   EU inward FDI stocks owned by the BRICs by economic activity in 2006, in EUR million
Brazil Russia India China Hong Kong
Agriculture and fishing 2 4 -1 1 -7
Mining and quarrying 12 -5 6 5 17
Manufacturing 344 540 590 420 340
Food products 212 31 408 31 -17
Textiles and wearing apparel 5 3 -2 19 69
Wood, publishing and printing 2 41 -1 24 46
Refined petroleum products and other treatments 1 3 9 0 29
Manufacture of chemicals and chemicals products 20 80 120 6 -122
Rubber and plastic products 7 12 -7 32 -35
Metal products 29 135 14 13 5
Mechanical products 108 23 12 27 94
Office machinery and computers -58 13 1 236 44
Radio, television, communication equipments 6 109 3 8 97
Vehicles and other transport equipment 3 69 29 19 -6
Electricity, gas and water 2 903 -2 1 -6
Construction 85 289 -3 13 2
Services 14168 12143 1463 3101 16317
Trade and repairs 1939 1122 150 312 352
Hotel and restaurants 5 43 1 5 38
Transport and storage 48 116 10 98 284
Telecommunications 8 18 28 24 10283
Post and courier activities 6 4 -21 2 599
Financial intermediation 4004 3921 523 2452 2301
Real estat and business activities 8130 6368 741 197 2386
Real estate 105 559 15 42 377
Renting of machinery and equipment 8 20 8 21 26
Computer activities 8 -3 286 3 99
Research and development 2 1 -2 -18 -6
Other business activities 8006 5789 435 150 1888
Total 14625 14571 2222 3566 17461
Remark: EU is EU27. China excludes Hong Kong. Economic activities according to Eurostat nomenclature. Numbers do not add up to 
Total because of non-allocated activities. FDI outwars stocks are classified according to the activities of the non-resident enterprise, i.e. 
the enterprise in the respective BRIC country.
Source: Eurostat.73
CHAPTER 3 
Migration, skills and productivity
3.1.  Introduction
This chapter looks at the relationship between the 
migration of high-skilled workers and productivity per-
formance84. The literature on international migration has 
repeatedly emphasised that the extent and structure of 
migration has an important impact on the competitive-
ness of regions and countries. A number of studies have 
stressed that highly skilled migrants are an important 
resource pool, which can be used to strengthen national 
R&D systems as well as integration within international 
business networks, to increase entrepreneurial activity, 
to improve the integration of both sending and receiv-
ing countries within the international division of labour, 
to overcome bottlenecks in regional labour supply, 
and to support regional clusters of high-tech activity. A 
recent paper by Hunt and Gauthier-Loiselle (2008) cites 
literature that foreign-born individuals in the US account 
for about 26% of US Nobel prize recipients (Peri, 2007), 
25% of the founders of venture-backed US companies 
(Anderson and Platzer 2006), 25% of new high-tech 
companies with more than one million US dollars of 
sales and 24% of international patent applications from 
the US (Wadhwa et al. 2007), although they account for 
only 12% of US residents.
In addition to these advantages it has also been argued 
that shifting the structure of migration to the more 
highly skilled may also have a positive impact on social 
security systems since they are less likely to represent a 
burden on national social security and transfer systems, 
84  Throughout this chapter the term «migration» refers to both intra-EU mobil-
ity of EU workers and immigration by third-country nationals for labour purposes 
from countries outside the EU. In this context, it is important to recall that EU 
citizens, unlike third-country nationals, enjoy a fundamental right – granted to 
them by the EC Treaty – to move freely within the European Union, without any 
particular admission or integration requirement for their residence and work in 
another Member State. This constitutes a fundamental difference in comparison 
to the conditions third-country nationals have to fulfil under the existing EU and 
national immigration rules, before they can reside and work in an EU Member 
State. In policy making terms, the latter category is of higher interest as only the 
entry and stay of third-country workers can be actively steered by Member States 
according to their changing economic and labour market needs.
due to their better integration within the labour markets 
of the receiving countries (see Chiswick, 2005)85.
These potential advantages of high-skilled migration 
are also reflected in the policy arena. In the face of age-
ing European societies and growing needs for highly 
skilled labour, the developed market economies of the 
EU Member States are facing increased competition 
for highly skilled migrants. To effectively and promptly 
respond to this increasing demand for highly qualified 
immigrant labour in Europe – and to offset present and 
upcoming skill shortages in the light of Europe’s rapid 
demographic ageing – the Commission presented in 
October 2007 a proposal for a directive on “conditions 
of entry and residence of third-country nationals for the 
purposes of highly qualified employment” (COM (2007) 
637 final). This so-called “EU Blue Card” directive has 
been adopted by the Council on 25 May 2009 (Directive 
2009/50/EC, OJ L 155, p. 17); it will be applicable in prac-
tice as of June 2011. This Blue Card system coexists with 
national procedures, which continue to be used by the 
Member States, and thereby merely offers an additional 
way of recruiting and admitting high-skilled migrants for 
work purposes. Furthermore, the European Commission 
(as evidenced for instance by the recent green paper on 
the European Research Area, see EC, 2007) also acknowl-
edges that “it is essential to establish a single European 
labour market for researchers, ensuring effective ‘brain 
circulation’ within Europe and with partner countries 
and attracting young talent and women into research 
careers” (EC, 2007, p. 11). In addition, the October 2005 
Directive on a specific procedure for admitting third-
country nationals for the purposes of scientific research 
should contribute to easier international movements of 
researchers (Directive 2005/71/EC, OJ L 289, p. 15).
85  It should be mentioned that the literature has suggested that these advan-
tages may be countered by the potential increase in wage pressures (and poten-
tially unemployment rates) for high-skilled labour as well as potentially reduced 
incentives for training and education of the native population.74
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As, however, also pointed out by the European Com-
mission’s Employment in Europe Report (EC, 2008) 
increased migration brings with it new demands on 
economic policy. This applies in particular to the need to 
develop appropriate integration policies and – of partic-
ular importance for high-skilled migration – institutional 
arrangements to guarantee that highly skilled migrants 
can transfer skills across borders and apply their knowl-
edge in the host economies.
Furthermore, migration incentives for the highly skilled 
may differ from those of the less skilled86. In particular, 
highly skilled individuals are likely to put more emphasis 
on the career aspects of migration in their decision to 
migrate (see for instance Ackers, 2005). Moreover, the 
migration of the highly skilled “has additional and com-
plex aspects relating to research opportunities, work 
conditions and access to infrastructure” (OECD, 2007, 
p. 23). For students, issues such as the quality of train-
ing facilities and mobility grants may be more important 
determinants in their decision to become mobile (Trem-
bley 2002) than income differentials, while for those 
highly skilled already in the workforce additional fac-
tors such as access to intra-firm arrangements to allow 
international mobility (for instance within multinational 
enterprises; cf. Hunt 2004) or generous family reunifica-
tion rules may be much more important for migration 
decisions.
This chapter provides an overview of the extent and the 
potential effects of high-skilled migration to the EU-27. 
First of all it is investigated how many high-skilled 
migrants live in the EU, where these migrants come 
from, and how the European Union is positioned in the 
international competition for talent from third coun-
tries. Second, it examines how high-skilled migrants fare 
in European labour markets. To this end employment, 
unemployment and inactivity rates by skill groups are 
analysed as well as job-skill mismatch for natives and 
foreign-born in the EU. Finally, this chapter looks at the 
effects of high-skilled migration on multifactor produc-
tivity, gross value added and GDP per capita growth, and 
patenting activities at sectoral and regional levels.
3.2.  Some results from the existing literature
In order to put the issues into context and to gain a first 
impression of the ability of the EU vis-à-vis some other 
countries to attract high-skilled migrants, Table 3.1 
presents the distribution of native-born across educa-
tion groups, and the share of foreign-born in each edu-
cation group (Peri 2005). The table shows that Australia, 
86  It is beyond the scope of this chapter to discuss migration motivations in 
great detail, but it should be mentioned that family reunion is also an important 
factor, and part of the migration will be related to the granting of refugee status 
for humanitarian purposes.
Canada, Switzerland and the US have larger shares of 
foreign-born in the high-skilled group than the EU-15, 
and that the low-skilled group in the EU-15 has the larg-
est share of foreigners (compared with the medium- and 
high-skilled group in the EU-15).
Despite the substantial academic and policy interest 
in the issues raised, there is to date only very little lit-
erature that focuses exclusively on high-skilled mobil-
ity. This applies in particular to the alleged positive 
effects of high-skilled mobility on receiving countries. 
In a recent survey of this literature, the OECD (2008) 
concludes, for instance, that in general there is a scar-
city of research on the impact of high-skilled mobility 
on receiving countries and that the existing literature 
is plagued by data and methodological problems, 
which make it hard to identify these effects. This lack 
of research applies even more strongly to the EU than 
to the US.
Furthermore, much of the literature is quite contro-
versial. For example, in the recent literature on the 
potential impact of high-skilled migration on receiving 
countries, there is a substantial debate centring on the 
question whether high-skilled foreigners are a substi-
tute for or a complement to high-skilled native labour 
(see Ottaviano and Peri (2006) and Borjas et al. (2008) 
for two diametrically opposed views). This is essential 
for assessing the potential wage impact of high-skilled 
migration. Here results even for one and the same coun-
try (e.g. Germany – Brücker and Jahn 2008, D’Amuri et al. 
2008, Felbermayer et al. 2008) depend very strongly on 
methodological choices and the data used. Nonetheless, 
a robust finding of most studies is that foreigners and 
natives are imperfect substitutes for each other overall, 
with previous immigrants being closer substitutes for 
recent arrivals. The findings for the high end of the skill 
distribution, however, remain controversial, ranging 
from perfect to relatively low substitutability between 
natives and   foreigners.
These different results for substitutability or comple-
mentarity lead to relatively divergent assessments of the 
impacts of high-skilled migration on wages, with some 
authors finding positive and others negative effects. 
Here, however, even those studies that do find nega-
tive effects suggest a relatively mild impact on wages 
(as well as on unemployment), with even the highest 
estimates for European countries suggesting that an 
increase in the number of high-skilled migrants by 10% 
will lead to wage losses for high-skilled natives some-
where in the range of 2-4%, and some evidence indicat-
ing that the primary route by which highly skilled native 
workers escape from increased competition seems to be 
occupational mobility.
In addition, however, there is some conclusive evi-
dence for a number of positive impacts of high-skilled 75
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Table 3.1:   Distribution of native-born and share of foreign-born across education groups
Distribution of native-born across education groups Share of foreign-born in each education group
Low Medium High Low Medium High
Australia 0.450 0.163 0.388 0.204 0.268 0.268
Canada 0.309 0.371 0.320 0.192 0.179 0.238
Switzerland 0.256 0.552 0.192 0.321 0.152 0.277
US 0.219 0.511 0.270 0.234 0.101 0.139
EU-15 0.535 0.232 0.232 0.059 0.040 0.058
France 0.548 0.272 0.181 0.136 0.087 0.124
Germany 0.236 0.570 0.194 0.220 0.099 0.110
UK 0.512 0.287 0.201 0.080 0.086 0.160
Source: Peri (2005). The data refer to 1999/2000.
migrants. This applies in particular to the effects of high-
skilled migration on innovation activities and to the 
positive trade- and FDI- generating effects of migration. 
With respect to innovation, quite an extensive literature, 
though almost exclusively focusing on the US, finds a 
positive association between both high-skilled migration 
and ethnic diversity and measures of innovation activi-
ties (see Hunt and Gauthier-Loiselle 2008, for a recent 
contribution). With respect to trade, by contrast, many 
contributions find a high degree of association between 
immigration and bilateral trade flows with estimates in 
general suggesting that a 10% increase in migration will 
increase bilateral trade by somewhere between 1% to 
2% (see Combes et al. 2005, Parsons 2005, Girma and 
Yu 2002 for results for the EU or individual European 
countries). Similarly, the slightly smaller literature on 
FDI (Kugler and Rapoport 2005, Docquier and Lodigiani 
2006, Javorick et al. 2006 and DeSimone and Manchin 
2008) suggests an equally strong association between 
migration and FDI activities, where in particular high-
skilled migrants seem to be instrumental in generating 
higher FDI.
Concerning the impacts on entrepreneurship and on 
productivity, the evidence is much more mixed. With 
respect to entrepreneurship much of the literature has 
focused on individual case studies, in particularly suc-
cessful regions or industries. The few more general 
(mostly US-focused) studies that have become available 
recently (e.g. Wadhwa et al., 2007) suggest that migra-
tion contributes significantly to the founding of new 
enterprises and the development of entrepreneurial 
activity. With respect to productivity, the few exist-
ing studies (see e.g. Quispe-Agnoli and Zavodny 2002, 
Paserman 2008, Mas et al. 2008) often disagree and sug-
gest that effects of migration are more often negative 
than positive, with positive effects mostly found in cases 
where a successful match between migrants’ skills and 
the requirements of their employees was achieved at 
the level of the firm.
3.3.  How important are high-skilled foreign-
born workers for the EU and where do 
they come from?
Where do highly skilled migrants in the EU reside?
Looking at the structure of highly skilled migration it is 
found that for the EU-27 as a whole, the foreign-born 
are found to be an important source of human capital. 
According to data from the European Labour Force Sur-
vey (EU LFS87), 9.7% of the total tertiary-educated resi-
dent population (as opposed to 8.1% of the total resi-
dent population) in the EU-27 is foreign-born. The share 
of the highly skilled among the resident population born 
outside the EU is 21.1%, while for intra-EU migrants it is 
23.0% (as opposed to 17.9% for the native-born popula-
tion). The foreign-born thus contribute more than pro-
portionately to the share of highly skilled in the EU.88
However, there is also substantial variation in migration 
experience in the EU-27 both with respect to receiving 
regions as well as with respect to sending regions. With 
respect to receiving regions highly skilled migration (as 
well as total migration) is strongly concentrated. Around 
94.2% of all highly skilled foreign-born in the EU-27 live 
in the EU-15. Only around 5.8% reside in the new Mem-
ber States (NMS) (cf. Table 3.2). 
This high concentration also applies to individual EU-15 
countries. The three largest receiving countries in the 
EU-27 (France, the UK and Spain) in sum account for 
57.5% of the total foreign-born population in the EU-15 
(Germany and Ireland are not included in the EU LFS 
87  European Commission, Eurostat, European Union Labour Force Survey, quar-
terly data. Eurostat has no responsibility for the results and conclusions which are 
those of the researchers.
88  Notice that the group of countries and the period is different from the ones 
on which Table 3.1 is based, so the figures are not directly comparable. The data 
in Table 3.1 refer to 1999/2000 but this table allows for a comparison between the 
EU and some other non-EU OECD countries.76
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data set; see note Table 3.2) and 63.6% of the highly 
skilled. The foreign-born share in the total resident pop-
ulation (aside from the obvious outlier of Luxemburg) is 
higher than 15% in Austria and Sweden but below 10% 
in Denmark, Greece, Italy and Portugal and even below 
3% in Finland.
This heterogeneity is also reflected in a number of impor-
tant indicators for the structure of migration. For instance, 
EU LFS data suggest a pronounced heterogeneity among 
EU countries with respect to the human capital structure 
of migrants born in other EU countries and from migrants 
born outside the EU. In Austria and Greece, the share of 
the highly skilled among migrants born outside the EU 
(with 11.2% and 12.4% respectively) is clearly below the 
average for both the EU-27 and the EU-15, while the share 
of highly skilled migrants born in other EU countries is 
Table 3.2:   Foreign-born share in total population and share of total foreign-born population by receiving 
country and skill group
Foreign-born share in total population Share of total foreign-born in EU-27
Skill level
Low Medium High Total Low Medium High Total
Total EU-27 8.0 7.6 9.7 8.1 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Total EU-15 9.5 11.1 11.4 10.4 95.8 92.1 94.2 94.1
Austria 19.9 13.1 18.7 15.9 3.8 5.2 3.1 4.2
Belgium 14.1 9.6 11.0 11.9 4.9 2.8 4.2 4.0
Denmark 7.3 5.8 7.2 6.6 0.9 1.0 1.4 1.1
Spain 9.2 21.6 12.7 12.5 18.4 16.3 19.5 17.8
Finland 2.8 2.9 2.5 2.8 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.5
France 14.9 8.5 11.2 11.8 28.5 15.6 20.3 21.9
Greece 6.0 7.4 5.6 6.4 2.6 2.3 1.5 2.2
Italy 5.6 7.5 7.5 6.4 15.2 12.6 6.6 12.3
Luxembourg 36.9 31.9 52.9 38.1 0.5 0.5 0.7 0.5
Netherlands 11.1 12.6 10.1 11.5 5.0 6.6 5.7 5.7
Portugal 4.6 12.1 12.1 6.4 2.9 1.5 1.9 2.2
Sweden 17.7 14.2 17.1 15.8 2.5 4.8 5.1 3.9
UK 10.4 13.4 13.1 12.5 10.2 22.5 23.8 17.8
Total NMS 1.7 1.6 2.9 1.8 4.2 7.9 5.8 5.9
Bulgaria - 0.3 0.7 0.3 0.0 - 0.1 0.1
Cyprus 12.8 17.1 20.7 16.4 0.3 0.4 0.6 0.4
Czech Republic 3.3 1.7 2.9 2.1 0.5 1.1 0.5 0.7
Estonia 11.2 17.2 20.3 16.7 0.2 0.9 1.0 0.7
Hungary 1.2 1.6 3.0 1.6 0.3 0.7 0.6 0.5
Lithuania 3.3 5.8 5.1 4.9 0.3 0.8 0.5 0.5
Latvia 10.4 14.2 17.1 13.7 0.5 1.4 1.0 0.9
Malta 3.4 6.5 7.9 4.3 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1
Poland 2.0 0.8 1.1 1.1 1.5 1.5 0.9 1.4
Romania - - - 0.1 - - - 0.0
Slovenia 9.3 7.5 6.3 7.8 0.4 0.7 0.3 0.5
Slovakia  0.7 0.6 1.3 0.7 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.1
Notes: Base population aged 15+, excluding Germany and Ireland, excluding unknown highest completed education and unknown 
country of birth (see section 2 for details of data construction). Low skilled = ISCED 0-2, medium skilled = ISCED 3,4, high-skilled = 
ISCED 5, Averages for 2006-2007. – = data provides too few observations to be reported. 
Source: EU LFS.
higher than average for Austria (24.5%) and only mod-
estly below average for Greece (20.4%).
By contrast, in France and the NMS the share of the 
highly skilled among those born in other EU-27 coun-
tries is clearly below the average. On the other hand, the 
share of high-skilled migrants among those born outside 
the EU is relatively high in France. The only country with 
substantially lower shares of highly educated migrants 
born both outside and within the EU-27 is Italy. For the 
UK, Sweden, Luxemburg, Spain and Denmark the share 
of highly skilled is above average for persons born both 
in the EU-27 as well as in third countries. Thus, data on 
the structure of migration also suggests substantial vari-
ation in the structure of migration from different send-
ing countries, which in turn reflect different historical 
ties and migration experiences among EU-27 countries.77
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Table 3.3:   Share of EU population aged 15+ by place of birth, duration of stay and highest completed 
education, 2006/2007
Skill level
Low Medium  High  Low  Medium  High 
duration of stay less than 10 years duration of stay more than 10 years
EU-born 25.4 48.7 25.9 42.6 36.5 20.9
of whom
From EU-12 to EU-15 27.2 56.6 16.2 27.4 48.0 24.6
From EU-15 to EU-15 19.3 35.5 45.2 37.3 44.9 17.8
From EU-27 to EU-12 20.1 51.9 28.0 34.6 49.3 16.2
Non-EU-born 41.8 37.8 20.5 43.2 35.5 21.3
of whom
Other Europe (including CEEC) 41.1 37.3 21.6 37.9 45.7 16.4
Turkey 64.1 29.5 (6.4) 66.2 27.4 6.5
North Africa 61.1 24.0 14.9 59.0 26.0 15.0
Other Africa 39.6 41.3 19.1 37.5 33.4 29.1
Figure 3.1:   Population aged 15+ by place of birth (share in total population residing in the EU-27), 
2006/2007 
0
.
5
1
.
6
0
.
9
0
.
9
0
.
9
0
.
9
0
.
3
0
.
3
0
.
3
1
.
7
0
.
8
1
1
1
1
0
.
1
0
.
1
0
.
1
0
.
1
0
.
1
0
.
1
0
.
1
0
.
1
0
.
1
0
.
1
0
.
1
0
.
1
0
.
1
0
.
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
.
4
0
.
7
2
.
3
0
.
2
0
.
2
0
.
2
0
.
2
0
.
2
0
.
2
1
.
1
0
.
4
0
.
1
0
.
1
0
.
1
0
.
7
0
.
7
0
.
7
0
.
7
0
.
7
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
 From  EU-12, to EU-15
 From  EU-15,  to EU-12
 From  EU-15, to EU-15
 From EU-12, toEU-12
CEEC
Other EEA and Europe
Turkey
North Africa
Other Africa
North America
Central America and Caribbean
South America
East Asia
Near and middle East
South and southeast Asia
Australia and Oceania
Other 
No answer
Low Skill Medium Skill High Skill
Notes: Base population aged 15+, excluding Germany and Ireland, excluding unknown highest completed education (see section 2 for 
details of data construction). Low-skilled = ISCED 0-2, medium skilled = ISCED 3,4, high-skilled = ISCED 5,6. CEEC = other non EU central 
and Eastern European countries. EEA = European Economic area, EU-12 countries acceding the EU in 2004 and 2007, EU-15 = EU Member 
States before 2004, Averages 2006-2007. 
Source: EU LFS.
Where do highly skilled migrants in the EU come from?
Looking at the sending regions, non-EU countries are 
a more important source of human capital for most EU 
countries than migrants from within the EU. 6.6% of 
the total tertiary educated resident population of the 
EU were born outside the EU. 2.5% were born in an EU 
country other than the one where they currently reside. 
Highly skilled non-EU-born migrants primarily come from 
other (non-EU) European countries (in particular Eastern 
Europe), South and Southeast Asia, South America, and 
Northern and Other Africa (with each of these groups 
contributing more than 0.8% to the total highly skilled 
population residing in the EU). Highly skilled intra-EU 
migrants by contrast are often migrants from one EU-15 
country to another EU-15 country (see Figure 3.1).78
European Competitiveness Report 2009
South & Central America Caribbean 39.7 40.7 19.6 35.3 39.8 24.8
East Asia 35.4 36.7 27.9 41.2 28.8 30.0
Near and Middle East 34.3 39.6 26.1 26.1 39.7 34.2
South and Southeast Asia 36.4 42.1 21.5 38.1 37.7 24.2
North America, Australia and Oceania 
(including other)
8.8 47.0 44.2 20.6 39.8 39.5
No answer 47.9 30.0 22.1 53.5 24.5 22.0
South and Southeast Asia 36.4 42.1 21.5 38.1 37.7 24.2
Australia and Oceania 10.2 52.0 37.9 22.5 47.0 30.5
Other  29.5 24.7 45.9 49.7 23.3 27.1
No answer 38.4 27.4 34.2 55.3 26.0 18.7
Notes: Base population aged 15+, excluding Germany and Ireland, excluding unknown highest completed education, excluding 
unknown duration of stay (see section 2 for details of data construction). Low-skilled = ISCED 0-2, medium-skilled = ISCED 3,4, high-
skilled = ISCED 5,6. CEEC = other non EU central and eastern European countries. EEA = European Economic Area, EU-12 countries that 
joined the EU in 2004 and 2007, EU-15 = EU Member States before 2004, averages 2006-2007, values in brackets have a low reliability.
Source: EU LFS.
The evidence, however, also suggests that more recent 
migrants to the EU-27 (in the country of residence for 
less than 10 years) are not always more highly quali-
fied than earlier migrants (cf. Table 3.3). More recent 
migrants from the main African and Asian and South 
American sending regions, are less well qualified than 
more established migrants from these regions. Thus, 
overall, the share of tertiary educated among non-EU-
born residents living in the EU-27 for less than 10 years 
is 20.5%, compared with 21.3% among the more estab-
lished non-EU born. The reason for this seems to be pri-
marily a substantial share of low-skilled seasonal and 
temporary workers coming to the EU from many of the 
main non-EU source countries.
Figure 3.2:   Share of highly skilled foreign-born among total foreign-born population in OECD countries 
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However, recent migrants from within the EU-27 are, 
substantially more highly qualified than more estab-
lished migrants from the EU-27. Here the share of highly 
skilled among those residing abroad for less than 10 
years is 25.9% (compared with 20.9% among migrants 
resident for more than 10 years).
3.4.  How does the EU compare to other OECD 
countries?
Comparing the skill structure of migrants in OECD coun-
tries suggests that EU countries are in general receiving 
a lower share of highly skilled migrants than non-EU 79
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OECD countries, but that there is also substantial varia-
tion in this respect. Countries such as Ireland and the UK 
received more than 30% highly skilled migration, while 
others such as Austria, Italy and Poland received a very 
low share by international standards. Furthermore, the 
data also suggest that migrant selectivity in the EU is sub-
stantially lower than in the main non-EU OECD countries. 
Some EU countries (such as Austria, Poland and Italy) 
actually receive a negative selection of migrants in terms 
of the current skill structure in the sending countries.
Looking at potential explanations for these differences in 
EU-27 skill structure, the results of recent literature (see 
Belot and Hatton, 2008) suggest that a weakness of all 
EU OECD countries is the relative remoteness of the EU 
from Asian countries (with a high share of highly skilled 
migrants), which reduces the ability of the EU to attract 
high-skilled migrants. Other more policy-relevant factors 
such as differences in (post-tax) wage premia for high-
skilled labour, financial constraints (affecting the skill mix 
from poor and distant countries), language and cultural 
proximity, all affect the qualification mix of migrants and 
point to substantial heterogeneity among EU countries, 
with destination country dummies further capturing 
other differences such as other labour market features, 
immigration and integration policies, etc. 
Furthermore, the lower share of tertiary educated 
migrants residing in the EU OECD countries (relative 
to non-EU OECD countries) is associated with a signifi-
cantly lower share of highly educated recent migrants, 
which most likely also reflects substantially higher 
shares of low-skilled temporary migration into the   
EU OECD countries. On the positive side, however, the EU 
countries in general have experienced a slightly stronger 
increase in the share of tertiary-educated foreign-born 
than non-EU OECD countries in the last decade. In terms 
of student mobility, EU countries also seem to be more 
attractive and admit a higher share of foreign students. 
Generally, it can also be observed that comparing the 
EU OECD countries with the four major non-EU receiving 
countries in the OECD – Australia, Canada, New Zealand 
and the US – more often yields significant differences, 
while comparisons of the EU with the US alone seldom 
lead to significant or sizable differences89. This result can 
be interpreted as indicating that those countries with 
modern, point-based migration systems (Australia, Can-
ada and New Zealand) are more successful in attracting 
highly skilled migrants than the EU or the US.
3.5.  Labour market situation of highly skilled 
migrants in the EU
Employment, unemployment and inactivity rates
There are also substantial differences in the labour mar-
ket outcomes (as measured by employment, unem-
ployment and activity rates) of foreign and native-born 
89  For example, the major non-EU receiving countries not only have a significantly 
higher share of foreign-born residents in the population, but also a significantly bet-
ter educational structure than the EU OECD countries. On the other hand, no signifi-
cant differences can be found when comparing the US to the EU OECD countries.
Figure 3.3:   Employment rate of foreign and native-born by major sending and receiving regions and skill 
groups 
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EU-27 residents by skill groups. In general, the less skilled 
foreign-born in the EU-27 are characterised by higher 
employment rates, higher labour market participation 
and also higher unemployment rates than the less skilled 
natives. The high-skilled foreign-born have lower labour 
market participation rates, higher unemployment rates 
and lower employment rates90. In addition native-foreign 
unemployment, employment and inactivity rate differen-
tials are more pronounced for the migrants from outside 
the EU than for migrants from other EU countries.
An empirical investigation based on (weighted) multi-
nomial logit regression analysis using EU LFS data (see 
Table 3.4) suggests that (after controlling for country of 
residence, age and gender) the highly skilled foreign-born 
in the EU have a 9.3 percentage-point lower probability of 
being employed, a 3 percentage-points higher probability 
of being unemployed and a 5.4 percentage point higher 
probability of being inactive than comparable natives. This 
points to a substantial underutilisation of highly skilled 
foreign labour in the EU-27. The less-skilled foreign-born, 
90  It should be noted that immigration rules in the EU are (at least to some 
extent) demand-driven, and under the EU Blue Card directive a high-skilled third-
country worker can only be admitted if s/he already has a job or binding job offer 
earning him or her a salary above the threshold defined in the Directive. Also, the 
recognition of qualifications is an admission requirement at least for regulated 
professions, cf. the EU Blue Card Directive 2009/50/EC.
by contrast, have a 2.9 percentage-point higher prob-
ability of being employed than comparable natives and 
face a 5.4 percentage point lower risk of inactivity but a 
1.2 percentage-point higher risk of unemployment.
This underutilisation is greater for migrants born in more 
distant (i.e. non-EU) sending countries. This applies in 
particular to the probability of unemployment. Here 
only less- and medium-skilled migrants born in Northern 
America and Oceania have a lower risk of unemployment 
than migrants from the EU, while the unemployment risk 
for highly skilled migrants born in for instance the Near 
and Middle East is 7 percentage points higher than that 
of comparable high-skilled natives.
But also migrants born in the EU-15 and even more mark-
edly, migrants from the new Member States have sub-
stantially different labour market outcomes than natives. 
For instance, high-skilled migrants born in the EU-15 
have an employment probability that is 7.4 percentage 
points lower, an unemployment risk that is 1.1 percent-
age points higher and a 6.3 percentage-points higher 
probability of being inactive than natives of the same 
skill group (even after controlling for receiving region, 
gender and age effects). These results thus suggest that 
even within the EU-15 borders the transfer of skills across 
country borders is far from unproblematic.
Table 3.4:   Regression results for the probability of unemployment, employment and inactivity
Skill level Test for 
difference 
among skill 
groups1)
High Medium Low
marginal effect std. error marginal effect std. error marginal effect std. error
Employment
Female –0.050 *** 0.006 –0.140 *** 0.006 –0.205 *** 0.009 a,b
Age 25-44 0.263 *** 0.010 0.348 *** 0.007 0.460 *** 0.008 a,b
Age 45+ 0.043 *** 0.009 0.081 *** 0.008 0.079 *** 0.010 b
Foreign-born –0.093 *** 0.006 –0.072 *** 0.005 0.029 *** 0.006 a,b
Inactivity
Female 0.045 *** 0.005 0.134 *** 0.007 0.221 *** 0.010 a,b
Age 25-44 –0.231 *** 0.010 –0.323 *** 0.008 –0.474 *** 0.009 a,b
Age 45+ 0.001 0.009 –0.023 *** 0.009 –0.023 ** 0.012 b
Foreign-born 0.054 *** 0.005 0.040 *** 0.005 –0.054 *** 0.007 a,b
Unemployment
Female 0.003 ** 0.001 0.002 0.002 –0.004 *** 0.001
Age 25-44 –0.023 *** 0.002 –0.018 *** 0.002 0.007 *** 0.002 a,b
Age 45+ –0.041 *** 0.002 –0.048 *** 0.002 –0.046 *** 0.002 b
Foreign-born 0.030 *** 0.002 0.027 *** 0.002 0.012 *** 0.001 a,b
Notes: The table reports marginal effects of a multinomial choice model, Base population aged 15+, excluding Germany and Ireland, 
excluding unknown highest completed education and unknown country of birth (see section 2 for details of data construction). 
Lowskilled = ISCED 0-2, medium-skilled = ISCED 3,4, high-skilled = ISCED 5,6 Results for receiving country dummy variables and year 
2007 not reported *(**) (***) signifies significance at 10% (5%) (1%) level, std. error – heteroscedasticity robust standard error of the 
estimate. 1) column presents results of a test for the significance of coefficients across skill groups: a) indicates that the coefficient of the 
variable for the medium educated differs from that of the less educated, b) indicates that the coefficient of the variable for the highly 
educated differs from that of the less-educated. All tests are at a significance level of 5%.
Source: EU LFS.81
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Table 3.5:   Regression results for the probability of unemployment, employment and inactivity among 
the foreign-born
Skill level Test for 
difference 
among skill 
groups1)
High Medium Low
marginal effect std. error marginal effect std. error marginal effect std. error
Employment
Female –0.120 *** 0.008 –0.210 *** 0.006 –0.271 *** 0.008 a,b
Age 25-44 0.244 *** 0.021 0.259 *** 0.009 0.381 *** 0.010 a,b
Age 45+ 0.066 *** 0.020 0.077 *** 0.010 0.129 *** 0.013 A
Duration<10 years –0.097 *** 0.010 –0.058 *** 0.008 –0.018 * 0.009 a,b
Unemployment
Female 0.010 *** 0.004 0.009 *** 0.003 –0.008 ** 0.003 a,b
Age 25-44 –0.019 ** 0.010 –0.021 *** 0.004 0.002 0.004 a,b
Age 45+ –0.033 *** 0.009 –0.048 *** 0.004 –0.045 *** 0.006 A
Duration<10 years 0.017 *** 0.005 0.014 *** 0.004 0.008 * 0.004 a,b
Inactive
Female 0.110 *** 0.007 0.202 *** 0.006 0.280 ** 0.009
Age 25-44 –0.225 ** 0.019 –0.238 *** 0.009 –0.383 *** 0.010
Age 45+ –0.033 *** 0.017 –0.029 *** 0.009 –0.084 *** 0.013
Duration<10 years 0.081 *** 0.009 0.044 *** 0.007 0.009 0.010
Notes: The table reports marginal effects of a multinomial logit model, Base foreign-born population aged 15+, excluding native-born 
population, excluding Germany and Ireland, excluding unknown highest completed education and unknown country of birth (see sec-
tion 2 for details of data construction). Low-skilled = ISCED 0-2, medium-skilled = ISCED 3,4, high-skilled = ISCED 5,6 Results for receiving 
country dummy variables and year 2007 not reported (see below) *(**) (***) signifies significance at 10% (5%) (1%) level, std. error – het-
eroscedasticity robust standard error of the estimate, 1) column presents results of a test for the significance of coefficients across skill 
groups: a) indicates that the coefficient of the variable for the medium-educated differs from that of the less-educated, b) indicates that 
the coefficient of the variable for the highly educated differs from that of the less-educated. All tests are at a significance level of 5%.
Source: EU LFS.
In addition econometric evidence indicates that the 
highly skilled foreign-born profit more strongly from 
a longer duration of stay (and thus improved integra-
tion) in the receiving country than the less skilled (see 
Table 3.5). The employment probability of a highly 
skilled migrant who has resided in the country of resi-
dence for more than 10 years is 9.7 percentage points 
higher than that of a migrant who has resided in the 
country of residence for less than 10 years. For the 
highly-skilled the unemployment probability is 1.7 
percentage points lower and the inactivity probability 
is 8.1 percentage points lower. For the less-skilled the 
differences are 1.8 percentage points for employment 
–0.8 and –0. 9 percentage points for unemployment and 
inactivity risks. They are thus substantially smaller. Thus, 
the highly skilled foreign-born, who stay in the country 
of residence for a longer period of time have significantly 
higher improvements in labour market performance 
than less skilled91. The highly skilled are thus particularly 
likely to profit from improved integration.
91  Here, another important factor may play a role: foreign-born with a longer 
period of residence might (and most likely will) have received part or all of the edu-
cation in the country of residence and hence their qualifications will more closely 
match with those of natives.
Finally, gender differences in unemployment, employ-
ment and inactivity probabilities among the foreign-
born are significantly higher than for all residents 
(although they also decrease with increasing educa-
tional attainment). This thus draws attention to the fact 
that female migrants (of all skill groups) must also be 
considered as particularly disadvantaged with respect 
to labour market integration.
Over-qualification
Based on reference levels of the educational attainment 
necessary to fulfil the tasks required in a particular occu-
pation, over-qualification can be defined by comparing 
the actual level of highest completed education of a per-
son to that required in her/his occupation. According to 
this definition a person is overqualified if the actual level 
of educational attainment is higher than that required 
for the occupation and under-qualified if the actual level 
of educational attainment is lower than that required 
for the occupation. Thus, over- and under-qualification 
is defined in terms of a characteristic of the employee 
relative to the occupation he/she holds. High-skilled 
migrants face substantially higher risks of over-qualified 
employment in the EU-27 than medium-skilled migrants 82
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(see Table 3.6). According to results from the EU LFS 
19.4% of the native-born high-skilled employed in the 
EU-27 (excluding Germany and Ireland) were over-qual-
ified, as against 33.0% of the high-skilled foreign-born. 
Both native and foreign-born highly skilled women have 
substantially higher rates of over-qualification (20.7% of 
native women and 34.9% of foreign-born women) than 
men (18.1% of natives and 31.2% of foreign-born).
For the medium-skilled, levels of over-qualification, by 
contrast, are substantially lower both for the foreign-
born and for natives. On the average for the years 2006 
and 2007 around 7.7% of the natives with an educational 
level equivalent to ISCED 3 or 4 were over-qualified for 
their occupation in the EU-27. Among the foreign-born 
the equivalent share was 19.4%. As with high-skilled 
workers, over-qualification among medium-skilled 
female workers is substantially higher than among 
males. While the over-qualification rate for native-born 
Table 3.6:   Foreign-born share in total population and share of total foreign-born population by receiving 
country and skill group
High-skilled Medium-skilled
Foreign-born Native-born Foreign-born Native-born
Receiving country EU-27 33 19.4 19.4 7.7
Receiving country EU-15 33.3 20.9 19.8 7.4
Austria 29.3 22 20.0 7.3
Belgium 27.4 21.4 14.3 9.3
Denmark 25.6 13.6 14.2 8.1
Spain 57.6 32.6 31.9 7.9
Finland 30.4 17.8 13.6 9.8
France 26.2 20.1 14.6 8.3
Greece 59.5 16.8 28.6 3.0
Italy 42.1 11.6 21.2 4.3
Netherlands 19.8 13.0 7.3 2-0
Luxembourg 13.7 5.6
Portugal 23.7 11.6 15.2 5.2
Sweden 27.1 11.6 9.5 5.5
UK 24.2 22.4 16.9 10.2
Receiving country NMS 27.3 13.8 14.3 8.3
Bulgaria 20.9 12.1
Cyprus 50.7 28.6 37.4 9.9
Czech Republic 14.3 5.8 8.6 4.9
Estonia 41.7 23.6 21 9.5
Hungary 10.4 5.4
Lithuania 22.0 12.8
Latvia 29.4 15.0 15.8 12.2
Malta
Poland 15.1 8.4
Romania 9.1 9.7
Slovenia 7.3 9.7 4.8
Slovakia 9.3 8.8
Notes: Base employed aged 15+, excluding Germany and Ireland, excluding unknown highest completed education and unknown 
country of birth (see section 2 for details of data construction). Low-skilled = ISCED 0-2, medium-skilled = ISCED 3,4, high-skilled = ISCED 
5,6. – = data provides too few observations to be reported. 
Source: EU LFS.
women in the EU-27 amounted to 8.4% in the EU-27 and 
was thus only 1.2 percentage points higher than that of 
men, for foreign-born medium-skilled women the gen-
der gap amounted to 9.7 percentage points (men 15.2%, 
women 24.9%) (cf. Table 3.6a).
In addition econometric results from regressions simi-
lar to those in the previous section (see Table 3.7) show 
that:
(1)   The probability of over-qualification is lower for 
migrants born in the EU-15 than for natives. The 
risk of over-qualified employment is 2.9 percentage 
points (for high-skilled) and 1.2 percentage points 
(for medium-skilled) lower than for a native, when 
the migrants were born in other EU-15 countries. 
Thus migrants born in the EU-15, provided they find 
work, seem to face few problems in transferring 
human capital across national borders.83
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Table 3.6a:   Share of overqualified workers in total employment by gender, skill group and receiving country
High-skilled Medium-skiled
Foreign-born Native-born Foreign-born Native-born
Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female
Receiving country EU-27 31.2 34.9 18.1 20.7 15.2 24.9 7.2 8.4
Receiving country EU-15 31.6 35.2 19.2 22.6 15.6 25.2 7.2 7.7
Austria 27.0 32.2 26.1 15.7 14.9 26.3 7.2 7.4
Belgium 23.7 31.7 18.5 24.2 13.6 15.2 8.3 10.7
Denmark 26.0 25.2 14.5 12.8 12.9 15.4 9.0 6.8
Spain 56.9 58.5 33.7 31.4 22.3 43.7 7.3 8.6
Finland - 37.9 13.5 21.1 (11.8) - 7.3 12.9
France 23.3 29.7 16.4 23.4 9.4 21.9 5.9 11.3
Greece 59.7 59.3 16.7 17.0 14.8 46.0 2.6 3.5
Italy 42.9 41.5 9.1 14.2 13.3 31.4 4.4 4.1
Luxembourg (3.0) (6.2) - - (3.9) 11.8 2.2 (1.6)
Netherlands 18.3 21.4 11.5 14.8 12.1 15.4 6.3 4.9
Portugal 23.5 23.8 10.0 12.7 9.9 21.0 4.4 5.9
Sweden 30.1 24.5 12.3 11.1 8.6 10.5 4.9 6.3
UK 21.8 26.7 19.0 26.0 18.6 14.7 11.8 8.0
Receiving country NMS 24.5 30.0 13.8 13.8 9.2 20.3 7.2 9.8
Bulgaria - - 23.6 19.2 - - 11.6 12.8
Cyprus 36.8 60.2 24.0 33.1 22.0 49.0 10.8 8.6
Czech Republic 14.3 14.4 5.7 6.0 5.5 13.1 3.9 6.2
Estonia 44.8 39.5 23.6 23.6 14.0 27.8 6.2 13.5
Hungary - (18.6) 10.1 10.7 - - 4.1 7.1
Lithuania - - 27.7 18.0 - - 11.3 14.5
Latvia 29.3 29.5 17.5 13.5 11.8 19.6 11.3 13.1
Malta - - - - - - - -
Poland - - 15.0 15.3 - - 6.4 11.1
Romania - - 9.6 8.6 - - 10.0 9.2
Slovenia (10.8) - 7.8 7.0 (6.0) (16.0) 3.8 6.2
Slovakia - - 9.7 8.9 - - 8.3 9.5
Notes: Base employed aged 15+, excluding Germany and Ireland, excluding unknown highest completed education and unknown 
country of birth (see section 2 for details of data construction). Low-skilled = ISCED 0-2, medium-skilled = ISCED 3,4, high-skilled = ISCED 
5,6 Values in brackets have a low reliability. – = data provides too few observations to be reported. 
Source: EU LFS.
(2)   High-skilled migrants from the new Member States 
face a substantially (namely 29.6 percentage points) 
higher risk of being over-qualified than natives. 
Medium-skilled migrants from the NMS have an 
over-qualification risk 19.6 percentage points higher 
than that of natives. Migrants born in the NMS thus 
belong to the groups of migrants with the greatest 
difficulties in transferring human capital across 
borders.
(3)   For most other sending country groups the over-
qualification risk is 10 to 20 percentage points higher 
for highly skilled migrants than for highly skilled 
native workers and 3 to 7 percentage points higher 
for medium-skilled migrant workers.
(4)   Comparing the magnitude of over-qualification 
between high- and medium-skilled foreign-born, 
highly skilled foreign-born have substantially larger 
problems in transferring human capital across border 
than medium-skilled workers.
Furthermore, results of further regressions (not reported 
here) suggest that the over-qualification risk reduces 
more substantially with increasing duration of residence 
for highly skilled than for medium-skilled foreign-born. 
Highly skilled foreign-born who have lived in a country 
for more than 10 years, experience a reduction in their 
over-qualification risk of approximately 15.4 percentage 
points. For medium-skilled migrants this effect is more 
modest. Finally, migrant workers face particularly higher 
over-qualification risks in agriculture and energy & con-
struction.
3.6.  Migration and productivity
Whether there is a relationship between migration and 
productivity is likely to depend on the attributes that 
migrants possess relative to native workers. In part, this 
may be determined by domestic immigration policy 84
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– more selective policies enable governments to iden-
tify specific skills and professions that are required in 
the domestic labour market. This section estimates the 
impact of various aspects of migrant labour on produc-
tivity at industry level across EU countries, taking into 
account skills and interactions with technology and dif-
ferentiating sources of migration. The paucity of empiri-
cal evidence should be noted in this regard, particularly 
with respect to differentiating labour types and their 
interaction with technology.
Using data from EU KLEMS92 and the EU LFS, the contri-
bution made by migrant labour to productivity growth 
in the EU is explored. The qualities that migrant work-
ers bring are diverse, largely dependent on their home 
country. Here, an industry perspective is adopted. Data 
is available at the NACE (Rev. 1.1) sectoral breakdown for 
the period 1995-2004 as shown in Table 3.8.
92  More information on this research data base can be found in Timmer et al. 
(2008) and the data is available from www.euklems.net.
First, a description of migration trends at sectoral levels 
is presented. Our analysis considers a division of migrant 
labour into those from the EU and those from the rest 
of the world (ROW). The EU here is defined as the EU-15 
since the data covers the period prior to the 2004/2007 
EU expansion. It is well documented that migrants tend 
to be concentrated in certain industries (cf. Mas et al., 
2008). Taking a sectoral perspective, Figure 3.4 shows 
the extent to which, at aggregated EU level, sectors are 
dominated by skill types. Figure 3.4 reveals that, in terms 
of the proportion of total employment, construction, 
hotels and restaurants, business services (70 and 71t74) 
and private households are sectors with significant pro-
portions of migrants. In these sectors, the proportion of 
low-skilled migrants accounts for at least half of total 
migrants, except in business services, where higher-
skilled migrant workers are relatively important. Con-
versely, sectors where migrants play a relatively minor 
role are fishing, energy and public administration and 
defence.
The importance of low-skilled migrants in some sectors, 
such as construction, is not surprising, but it is perhaps 
Table 3.7:   Regression results for the probability of over-qualified employment
High-skilled Medium-skilled
marginal effect standard error marginal effect standard error
Female 0.064*** 0.003 0.011*** 0.001
Age 25-44 –0.155*** 0.006 –0.041*** 0.001
Age 45+ –0.174*** 0.004 –0.050*** 0.001
Sending country
Native-born Reference category Reference category
EU-15 –0.029*** 0.007 –0.012*** 0.002
NMS 0.296*** 0.017 0.192*** 0.010
Other Europe 0.350*** 0.015 0.148*** 0.006
Turkey 0.188*** 0.038 0.066*** 0.012
North Africa 0.157*** 0.021 0.051*** 0.010
Other Africa 0.105*** 0.014 0.043*** 0.008
South & Central America 0.194*** 0.019 0.177*** 0.013
East Asia 0.103*** 0.032 –0.001 0.009
Near and middle East 0.168*** 0.021 0.025*** 0.008
South and southeast Asia 0.123*** 0.013 0.063*** 0.008
US, Australia and Oceania –0.079*** 0.017 –0.040*** 0.005
Sector of employment
Agriculture and Mining Reference category Reference category
Manufacturing –0.155*** 0.003 –0.030*** 0.001
Energy and Construction –0.122*** 0.004 –0.019*** 0.001
Market services –0.216*** 0.005 –0.057*** 0.001
Non market services –0.363*** 0.007 –0.052*** 0.001
Notes: The table reports marginal effects of an ordered logit model, Base foreign-born employed aged 15+ excluding, excluding Ger-
many and Ireland, excluding unknown highest completed education and unknown country of birth (see section 2 of the main report 
for details of data construction) medium-skilled = ISCED 3,4, high-skilled = ISCED 5,6. Results for receiving country dummy variables and 
year 2007 not reported (see below). *(**) (***) signifies significance at 10% (5%) (1%) level, standard error – heteroscedasticity robust 
standard error of the estimate.
Source: EU LFS.85
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Table 3.8:   Sectors available in EU LFS
Code Description
1 A Agriculture
2 B Fishing
3 C Mining
4 15t16 Food, drink and tobacco
5 17t19 Textiles and textile products, leather and footwear
6 21t22 Pulp, paper, paper products, printing and publishing
7 23 Coke, refined petroleum products and nuclear fuel
8 24 Chemicals and chemical products
9 25 Rubber and plastics
10 26 Other non-metallic mineral products
11 27t28 Basic metals and fabricated metal products
12 29 Machinery n.e.c.
13 30t33 Electrical and optical equipment
14 34t35 Transport equipment
15 36t37 Manufacturing nec; recycling
16 E Energy/utilities
17 F Construction
18 G Wholesale and retail
19 H Hotels and restaurants
20 60t63 Transport and storage
21 64 Communications 
22 J Financial intermediation
23 70 Real estate activities
24 71t74 Renting of machinery and equipment and other business activities
25 L Public administration and defence
26 N Health
27 O Other social, personal and community
28 P Private households
more surprising to see that low skills account for such a 
small proportion of migrant labour in some other sec-
tors, such as agriculture. This may be taken as evidence 
of over-qualification in such sector, where work is excep-
tionally seasonal and likely to be short-term.
A sectoral breakdown of the EU LFS data thus shows 
that there is a great deal of variation in the concen-
tration and the nature of the migrant labour force. It 
should also be noted that there is considerable hetero-
geneity among the EU countries. In addition, there has 
been a shift from low- to high-skilled migrants in the 
EU (see background study). By comparison, migration 
growth for the rest of the world displays a positive 
trend in almost all countries in all periods and in all skill 
groups.
As a first step, the measure of multi-factor productivity 
(MFP) provided in EU KLEMS for each country and each 
industry over time is obtained. Both MFP growth and 
MFP levels are used, and regressed on a number of addi-
tional explanatory variables that relate to the migrant 
workforce, as specified below:
where eu_share is the proportion of migrant workers in 
the workforce from EU countries and row_share is the 
rest of the world proportion for each country (c), indus-
try (i) and year (t).
The aim is to see how far the proportion of migrants 
affects both productivity levels and growth. Equations 
1a and 1b are estimated using standard-panel ordinary 
least squares (OLS), including industry, time and country 
dummies. A number of variants of the equation are con-
sidered, including time*country effects to take explicit 
account of business cycle effects, which are reported 
below.
As a refinement to the estimations above, a simple 
Cobb-Douglas production function is adopted, with 
value added as the dependent variable, capital differ-
entiated in terms of its ICT and non-ICT components, 86
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Figure 3.4:   Migrant share in % of total employment by sector and skill group, 2004 (‘EU total’) 
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Source: EU LFS; EU total comprises 13 countries, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Spain, Finland, France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, 
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and hours worked as the labour input. In addition, the 
share of migrant labour differentiated by EU and ROW 
is included:
In order to take better account of the impact that 
migrants have on productivity, a measure needs to be 
incorporated to take explicit account of the skills that 
this subset of workers have. There are a number of ways 
in which this may be done. The share of high-skilled 
migrants is included in the specification in addition to 
the share in terms of numbers of migrant workers. These 
terms should enable us to capture both the volume and 
quality effects to some extent. However, a more efficient 
way of incorporating these two components would be to 
construct a labour quality measure (Timmer et al., 2008), 
because it would be interesting to disentangle the skills 
effect (high/low labour quality) from the labour-type 
effect (migrant/non-migrant).
Another refinement to the estimation is to incorporate 
a measure of the interaction between ICT and high-
skilled migrant labour. This term is added to the esti-
mated models in order to explore the extent to which 
migrant labour allows for better utilisation of these new 
technologies, since they may bring to the labour mar-
ket additional knowledge and know-how not captured 
in the skills measure. Table 3.9 below outlines the vari-
ables included in the specifications and how they have 
been constructed.
In summary, the level estimates appear stronger than 
the growth estimates. Thus, the ratio of migrants to 
total employment is negatively related to sectors where 
productivity levels are higher, but are not significantly 
positively related to growth in productivity. When con-
sidering a simple share of migrant labour in total labour 
by industry, country and year, it is found that the impact 
is negative for levels of MFP and value added. In growth 
rate specification the impact is positive. Tables 3.10 and 
3.11 outline some of the key findings in relation to the 
whole dataset.
It is important to distinguish between EU and ROW 
migrants, since the productivity effects of these two 
groups of migrant workers appear to operate in oppo-
site directions, with the EU effect being negative. This is 
likely to be influenced by national immigration policies 
geared towards the selective recruitment of ROW work-
ers. There are much fewer restrictions on EU nationals. 
The correlation between EU and ROW shares of migrants 
is positive though small (0.05), so should not bias the 
findings because of multicollinearity. The highest cor-
relation between the various migrant variables included 
in the productivity specifications was between the share 
of high-skilled migrants (hi_share) and the interaction 
between this and the ICT and high-skilled share variable 
(ict_int) at 0.54. These terms are not included together 
in any one specification. It should be noted that the 
breakdown of migrants into ROW and EU is crude; ROW 
includes workers from technology-leading as well as 87
Chapter 3 — Migration, skills and productivity
Table 3.9:   Variables included in the econometric analysis
Name Description  Calculation
va Value added From EU KLEMS
lnva logged value added Ln(va)
dlnva logged value added growth d.ln(va)
mfp Multifactor productivity calculated in EU KLEMS – 
quality adjusted
From EU KLEMS
lnmfp Logged mfp Ln(mfp)
dlnmfp Logged mfp growth d.ln(mfp)
ict_ratio Ratio of ICT capital to total capital (ICT+nonICT) ict_ratio=capitlev/(capitlev+capnitlev)
ict_int ICT ratio multiplied by the share of high-skilled 
migrants
ict_int=(hi_share*ict_ratio)/10
eu_share Share of EU migrants in total employment eu_share=(eu_hi+eu_med+eu_low)/totl_lfs
row_share Share of ROW migrants in total employment  row_share=(row_hi+row_med+row_low)/totl_lfs
hi_share Share of high skilled migrants in total migrant 
employment
Hi_share=(eu_hi+row_hi)/totl_mig
hi_share_m Share of high skilled migrants as a proportion of 
share of high-skilled natives
Hi_skill_m=hi_share/(nat_hi/nat_totl)
hi_sh_nat Share of high-skilled natives in total native 
employment
Hi_sh_nat=nat_hi/(totl_lfs-totl_mig)
Table 3.10:   Multi-factor productivity and the impact of migrant workers, 1995-2004, EU countries, all sectors
Variables LnMFP LnMFP LnMFP dlnMFP dlnMFP dlnMFP
mig_share -0.7719** 0.0979***
  [0.3185] [0.0345]
hi_share 0.2422*** 0.2319*** 0.0034 0.0035
  [0.0738] [0.0731] [0.0082] [0.0082]
Eu_share   -4.8824*** -4.2582*** 0.1224* 0.1012
    [0.6428] [0.6817] [0.0706] [0.0753]
row_share   0.7487** 0.1395 0.0891** 0.0890**
    [0.3775] [0.4107] [0.0411] [0.0451]
Ict_int   6.6211*** -0.0349
  [1.9925] [0.2162]
Observations 2957 2957 2909 2697 2697 2654
R-squared 0.898 0.9 0.897 0.212 0.212 0.213
F 173.9 176.3 169.2 5.182 5.143 5.121
Rmse 0.381 0.378 0.374 0.0398 0.0398 0.0397
Source: EU KLEMS and EU LFS data, own calculations estimated on dataset excluding Luxembourg. Note that all models include time, 
industry, country and business cycle dummies; ***, **, * indicate 1%, 5% and 10% significance respectively.
technology laggard countries. Ideally, more disaggre-
gated data should be available, allowing us to distin-
guish more specifically between nations.
A more disaggregated approach by sector also seems 
to tell us more about the nature of the relationship 
between migrants and productivity. Two sectoral disag-
gregations are considered, one separating manufactur-
ing from services and another based on patterns of tech-
nological usage. The manufacturing and services split is 
particularly important since these are two distinct sec-
tors that operate very differently. The share of manufac-
turing is generally falling in European economies, while 
the relative growth in services has been increasing. 
However, services are more difficult to measure since 
information on inputs and outputs is less quantifiable. It 
is therefore reasonable to assume that they are unlikely 
to operate under the same production function. When 
industries are grouped according to whether they use or 
produce ICT, there is little evidence that, in ICT – using 88
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Table 3.11:   Value added production function and the impact of migrant workers, 1995-2004, EU countries, 
all sectors
Variables lnVA lnVA lnVA dlnVA dlnVA dlnVA
Lnhrs 0.5198*** 0.5194*** 0.4571*** 0.3309*** 0.3311*** 0.3302***
  [0.0267] [0.0267] [0.0263] [0.0277] [0.0277] [0.0276]
Lnkit -0.0350*** -0.0349*** -0.1071*** 0.0435*** 0.0437*** 0.0432***
  [0.0118] [0.0118] [0.0129] [0.0097] [0.0097] [0.0097]
Lnknit 0.3651*** 0.3646*** 0.4605*** 0.1333*** 0.1335*** 0.1309***
  [0.0198] [0.0199] [0.0207] [0.0300] [0.0300] [0.0300]
mig_share -0.5504** 0.1293***
  [0.2547] [0.0329]
hi_share 0.3904*** 0.3900*** 0.0082 0.0083
  [0.0574] [0.0574] [0.0076] [0.0076]
Eu_share -0.6853 -1.1060**   0.1470** 0.1334**
  [0.5113] [0.4995]   [0.0661] [0.0662]
row_share -0.4894 -0.7684**   0.1215*** 0.1154***
  [0.3240] [0.3167]   [0.0416] [0.0415]
Ict_int 23.3410***   0.3661*
  [1.7757]   [0.2029]
Observations 2987 2987 2987 2727 2727 2727
R-squared 0.935 0.935 0.938 0.332 0.332 0.332
F 278.9 276.9 289.9 9.447 9.375 9.398
Rmse 0.3 0.3 0.294 0.0376 0.0376 0.0376
Source: EU KLEMS and EU LFS data, own calculations estimated on dataset excluding Luxembourg. Note that all models include time, 
industry, country and business cycle dummies; ***, **, * indicate 1%, 5% and 10% significance respectively. 
or producing – sectors the use of migrant labour has any 
significant impact on productivity in the MFP estimations 
or in the value added specifications.
Another interesting issue is how skilled migrant labour 
affects productivity, and also how such labour might 
interact with technology. The findings in Tables 3.10 and 
3.11 suggest that there are strong positive relationships 
between productivity and high-skilled migrant workers 
and in the technology interaction. However, when looking 
at productivity growth the effects are much more muted 
and generally insignificant. This is most likely because 
productivity changes resulting from migrant labour oper-
ate over a much longer time frame than that measured 
in the growth equations, so the longer-run levels speci-
fication appears to be more able to capture the impacts. 
Refinements to measurement may help, and a number 
of possible changes to the variables and data have been 
explored to test how sensitive the findings are to specifi-
cations and the dimensions of the data (truncating time 
periods and reducing the number of countries included). 
Extensions to the work include adopting a more sophis-
ticated production function, although the interpretation 
of the coefficients with these more flexible functional 
forms is less straightforward than with the Cobb-Douglas 
function. More sophisticated estimation techniques are 
also available and have been explored using the General 
Methods of Moments (GMM) estimation procedure. The 
findings from these estimates caution against placing 
too much emphasis on the OLS results, since the effects 
of migrant labour on productivity largely disappear. That 
said, there are reasons to suppose that GMM estimation 
procedures might be less suited to industry data than to 
microanalyses because of the dimensions of the data, 
which include a relatively small and diverse number of 
industries and not so many years. An alternative is the 
pooled mean group estimator (Pesaran, Shin and Smith, 
1999), which has been used before (O’Mahony and Vec-
chi, 2005).
Policy conclusions
The impact of migration on productivity is an under-
researched area, particularly in view of the increased 
mobility of labour in recent years. The findings in this sec-
tion are mixed but are in line with other studies of the 
productivity impact of migrant labour (Mas et al. 2008; 
Paserman 2008). Some evidence is found of a significant 
effect of migrant labour at industry level across Europe, 
which differs for ROW and EU migrants, with the former 
displaying some evidence of a positive effect, while EU 
migration shows if anything a negative impact on pro-
ductivity and its growth. However, this largely disappears 
when potential endogeneity within the production func-
tion estimates is taken into account. Thus, caution should 
be exercised when drawing firm policy recommendations 
from this exploratory research across such a diverse col-
lection of experiences. With this in mind, however, there 
is some evidence to suggest that the more selective 89
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immigration policies applying to rest of the world workers 
do yield a positive effect, in contrast with the indifferent 
findings in relation to EU migrants. There is some limited 
evidence that technology and the share of high-skilled 
migrants have a positive impact on productivity.
3.7.  Effects of migration on regional GDP per 
capita and patenting
The relationship between (skilled) migration and eco-
nomic performance at regional level is also studied. For 
this, data are combined from the European Labour Force 
Survey (EU LFS) and the Eurostat Regional data base. In 
particular the impact of migration on GDP per capita 
growth and patenting is investigated at the EU-15 NUTS 
2-digit level over the period 2000-2006 using (dynamic) 
panel regression methods.
Some regional aspects of migration are summarized in 
Table 3.12, which shows the arithmetic average over 
regions of the share of high-skilled workers, and the 
share of migrants in total employed persons, together 
with the minimum and maximum for each of the respec-
tive indicators and each country. The first variable (share 
of high-skilled workers) indicates that there are quite 
large differences across countries. The shares range 
from a minimum of 13.5 percent in Portugal to a maxi-
mum of 38.4 percent in Belgium. This of course reflects 
specificities of the national educational systems (further 
note that these numbers are the arithmetic means over 
regions for each country). Even more important, how-
ever, is the range of high-skilled workers across regions. 
This range is lowest in Ireland and Italy with less than 
10 percentage points, but goes up to about 25 percent-
age points in France and Spain and is even higher in the 
United Kingdom with almost 30 percentage points.
The next variable looked at is the share of migrants in 
total employed persons. The corresponding figures 
are reported in the next three columns of Table 3.12. 
Again, the arithmetic mean over regions for each 
country is reported. These average shares range from 
less than 4 per cent in Finland to about 14 per cent in 
Germany (not considering the case of Luxembourg). 
This partly reflects the country-specific patterns of 
migration already discussed above in more detail. Let 
us thus turn again to the distribution of these shares 
measured – for simplicity – by range, i.e. the difference 
between the maximum and the minimum as reported in 
Table 3.12. This range varies from little less than 10 per-
centage points in Finland, Greece and maybe Portugal 
(not considering the special case of Ireland) to more 
than 40 percent in the United Kingdom. Though these 
quite high numbers might be caused by data problems 
they nonetheless show that migrants within countries 
are highly concentrated in particular regions (at least 
in some countries). In many cases the highest migrant 
shares are observed in the capital cities or other larger 
urban areas. A closer examination shows that most 
regions exhibit migrant shares in the range between 0 
and about 20 percent whereas only very few regions 
exhibit migrant shares larger than this. Second, between 
2000 and 2005 the distribution shifted to the right, in 
particular for regions with migrant shares up to 20 per 
cent. This implies that higher migration shares can be 
observed in most regions.
In the econometric part, the effects of migration on 
regional GDP per capita growth and patents per inhabit-
ant are studied. The following specification for regional 
growth is used:
it it it
it t i it
u Dummies ShSHM ShM
ShSH ShGFCF Gap
+ + + +
+ + = −
5 4
3 2 1 , 1
β β
β β β γ
, 
Table 3.12:   Descriptive results in %, 2005
Share of high skilled workers Share of migrants
Mean Minimum Maximum Mean Minimum Maximum
Austria 17.6 13.8 25.9 13.5 6.3 31.7
Belgium 38.4 30.8 50.9 12.1 3.2 37.0
Germany 25.7 18.5 38.8 14.1 3.2 24.5
Spain 32.2 21.9 47.8 11.4 4.0 21.4
Finland 31.5 22.4 37.3 3.6 1.3 9.6
France 25.3 16.3 41.6 9.0 2.7 31.5
Greece 19.9 13.2 29.4 6.2 2.6 12.3
Ireland 30.3 25.9 34.6 11.4 11.1 11.7
Italy 14.3 11.1 19.7 7.3 3.1 12.7
Netherlands 28.8 22.3 39.2 10.2 4.3 17.9
Portugal 13.5 9.1 22.8 7.9 3.9 14.5
Sweden 27.8 22.7 36.9 11.7 6.5 21.9
United Kingdom 29.2 20.6 49.6 7.8 2.7 43.2
Note: The means represent unweighted averages over regions. 90
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where γ refers to regional GDP per capita growth by 
NUTS-2 region, taken from the Eurostat Regio database. 
GAP refers to the initial gap in GDP per capita defined 
as Gap=(GDP per capita/max{GDP per capita}) (where 
max{GDP per capita} denotes the region with highest GDP 
per capita in the particular year). ShGFCF is the share of 
gross fixed capital formation in total output, ShSH is the 
share of high-skilled workers (workers with ISCED levels 
5 and 6), ShM is the share of migrants, and ShSHM is the 
share of high-skilled migrants. In another specification 
the difference between the shares of native high-skilled 
workers and migrant high-skilled workers is used, i.e. 
Diff=ShSH-ShSHM. The results from various specifications 
of a random effects model are reported in Table 3.13. Gen-
erally, the share of gross fixed capital formation and the 
number of patents (per million inhabitants; PTcap) turn 
out to be not significant in any of these specifications. 
Further, the gap lagged by one period is significant with 
the proper (negative) sign, i.e. a lowering of the gap also 
reduces the growth rate (catch-up growth). The share of 
migrants does not turn out to be significant in any case. 
More important, the variables of interest are significant 
and also show the expected sign in most cases. These are 
the share of high-skilled workers, and in particular the 
share of high-skilled migrants, or the difference, though 
these are only significant in specifications (1) and (2), 
respectively.
With respect to the size of the coefficients the results 
indicate that an increase in the share of high-skilled 
Table 3.13:   Econometric results I
Dependent variable: Growth of GDP per capita
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ln Gapt-1 -0.035*** -0.034*** -0.048*** -0.048***
0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
ShSH t 0.028 0.061*** 0.046** 0.063***
0.117 0.000 0.026 0.000
ShGFCF t -0.004 -0.004 -0.022 -0.021
0.789 0.802 0.333 0.336
ShM t 0.006 0.006 -0.004 -0.004
0.658 0.642 0.783 0.804
ShSHM t 0.033*** 0.017
0.001 0.114
Diff t 0.028*** 0.015
0.002 0.146
PTcap t 0.000 0.000
0.995 0.992
Chi2 600.499 597.809 564.622 563.984
R2 within 0.252 0.251 0.275 0.275
R2 between 0.731 0.729 0.695 0.694
R2 overall 0.352 0.351 0.407 0.407
Obs. 1132 1132 846 846
No. of groups 194 194 187 187
z-values reported below coefficients; ***, **, * denote significance at 1, 5, and 10%, respectively. All regressions include country dum-
mies, time dummies and a constant.
migrants (or increase in the difference) by one percent-
age point increases the growth rate by 0.03 percentage 
points. As the share of migrants and the share of high-
skill migrants might be endogenous, an attempt is made 
to account for this using the lagged shares as instru-
ments. The results of this exercise are qualitatively similar 
to those reported in Table 3.13. In particular, the share of 
high-skilled migrants remains significantly positive in the 
first two specifications.
In Table 3.14 the log of patents per million inhabitants is 
used as the dependent variable which is regressed on the 
lagged skill share, the share of migrants and the skill share 
of migrants or the difference variable. In the random effects 
specifications (1) and (2) the lagged skill share and the share 
of migrants are found to be highly significant and positive 
whereas the variables capturing high-skill migration are not 
significant. When allowing for a lagged dependent variable 
in specifications (3) and (4)93, the share of migrants remains 
significantly positive. More important, the variables captur-
ing high-skill migration are significant at the 10 percent 
level. However, it should be noted that the instruments 
used in this specification might not be appropriate94.
93  For this we use a GMM-type estimator. Instruments in the 
differenced equation are the further lags of the dependent vari-
able and first differences of the independent variables. In the level 
equations, the instrument used is the first lagged difference of the 
dependent variable.
94  The large values of the Sargan test indicating that the over-
identifying restrictions are not valid.91
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Table 3.14:   Econometric results II
Dependent variable: ln PTcap
Random effects Arellano-Bover/Blundell-Bond GMM estimation 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ln PTcap t-1 0.247*** 0.251 ***
0.000 0.000
ShSH t-1 1.688 *** 1.661 *** 1.311 1.283
0.006 0.006 0.130 0.140
ShM t 2.043 *** 2.001 *** 1.766 *** 1.876 ***
0.000 0.000 0.005 0.003
ShMSH t -0.085 0.380
0.643 0.113
Diff t -0.146 0.457 *
0.430 0.065
Chi2 633.678 634.646 179.279 179.173
R2 within 0.158 0.158
R2 between 0.742 0.742
R2 overall 0.712 0.712
Obs. 850 850 832 832
Nr. of groups 187 187 184 184
Sargan 225.341 223.581
z-values reported below coefficients; ***, **, * denote significance at 1, 5, and 10%, respectively.
Specifications (1) and (2) include country dummies, time dummies and a constant; specifications (3) and (4) include time dummies and 
a constant.
The results suggest that an increase in the share of high-
skilled workers by one percentage point will increase the 
patents per million inhabitants by a little less than 2 per 
cent. Similarly, a higher share of migrants will increase it 
by about 2 percentage points. With respect to the size 
of the coefficients, the results are in line with the find-
ings by Hunt and Gauthier-Loiselle (2008), who perform 
similar regressions for the US. For this comparison one 
has to take into account that a yearly panel is estimated 
in the present analysis whereas in the paper mentioned 
the effects are estimated over 10-year periods. However, 
the results are not robust to alternative specifications or 
when trying to take into account potential endogeneity, 
heteroscedasticity of the error term, etc.
3.8.  Conclusions
This study provides an overview of the extent and poten-
tial effects of high-skilled migration to the EU-27. First of 
all, it investigates how many high-skilled migrants live in 
the EU, where these migrants come from, and how the 
European Union is positioned in the international com-
petition for talent. Second, it studies how high-skilled 
migrants fare in European labour markets. To this end, 
employment, unemployment and inactivity rates are ana-
lysed by skill groups as along with job-skill mismatch for 
natives and foreign-born workers in the EU. Finally, the 
issue of the effects of high-skilled migration on productiv-
ity and other measures of competitiveness is addressed at 
sectoral and regional levels.
It is found that – despite substantial heterogeneity 
among individual EU countries – high-skilled migrants are 
an important source of high-skilled labour in the EU-27. 
According to data from the European Labour Force Sur-
vey, 9.7% of the total tertiary-educated resident popula-
tion (as opposed to 8.1% of total resident population) in 
the EU-27 is foreign-born. The share of the highly skilled 
among the resident population born outside the EU is 
21.1%, while for intra-EU migrants it is 23% (as opposed to 
17.9% for the native-born population). The foreign-born 
thus contribute more than proportionately to the share 
of the highly skilled in the EU. High-skilled migration is, 
however, also strongly concentrated on individual receiv-
ing countries. Around 94.2% of all highly skilled migrants 
in the EU-27 live in the EU-15. Only around 5.8% reside 
in the new Member States. The three largest receiving 
countries in the EU-27 (France, the UK and Spain) in all 
account for 57.5% of the total foreign-born population 
in the EU-15 (with Germany and Ireland excluded from 
the sample) and 63.6% of the highly skilled. The foreign-
born share in the total resident population (aside from 
the obvious outlier of Luxemburg) is higher than 15% in 
Austria and Sweden but below 10% in Denmark, Greece, 
Italy and Portugal and even below 3% in Finland.
Immigration policy vis-à-vis high-skilled third country migrants: 
Increasing the skill selectivity of European migration policy
There is some evidence that – on average – EU OECD 
economies (EU) have a lower share of highly qualified 
migrants than the (arithmetic) average of the (high-92
European Competitiveness Report 2009
migration) non-EU OECD economies, and that the gap 
compared with the average of the major migration 
receiving countries (such as Australia, Canada, New Zea-
land) is larger for short-term than long-term migrants. 
The gap compared with the US, by contrast, was much 
smaller and – in many instances – not significant.
Although these international comparisons could not be 
conducted separately for migration flows inside the EU 
and from outside the EU, evidence from the European 
labour force survey suggests that the high-skilled share 
among migrants from outside the EU is lower than among 
migrants from within the EU, despite non-EU countries 
being a more important source of human capital for most 
EU-27 countries than migrants from within the EU.
Thus one possible policy initiative to improve the skill 
structure of migrants is to increasingly target highly 
skilled migrants in immigration laws, taking into account 
that only the entry and stay of highly skilled migrants from 
third countries (third-country nationals) can be actively 
steered by Member States according to their changing 
economic and labour market needs. The EU (e.g. Students 
Directive 2004/114/EC; Researchers Directive 2005/71/EC; 
EU Blue Card Directive 2009/50/EC) and most EU-27 coun-
tries have undertaken major steps to change immigra-
tion in this direction in recent years, which has resulted 
in an increasing share of high-skilled migrants settling in 
the EU. The European Pact on Immigration and Asylum, 
approved by the European Council in October 2008, calls 
explicitly for these efforts to be continued in the future 
“to increase the attractiveness of the European Union for 
highly qualified workers and take new measures to fur-
ther facilitate the reception of students and researchers 
and their movement within the EU”.
However, the results also suggest that this increasing 
selectivity of immigration regimes is offset by a relatively 
low qualification structure of short-term migrants in the 
EU. In particular, more recent migrants (in the EU for less 
than 10 years) from the main African, Asian and South 
American sending regions are less well qualified. Over-
all, the tertiary educated share among non-EU-born resi-
dents living in the EU-27 for less than 10 years is 20.5%, 
compared with 21.3% among the more established non-
EU-born. For intra-EU migrants, by contrast, the share 
of the highly skilled among those residing abroad for 
less than 10 years is 25.9% (compared to 20.9% among 
migrants resident for more than 10 years).
Thus, the evidence also suggests that attempts to 
improve the qualification structure of migrants to the 
EU-27 are offset by an opposing tendency of increas-
ing labour market demand for low-skilled workers that 
often enter the EU labour market as temporary or sea-
sonal workers or illegal migrants. While international 
competition for migrants is focusing primarily on the 
high-skilled, comprehensive migration policies thus 
need to address future labour market needs across the 
full skill spectrum. Realistically, migration policy will 
thus also need to develop strategies towards less-skilled 
migrants. From the standpoint of competitiveness, how-
ever, highly skilled migration should be preferred over 
low-skilled migration.
Making the EU more attractive for high-skilled migrants
With respect to high-skilled migrants, increasing the 
selectivity of migration regimes alone will not suffice to 
attract more of them. To be fully effective, such meas-
ures have to be accompanied by increased efforts to 
make the European Union more attractive as a destina-
tion for highly skilled migrants. In this respect, the still 
fragmented nature of EU labour markets, which make 
both the recognition of qualifications as well as the 
transparent portability of entitlements to social security 
systems difficult even for intra-EU migrants, also act as 
an impediment to attracting high-skilled migrants from 
abroad. Thus, closer co-ordination of migration policies 
among the Member States with respect to highly skilled 
could help to increase the attractiveness of the European 
Union as a destination for high-skilled workers. Initiatives 
aiming at facilitating migrants to work within the entire 
EU and which focus on the highly skilled, such as the 
future “EU blue card” scheme (as of 2011), but also the 
creation of European networks with the aim of cross-link-
ing national agencies and providing job exchange plat-
forms are important first steps and good examples of the 
kinds of initiatives that could provide substantial returns, 
especially when the currently rather embryonic rules on 
intra-EU mobility are gradually further developed.
In addition, increasing the share of highly skilled 
migrants also has to go hand in hand with structural 
change in labour demand in the EU, since ultimately 
labour migration will only occur in sectors, occupations 
and regions where high-skilled labour is in high demand. 
Consequently, there is also a pressing need to develop 
migration and labour market policy for the integration 
and basic socio-economic rights of high-skilled migrants 
in co-ordination with industrial, technology and educa-
tional policies and the needs of employers dictated by 
structural change within the European Union.
Furthermore, results from previous literature suggest 
that – aside from financial considerations such as tax and 
social security arrangements, which may act as a deter-
rent to high-skilled migration – different subgroups 
among high-skilled migrants will be drawn to receiving 
countries for different reasons. Researchers for instance 
move abroad to keep up-to-date with the state of the 
art in their field, to get qualified feedback on the origi-
nality, relevance and quality of their research and as an 
additional source of inspiration. By contrast, political 
repression, social constraints, no (or only limited) access 93
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to research funding, over-regulated bureaucracies as 
well as insecure conditions of employment or a generally 
low quality level of universities and other institutions of 
higher education and research deter migration by scien-
tists and researchers. Especially for young researchers, 
this also holds true for rigid career advancement schemes 
tied to seniority instead of performance. For entrepre-
neurially-minded individuals, by contrast, the societal 
and administrative climate for innovation, business-
start-ups and self-employment can play important roles 
(either as push or pull factors) in becoming a migrant. In 
this context also immigration related “soft factors”, such 
as generous family reunification rules, may be of impor-
tance given that highly skilled persons have a tendency 
to marry or live together with a person having the same 
degree or level of education. Thus, increasing the share 
of highly skilled migrants, moving to the EU – aside from 
measures designed to make immigration laws more 
selective – may also involve a wide range of measures to 
increase the attractiveness of the EU-27 for high-skilled 
migrants, which may extend far into other policy fields, 
usually considered to be unrelated to migration policy.
Using the potentials of student mobility
One group of particular interest in this respect are stu-
dents. The few results available in the literature on inter-
national student flows suggest that many EU countries 
have been relatively successful in attracting foreign stu-
dents. This, however, seems to be mostly due to high 
student mobility within the EU (thus pointing to the suc-
cess of programmes to enhance student mobility, such 
as the ERASMUS programme). With respect to student 
mobility from third countries and students studying 
in advanced research programmes, by contrast, many 
EU countries still seem to be lagging behind the major 
non-EU receiving countries. Thus, initiatives aiming to 
increase the attractiveness of European universities for 
students from third countries and for students intend-
ing to participate in advanced programmes (e.g. at Ph.D. 
level) could also be expected in the long run to increase 
high-skilled migration to the EU.
However, the success of such initiatives will also hinge 
on the possibility for these students to work in the 
receiving countries after completing their degree. In this 
respect success so far seems to have been rather limited, 
since the share of highly educated migrants working 
in EU countries is by and large not correlated with the 
number of foreign-born students studying in a country. 
Recently, however, a number of EU-27 countries have 
shifted to migration policies designed to encourage for-
eign-born students to remain and work in the receiving 
country at least for some time after they graduate and 
it is currently too early to evaluate how successful these 
measures are in increasing the skill content of migration 
to the EU.
Return migrants
Another group of particular interest are highly skilled 
emigrants from the EU who intend to return95. Here 
results from international comparisons suggest that 
a number of EU countries have a large share of highly 
educated migrants working abroad. However, the return 
intentions of these migrants are still an open question 
in international migration research. Despite this lack of 
research, from a policy perspective, ensuring frictionless 
return and encouraging models of repeat migration (i.e. 
brain circulation) also with non-EU partner countries 
are central policy concerns, which have received some 
attention in the recent migration debate. In particular, 
it is likely that return and repeat migration will become 
increasingly common among high-skilled migrants and 
that migration and labour market management systems 
will increasingly have to accommodate this group.
Improving the labour market integration of high-skilled third 
country migrants
While attracting more highly skilled migrants is an 
important challenge, an arguably even more important 
policy-relevant finding of this study is that high-skilled 
migrants in the EU face a number of challenges when 
entering the European labour market, which distinguish 
them from less skilled migrant groups. In particular high-
skilled migrants – in contrast to less-skilled migrants 
– have lower labour market participation rates, higher 
unemployment rates and lower employment rates than 
comparable natives and face substantially higher risks of 
being employed in jobs that do not fit their skill profile.
Econometric evidence based on the EU LFS suggests that 
(after controlling for country of residence, age and gender) 
highly skilled migrants in the EU have a lower probability 
of being employed (by 9.3 percentage-point), a 3 percent-
age points higher probability of being unemployed and 
a 5.4 percentage point higher probability of being inac-
tive than comparable natives. Less skilled foreign-born, 
by contrast, have a 2.9 percentage-point higher prob-
ability of being employed than comparable natives and 
face a 5.4 percentage-point lower risk of inactivity but a 
1.2 percentage-point higher risk of unemployment. Thus 
(even after controlling for compositional effects) highly 
skilled – in contrast to less skilled – migrants in the EU-27 
are substantially (by 9.3%) less likely to be employed than 
high-skilled natives. In addition according to results from 
the EU LFS 19.4% of the native-born highly-skilled, work-
ers in the EU-27 (excluding Germany and Ireland) were 
over-qualified, as against 33.0% of the highly-skilled for-
eign-born. This thus points to a substantial underutiliza-
95  For example, a study for the United States concludes that high-skilled immi-
grants from China and India are returning to their home countries because of, 
among other factors, better career opportunities (see Wadhwa et al., 2009).94
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tion of highly-skilled foreign labour in the EU-27 due to 
non-employment and over-qualification.
These results thus suggest that aside from policies to 
attract more high-skilled migrants, there is also a need 
for increased efforts to integrate highly skilled migrants 
within the labour market. Here, aside from measures 
to improve foreign-language knowledge of migrants, 
the acceptance of professional qualifications, and train-
ing and action to fight discriminatory practices in the 
workplace, a number of EU-27 countries have recently 
adopted measures that increasingly acknowledge that 
improved integration requires a more broad-based 
approach, one backed by measures to improve the 
social, cultural and political integration of migrants. 
In such policies, national approaches are often also 
augmented by more regionally focused integration   
initiatives.
Aside from this, however, the results also point to a 
number of specific groups among the high-skilled that 
may require particular policy attention. This applies in 
particular to highly skilled foreign-born women. Virtually 
all results indicate that gender differences to the disad-
vantage of women with respect to employment, unem-
ployment and inactivity as well as over-qualification 
rates are larger among the foreign-born than among 
natives. This points to the double disadvantage often 
faced by foreign-born women in integrating within the 
labour market of host societies.
A further target group for such measures, highlighted 
by the results, are more recent migrants. The results 
suggest that differences in activity, unemployment and 
employment as well as over-qualification rates between 
more recent migrants and established migrants are 
larger for the high-skilled foreign-born than among 
the low-skilled foreign-born. High-skilled migrants thus 
often have to accept a sizeable “transferability discount”, 
which is documented by the high degree of over-qual-
ification (but also by lower employment rates) found in 
the analysis. On the other hand low-skilled migrants find 
it easier to transfer their skills, which are lower in any 
case. Thus almost by definition high-skilled migrants are 
also more likely to profit from measures to ensure bet-
ter labour market integration (for example by improving 
language proficiency and training in the host country), 
than the less skilled.
In addition the results indicate that highly skilled 
migrants from more distant destination countries also 
have greater problems in integrating within EU labour 
markets. It is thus to be expected that increased efforts 
to attract high-skilled migrants, which will almost by 
necessity also entail an increased share of migration from 
countries more remote from Europe (for instance Asian 
countries), will also have to be accompanied by increas-
ing efforts to ensure their labour market integration.
Finally, a number of results in the literature (see Chiswick 
and Miller 2007, Bock-Schappelwein et al. 2009) also sug-
gest that aside from labour market integration, the inte-
gration of foreign-born children within the school system 
of the receiving country requires close attention. Persons 
migrating in their late teens (i.e. at an age when compul-
sory education has ended) often end up with a substan-
tially lower educational attainment than migrants migrat-
ing earlier or later in their lives.
Policies for high-skilled migrants within the EU
Finally, it should be noted that aside from highly skilled 
migrants from third countries, high-skilled migrants 
within the EU also often face a sizeable “transferability 
discount” on their human capital, which is reflected in 
higher rates of over-qualification and lower employment 
rates. This applies even to migrants migrating from one 
EU-15 country to another, but even more strongly to the 
more recent group of migrants from the new Member 
States to the EU-15, who are often faced with very high 
rates of over-qualification. According to the results high-
skilled migrants from the NMS (even after controlling for 
differences in age and gender structure) face a 29.6 per-
centage points higher risk of being over-qualified than 
natives, and medium-skilled migrants from the NMS have 
an over-qualification risk that is 19.6 percentage points 
higher than that of natives.
While the policy instruments to reduce these substantial 
over-qualification rates among EU migrants clearly should 
follow similar lines as initiatives catering for third-country 
migrants (i.e. giving high priority to formal and informal 
transferability of qualification, language proficiency and 
training), the role of the European Commission in devising 
such policy instruments for intra-EU migrants and super-
vising their efficient implementation should seem to be 
particularly important.
Policies designed to exploit sectoral and regional allocation 
patterns of migrants
Our analysis regarding the impact of migration and, in 
particular, high-skilled migration on sectoral productiv-
ity and gross value added (levels and growth) is still pre-
liminary (in the sense of endogeneity issues not being 
fully resolved), but yields a number of interesting results 
regarding the relationship between migration and pro-
ductivity using sector-level data. Particularly interesting 
is the difference in the impact of the share of migrants in 
levels and growth specifications, as well as the importance 
of a break-down by different groups of migrants (from EU 
and RoW). There is also a relatively robust result for the 
positive impact of the share of high-skilled migrants and 
for an interactive effect between the high-skill migrant 
share and ICT technology. Furthermore, it is shown that 95
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industry heterogeneity is important specifically with 
respect to a manufacturing versus services breakdown.
The results support the insights gained from other (coun-
try-specific) studies (see e.g. Paserman 2008). The alloca-
tion of migrants to jobs/firms/sectors is negatively related 
to productivity levels in these jobs/firms/sectors, but 
migration contributes positively to productivity growth. 
It is interesting to note that migrants that undergo more 
skill-screening (RoW migrants) do not show the negative 
allocation effect in the same way – in fact the effect is 
often positive – and that the share of high-skill migrants 
mostly yields positive level and growth effects. Taking 
these results at face value (i.e. forgetting about the still 
unresolved endogeneity issue), one can conclude that 
there is a positive relationship between migrant shares 
and productivity (and output) growth and that the level 
relationship between migration and productivity (which 
is an allocation effect of migrants across sectors) can be 
influenced through skill screening. However, one might 
also argue that migrants perform an important “greasing 
of the wheels” function (see Borjas, 2001) in that they also 
contribute to productivity growth in industries with lower 
productivity levels, which might be important in itself.
As regards the analysis of migrants and regional growth 
and regional technological development (proxied by pat-
ents per capita) a positive relationship is found between 
the share of high-skilled employed persons and high-
skilled migrants and the growth rate of regional GDP per 
capita. Looking at patenting (per capita) as the depend-
ent variable, a positive significant relationship with the 
share of migrants is also found. However, these results are 
not robust to changes in specifications to take potential 
endogeneity into account, so further work on this will 
be needed. There are various avenues available to deal 
with this issue (exploring particular instrumental vari-
ables), but the data-base has not allowed to make much 
progress so far. Nonetheless, the results obtained so far 
do point to a positive relationship between the share of 
high-skilled migrants and regional growth and between 
the share of migrants in a region and a region’s patenting 
activity. The analysis of the dynamics of migrants’ shares 
across regions revealed another interesting phenomenon: 
migrant shares (and this is also true for their shares among 
skilled workers) are increasing particularly in two types of 
regions: those where they have traditionally occupied 
a relatively low share – which amounts to a dispersion 
effect – and those where there was already a relatively 
high share – which is an agglomeration or network effect. 
The results for skilled migrant shares and regional growth 
(and for migrant shares and patenting) thus derive from 
a possible positive relationship in both types of regions. 
On the one hand, they might arise through an increased 
degree of “dispersion” which amounts again to a “greas-
ing of the wheels” effect, and, on the other, might be due 
to an “agglomeration effect”, taking account of possible 
complementarity or externality effects on the productivity 
of existing stocks of migrants or domestic workers. One 
possible way to disentangle these two effects would be to 
analyse the relationships separately for different groups 
of regions and test for complementarity effects explicitly. 
This will be explored in further research.
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CHAPTER 4 
Training, education and productivity
4.1.  Introduction
Remaining competitive in an increasingly globalised 
world requires that European nations maintain their 
comparative advantage in having a highly skilled labour 
force. Workers not only need to be skilled, but also have 
to adapt fast to change. On-the-job training and educa-
tion are therefore important sources of long-term com-
petitiveness and means of adjustment. Indeed, as part of 
its “Growth and Jobs Strategy”, the EU intends to “adapt 
education and training systems in response to new com-
petence requirements”. The “New skills for new jobs” ini-
tiative aims to understand better how these objectives 
can be met. In the face of rapidly changing technology 
(for example, the changes brought about by information 
and communications technology), it is imperative that 
skills are appropriate and up to date. Providing basic 
skills is mostly the responsibility of the general educa-
tion system, but changing education provision is often 
time-consuming. Firms or workers can instead make up 
for any skill shortfall by engaging in training. In times of 
crisis, training and education help mitigate the effects 
of the downturn. When people are maintained in jobs 
but activity is slowing down, in-house training can be an 
opportunity for re-training to facilitate mobility within 
the organisation. Training outside the firm can be a way 
to help workers move to other sectors or other organi-
sations. Training is one way of improving the match 
between existing skills and the needs of the economy.
This chapter investigates the impact of training and edu-
cation on productivity, referring in particular to a litera-
ture that emphasizes the need to reorganise production 
following the adoption of information and communica-
tion technology (ICT96). It examines training at the level 
of the economy as a whole and the variation across 
industries, focusing especially on manufacturing versus 
market service sectors. It also examines the character-
istics of those who receive or do not receive training. 
96  ICT assets correspond to office and computer machinery, communication 
equipment, and software.
It outlines the incentives that can be used to increase 
training uptake.
This chapter is organised as follows. It first reviews the 
literature on training, education, their links with the use 
of information technology and their impacts on produc-
tivity and earnings. Section 4.3 provides a descriptive 
overview of training in the EU using data from the EU 
Labour Force Survey (EU LFS97). It presents data by indus-
try and country on the extent of training, who receives 
training, its duration and location, and fields of study. 
A sub-section also considers the training of migrants. 
Section 4.4 then analyses the impact of training and 
education on productivity and its links to ICT. This uses 
two complementary approaches – a growth accounting 
exercise that models training as intangible investments 
and an econometric analysis of the impact of training 
on productivity. Section 4.5 applies limited dependent 
variable regression methods to the EU LFS microdata on 
individuals to examine what factors characterise train-
ing recipients, including an analysis by field of training. 
Section 4.6 reviews the existing evidence on incentives 
to train, with a particular focus on older workers. Finally, 
section 4.7 concludes.
4.2.  Training, education and productivity
The importance of education and training as drivers 
of firm performance has long been recognised in both 
human resource management and economics. Work-
place learning and continuous improvement are consid-
ered essential for an organisation to remain competitive 
(Salas and Cannon-Bowers, 2001). When training does 
result in improvements in relevant knowledge and the 
acquisition of relevant skills, employee job performance 
should improve, provided that the skills learned in train-
ing transfer to the job (Baldwin & Ford 1988). According 
97  European Commission, Eurostat, European Union Labour Force Survey, quar-
terly data. Eurostat has no responsibility for the results and conclusions which are 
those of the researchers.98
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to Ostroff and Bowen (2000), employees’ collective atti-
tudes, behaviour, and human capital should influence 
organisational performance. In turn, organizational per-
formance should lead to positive financial outcomes for 
the organisation (Becker and Huselid, 1998), mediating 
the relationship between human resource outcomes 
and financial performance. In general, research finds that 
workplace training promotes good working practices. 
For example, Krueger and Rouse (1998) find that training 
is positively associated with the incidence of job bids, 
upgrades, performance awards, and job attendance.
Training is all the more important for carrying out the 
reorganisations that come with the development of new 
technology. Countries may adopt and utilise technolo-
gies differently, depending on their skill endowments 
(Lewis 2005, Acemoglu 1998). Much research effort has 
been devoted to the issue of whether technical change 
is skill-biased (i.e. favours the more skilled workers) and 
to the impact of information and communications tech-
nology (ICT) on the demand for skilled labour (e.g. Bartel 
and Lichtenberg 1987, Autor, Katz and Krueger 1998, 
Machin and van Reenen 1998). Recent work shows that 
there is growth in both high-skilled occupations and 
low-skilled occupations, with declining employment 
in the middle of the distribution (Goos, Manning and 
Salomons, 2009). The implication is that there is a par-
allel increase in two opposite categories: high-paid on 
the one hand and in low-paid on the other hand. This is 
explained mainly by the fact that technologies are more 
pervasive and the use of non-routine tasks is also more 
spread. In a similar vein, research has highlighted that 
organisational changes and other forms of intangible 
investment such as workforce training are necessary 
to gain significant productivity benefits from using ICT 
(Bertschek and Kaiser 2004, Bresnahan, Brynjolfsson and 
Hitt 2002, Brynjolfsson, Hitt and Yang 2002, Black and 
Lynch 2001). Helpman and Rangel (1999) argue that 
technological changes may lead to an initial slow-down 
because the diffusion process requires more education 
or training. Thus the overall skills of the workforce have 
to be increased to ensure successful diffusion, whereby 
firms will have to replace their unskilled workers with 
those who are more skilled or have higher educational 
qualifications. The literature on technology and organi-
sational capital suggests that an important element of 
organisational change is retraining of the workforce.
There are many studies that find a positive association 
between workplace training and productivity (Bartel 
1994, Black and Lynch 1996, Conti 2005; Dearden et al. 
2006, Vignoles et al. 2004, Zwick 2006). In one of the 
first papers on this issue, Bartel (1994) finds that there 
is a positive association between training and labour 
productivity in US manufacturing firms. Deardon et al. 
(2006) find that the impact of training is about twice as 
high on productivity as on wages, which they interpret 
as suggesting external benefits from training not cap-
tured by workers. Konings and Vanormelingen (2009) 
use panel data on Belgian private sector firms and con-
firm that the impact of training is higher on productivity 
than on wages (after having controlled for the poten-
tial endogeneity of training). The productivity premium 
of a trained worker is 23%, while the wage premium of 
training is 12%. The former is found to be strong and 
significant. This is slightly lower than Dearden. But their 
observations are at firm level and not at sectoral level. 
Therefore Konings and Vanormelingen do not capture 
spillovers. The work also differentiates the various indus-
tries and in the majority of sectors the impact on prod-
uctivity higher than on wages.
In addition it is important to emphasise that training and 
education are important but not sufficient for produc-
tivity growth (Mayhew and Neely 2006). How much (if 
any) impact training has depends on the accompanying 
product and production strategies of the organization 
in which the training takes place. Ballot et al. (2006) use 
firm-level panel data to analyse the shares of firms and 
workers in returns on tangible (physical capital) and 
intangible assets98 (training, R&D). They find that returns 
to firms from investing in physical capital are higher than 
the returns from investing in training and R&D.
Trainings are relevant if they are targeted. The literature 
also points to the need to distinguish the different types 
of training as much as possible, looking for instance at 
ICT training or training of different lengths. Mabey and 
Ramirez (2005) analyse the impact of varying training 
types on productivity and find the significance of the 
impact depends on the type of training. Lynch and Black 
(1998) find that the higher the proportion of off-the-job 
training the higher the productivity in manufacturing, 
whereas in non-manufacturing sectors training in com-
puter skills will increase productivity. Plant productivity 
is found to be higher in businesses with more highly-
educated workers or greater computer usage by non-
managerial employees, while the impact of ICT adoption 
on productivity can only be realised if the appropriate 
work practice has actually been implemented (Black 
and Lynch 2001). Workers believe that their return on 
education and training will be high if firms adopt the 
new technology, so they will certainly invest more in 
their training. Moreover, firms will hire more skilled 
labour when adopting IT-related innovations (Bresna-
han et al. 2002). Entrepreneurs will have more incentive 
to adopt new technology if the workforce’s level of edu-
cation is already high (Acemoglu 1997).
The willingness of firms to adopt ICT is subject to the rela-
tive benefits and costs involved (Hollenstein 2004). A firm 
will regard adoption as beneficial if it helps to lower pro-
duction costs, improve efficiency and flexibility, and/or 
98  “Section 4.4.1. Training as an intangible investment” clarifies the concept of 
intangible investment99
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increase product quality. Regarding the costs of adoption, 
the usual arguments involve: (1) direct costs of invest-
ment (Goodacre and Tonks, 1995); (2) ICT-related training 
and labour reshuffle costs (e.g. Leo, 2001); (3) manage-
ment readjustment costs (e.g. Eder and Igbaria 2001).
There is no consensus on the impact of education on ICT 
adoption. Lee (2001) examines the impact of education 
on ICT adoption (PCs per 1000 people) using cross-sec-
tion regressions for 80 countries in 1995 – 1998 and finds 
a significant relationship between education level and ICT 
adoption. He also finds that secondary and college-level 
education is important for adoption of ICT in a country. 
Furthermore, Gust and Marquez (2004) find that the level 
of human capital significantly influences ICT adoption 
(ICT expenditure as a percentage of GDP) for 13 industrial 
countries. In contrast, some research finds no evidence 
that education is associated with the diffusion of ICT (for 
example, see Hargittai 1999 for an investigation of the 
determinants of Internet connectivity (internet hosts per 
capita) in 18 OECD countries and Norris (2001) for Inter-
net use in the EU-15 in 1999). Nevertheless, one should 
note that different dependent variables (ICT proxies) were 
used in the above papers and it may be natural to expect 
that estimates of the impact would vary.
Training can upgrade workers’ skills and may thus be 
linked to faster adoption of ICT. Bresnahan et al. (2002) 
find worker skills are positively associated with ICT 
adoption. Hollenstein (2004) suggests that training will 
increase the absorptive capacity of firms and hence facili-
tate procedures’ adoption.
There is ample evidence that training impacts on workers’ 
earnings (see e.g. Booth 1991 and Blundell, Dearden and 
Meghir 1996 for the UK, and Lynch 1992 and Bartel and 
Sicherman 1999 for the US). A typical example is Dearden 
et al. 2006, who find that a 1% increase in training is asso-
ciated with an increase in hourly wages of about 0.3%. 
Vignoles et al. (2004) find that male workers in mid-career 
(aged 33-42) experience the highest wage growth from 
training and that firms often train those workers who are 
more able in the first place. Training may have different 
impacts on workers based on their individual character-
istics (e.g. age, gender and education level) and whether 
they work in the public or private sector. In the public 
sector, for example, women are found to have higher 
positive returns on job training than men, but returns are 
insignificant for young workers (Greenberg et al. 2003). 
Blundell et al. (1996) find that more educated people 
have higher chances of receiving training. It is also impor-
tant to distinguish the source of funding for the training – 
firm-sponsored or self-sponsored? The different sponsors 
may have different interests in taking/providing training. 
Firms are more interested in investing in types of train-
ing that increase the worker productivity through skill 
improvement whereas workers want to see an increase in 
their wage rates after participating in training. In a perfect 
market, wage rates are equal to marginal productivity. 
However, imperfections in the labour market may lead to 
situations where workers may gain very little in terms of 
wage increases from the value added they create, (Ballot 
et al. 2006). In fact, it is now generally accepted that firms 
and workers jointly invest in training programmes (work-
ers sometimes invest with reduced wages) – i.e. training 
is a joint decision. 
Finally, macroeconomic conditions also affect the effec-
tiveness of training. For example, training will be less 
effective if the unemployment rate is high – particu-
larly for young people (Greenberg, 2003). Labour mar-
ket imperfections (Acemoglu and Pischke (1999a)) also 
influence the level of training. In non-competitive labour 
markets, it is notably possible for firms to pay the work-
ers below productivity, especially if the firm benefits from 
monopsony power. In that case, by increasing skills firms 
can also increase its profits. Compressed wage structure 
is justified by the fact that it is difficult for employees to 
find another job, but it may also be costly for companies 
to hire new suitable employees. Demographic trends 
also play a role. Numbers of studies put forward that 
health is increasingly important in the context of an age-
ing society. However, according to some authors there is 
no consensus on the fact that the performance of older 
workers is lower than younger ones. Furthermore, health 
is another component of human capital, besides educa-
tion and training, which influences productivity. Healthier 
individuals, with a longer lifespan in front of them, would 
have greater incentives to invest in education or training 
as they would benefit from if for a longer time. And vice-
versa, improvements in education also tend to lead to 
wealth improvements on average.
Having recapitulated the role of education and train-
ing as source of firms’ and individuals’ performance, it 
is essential to get a factual overview on the provision of 
training in the EU.
4.3.  Workforce training in the EU
This section examines the prevalence of workforce train-
ing across EU countries and how training affects produc-
tivity. It uses EU LFS as the main data source, linked to 
data from EU KLEMS. It begins with an overview of train-
ing in the EU, considering both the quantity and quality 
of training provided and information on who receives 
training, also looking at the gender, age, skill and nation-
ality dimensions. This is followed by estimates of the 
impacts of training on productivity using both growth 
accounting and industry panel regression analysis.
One should note that in the EU LFS, training refers to 
being provided with education or training during the 
previous four weeks. It includes both formal education 
being provided in the system of schools, colleges, uni-100
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versities and other educational institutions and non for-
mal provision outside these institutions.
4.3.1.  Training in the EU: descriptive analysis
4.3.1.1.  Proportions of the workforce receiving training
In 2006 in the EU as a whole approximately 14% of 
employees received some training in the four weeks prior 
to the quarterly survey. Training proportions are signifi-
cantly higher in the EU-15 than in the new Member States 
and higher in market services than in manufacturing. 
There appears to be slightly higher growth between 2003 
and 2006 in manufacturing than in market services. The 
figures for the EU as a whole hide large variation across 
countries (see Carmichael et al., 2009). The proportions 
are very high in the Scandinavian countries, the Nether-
lands and the UK, but are considerably lower in the large 
continental EU-15 countries: France, Germany, Spain 
Table 4.1:   Proportion of the workforce receiving training in the past four weeks
Total Economy Manufacturing Market Services
2003 2006 2003 2006 2003 2006
EU-26* 13.5 14.4 8.1 9.2 15.2 15.5
EU-15 15.3 16.2 9.8 10.9 16.7 17.1
NMS-11* 6.6 6.8 3.9 4.1 8.2 8.1
* Excluding Malta.
Source: EU LFS.
Figure 4.1a:   Training proportions by industry: EU-26* 
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and Italy. Some EU-15 countries (Portugal, Greece) have 
training rates as low as some of the smaller new Member 
States (NMS). Training proportions show a tendency to 
rise over time, which is especially apparent in countries 
for which long-run data are available.
Figure 4.1a shows the training proportions across industry 
groups in 2006 for the EU-26. It suggests that the training 
percentage is generally higher in service sectors than in 
production industries and is highest for financial services, 
education and health. The distribution across industries 
is similar in the EU-15 and the NMS, except perhaps in 
financial services where the NMS-11 proportion (exclud-
ing Malta) is closer to the EU-15 than for other sectors.
4.3.2.  Characteristics of workers who receive training
The characteristics of training recipients are considered 
in the following section. O’Mahony and Peng (2008), 101
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Figure 4.1b:   Training proportions by industry: EU-15 and NMS-11* 
0.0
5.0
10.0
15.0
20.0
25.0
AtB C D E F G H I J K L M N O
EU15
EU12
Notes: AtB = Agriculture, Forestry & Fishing; C= Mining; D = Manufacturing; E = Electricity, Gas & Water; F = Construction; G = Distribu-
tion; H = Hotels & Catering; I = Transport and Communications; J = Financial Services; K = Business Services; L = Public Administration; 
M = Education; N = Health and Social Services; and O = Other Personal Services.
* Excluding Malta
Source: EU LFS.
using UK data, present evidence that the propensity to 
receive training decreases with age and increases with 
skill level, with males slightly less likely to receive train-
ing on average than females. Information for the EU 
as a whole for 2006 is summarized below, divided into 
18 separate groups using the notation in the footnote 
to the table. Thus, for example, MOI is male, aged 50+ 
with intermediate level qualifications. The heights of 
the bars are greater on the right-hand side, indicating 
more females are trained than males and this is true for 
all age-skill combinations. The training proportion rises 
with skill level (from light to dark), and significantly so 
comparing those with university degrees or equivalent 
with other groups. The height of the bars also declines 
with age, comparing bars of the same colour, with the 
exception of the female high-skill group. There is a simi-
lar cross characteristic pattern in both the EU-15 and 
NMS-11 countries (excluding Malta), except that for 
Figure 4.2:   Training proportions by worker characteristic EU-27 
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the high-skilled group in the NMS-11 (both males and 
females), those in the 30-49 age group are more likely to 
receive training than in the younger age group.
There are some differences across countries in this gen-
eral pattern, with some showing far less variation across 
groups than others. Table 4.2 shows the coefficient of 
variation99 for the training proportion across the 18 char-
acteristic groups by EU country. In most countries the 
group with the lowest training intensity are low-skilled 
males aged 50+. In the Czech Republic and Slovenia the 
group least likely to be trained are low skilled females 
aged 50+, in Finland low-skilled young males and in the 
Netherlands low-skilled young females.
Table 4.2:   Coefficient of variation in training 
proportions across 18 characteristic 
groups, 2006
AT 0.59 IT 0.75 CZ 0.99
BE 0.59 LU 0.47 EE 0.85
DE 0.78 NL 0.40 HU 0.88
DK 0.30 PT 0.63 LT 1.15
ES 0.55 SE 0.42 LV 0.87
FI 0.42 UK 0.35 PL 1.01
FR 0.40 RO 1.05
EL 0.89 BG 1.19 SI 0.70
IE 0.52 CY 0.76 SK 1.04
Source: Based on EU LFS data.
Similar patterns to those in Figure 4.2 are apparent for 
a breakdown by industry group, although the sample 
sizes tend to be very small for some industries. In both 
the EU-15 and the NMS-11 (excluding Malta), the decline 
in training with level of skill in manufacturing appears 
to be much steeper than for the economy as a whole, in 
particular for males.
4.3.3.  Quality of training
This section considers a number of measures that 
yield information on the quality of training received. 
These include purpose of training, duration of training, 
whether training occurs during working hours and field 
of training. 
These questions have only been asked since 2003 or 
2004, depending on the country. Part of these EU LFS 
variables are optional only, so data availability is lim-
ited. The numbers presented below are hence all. The 
numbers presented below are all based on average 
99  The coefficient of variation is a statistical measure of the spread of a sample 
(which has been normalised).
values over the period 2003-2006. EU LFS respondents 
were asked if the purpose of training was mainly pro-
fessional or mainly personal/social. In the EU as a whole 
84% said the training was mainly professional. There 
was some small variation by type of worker – the most 
salient being that the low-skilled were more likely to say 
the training was for personal reasons (25%) as against 
only 14% for the highest skill group. The percentage of 
workers saying training was for professional reasons was 
similar across gender and across age groups. There were 
also some differences across country and industry, but in 
general the response rate on this question was quite low 
so these differences are unlikely to be significant.
A more revealing quality dimension is the average length 
of training, shown in Table 4.3. On average, workers who 
received training in the past four weeks were trained for 
about 12 hours or about 1.5 days in the EU as a whole. 
This is a significant length of time, suggesting a reason-
able quality of training. There is some variation across 
countries with hours generally greater in the new Mem-
ber States than in the EU-15. Comparison of the num-
bers in Tables 4.1 and 4.3 suggest an inverse relationship 
between length of training and percentage trained – indi-
cating a possible trade-off between quantity and quality 
of training. The correlation between duration and pro-
portions trained is significantly negative (-0.57, -0.64 and 
-0.49, for the EU-26, EU-15 and NMS-11, respectively).
Table 4.3:   Average duration of training (hours), 
2003-06
EU-26 12.3 FR 18.7 CY 13.9
EU-15 12.0 GR 22.5 CZ 11.7
NMS-11* 15.6 IE 13.1 EE 16.2
IT 14.7 HU 24.1
AT 16.6 LU 16.2 LT 15.9
BE 14.8 NL 15.5 LV 16.2
DE 17.4 PT 19.6 PL 16.6
DK 15.7 SE 9.7 RO 19.8
ES 22.6 UK 12.0 SI 15.6
FI 11.5 BG 24.8 SK 15.4
* Excluding Malta
Source: EU LFS.
Figure 4.3 shows duration of training by worker char-
acteristics. It suggests that females receive less training 
on average than males and that the duration of train-
ing falls marginally with skill level for the youngest age 
group, offsetting to some extent the reverse findings 
for proportions of workers trained with respect to these 
two dimensions. However, the duration of training falls 
with age, reinforcing the findings for this group in Fig-
ure 4.2 above, so both the quantity and quality of train-
ing appear to be lower for older age groups.103
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An important indicator of the commitment of firms to 
training, and of the cost to firms as used in the intan-
gible investment calculations below, is the extent to 
which training occurs during normal working hours. The 
EU LFS asks respondents if their training occurred always 
or mostly during working hours. In the EU countries for 
which data were available, about 67% of respondents 
said training occurred wholly or mostly during working 
hours. Similar proportions were observed in manufactur-
ing (70%), distribution (60%), financial and business serv-
ices (72%) and health (68%), but were smaller in some 
sectors such as hotels (43%) and education (49%). The 
variation was greater across countries. In Finland, France 
and the UK more than 75% of training occurred during 
working hours. In Belgium, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands 
and Poland, the proportion was about 50%, whereas in 
many new Member States and Greece the proportion 
was under 40%. However, it should be noted that this 
variable was not reported for many countries including 
Germany and Spain.
In terms of worker characteristics, all groups showed 
very similar proportions except low skilled young per-
sons, who received about 50% of training outside nor-
mal working hours. This variable is the one most likely 
to be correlated with commitment by the firm, since 
the opportunity costs of lost production will be greater 
for those trained during working hours than for those 
who undertake training outside normal hours, even if 
the firm pays the direct costs of both. The opportunity 
costs in terms of production foregone are lowest for the 
young unskilled since they have the lowest relative earn-
ings but they are also likely to be relatively mobile. The 
results suggest that the latter effect dominates.
Figure 4.3:   Duration of training by worker characteristics, EU-26, average 2003-06 
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Source: Based on EU LFS data.
The final quality dimension we examine is the field of 
training. The EU LFS divides this variable into 15 separate 
categories, which are given in Carmichael et al. 2009. As 
the response rate is also low for this question and the 
number of categories is large, the six groups described 
in Table 4.4 were aggregated. This shows that training 
directly related to computing is a small proportion of 
total training. However it should not be concluded that 
ICT is a minor element of training since many fields will 
involve some use of ICT. The table shows some differ-
ences between the EU-15 and the new Member States 
with language training and teacher training more preva-
lent in the latter and computer use and services training 
in the former. Science and engineering training is more 
common in manufacturing and social sciences, business 
and law in market services. Finally the summary data 
show only small differences by worker characteristics, 
although there is some indication that low-skilled older 
workers are more likely to be trained in computer use 
and less likely to receive training in science and engi-
neering or social science, business and law.
4.3.4.  Training of migrants
This section considers the training experience of migrants 
versus nationals. Given the transient nature of much 
migration it might be expected that migrants receive less 
training than other workers as firms are less likely to reap 
the benefits of training these workers. Table 4.5 shows 
the proportion of workers trained in 2006, cross-classi-
fied by migration status (national versus non-nationals) 
and skill level for the total of 17 EU countries for which 
data are available (EU-15 minus Greece and Ireland, plus 
the Czech Republic and Hungary).104
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Table 4.4:   Training by field of study: shares of fields in total training
EU-15 NMS-11* EU-26 Manufacturing Market services
General, arts and languages (000,200,222) 19.1 25.7 18.3 24.0 20.0
Social science, business and law (300) 22.2 20.5 23.8 19.0 32.6
Science and engineering (400,420,440,460,500) 9.7 11.5 9.7 20.5 8.8
Computing (481,482) 11.2 7.7 11.3 12.6 12.6
Health, veterinary, education (100,600,700) 20.0 21.2 20.6 5.7 7.2
Services (800) 16.9 12.3 16.3 18.3 18.7
* Excluding Malta
Source: EU LFS.
Table 4.5:   Training proportions by migrant status and skill, EU, 2006
Total all 
workers
Total 
nationals
Nationals Total  
non-
nationals
Non-nationals
High skill Medium 
skill
Low skill High skill Medium 
skill
Low skill
Total economy 15.5 15.7 21.2 14.2 12.7 12.5 20.1 13.6 7.2
Manufacturing 10.2 10.4 15.6 8.8 9.8 8.1 12.3 7.8 6.6
Market services 16.2 16.4 19.4 15.8 14.8 13.9 18.7 15.6 8.9
Non-market services 20.3 20.1 24.8 17.6 14.1 25.5 30.1 26.7 13.9
Health 21.6 21.4 28.1 18.4 15.9 25.6 33.2 25.9 13.1
Source: EU LFS.
Looking first at the total economy, nationals are more 
likely to be trained than non-nationals although the dif-
ference is not large. Dividing by skill level shows that 
significant differences in training propensity by nation-
ality are found only for the lowest skill group. Division 
by industry group highlights some interesting results. 
In manufacturing and market services the differences 
between nationals and non-nationals regarding the 
likelihood of receiving training is larger than for the 
total economy, with the largest differences again in the 
lowest skill group. In contrast in non-market services 
and especially health, non-nationals are more likely to 
receive training with the difference most pronounced 
for those with high skills. Carmichael et al. (2009) present 
data by country. This shows a wide variation. In Austria, 
France, Germany, Italy and Spain, non nationals are far 
less likely to receive training whereas in the UK and 
Denmark and the Czech Republic the training of non-
nationals is significantly greater.
The EU LFS data as available for analysis do group 
respondents into EU nationals and others according 
to the EU composition of the reference period. Up to 
2004, EU nationals were understood as citizens of EU-15 
countries. Table 4.6 shows the proportion trained in 
2004 dividing migrants into those working in an EU 
country who were nationals of another EU-15 country 
and migrants from all other countries. In total, migrants 
who were EU-15 nationals were marginally more likely 
to receive training than other migrants but this was pri-
marily the case in manufacturing. In both market and 
non-market services, migrants from the rest of the world 
were more likely to receive training. This difference was 
most pronounced in the health sector and probably 
reflects recognition of medical qualifications among EU 
Member States and additional training requirements for 
those coming from outside the EU.
Table 4.6:   Proportions of migrants receiving 
training: EU nationals and other, 2004
EU-15 
nationals
Rest of 
the world
Nationals
Total 13.5  12.3  15.6
Manufacturing 9.3  7.9  10.5
Market Services 13.4  14.6  16.5
Non-market Services 22.8  25.8  19.8
Health 23.3  26.7  20.7
Source: Based on EU LFS data.105
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4.4.  Training, wages and productivity
This section analyses training as an intangible invest-
ment, using the information on proportions of workers 
trained and the duration of training to yield estimates 
of the values of these investments. It first sets out a 
description of the methodology employed – further 
details and sensitivity analysis are given in Carmichael et 
al. (2009). This is followed by a description of the impor-
tance of these intangible investments as shares of GDP. 
It then uses a growth accounting approach to assess 
the impact of intangible investments in training on   
output growth and compare with similar investments 
by individuals in general education. Another approach, 
an econometric one, brings new insight compared to 
the growth accounting approach as it allows to freely 
estimate the impact of training on productivity and 
earnings.
4.4.1.  Training as an intangible investment
As noted in section 4.2, much of the recent literature on 
the productivity effects of new technologies emphasises 
the need to invest in organisational changes and other 
firm-specific changes in production processes in order to 
reap the benefits. These changes require firms to expend 
some resources, which collectively are termed intangi-
ble investments. The literature frequently referred to 
these intangible investments as the “missing input” – 
as intangibles are difficult to observe and measure by 
definition, their impact is mainly captured by the MFP 
component in analyses of sources of growth. The pio-
neering work by Corrado, Hulten and Sichel (2005, 2006) 
attempted to measure intangibles for the US, defining 
a number of categories, including software, scientific 
and non-scientific R&D, brand equity and firm-specific 
expenditure such as on-the-job training and managing 
organisational changes. Estimates by the above authors 
suggest that such investment accounts for about 11% of 
US GDP and have been growing rapidly. Similar studies 
for the UK (Giorgio Marrano and Haskel, 2006, Giorgio 
Marrano, Haskel and Wallis 2007), Finland (Jalava, Aulin-
Amhavarra and Alanen, 2007), Canada (Baldwin et al. 
2008), the Netherlands (van Rooijen-Horsten et al. 2008) 
and Japan (Fukao et al. 2007) also suggest that intan-
gibles are sizeable, although most account for lower 
proportions of GDP than in the US.
This section analyses training as an intangible invest-
ment, using the information on proportions of workers 
trained and the duration of training. It first sets out a 
brief description of the methodology employed – fur-
ther details and sensitivity analysis are given in Car-
michael et al. (2009). This is followed by a description of 
the importance of this intangible investment as a share 
of outputs. Then growth accounting is used to estimate 
the impact of intangible investment in training on out-
put growth.
Estimating intangible investments by firms requires a 
monetary valuation of the number of hours of training 
received by workers. Total hours trained is calculated by 
numbers of workers trained (proportion trained times 
employment) multiplied by average duration of train-
ing. These hours are then multiplied by the average 
hourly cost to firms. The latter requires an adjustment to 
account for any costs borne by the workers themselves. 
Hence intangible investments by firms in training in 
industry i, country j and time period t are calculated by:
TI =
Nb of workers in trainingi,j,t
Total employmenti,j,t
*Total employmenti,j,t *
Total nb of hours in trainingi,j,t
Nb of workers in trainingi,j,t
*Cost of an hour trainingi, j, t *Proportion of training costs born by the firmi, j, t
where TI = nominal expenditures on investments in 
training, the number of workers in training divided by 
total employment is the proportion of workers trained. 
The hours spent in training per worker correspond to the 
total number of hours in training divided by the number 
of workers in training. The other components of the 
decomposition of TI are the proportion of training costs 
borne by firms and the cost of an hour’s training. The 
number of workers in training is estimated from the EU 
LFS data summarised in Table 4.1 above, total employ-
ment is employment from EU KLEMS and “Total nb of 
hours in training” is hours of training as summarised in 
Table 4.3. Since hours are reported for the previous four 
weeks, this is converted to an annual basis, allowing for 
time lost due to holidays and other forms of absence. 
Hourly costs will have two elements: the direct costs of 
training (costs of running courses or external fees) and 
the opportunity costs. The latter are estimated using the 
average labour compensation of employees taken from 
EU KLEMS. There is much less information available to 
estimate the direct cost. Here it is assumed that the ratio 
of total to opportunity costs is equal to two, which is 
based on UK survey data reported in Giorgio-Marrano 
and Haskel (2006). Finally, in a measure of intangible 
investments by firms it is important to exclude any cost 
borne by the workers themselves. Although there is 
no direct evidence on this it is assumed that it can be 
proxied by the extent to which training occurs during 
working hours. Training occurring outside usual hours 
arguably has zero opportunity cost for the firm, so the 
proportion of training costs borne by firms is estimated 
as the proportion of respondents who replied that train-
ing occurred entirely or mostly during working hours. 
Table 4.7 shows intangible investments as a share of 
value added.106
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Table 4.7:   Intangible investments in training as a % of GDP, average 2003-06
Total Manufacturing Market Services Non-market services
EU-24* 1.36 1.01 1.27 2.36
EU-15 1.50 1.15 1.39 2.54
NMS-9* 0.42 0.24 0.41 0.91
UK 2.69 1.99 2.50 4.62
DK 2.60 2.08 2.40 4.24
NL 2.25 1.43 2.37 3.24
FI 2.22 1.59 2.14 4.01
SE 1.90 1.23 1.89 2.96
FR 1.77 1.59 1.62 2.55
DE 1.62 1.50 1.47 2.28
SI 1.30 0.66 1.48 2.32
ES 1.02 0.76 0.80 2.60
AT 0.87 0.77 0.77 1.46
BE 0.84 0.60 0.72 1.44
LU 0.82 0.60 0.84 1.18
LV 0.75 0.35 0.50 2.25
EE 0.69 0.27 0.61 2.06
PT 0.57 0.26 0.45 1.25
LT 0.51 0.25 0.51 1.41
PL 0.49 0.35 0.47 1.01
IE 0.47 0.16 0.42 1.04
CY 0.45 0.14 0.43 0.85
SK 0.36 0.13 0.42 0.82
IT 0.33 0.17 0.27 0.81
CZ 0.20 0.14 0.16 0.57
HU 0.20 0.06 0.20 0.42
GR 0.11 0.01 0.13 0.17
* Excluding Bulgaria, Malta and Romania
As industry value-added data are not available for Malta, 
Bulgaria and Romania, only 24 countries are included. In 
the EU-15, intangible investment in training represents 
1.55% of GDP, more than three times the figure in the 
new Member States. The share is lower in manufacturing 
GDP than in the total economy, but the latter is heavily 
influenced by relatively high training propensities in non-
market sectors such as health and education. The share 
of intangible training investments in GDP for 1-digit 
sectors is available in Carmichael et al. (2009). This indi-
cates that training investments tend to be relatively high 
in financial services and business services but in many 
countries, it is also sizeable in wholesale and retail trade.
Table 4.7 also gives the results for individual countries, 
sorted from highest to lowest for the total economy. It 
shows that the UK is the country most willing to spend 
on training – the figure is a little higher than the share of 
2.45% in 2004 estimated by Giorgio-Marrano and Haskel 
(2006), especially since their value-added figures include 
an upward adjustment to add many types of intangible 
investments to output. The figure for Finland is a little 
higher than that estimated by Jalava, Aulin-Amhavarra 
and Alanen, 2007, about 1.5% in 2005. In general intan-
gible investment in training has a lower share of GDP in 
smaller countries and new Member States. However, the 
share is much smaller for Italy than for other large EU-15 
countries, while the figure for Slovenia, a small new 
Member State, is comparable to Spain’s. This is explained 
partly by the fact that the types of sectors that predomi-
nate in new Member States are less intensive in training. 
The cross-country pattern by broad sector is similar to 
that for the total economy, with some marginal differ-
ences in ranking – for example France ranks 4th in manu-
facturing but only 7th in non-market services.
In order to estimate the impact of this investment on 
productivity, it is necessary to transform workforce 
training into intangible capital. Numbers of steps are 
to be followed that require various assumptions: nomi-
nal series have to be derived, the nominal values are to 
be converted into real ones, the real investments are 
turned into capital stocks and capital assets are com-
bined to estimate aggregate capital input. In the first 
phase one needs to convert investment values into 
volumes and construct capital stocks. Following the 
convention in the literature, introduced by Corrado, 
Hulten and Sichel (2005) and also used by Giorgio-Mar-107
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Table 4.8:   Intangible training capital and output 
growth, 2001-2005
Growth in 
intangible 
training 
capital
(% p.a.)
Contribution 
of intangible 
training 
capital to 
value added 
growth (1)
Contribution 
of Labour 
Composition 
to output 
growth (2)
EU-24 9.15 0.12
EU-15 9.25 0.14
EU-15ex (3) 9.48 0.15 0.19
NMS-9* 6.01 0.03
AT 2.94 0.03 0.21
BE 6.68 0.06 0.16
DE 2.46 0.04 0.12
DK 5.84 0.15 0.15
ES 17.93 0.18 0.49
FI 8.67 0.19 0.26
FR 21.60 0.38 0.26
GR 20.30 0.02
IE 8.41 0.04 0.63
IT 8.60 0.03 0.21
LU 14.06 0.12
NL 17.91 0.40 0.48
PT 0.80 0.00 0.85
SE 5.08 0.10 0.33
UK 8.94 0.24 0.39
CY 17.16 0.08
CZ 2.77 0.01 0.37
EE 5.14 0.04
HU 9.07 0.02 0.93
LT 15.29 0.08
LV 7.80 0.06
PL 3.49 0.02
SI 15.90 0.21 0.76
SK 8.31 0.03
* Excluding Bulgaria, Malta and Romania
(1) Column 1 times share in value added.
(2) Source: EU KLEMS.
(3)   Aggregate across EU-15 countries for which growth accounts 
are available in EU KLEMS.
rano, Haskel and Wallis (2006), the perpetual inventory 
method to construct stocks, using geometric decay and 
a 40% depreciation rate is used. In addition this earlier 
literature is followed in using the GDP deflator to con-
struct volume measures – see Carmichael et al. (2007a 
and 2007b) for further details. Table 4.8 shows growth 
in intangible training capital stocks and its contribution 
to value added growth. For comparison it also shows 
the percentage point contribution of labour composi-
tion to output growth where it is available in EU KLEMS. 
The labour composition effect corresponds to a change 
in the share of hours worked by low-skilled workers to 
high-skilled workers that leads to a growth of labour 
services which is larger than the growth in total hours 
worked. Labour services are labour inputs which take 
the heterogeneity of the labour force into account.
The results in Table 4.8 suggest that intangible capital 
growth from on-the-job training was very high in the 
period from 2001 in the EU-15 and also relatively high in 
the new Member States. To place this in perspective, the 
growth rate of real tangible physical capital in the EU-15 
was only 2.5% per annum in the same period100. The 
contribution of intangible training capital in the EU-15 
is only a little below the contribution from labour com-
position which in turn is mainly driven by up-skilling of 
the workforce through general education. In a number 
of countries, namely Denmark, Spain, Finland, France, 
the Netherlands, Sweden, Slovenia and the UK, these 
high growth rates translate into small but significant 
contributions to value added growth. For these coun-
tries, contributions from training are above those from 
labour composition in France and Denmark and around 
the same in Finland and the Netherlands. Interestingly, 
in many countries where labour composition changes 
are very high, e.g. Ireland, Portugal and Hungary, the 
contribution of intangible training capital is small.
Table 4.9 shows growth in intangible training capital 
and contributions to output growth by broad sector. 
Training capital is most important in non-market sectors 
– in the EU aggregates and all individual countries the 
contributions are greater in non-market services than in 
the total economies. The table also reveals that contri-
butions are significantly higher in market services than 
in manufacturing in the EU and in all countries other 
than the Czech Republic. The growth rates of intangi-
ble training capital and contributions to value added in 
individual sectors are shown in Carmichael et al. (2009). 
These show that contributions are highest in the health 
sector as expected, with intangible training capital also 
important in financial services, business services and 
wholesale and retail trade.
100  This number, derived from EU KLEMS data, includes some intangible capital 
in the form of software; see O’Mahony and Timmer (2009) for more details of capi-
tal growth rates in the EU.
The estimates above will be sensitive to the assump-
tions underlying equation for estimating investment in 
training and to the assumptions employed to capitalise 
these assets. These issues are discussed in more detail 
in Carmichael et al. (2009). An important sensitivity test 
is the impact of alternative depreciation rates – the 
results show a relatively small impact from changing the 
assumption for the depreciation rate.108
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Table 4.9:   Intangible Training capital and output growth, 2001-2005, by sector
Growth in intangible training capital (% p.a.) Contribution of intangible training capital  
to value added growth
Manufacturing Market services Non-market 
services
Manufacturing Market services Non-market 
services
EU-24 5.97 9.88 10.04 0.06 0.13 0.24
EU-15 6.03 9.97 10.13 0.07 0.14 0.26
NMS-9* 3.73 6.73 6.99 0.01 0.03 0.06
AT 2.67 3.51 6.01 0.02 0.03 0.09
BE 4.88 6.13 9.18 0.03 0.04 0.13
CY 14.03 12.89 23.00 0.02 0.06 0.20
CZ 4.54 0.99 3.92 0.01 0.00 0.02
DE 1.43 2.86 3.68 0.02 0.04 0.08
DK 2.24 6.37 6.60 0.05 0.15 0.28
EE 6.14 9.83 1.86 0.02 0.06 0.04
ES 17.90 17.17 17.89 0.14 0.14 0.47
FI 6.71 8.50 9.71 0.11 0.18 0.39
FR 23.57 23.39 19.30 0.37 0.38 0.49
GR 18.05 17.37 19.74 0.00 0.02 0.03
HU 5.38 8.28 10.53 0.00 0.02 0.04
IE -0.80 8.06 10.16 0.00 0.03 0.11
IT 2.12 7.04 12.51 0.00 0.02 0.10
LT 16.74 20.69 11.30 0.04 0.11 0.16
LU 6.23 16.04 11.71 0.04 0.13 0.14
LV 2.79 8.06 7.28 0.01 0.04 0.16
NL 16.01 15.60 23.27 0.23 0.37 0.75
PL 0.95 4.55 5.02 0.00 0.02 0.05
PT -5.96 -2.65 4.70 -0.02 -0.01 0.06
SE 2.65 5.22 5.77 0.03 0.10 0.17
SI 16.94 15.43 15.48 0.11 0.23 0.36
SK 4.42 7.67 8.56 0.01 0.03 0.07
UK 5.10 10.34 8.18 0.10 0.26 0.38
* Excluding Bulgaria, Malta and Romania
4.4.2.  Training, wages and productivity: econometric 
analysis
An alternative to employing growth accounting is to 
use econometric methods to freely estimate the impact 
of training on labour productivity and to compare with 
impacts on multi factor productivity (MFP) and on earn-
ings. In this section the specification employed by Hel-
lerstein et al. (1999) to compare production function 
and wage equation estimation which was applied to 
the specific case of training by Deardon et al. (2006) are 
largely followed. Thus, the following log form equation 
for labour productivity (lnlp) is estimated: 
lnlpcit = α + β trcit + γ trcit ∙ ln(capit/h)cit + µ ln(capit/h)cit + 
λ ln(capnit/h)cit + labour type controls (interactions with 
trcit) + country, industry and time dummies 
where trcit is the proportion of workers receiving training 
in the industry i (i=1…9) of country c (c=1..17), in year t 
(t=1995…2005). Control variables include both ICT and 
non-ICT capital101 per hour worked (capit/h and capnit/h), 
and workforce characteristics, namely, the propor-
tions of male workers, workers aged 15-29, those aged 
between 30-49, the highly educated (eduhprop) and the 
medium-educated (edumprop) among total employees, 
and their interactions with training. In each OLS estima-
tion country, industry and time dummies are used to 
control for the unobservable time-invariant effects and 
the business cycle.
The analysis in this section uses data for the 17 EU coun-
tries for which input, output and productivity data at 
industry level are available in the EU KLEMS database102. 
101  ICT capital corresponds to services flows from office and computer machinery, 
communication equipment, and software while non-ICT capital is based on services 
flows from machinery, transport equipment and non-residential buildings.
102  Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Spain, Finland, France, Germany, 
Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Luxemburg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Slovenia, Sweden 
and the United Kingdom.109
Chapter 4 — Training, education and productivity
This provides data on value added (VA), hours worked, 
labour compensation, a breakdown of capital into ICT- 
and non-ICT assets, and derived variables such as multi 
factor productivity (MFP) at industry level (O’Mahony 
and Timmer 2009). All these input, output and produc-
tivity variables are converted into the US dollar at 1997 
values, using the volume index at industry level (also 
provided by EU KLEMS) and price ratios for outputs and 
inputs developed by Inklaar and Timmer (2008). Hence, 
all productivity and wage variables in regressions are 
comparable across countries and industries.
The panel data employed in this analysis cover nine 
industries, using the EU KLEMS industry division into 
Manufacturing (D), Electricity, gas and water supply (E), 
Construction (F), Trade (G), Hotels and restaurants (H), 
Transport, storage and communication (I), Financial inter-
mediation (J), Real estate, renting and business activities 
(K), and Other community, social and personal services 
(O). Excluded are Agriculture, forestry and fishing (AtB) 
and Mining and quarrying (C) as the proportions trained 
in these sectors are small and variable, together with the 
public administration sectors such as Public administra-
tion and defence (L), Education (M) and Health and social 
work (N), in order to focus on the market economy.
Wage, labour and capital inputs variables are from EU 
KLEMS, while training and all workforce characteris-
tics variables are from the EU LFS. The regressions are 
weighted by the average employee compensation share 
of each industry over the period 1995-2005, a standard 
approach in the literature to take account of industry 
heterogeneity.
Similar equations are estimated for multi factor produc-
tivity (lnmfp), which uses the standard growth account-
ing deducting the cost share weighted average inputs 
from output, and hourly wage rates (lnw). Labour pro-
ductivity at industry level is measured as the value 
added per hour within the industry, while hourly wage 
rates at industry level are measured as labour compen-
sation per hour within the industry. Labour and capital 
input variables are not included in the MFP equations as 
they are already accounted for in the measurement of 
that variable103. The availability of data on training varies 
by time period – see Carmichael et al. 2009 for details – 
so estimations are carried out on an unbalanced panel. 
Two groups of regression results are presented. The 
baseline specification only considers the overall effect 
of training on productivity for all 17 European countries 
in the regression, while the more sophisticated specifi-
cation involves allowing for the different education sys-
tems in European countries. Estimation was carried out 
103  See O’Mahony and Timmer (2009) for details of output, input and productiv-
ity measures at the industry level in the EU KLEMS database, and a discussion of 
issues in measuring productivity.
using both the OLS within estimator and the Generalized 
Method of Moments (GMM), the latter to take account of 
the possibility that training and other explanatory vari-
ables in the regressions may be not strictly exogenous. 
The GMM approach is typically based on using lagged 
levels of the dependent variable as instruments for 
lagged first differences. However, it is very difficult to 
come up with the right instruments as the GMM results 
were not entirely satisfactory (see results of the GMM in 
Carmichael et al. 2009). Within OLS can corrects for cer-
tain selection and endogeneity effects that do not vary 
over time, hence a defendable route.
Results from the baseline specification are presented in 
Table 4.10 (within OLS). The first two columns in Table 
4.10 use data on industry labour productivity regressed 
on industry training proportions (tr) and the ICT capital 
per hour interacted with training (trlnicth). When labour 
productivity is regressed on training alone the results 
were negative, but insignificant. The effect of training on 
its own is also negative in the MFP and wage equations. 
This is surprising given that authors such as Vignoles et 
al. (2004) and Dearden et al. (2006) find positive impacts. 
When training is interacted with ICT capital the results 
for labour productivity (1.217), MFP (0.404) and wage 
(0.273) were all positive and significant. The results in 
Table 4.10 suggest an important role for training when 
combined with ICT investments but suggests little or 
no benefits of training not linked to the new technol-
ogy. The impact of training interacted with ICT is much 
higher in the labour productivity and MFP than in the 
wage equation consistent with the findings of Deardon 
et al. (2006). Therefore these results can support the idea 
of external benefits from training.
The within estimations also show significantly positive 
associations between education and productivity or 
wage. The proportions of workers with high (eduhprop) 
and medium education (edumprop) can significantly 
increase labour productivity and wage. And educa-
tion also benefits labour productivity more than wage, 
while high education has a more significant effect than 
medium education. For instance, as the proportions of 
workers with high education increases by one percent, 
labour productivity increases by about 2.8 percent 
(see column 2) while wage increases by only 1.4 percent 
(see column 6). Moreover, as the proportions of work-
ers with medium education increase by one percent, 
labour productivity increases by about 1.2 percent, and 
even less for wage (only about 0.36 percent). When high 
education proportions are interacted with the training 
proportion, the coefficients are negative for both labour 
productivity and wage, but positive for MFP. Hence, 
training appears to substitute for high education for 
both labour productivity and wage while complement-
ing high education in MFP. Training and medium educa-
tion seemingly have an opposite pattern to high educa-
tion, but not all coefficients are significant. 110
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To explore the training effect in different education 
systems, a more sophisticated specification is applied 
to this framework. The approach was to investigate 
the education and training systems characterising 
the various countries based on previous literature on 
the topic (drawing from the work of Estevez-Abe et al. 
(2001, Table 4.3, p. 170)) and on further interviews with 
researchers from the respective countries. In the “Voca-
tional” group, vocational colleges or apprenticeships are 
predominant. In “Academic” countries, training is more 
company-based or vocational training is weak. “Mixed” 
types of training and education systems include both 
apprenticeship and vocational training. The Member 
States that recently joined the EU, the “new comers” are 
countries in transition. This last group of countries is not 
attached to any group as, due to the on-going changes, 
past experience may not be a good guide. Based on 
that, the education systems of the EU-15 countries are 
categorised into three groups: Vocational (Austria, Ger-
many, Sweden and Finland), Academic (Italy, France, 
Ireland, the UK, Spain and Luxemburg) and Mixed 
(Belgium, Netherlands, Denmark and Portugal). Also 
included is a fourth group called New-comers (Hungary, 
Czech Republic and Slovenia)104. Dummy variables are 
created for four groups, which are interacted with train-
ing (and training interacted with ICT capital) variables. 
The vocational group is used as the baseline group. 
104  Estevez-Abe et al. (2001) do not categorise all countries for which data are 
available in this report. Based on discussions with researchers from these coun-
tries, Spain is classified in the academic group and Portugal in the mixed group.
Table 4.10:   Productivity, Wage and Training, Within OLS
Lnlp lnmfp Lnw
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
tr   -1.617  -0.921  -2.061  -1.932  -1.762**  -1.606* 
    1.901  1.833  1.425  1.416  0.906  0.899 
tr*lnicth 1.217***  0.404***  0.273*** 
  0.121  0.096  0.059 
lncapith   0.008  -0.159***  0.041***  0.004 
    0.019  0.025  0.009  0.012 
lncapnith   0.301***  0.292***  0.079***  0.077*** 
    0.031  0.030  0.015  0.015 
tr*eduh   -4.117***  -7.509***  3.459***  3.097***  -2.221***  -2.981*** 
    0.980  1.002  1.004  1.002  0.467  0.492 
eduhprop 1.966***  2.784***  1.234***  1.417*** 
  0.239  0.244  0.114  0.120 
tr*edum 2.828**  1.065  -2.978**  -2.850**  0.801  0.406 
  1.324  1.288  1.233  1.225  0.631  0.632 
edumprop 0.670***  1.177***  0.248***  0.362*** 
  0.183  0.184  0.087  0.090 
Year Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of Observations 1349 1349 1305 1305 1349 1349
Notes: Other age and gender control variables are examined but not presented in the table. Training interacted with age and gender 
show mixed results. See Carmichael et al. 2009. Standard errors are in italics. ***, ** and * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, 
respectively.
Since the vocational and academic groups include all 
big economies in the EU, they dominate the overall ten-
dency in the estimation. The results of these regressions 
are shown in Carmichael et al. (2009). A summary of the 
coefficients on the training terms is given in Table 4.11. 
No group can be put forward as a better one. Nonethe-
less, the results highlight that certain forms of training 
and education system have more impact on productiv-
ity under certain conditions.
In Table 4.11, the training variable alone has no signifi-
cant effect on labour productivity in the baseline voca-
tional-oriented group and the academic-oriented coun-
tries, which is consistent with the findings in Table 4.10. 
These negative results may be biased by omitting the 
interaction with ICT capital. The effect of training alone 
is significantly positive in both mixed (3.412) and new 
member groups (4.833). Furthermore, when the training 
variable is interacted with ICT capital, the interaction has 
a significant positive effect on labour productivity in the 
vocational-oriented (1.447), academic-oriented (1.195) 
and the mixed countries (0.783), but is insignificant in 
new member countries. Thus, these results strengthen 
the findings in the baseline specification that the overall 
effect of training on labour productivity is not significant 
in those big economies while training interacted with 
ICT capital have positive effect on labour productivity. 
The estimates for MFP and wages show a very similar 
pattern. In the next four columns, it is undeniable that 
the effect of training alone on MFP and wage is insig-111
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Table 4.11:   Training and Education Systems: Summary of Within OLS results
Training Labour productivity MFP Wages
Vocational 0.808 -1.919 -0.779
Academic -0.112 -1.984 -1.215
Mixed 3.412* 1.959 -0.085
New comers 4.833** -3.251 1.824
Training interacted with ICT Labour productivity MFP Wages
Vocational 1.447*** 0.063 0.185***
Academic 1.195*** 0.397*** 0.407***
Mixed 0.783*** 0.173 0.056
New comers 1.065 0.317 0.218
Notes: Full regression results are given in Carmichael et al. 2009. The coefficients presented here are the overall impacts for each group 
whereas the estimation in Carmichael et al. 2009 shows the incremental effects for groups 2-4 over the benchmark group 1. In order to 
gauge the importance of these cross group differences ***, ** and * denote significant difference relative to base (vocational) group at 
1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
nificant. However, the academic-oriented group shows 
significantly positive association with training interacted 
with ICT capital in MFP (0.397) and wage (0.407) estima-
tion. Vocational-oriented countries also show a weaker, 
but still significantly positive effect of training interacted 
with ICT capital on wages (0.185), but is insignificant on 
MFP. Therefore, results from this sophisticated specifi-
cation suggest an important role for training combined 
with ICT investments, especially for both vocational and 
academic-oriented groups, but little or no benefits of 
training not linked to the new technology. 
Therefore, focusing on the results yields some interest-
ing conclusions. Firstly, training alone has insignificant or 
even negative overall effect on labour productivity, MFP 
and wages. Positive effects of training alone on productiv-
ity are more evident for mixed and new member groups. 
Secondly, training combined with ICT capital has a signifi-
cantly positive effect on productivity, MFP and wage. The 
academic-oriented group can benefit more from training 
combined with ICT capital than other groups. Finally, new 
Member States have no significant effects from training 
combined with ICT capital. It suggests that in new Mem-
ber States the impact of training is not yet associated with 
the introduction of new technology. 
4.4.3.  Member States training and ICT
An alternative to looking at interactions between train-
ing and ICT in a production function is to consider the 
direct impact of training on the adoption and use of ICT. 
Cross-country, cross-industry and cross-firm analyses 
show how important the successful adoption of ICT is 
for the competitiveness of firms and the development 
of a country as a whole. In general, ICT is found to con-
tribute positively to GDP growth (O’Mahony and Vecchi 
2005; Oulton 2002) and firms’ productivity (Matteucci 
et al., 2005 Gust and Marquez 2004). At the macro level, 
researchers have analysed the determinants for the 
adoption and diffusion of ICT, which include the over-
all educational level of the population, real per capita 
income, openness, industrial structure, geographical 
location and relative price of adoption across coun-
tries (for a detailed discussion, see Pohjola 2003). On 
the micro side, research is often concerned with quan-
tifying the impact of determinants such as firm-level 
human capital (number or proportion of skilled labour), 
workplace organisation, benefits and costs of adoption, 
absorptive capacity induced mainly by training as well 
as initial human capital, competition and other firm-
specific fixed effects (see Hollenstein 2003, for a survey 
of the literature). However, the industry or meso-level 
determinants of ICT adoption and diffusion are not so 
widely investigated due to lack of data in the past. Com-
bining EU LFS and EU KLEMS data allows an examination 
of the direct link between ICT and training. 
A series of industry level short-run demands for ICT is 
estimated using the following OLS (with fixed effects) 
specification, for industry i and country j:
ij t t j i i, j, t–1 i, j, t
i, j, t i, j, t i, j, t–1 i, j, t
GENDER X φ γ η ε
AGE EDU TR (ICT / K)
+ + + + +
+ + + =
where ICT/K is the proportion of ICT capital, TR is the 
proportion of workers who have undertaken training 
during the last four weeks; EDU has three categories: 
proportions of workers with lower secondary, upper 
secondary and tertiary education; AGE comprises three 
categories: proportions of young (15-29), medium-aged 
(30-49) and older (50+) workers; GENDER is the propor-
tion of male workers; X includes production function 
variables, namely log of value added, log of capital and 
log of employment. Industry (φ), country (γ) and year (η) 
dummies are included in the estimation and εijt  is the 
usual disturbance term.112
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Estimations using only the current level variables may be 
subject to the problem of endogeneity either because 
ICT investment or training decisions are made simulta-
neously by management. Therefore, lagged explanatory 
variables are used. More work is needed to deal with the 
simultaneity issue so the results should be interpreted 
with some caution. Carmichael et al. (2009) also report 
results when current values are used – these do not alter 
the conclusions. The regression results are presented in 
Table 4.12. The overall fit of the model is good with about 
70% of the variation explained. As expected, the skill and 
human capital indicators are the strong predictors of ICT 
adoption. A one percentage point increase in the train-
ing proportion can predict about half a percentage point 
increase in ICT adoption. The contribution of educational 
attainment to ICT adoption increases substantially by 
education level. Age and gender profiles within an indus-
try do not seem to have individual impacts, but there is 
some indication that ICT adoption is more prevalent in 
industries where the majority of the workers are young 
(aged 15 – 29). Value added is positively correlated with 
ICT adoption, a finding consistent with Bresnahan et al. 
(2002), possibly indicating that ICT adoption at industry 
level is related to greater success of firms within an entire 
industry. The level of capital investment shows no effect 
on ICT adoption, but the number of employees, usually 
an indicator of the size of an industry, has a significant 
negative impact on ICT adoption.
The cross-products introduced in the regression reveal 
that the impact of training and education is gender- and 
age-specific. In general, training males appears to be 
beneficial for ICT adoption. But the training of workers 
of different ages does not seem to matter, even though 
there is some indication that training older workers 
(aged 50+) is negatively correlated with ICT a  doption. 
An interesting finding is that training provided to 
workers with a higher educational attainment contrib-
utes less to ICT adoption than the training provided to 
workers with low educational attainment. The possible 
  reason is that the marginal benefit from training the less 
educated workers may be higher – they gain a greater 
amount of skill per training provided – than for their 
highly educated counterparts. Accordingly, firms which 
train less educated workers may increase the overall skill 
level of the workforce to a greater extent, which aids in 
the adoption of ICT.
As mentioned earlier, a higher proportion of male work-
ers aged 50+ in a given industry is associated with a 
lower proportion of ICT capital. However, the most puz-
zling result is that a higher proportion of male work-
ers with a higher educational attainment is also found 
to contribute less to ICT adoption. When these two 
impacts are seen together, it becomes obvious that 
the older male workers with a high educational attain-
ment appear to be negatively associated with ICT adop-
tion. O’Mahony and Peng (2008) find that ICT adoption 
adversely affects the wage share of high-skilled males 
aged 50+. They argue that faster skill depreciation, less 
training opportunities and less willingness to take-up 
training at old ages can partly explain this result. They 
find that older males tend to refuse training offers more 
frequently than younger males and females of the same 
age, particularly when they have higher degrees. This 
finding can be helpful in interpreting the puzzle. If older 
male workers tend to refuse more training offers, they 
will then be less likely to acquire modern skills, a precon-
dition for the adoption of ICT. Firms with fewer employ-
ees with modern skills will tend to have less incentive to 
adopt new technology (Chander et al., 2004).
Table 4.12:   ICT demand as a function  
of human capital (1995 – 2005)  
Dependent variable: ICT/K,  
(Number of observations = 2010)
Coefficient Std. Error
TRAINING 0.419*** 2.72
EDU- (medium level) 0.180*** 2.93
EDU- (high level) 0.143* 1.83
MALE -0.062 -0.4
AGE- (30-49) -0.025 -0.17
AGE- (50+) 0.355** 2.59
TRAINING * MALE 0.323*** 3.43
TRAINING * AGE (30-49) 0.028 0.12
TRAINING * AGE (50+) -0.325 -1.24
TRAINING * EDU (medium level) -0.676*** -3.48
TRAINING * EDU (high level) -0.315** -2.06
MALE * AGE (30-49) 0.238 1.09
MALE * AGE (50+) -0.384* -1.84
MALE * EDU (medium level) -0.260*** -3.77
MALE * EDU (high level) -0.270** -2.34
Adjusted R2 = 0.705
Notes: Other control variables (value added, capital, employ-
ment) are examined but not presented in the table. ***, ** and * 
denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
4.5.  What affects on-the-job training
Having explored the impact of on-the-job training on 
productivity and wages this section focuses on what fac-
tors affect the decision of individual employees to train. 
There is a considerable previous literature looking at this 
question for a range of time periods and countries. One of 
the seminal papers for on-the-job training was provided 
by Mincer (1962), who uncovered some socio-economic 
patterns. These are that less on-the-job training is under-
taken by women, black people, those with lower incomes 
and those with lower levels of education. Lynch (1992) 
uses the youth cohort of the US National Longitudinal 
Survey to explore the on-the-job training experiences 
of young employees. She finds that on-the-job training 
has a substantial impact on subsequent earnings. She 
also finds that females and non-white people experi-113
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ence a significantly lower incidence of on-the-job train-
ing. Similarly, using a 1994 survey of US employers, Lynch 
and Black (1998) find that employer-provided training is 
greater for employers with larger numbers of employees, 
for capital-intensive production and for employees with 
existing higher levels of educational attainment. Sussman 
(2002) focuses on various socio-economic characteristics 
that affect access to job-related training in Canada. Her 
main finding is that being too busy is the main constraint 
on employees undertaking additional training. Rubenson 
(2007) finds, using Canada’s Adult Education and Training 
Surveys, that the strongest impact of on-the-job training 
is from the existing level of education of the employee. 
Other papers that address this issue include Krueger and 
Rouse (1998) and Wooden et al. (2001).
Vignoles et al. (2004) find that there is a great deal of 
selection by employers as to which employees are able 
to engage in on-the-job (lifelong) training. They use the 
individual-level panel data from the UK National Child 
Development Study (NCDS). Employers seem able to 
select those employees who benefit the most, in terms 
of their wage, from their training. This implicitly also 
means that those employees whose productivity can 
increase the most are selected for on-the-job training. 
The research aims to identify those demographic and 
economic characteristics that are, for a sample of EU 
countries, consistently associated with a higher prob-
ability of on-the-job training.
This question is addressed by carrying out an economet-
ric analysis on individual-level employee data from the 
European Union Labour Force Surveys (EU LFS) for the 
years 2003 to 2007. The dependent variable is the indi-
cator of on-the-job training, recording if the employee 
undertook any training in the previous four weeks. It 
is called EDUC4WN. The dependent variable is binary 
zero-one, so Probit regressions are used for the analy-
sis and marginal (probability) effects are also reported 
to aid interpretation. The explanatory variables include 
as many demographic and economic characteristics 
as are important and are consistently available in the 
dataset. Country-specific Probit regressions are run for 
a representative sample of EU Member States: Austria, 
Belgium, Germany, Denmark, Spain, Finland, France, 
Italy,   Netherlands, Sweden and the United Kingdom. The 
next sub-section reviews the EU LFS data, followed by a 
discussion of the economic and demographic character-
istics that determine training take-up.
4.5.1.  The EU Labour Force Survey data
The analysis is based on individual-level data from the 
EU LFS from 2003 to 2006 where only employees are 
selected. In this section some explanatory variables 
are presented along with the reasons why they are 
included in the regression – further details are avail-
able in Carmichael et al. (2009). For ease of exposition, 
the independent variables are divided into three broad 
categories: demographic, economic and temporal that 
are presented in Appendix (table 4.13 and 4.14).
The demographic characteristics relate to age, gender, 
marital status, education level, area of origin (relative 
to the urbanisation level), nationality (national or for-
eigner). The economic characteristics account for job 
tenure, number of hours worked, part-time work, work 
from home, looking for another job and the area in 
which the employee works.
The variables related to age are included in order to 
model the expected non-linear decline in training that 
occurs with age. The impact of being female on training 
may vary by country according to various other factors, 
such as the level of female participation in the labour 
market. Regarding urbanisation, the prior assumption 
is that more densely populated urban areas will have 
easier access to educational facilities for on-the-job 
training.
The job tenure variables are variables capturing the 
number of years an employee has been with the cur-
rent employer. The probability of undertaking training 
is expected to increase with tenure but at a decreas-
ing rate. It is worth noting that age is already control-
led for in the Probit regressions. Temporary employees 
may have a higher probability of receiving training if 
this is self-financed but a lower probability of receiving 
firm-paid training. Unfortunately, the data do not show 
who paid for the training. Looking for another job may 
discourage training if it takes up too much time. Con-
versely, looking for another job may encourage train-
ing if it improves outside employment opportunities. 
The area in which the employee works is represented 
by the “International Standard Classifications of Occu-
pations” which is detailed in Appendix in table 4.14. 
Ten binary variables (ISCO_0to9=0,1) capture one-digit 
categories for the European Union variant of ISCO-COM 
(88). With the exception of ISCO_0=1, which covers the 
military, the other categories can be interpreted as a 
rough measure of occupational status, with ISCO_1=1 
the highest status and ISCO_9=1 having the lowest. 
These nine binary variables can also be viewed as a 
rough proxy for earnings, which are not available in 
the EU LFS datasets. The excluded control category in 
these regressions is the lowest status ISCO_9. No strong 
prior is available on the effect of these ISCO variables 
on the probability of training. It may be that higher 
status occupations are associated with more training 
opportunities. Conversely, those in the highest-status 
occupations may already have all the training required 
for the occupation and no further need to train. The 
existing literature suggests that the probability of on-
the-job training should increase with the job status of 
the employee.114
European Competitiveness Report 2009
In addition some temporal dummy variables are also 
included. QUARTER_(1/2/3/4)=0,1 are binary variables 
recording the quarter corresponding to the survey ref-
erence week and are intended to capture if there is a 
seasonal cycle for undertaking on-the-job training. For 
example, QUARTER_3 may be a quarter when less on-
the-job training is undertaken because employees are 
more likely to be on holiday. Conversely, it may be asso-
ciated with a higher probability of training if employees 
see the holiday period as an opportunity to train. The 
year variables (from 2003 to 2007) are binary variables 
capturing the year of the interview reference week. The 
excluded control year is 2007, and the regression results 
indicate which other years have been excluded from the 
regression because of data unavailability.
4.5.2.  Economic and demographic characteristics that 
determine training take-up 
The analysis in this section employs a Probit estimation, 
details of which are given in Carmichael et al. 2009. Since 
EDUC4WN is a binary 0/1 variable, limited dependent 
variable regression rather than OLS is the appropriate 
statistical tool for the analysis. The estimated parameters 
are difficult to interpret directly, so the discussion below 
focuses on marginal effects which provide a measure of 
the change in the probability of the dependent variable 
due to changes in the independent variables. If the inde-
pendent variables are binary, the marginal effects pro-
vide a measure for the probability of a change in these 
variables leading to a positive outcome for the depend-
ent variable. For example, they indicate the change in the 
probability of being trained (EDUC4WN=1) for a woman 
as compared to a man (FEMALE=1). If the independent 
variables are continuous the marginal effects give the 
slope of these functions with respect to the probability, 
e.g. the estimated parameter on number of hours per 
week usually worked in a first job gives the change in 
the probability of being trained due to working an extra 
hour. Marginal effects can be calculated for any set of 
characteristics, but are most often, as here, based on the 
mean characteristics for the sample under analysis.
The marginal effects from country-specific Probit regres-
sions are given in Appendix Table 4.15. The age dum-
mies are significant in the Probit regressions for every 
country – the young have the highest probability of 
undertaking training and this probability declines, at a 
diminishing rate, with age. The effect of being female is 
mixed, associated with a lower probability of undertak-
ing on-the-job training in Germany, Spain, France, Italy 
and the Netherlands, and associated with a higher prob-
ability of undertaking on-the-job training in Denmark, 
Finland, Sweden and the UK. These results are likely to 
reflect the degree of female labour market participation 
within each respective country. The results for marital 
status show no clear patterns although the parameter 
estimates for most countries are statistically significant 
but with different signs.
Having received high or medium education seems to 
have the effect of increasing the probability of under-
taking on-the-job training when compared to having 
received low education for the vast majority of coun-
tries. This suggests that on-the-job training is a comple-
ment to existing educational attainment. One exception 
is Denmark where the results are mixed with having 
received medium education reducing the probability 
of undertaking more training and having received high 
education increasing this probability. The other notable 
exception is Germany with high and medium level of 
education being associated with a lower probability of 
undertaking on-the-job training, suggesting it may act 
as a substitute to compensate for lower previous educa-
tional attainment rather than as a complement.
A dense urban environment is associated in most cases 
with a higher probability of undertaking on-the-job 
training in most countries. This result seems reasonable 
if dense urban areas have easier geographic access to 
adult educational facilities. However, this pattern is not 
universally true, as in the cases of Spain, Sweden and the 
United Kingdom.
Being a foreign national is almost universally associated 
with a significantly reduced probability of undertak-
ing on-the-job training. It is easy to envisage situations 
where nationals of the home country have better access 
to on-the-job training facilities. The three exceptions to 
this general result are Denmark, the Netherlands and the 
United Kingdom. In these three countries being a foreign 
national is actually associated with a higher probability 
of undertaking on-the-job training. This situation could 
possibly come about if Denmark, the Netherlands and 
the United Kingdom attract a large number of non-EU 
nationals who simultaneously undertake both paid work 
and studies, which may be explained by the existence 
of a large number of non-EU students in higher educa-
tion. As noted above, it can also reflect the high usage of 
foreign workers in the health sectors in some countries, 
most notably the UK.
The results for the parameter estimates on tenure in the 
job indicate for most countries a concave function with 
respect to on-the-job training. It means that the prob-
ability of on-the-job training increases with the length 
of tenure but at a decreasing rate. This, obviously, sug-
gests that the longer an employee has been in a job, the 
higher the probability of undertaking on-the-job train-
ing. It is worth noting that the effect of age was control-
led for by the included age variables.
Longer usual hours of work are associated in every coun-
try with a reduced probability of undertaking on-the-job 
training, while the significant positive parameter esti-115
Chapter 4 — Training, education and productivity
mates for part-time work (except for Sweden) indicate 
part-time employees have a higher probability of under-
taking on-the-job training. Being a temporary employee 
is in every country associated with a higher probability of 
undertaking on-the-job training. This result is evident if 
the temporary employment is perceived as a transitional 
job in expectation of obtaining better employment once 
the on-the-job training is successfully completed.
The impact of looking for another job varies largely by 
country. In some cases it is not significant, but in oth-
ers it can have a significant positive or negative impact 
on having undertaken on-the-job training in the previ-
ous four weeks. Evidently, in some countries looking 
for another job is a complement to on-the-job training, 
while in others these two activities are substitutes.
Working from home has the almost universally strong 
effect of increasing the probability of undertaking on-the-
job training. The flexible working practices associated with 
being able to work from home may be correlated with 
increased training opportunities. However, the results 
also suggest that those employees who usually work from 
home actually have fewer on-the-job training opportuni-
ties that those who only sometimes work from home.
The ISCO dummies capture the “status” of the occu-
pation and are highly correlated with earnings and/or 
wealth. ISCO_9 (elementary occupations) is the excluded 
category and is the one associated with the lowest earn-
ings. The probability of on-the-job training increases 
consistently from ISCO_8 to ISCO_2 (professionals). For 
ISCO_1 (legislators, senior officials and managers) the 
probability of on-the-job training is slightly lower than 
for ISCO_2. The parameter for ISCO_0 varies from coun-
try to country regressions, indicating different impacts 
on training for different national armed forces.
Finally, no systematic patterns emerge with respect to 
the QUARTER dummies, other than QUARTER_3 (July 
to September) being typically associated with a lower 
probability of on-the-job training.
The analysis presented was extended to take account of 
different systems of education provision by comparing 
Austria and Germany to France and the UK. In Austria 
and Germany the general education systems place high 
emphasis on vocational training whereas in France and 
the UK general education is recognised as being largely 
academic in nature. Without any prior pre-conceptions, 
it is investigated whether the vocational versus academic 
nature of education affects the probability of undertak-
ing on-the-job training. The results of this extension are 
presented in Carmichael et al. (2009) and are just sum-
marised here.
First adding a “Vocational” dummy, with the value 1 for 
Austria or Germany, has the effect of reducing the prob-
ability of undertaking on-the-job training. Specifically, all 
other things being equal, a worker in a country with a 
vocationally-oriented education system has on average a 
3.92 percent lower probability of undertaking on-the-job 
training. Including interactions between the vocational 
dummy and other variables also yields some interest-
ing conclusions. For example, being female in a country 
with a vocational education system is associated with a 
much lower probability of undertaking on-the-job train-
ing. Individuals in countries with vocational education 
systems tend to undertake more education the younger 
they are while those in countries with academic educa-
tional systems undertake more education the older they 
are. For those with an existing higher or medium level 
of education the probability of undertaking additional 
on-the-job training is actually lower in vocationally ori-
ented countries. Against this the results for the occupa-
tional dummies suggest that in countries with vocational 
education systems the positive association between job 
status and on-the-job training is magnified.
This interesting result showing lower probabilities of 
training in more vocationally oriented countries could 
come about if much of what is taught in general voca-
tional training in countries such as Austria and Germany 
needs to be learned on the job in countries where the 
school curriculum focuses on more academic subjects. 
However it could also be consistent with other explana-
tions such as lower willingness by workers to undertake 
training or a proxy for different types of labour market 
institutions.
4.5.3.  Determinants of the field of training
The analysis was further developed to explore the 
determinants of training participation by type or field 
of training. In this analysis the relationships between 
training field and other variables are examined in more 
detail: (i) educational systems (whether a country is 
more vocationally or more academically orientated); 
(ii) age; (iii) education and; (iv) gender. The sample for 
this part of the research was restricted to those who had 
attended informal training courses within the last four 
weeks. The research methodology involved multinomial 
logit estimations (see Carmichael et al. 2009 for details of 
the method) for which the categorical dependent vari-
able, field of training, was constructed as follows:
Outcome 0:   General: General programmes and arts; the 
base outcome
Outcome 1:   Social Science: Social science, business and 
law
Outcome 2: Science: Science and engineering
Outcome 3: Computing: Computer science and use
Outcome 4:   Health: Health (including agriculture and 
veterinary) and education
Outcome 5: Services116
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The data set comprises annual series (2004-2006) for the 
UK, France, Austria and Germany. Regressions were run 
including a dummy variable representing the vocation 
system (for Germany and Austria) and including inter-
actions terms with this dummy variable. The independ-
ent variables included in the estimations closely mirror 
those in the training participation estimations, e.g. vari-
ables indicating individual characteristics (e.g. age and 
marital status) and controls for job- specific characteris-
tics (e.g. tenure, temporary, part time and occupational 
dummies). In addition, industry-sector dummy variables 
for current economic activity were also included. There-
fore, the sector of industry in which a company training 
its employees is operating is controlled for. 
The results of the multinominal regressions are reported 
in Carmichael et al. (2009). The main conclusions that 
emerged are as follows. The odds ratios associated with 
the vocational dummy variable are consistently less than 
one and significant. This implies that relative to general 
training the odds of an individual undertaking training 
in any of the other fields is significantly less in the more 
vocationally oriented countries (Germany and Austria) 
compared with the more academically orientated coun-
tries (the UK and France). These differences are most 
pronounced for training in social sciences and are also 
large for science and computing. The difference is less in 
relation to training in health and even smaller in relation 
to services. These results appear to be consistent with 
the notion that vocational training at school level can 
substitute for specific skills required in the workplace. 
Some interesting results also emerge regarding the 
demographic variables. The results indicate that the 
relationship between age and training participation 
depends to some extent on the type of training being 
undertaken since the impact of age varies according to 
training field. For example, the odds of training in social 
science, science and services (relative to general train-
ing) are less than 1 for all age groups over 42 (indicating 
that older workers are less likely to be involved in these 
fields of training relative to general training). However, 
the relative odds of training in computing and health 
appear to be higher for some older people below 60. 
The results indicate that, compared with general train-
ing, males are significantly more likely than females to 
undertake any kind of specialised training.
Looking at education variables, for social science and sci-
ence training, educational attainment has no significant 
effect (at the 5% level or above) on participation relative 
to the base category. However, having attained a higher 
level of education lowers the relative odds of participat-
ing in computer-related training and having attained 
either an intermediate or higher level of education low-
ers the relative odds of participating in services training 
(even after controlling for industry sector). In contrast, 
the odds of undertaking health-related training (rela-
tive to general training) are higher for those who have 
attained a higher level of education.
In summary the results indicate that participation in 
training is conditioned by type of field of training, since, 
for trainees, participation in alternative training fields is 
not random. For example, while the overall relationship 
between age and training participation is clearly nega-
tive, among trainees, workers over 44 are more likely to 
participate in general training and training in health and 
computing. In contrast, younger trainees are more likely 
to be involved in services training although they are also 
more likely to be involved in general training. Female 
trainees are more likely than males to be involved in 
general training while male trainees are more likely to be 
involved in any kind of training other than either general 
training or training in health. More educated trainees 
are most likely to be involved in health and social sci-
ence training and least likely to be involved in training 
in computing and services. Regardless of age, gender 
or educational attainment, trainees in more academi-
cally oriented countries are more likely to be engaged in 
non-general training than trainees in more vocationally 
oriented countries and the latter are more likely to be 
involved in general and services training than any other 
kind of training.
This analysis helps policy makers identify which charac-
teristics affect the probability of undertaking on-the-job 
training. One must, however, be cautious in automati-
cally assuming that more on-the-job training is to be 
recommended. There is the much more subtle question 
as to the effectiveness of on-the-job training on the effi-
ciency of the workforce. Until the EU LFS microdata pro-
vide a measure of labour efficiency, such as the wage, 
this remains a challenging question to address directly.
4.6.  Incentives and disincentives to train for 
older and less-skilled workers
This section explores reasons for lower training rates 
among older and less skilled workers. It sets out theo-
retical perspectives for incentives in terms of the costs 
and benefits of training and then relates these theoreti-
cal ideas to empirical evidence on barriers to training.
4.6.1.  Theoretical considerations: the costs and 
benefits of training
According to human capital theory (Becker 1964; Mincer 
1962, 1974), the decision to invest in human capital is 
based on cost-benefit considerations for both employ-
ers and employees, which determine their decisions on 
whether to offer or undertake training. For workers, the 
main benefits from participating in training are likely to 
be increased chances of promotion, greater opportuni-117
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ties for career development, more choice in employ-
ment and higher earnings. The latter in particular will 
depend on the type of job or occupation to which the 
training relates; higher potential earners will have more 
incentive for training. For unemployed workers who par-
ticipate in training, the expected gains may also derive 
from enhanced employability. The costs of training for 
the individual will vary according to a number of factors, 
including whether or not training takes place on the 
job or not, whether the employer pays the direct costs 
of training, the duration of the training, how arduous 
or how difficult the training is and how much effort is 
involved. If training is not fully incorporated within time 
at work, individuals may also incur forgone or lower earn-
ings and loss of leisure time. The net benefits of training 
will therefore vary according to the type of training being 
considered, the employment to which it is relevant, the 
characteristics of the individual concerned, and the dura-
tion of time over which the benefits of training can be 
earned and therefore compensate for costs incurred.
For employers, the benefits from training derive from 
expected increases in productivity leading to higher 
profits. Employers accrue training costs in the form of 
course fees, payments to instructors, supervision costs 
and foregone output while an employee participates in 
training. As these costs will vary to some extent depend-
ing on the characteristics of trainees, employers will tend 
to provide more training opportunities for those workers 
for whom they perceive the costs of training to be lower 
and the long-term benefits higher due to increases in 
productivity.
Human capital theory predicts that the extent of any 
net benefits from job-related training (for either or both 
employees and employers) will critically depend on 
the likely length of tenure of the employee, the return 
to training in terms of higher wages, and the effective-
ness of training. The first two factors potentially have 
a negative impact on the incentives of older people to 
undertake training while the third also has implications for 
low-skilled workers of any age if their status is attributable 
to lower ability. Acemoglu and Pischke (1999b) offer a 
model where investment in general training from com-
panies is relevant under certain circumstances. Firms 
have higher return to training if employees do not leave 
the company. They mention that high turn  over coun-
tries or industries have lower training. In many European 
countries, it is the employer who pays for the general 
training.
In relation to length of tenure, the earlier any training is 
undertaken the greater the likely return to both trainee 
and employer. This is because the period during which 
the gains from higher productivity and the consequent 
flow of higher, discounted earnings are received will 
be longer. Since older employees have fewer years of 
employment to recoup any training costs (for them-
selves or their employer), human capital theory predicts 
that older workers will not only be less motivated to 
accept any offers of training that come their way but 
will also be less likely to be offered training in the first 
place. Against this, there is a general perception that 
older workers exhibit greater employment stability than 
younger employees, so that expected years with the 
firm will be synonymous with years to retirement. Also, 
where depreciation rates for investment in training are 
very high, the impact of age will be relatively minor.
Since there is a positive relationship between age and 
earnings (due to career progression and seniority), any 
forgone earnings costs associated with training will 
increase with age. This will act as a further disincen-
tive for older people to train since it reduces the rate of 
return on such investments. However, for older workers 
in low-skilled jobs where there is little or no reward for 
seniority, age will be less of a factor in determining will-
ingness to accept offers of training. Nevertheless, the 
direct costs of any training not financed by employers 
or the government will be higher (relative to income 
and wealth) for the generally less well-off, lower-skilled 
workers (of any age). Therefore, training costs are more 
likely to impact negatively on the training incentives of 
lower-skilled workers. However, while these costs may 
be similar for all low-skilled workers, the net effect on 
the motivation to train will be greater for older workers 
since, as discussed above, they have less time in which 
to recoup such costs.
In relation to the effectiveness of training, human capi-
tal theory predicts that lower levels of ability lead to 
lower productivity in the workplace and therefore that 
a worker with a higher ability will command a higher 
wage. It follows that any given human capital invest-
ment, or more specifically training, is associated with a 
higher rate of return (in terms of both higher productiv-
ity and higher earnings) the more able the worker. Thus 
if learning ability declines with age, training effective-
ness, in terms of the potential gains to the employer 
from higher productivity and consequently higher earn-
ings for the trainee, would be lower for older workers 
(as well as lower-ability workers). This would lead to 
both lower offers of training for older workers and less 
incentive for them to accept any offers that came their 
way. Furthermore, lower learning ability will also raise 
the costs of training, in terms of effort and time, for 
the trainee and therefore have an additional negative 
impact on their motivation to train. However, while it 
is commonly assumed that learning ability deteriorates 
with age, the evidence on this point is very mixed (see 
Wooden et al. 2001; and Waldman and Avolio 1986).
The above arguments indicate that the lower training 
rates observed among older people as well as less-
skilled people, as outlined in section 2.1 above, are con-
sistent with the predictions of human capital theory, 118
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also implying that decisions to reject an offer of train-
ing may be entirely rational. Nevertheless, lower train-
ing rates will impact negatively on employability in the 
medium to long-term, particularly if an older person 
becomes unemployed, since the value of human capital 
depreciates. For example, Groot (1999) has estimated 
that the value of skill depreciates at rates of between 
11 per cent and 17 per cent annually. In addition, some 
beliefs regarding the relationship between the costs and 
benefits of training and age may be based on incorrect 
or stereotypical and ageist attitudes to older workers. 
Specifically, ageist perceptions may reinforce employ-
ers’ disinclination to invest in training for older workers 
(Lundberg and Marshallsay 2007; Cabinet Office 2000; 
McKay and Middleton 1998; Thompson 1990). This could 
therefore partly explain the lower incidence of training 
among older workers. In such cases, however, the deci-
sions made by both employers and employees in rela-
tion to training would not necessarily be correct ones. 
This point is developed further below.
4.6.2.  Empirical evidence: barriers to training
A number of studies from a range of countries have 
reported evidence for lower training participation rates 
among older and less skilled workers being related to 
barriers to training. These may either reduce an individ-
ual’s incentive to take up training offers or an employ-
er’s incentives to offer training to particular groups. As 
such, barriers to training are factors that either restrict 
opportunities for training or, if training is available, raise 
the perceived costs of training or reduce the benefits of 
training, making it more likely that an offer of training 
is rejected. Three main types of barriers to participation 
in job-related training can be identified in the literature 
(Sussman, 2002): 
•	 	 Situational barriers: barriers associated with a person’s 
situation in life at a given time e.g. being too busy at 
work, financial constraints, family responsibilities or 
lack of child care, language, health problems, lack of 
relevant education, or insufficient ability 
•	 	 Institutional barriers : barriers associated with estab-
lished practices that exclude or discourage partici-
pation in training e.g. high training fees, entrance 
requirements, limited course offerings, inconvenient 
times or locations, ageist attitudes of employers
•	 	 Dispositional/or psychological barriers: barriers attribut-
able to negative options and attitudes towards learn-
ing or negative perceptions of oneself as a learner
All three types of barriers to training raise the perceived 
or actual costs associated with training. Situational and 
dispositional barriers are perhaps more likely to explain 
why a particular individual (or group of individuals) has 
relatively low incentives to train and therefore is more 
likely to reject an offer of training. Institutional barriers 
are most likely to explain why a person or group of indi-
viduals is not offered training by employers. However, 
none of these categories are mutually exclusive as they 
can overlap or act together to reinforce each other, e.g. 
if the location is not convenient, the costs of the training 
are likely to be higher.
The degree to which barriers to training impact on actual 
training outcomes has been explored by Sussman (2002), 
who reviews evidence from the 1998 and 1994 Adult 
Education and Training Surveys (AETS), supplements to 
the respective Canadian Labour Force Surveys. Respond-
ents were asked if there was any training or education 
they needed to take for job-related or career reasons but 
did not. If the answer to this question was yes, then they 
were asked to identify all the barriers to training they 
faced. The main barriers identified by those who did 
perceive an unmet need for training were: 1. too busy at 
work (situational); 2. training too expensive (situational/
institutional); 3. inconvenience of time and location if 
training was available (institutional); 4. unavailability of 
a course or training programme (institutional); 5. lack 
of employer support (institutional); 6. family responsi-
bilities (situational). Sussman (2002) found that among 
those who reported unmet needs for training the two 
main reasons given were being too busy at work and 
expense, but also important were lack of an offer of train-
ing, the inconvenience of location or time if training was 
offered, lack of employer support and family responsibili-
ties (especially for women). Insufficient qualifications or 
prerequisites and health reasons were only important 
for a small minority. Among those who perceived unmet 
needs for training but who had taken some job-related 
training, the main barriers to more training were also 
being too busy at work, inconvenient time or location 
and the unavailability of a course. For those who had 
taken training, finance was not an important issue.
Cully et al. (2000) report on data from the Australian sur-
veys of Training and Education Experience (ATEE) which 
interviewed only employed respondents. In these data 
three types of training are examined; in-house, external 
and unstructured. This study additionally identifies fear 
of training as a dispositional or psychological barrier to 
participation in training which is particularly demotivat-
ing for older people.
Chapman et al. (2003) suggest that the expense of train-
ing (particularly in the context of credit constraints 
among the unemployed) is an important barrier to train-
ing for older people in Australia. They found that 50-60 
year olds were less likely than younger cohorts to have 
participated in self-financed training although they were 
no less likely to have had taken part in assisted training. 
They also cite lack of employer support as a further dis-
incentive for training among older people. Similarly, 119
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Lundberg and Marshallsay (2007), who report on evi-
dence from survey-based studies on the perspectives of 
older workers (aged over 45) in three industry sectors: 
finance, care work for the aged in the health sector and 
construction. They report that about 20% of respond-
ents thought that that their employer had negative atti-
tudes supporting training for older workers (specifically 
beyond retirement age).
Wooden et al. (2001) and Cully et al. (2000) both report on 
ATEE data and show that the likelihood of training was 
much lower among older employees. The main reasons 
cited by the authors for the lower training participation 
of older workers were fewer training offers, differential 
learning ability and the attitudes of the older workers 
themselves. Fewer offers of training are made to older 
workers either because they are perceived to be more 
costly to train or because of less specific, negative and 
potentially ageist attitudes of employers towards older 
workers. Wooden et al. (2001) and Culley et al. (2000) 
found that the probability of undertaking training was 
positively related to educational attainment. Since older 
workers generally have lower levels of educational 
attainment, these authors both suggest that this is likely 
to be an important explanation for lower training rates 
among older workers. Culley et al. (2000) use regression 
analysis to explore this relationship and find that much 
of the differences in age and participation in training are 
unexplained by the data, attributing this to unobservable 
characteristics of older workers and age discrimination.
The attitudes of older workers themselves can constitute 
a dispositional or psychological barrier to training if, for 
instance, they result in a fear of training or a lack of a 
perceived need for training. Cully et al. (2000) argue that 
fear of training is associated with lack of confidence in 
the ability to succeed on a training programme. Among 
older workers, fear of training can be attributed to nega-
tive self-perceptions related to expectations of low train-
ing performance or low ability, unfamiliarity with the 
training environment, or fear of being unable to com-
pete with younger and possibly more educated trainees. 
Fear of training raises the psychological costs of training 
and consequently lowers motivation to train.
Lack of perceived need is potentially a major reason for 
low motivation for training among older people. From 
the human capital perspective, a lack of a perceived 
need for training suggests that the perceived benefits 
from training are either low (relative to the costs) or 
non-existent. Sussman (2002) found that while a major-
ity of all respondents in the AETS Canadian data had not 
participated in any training, a majority of these did not 
perceive a need for training, which may suggest a lack 
of motivation. Older people in particular were less likely 
to report unmet needs for training than women, those 
with less than a high school education, part-time work-
ers and workers in agriculture and other primary indus-
tries and construction. These were also found to report 
fewer barriers to training. Similarly, Cully et al. (2000) 
found that among the respondents to the ATEE surveys, 
no need for training was more likely to be cited by older 
workers. Similar findings are also reported in US research 
by Guthrie and Schwoerer (1996) and Lundberg and 
  Marshallsay (2007). A perceived lack of need for train-
ing would be consistent with beliefs that there would be 
insufficient reward from participating in training either 
because the individual has already accumulated suf-
ficient skills and experience or because training will do 
  little to enhance future promotion prospects or employ-
ability. As such, training utility will be conditioned by age 
because, as discussed above, the longer-term be  nefits of 
training are reduced by looming retirement.
There is some evidence that older workers do not per-
ceive a lack of need for training in itself, but rather a lack 
of need for the type of training that is currently on offer. 
This possibility is explored further by Lundberg and Mar-
shallsay (2007) who found that a majority of respond-
ents in their sample thought that training in comput-
ing skills would be the most useful in enabling them to 
continue work after retirement. As stressed by Lundberg 
and Marshallsay (2007) reiterating the recommendations 
of Pillay et al. (2003) and Sheen (2000), “there is a need 
to understand how workers perceive their work” in order 
to adopt practices that will result in “increased produc-
tivity” as well as “long-term career benefits”. Qualitative 
studies are well suited to such a task.
Wooden et al. (2001) conducted focus groups with 
employed and unemployed people over 45 as well as 
with human resources managers. The main barriers iden-
tified were attitudinal, specifically resistance to change 
and fear of ICT. However, ageist attitudes of managers 
(particularly younger managers) rather than trainers 
were identified as obstacles by this group. For example, 
older workers thought that managers perceived older 
workers as being incapable of change or as a threat 
because of their willingness to challenge managers’ 
decisions. The research by Carmichael et al. (2007a and 
2007b) was based on a small-scale, in-depth study with 
56 people between 50 and 68 in the North West of Eng-
land. Among this sample there was a general apprecia-
tion of the value of training and a majority of respond-
ents said that they had undertaken some job-related 
training since leaving full-time education; some more 
vocational than others, some more intensive than others 
and some quite limited. Nearly half of the respondents 
had been involved in training related to computing/IT. 
Some of this training was perceived to be inadequate 
but in several cases it had lead to career changes. Car-
michael et al. (2009) identify five main barriers to train-
ing in addition to lack of opportunity. Two of these were 
dispositional: lack of motivation associated with the lack 
of perceived need for training and resistance to train-
ing and the acquisition of new skills. Lack of a perceived 120
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need for training was noted above as an important 
determinant of lower training rates among older work-
ers. Among the sample, lack of a perceived need or lack 
of motivation was sometimes attributable to the inap-
propriateness of the training in question or to looming 
retirement. Resistance to training was possibly sympto-
matic of a more general resistance to change (also noted 
by Wooden et al. 2001). Additional barriers identified in 
this research were the expense of training, lack of time 
for training and prior and negative experiences of train-
ing (e.g. due to the general unpleasantness, difficulty, 
inadequacies or ineffectiveness of training), with the lat-
ter acting as a disincentive for undertaking further train-
ing. In addition, this research identifies three possible 
incentives for training. First of all, self-motivation was 
identified as an important driver of learning and train-
ing. Secondly, employer attitudes were seen as a critical 
determinant of whether or not an employee undertook 
training. Lastly, while negative experiences of training 
could act as a disincentive to train, pleasant, enjoyable 
experiences could have the opposite effect.
4.7.  Conclusions
Access to the microdata underlying the EU Labour Force 
Survey (EU LFS) has allowed for the first time a compre-
hensive examination of various aspects of employee 
training in the EU. These include its impact on produc-
tivity and earnings, links with ICT adoption and use, and 
determinants of who is trained and the fields of training. 
Modelling training activities as intangible investment by 
firms gave the possibility to compare the extent of this 
investments across countries while econometric analy-
sis permits an evaluation of the links with ICT. Detailed 
analysis of the factors affecting who receives training 
is possible given the very large samples available. The 
main conclusions that emerge from this analysis are as 
follows:
In a small number of countries, intangible capital from 
investing in training is a significant contributor to out-
put growth, and in some the impact of training is on 
a par with contributions from upskilling through the 
general education system. In other countries, however, 
the contribution of this type of investment is relatively 
small. The econometric analysis suggests that training 
has most impact when combined with investment in 
ICT, in particular in countries with a more “academic” 
general education system. This is consistent with recent 
literature emphasising the role of organisational change 
and associated retraining of the workforce in diffusing 
new technology. Training also appears to have a direct 
impact on the adoption and use of ICT although the 
impact is gender-, age- and skill-specific. An interesting 
finding is that training workers with a higher educational 
attainment contributes less to ICT adoption than train-
ing for the workers with low educational attainment.
A number of factors affect who is likely to receive train-
ing, confirming earlier analysis for the UK in O’Mahony 
and Peng (2008) that lower-skilled and older workers 
are less likely than other workers to receive training. The 
analysis also highlights that training increases with job 
tenure, thus implying that labour market systems that 
promote long-term relationships between firms and 
workers might have positive impacts on human capital 
accumulation, a point frequently emphasised by the ILO 
(see e.g. Storm and Naastepad 2007).
The analysis of the fields of training also yields some 
interesting findings in respect of worker characteristics. 
While the overall relationship between age and train-
ing participation is clearly negative, among trainees, 
workers over 44 are more likely to participate in general 
training and training in health and computing. Males are 
more likely to be trained in specific rather than general 
areas and more educated trainees are most likely to be 
involved in health and social science training and least 
likely to be involved in training in computing and serv-
ices. Regardless of age, gender or educational attain-
ment, trainees in countries with more vocationally ori-
ented education systems are more likely to be engaged 
in general and services training than trainees in more 
academically oriented countries. 
A number of implications follow for dealing with the 
barriers to training outlined in section 4.5. For example, 
lack of confidence, fear of training or resistance to train-
ing could be addressed by adopting particular training 
methods that are suited to specific groups of workers. 
Training providers need to ensure that prospective train-
ees can realistically expect tangible benefits from that 
training which translate into incentives to train e.g. by 
making the purpose of training clear and closely linking 
training to specific employment opportunities. But the 
lack of a perceived need for training is more difficult to 
address. Wooden et al. (2001) suggest that this could 
require a rise in the retirement age and more emphasis 
on a “throughout-career” requirement for accreditation. 
Finally, the likely impact of the financial crisis on train-
ing is worth highlighting. Here, it is important to distin-
guish immediate effects from more long-term consid-
erations. In the short run credit constraints are likely to 
inhibit firms from spending on activities such as training 
which are not central to their core activities. Against this, 
to the extent that firms hoard labour in recessions, the 
underutilisation of labour may provide an opportunity 
to undertake training. As firms are both more likely to 
hoard highly skilled workers and, as seen above, more 
likely to provide training to these workers, this might 
counterbalance the credit-tightening effects. Which pre-
dominates is an empirical matter on which there is little 
evidence to date. In this respect, in many of the large 
EU Member States for which data are available, training 
proportions increased in the previous recession period, 121
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2000-2002, suggesting some labour hoarding impact. 
However this rise was small and not ubiquitous so it is 
probable that the credit-rationing effect dominates.
In the longer term the impact of the financial crisis on 
training is intrinsically linked with its effect on propen-
sities to innovate and adopt new technologies. Lack 
of access to credit might seriously delay these activi-
ties. There is a large literature that suggests positive 
impacts of financial development on growth through 
financial intermediaries producing better information 
and improving resource allocation (see Levine 2005 for 
a review) and a growing one on the negative effects of 
financial crises (see e.g. Kroszner, Laeven and Klingebiel, 
2007). Here again there are likely to be two counterbal-
ancing effects. Firms dependent on external finance 
are less likely to invest and introduce new technologies 
when they are credit constrained and so are also less 
likely to undertake complementary activities such as on 
the job training.
However, in the very long run the crisis will probably 
change the nature of financial business models, which 
could stimulate innovation. One cause of the financial 
crisis, as discussed in Barrell and Davis (2008), was that 
low interest rates following the 2001 recession led finan-
cial market institutions to seek out alternative activities 
that yielded a higher rate of return. This in turn led to the 
financial innovations that ex post increased risk and have 
had such disastrous consequences. In the future financial 
institutions may look elsewhere in the search for higher 
returns and might well find these through financing 
innovation in the real economy. Whether these poten-
tial positive impacts materialize is a matter for future 
research. In the meantime, the most likely scenario is 
that the crisis will have a negative impact on intangible 
investments such as training for some time yet.
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Appendix
Table 4.13: Independent variables: demographic characteristics
Variable Description
AGE Ten 5 yearly age bands 
FEMALE Female employee
MARITAL_MARRIED Marital status: married
MARITAL_W_S_D Marital status: widowed, separated or divorced
MARITAL_SINGLE Marital status: single
EDUCATION_L Education low : ISCED 0 (no formal), 1 (primary), 2 (lower secondary), 3c (<2years)
EDUCATION_M Education mid : ISCED 3abc (upper secondary), 4 (post secondary)
EDUCATION_H Education high: ISCED 5ab (1st stage secondary), 6 (2nd stage secondary)
URBAN_DENSE Densely-populated area
URBAN_INTERM Intermediately-populated area
URBAN_THIN Thinly-populated area
NATIONAL_HOME Nationality of home country
NATIONAL_FOREIGN National of foreign country
Table 4.14: Independent variables: economic characteristics
Variable Description
TENURE Number of years with current employer
TENURESQ TENURE squared
HWUSUAL Number of hours per week usually worked in first job 
PARTTIME Part-time employee
TEMPORARY Temporary employee
LOOKOJ Looking for another job
HOMEWK_USUALLY Usually works from home
HOMEWK_SOMETIMES Sometimes works from home
HOMEWK_NEVER Never works from home
ISCO_0 0: Armed forces
ISCO_1 1: Legislators, senior officials and managers
ISCO_2 2: Professionals
ISCO_3 3: Technicians and associate professionals
ISCO_4 4: Clerks
ISCO_5 5: Service employees and shop and market sales employees
ISCO_6 6: Skilled agricultural and fishery employees
ISCO_7 7: Craft and related trades employees
ISCO_8 8: Plant and machine operators and assemblers
ISCO_9 9: Elementary occupations. This is the excluded/control category in the regressions
Note: For the variable TENURE, the minimum is 1 and the maximum 52, for TENURESQ the minimum is 1 and the maximum is 2704, for 
HWUSUAL the minimum is 1 and the maximum is 80.126
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Table 4.15: Marginal effects estimates – Independent variables: EDUC4WN (on-the-job training indicator)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Country: Austria Belgium Germany Denmark Spain Finland
FEMALE -0.0136*** -0.0110*** -0.0151*** 0.0352*** -0.00592*** 0.0251***
(-8.76) (-5.89) (-15.8) (11.8) (-3.97) (7.05)
AGE_17 0.531*** 0.361*** 0.630*** 0.541*** 0.195*** 0.512***
(89.9) (24.6) (116) (85.4) (22.8) (55.8)
AGE_22 0.115*** 0.0333*** 0.215*** 0.265*** 0.0819*** 0.234***
(29.8) (6.89) (57.9) (34.2) (18.1) (26.2)
AGE_27 0.0538*** 0.0106*** 0.0813*** 0.107*** 0.0349*** 0.0829***
(16.8) (2.95) (33.0) (16.7) (10.3) (11.1)
AGE_32 0.0193*** 0.000437 0.0228*** 0.0153*** 0.00919*** 0.0282***
(7.25) (0.14) (12.2) (2.91) (3.21) (4.13)
AGE_37 0.00468** -0.00597** 0.00801*** -0.00751 0.00760*** 0.000990
(1.98) (-2.08) (4.90) (-1.53) (2.80) (0.16)
AGE_47 -0.00593** -0.00744** -0.00853*** -0.0110** -0.00690*** -0.00991
(-2.49) (-2.56) (-5.31) (-2.23) (-2.59) (-1.63)
AGE_52 -0.0262*** -0.0154*** -0.0192*** -0.0246*** -0.0250*** -0.0273***
(-10.2) (-4.93) (-11.6) (-4.92) (-8.95) (-4.42)
AGE_57 -0.0625*** -0.0319*** -0.0383*** -0.0549*** -0.0430*** -0.0716***
(-22.5) (-9.27) (-22.1) (-10.8) (-14.6) (-11.3)
AGE_62 -0.0891*** -0.0412*** -0.0564*** -0.0895*** -0.0528*** -0.113***
(-20.4) (-7.64) (-27.5) (-14.2) (-14.9) (-13.7)
MARITAL_W_S_D -0.00843*** -0.00473 -0.00707*** 0.00954* -0.00256 -0.000990
(-3.18) (-1.49) (-4.08) (1.73) (-0.78) (-0.16)
MARITAL_SINGLE -0.0222*** -0.0110*** -0.0286*** -0.00679* -0.0259*** 0.00973**
(-12.4) (-5.08) (-24.3) (-1.92) (-13.9) (2.33)
EDUCATION_HIGH 0.0425*** 0.0534*** -0.000614 0.0499*** 0.0777*** 0.0483***
(13.6) (16.8) (-0.37) (10.2) (32.2) (8.11)
EDUCATION_MED. -0.00812*** 0.0246*** -0.0389*** 0.0181*** 0.0743*** 0.0408***
(-3.77) (9.19) (-26.8) (4.55) (29.8) (8.13)
URBAN_INTERM -0.0136*** -0.00836*** -0.0114*** -0.0290*** 0.00222 -0.0137***
(-8.32) (-4.98) (-12.5) (-9.26) (1.32) (-3.02)
URBAN_THIN -0.0292*** -0.0266*** -0.0101*** -0.0349*** -0.00268* -0.0392***
(-19.3) (-10.1) (-9.22) (-10.7) (-1.68) (-10.7)
NATIONAL_FOREIG. -0.0384*** 0.0171*** -0.0268*** -0.0311*** -0.0258*** -0.0294**
(-16.0) (5.32) (-16.4) (-3.99) (-8.70) (-2.14)
TENURE 0.00129*** -0.000366 0.00229*** 0.00443*** 0.000614** 0.00148**
(5.10) (-1.11) (13.9) (9.06) (2.04) (2.36)
TENURESQ 0.00000616 0.0000153 -0.0000309*** -0.0000911*** -0.00000597 -0.00000198
(0.84) (1.63) (-6.80) (-6.35) (-0.70) (-0.11)
HWUSUAL -0.000970*** 0.000889*** -0.00181*** -0.00514*** -0.00239*** -0.00340***
(-10.4) (7.49) (-23.8) (-24.3) (-18.1) (-12.0)
PARTTIME 0.0347*** 0.0357*** -0.00331* -0.00463 0.0212*** 0.0143**
(12.4) (11.7) (-1.72) (-1.00) (5.55) (2.03)
TEMPORARY 0.220*** 0.0525*** 0.183*** 0.0953*** 0.0264*** 0.0648***
(58.4) (14.0) (78.3) (19.2) (14.0) (12.8)
LOOKOJ 0.00407 0.0125*** -0.0380*** -0.0427*** 0.0430*** 0.0141**
(1.00) (3.41) (-23.9) (-8.99) (12.8) (2.44)
HOMEWRK_USUAL. 0.0985*** 0.0516*** 0.0290*** 0.0734*** 0.0622*** 0.0556***
(28.0) (11.6) (9.31) (11.2) (7.41) (7.78)
HOMEWRK_SOMET. 0.0846*** 0.0576*** 0.0473*** 0.0705*** 0.0335*** 0.0835***
(33.3) (15.1) (25.4) (17.4) (4.96) (11.5)
ISCO_0 0.177*** 0.0935*** -0.00564 0.157*** 0.0850*** 0.150***
(11.1) (6.63) (-1.10) (6.74) (7.79) (5.47)
ISCO_1 0.174*** 0.107*** 0.160*** 0.143*** 0.111*** 0.205***
(31.1) (14.8) (29.2) (16.7) (14.0) (20.6)127
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Country: Austria Belgium Germany Denmark Spain Finland
ISCO_2 0.216*** 0.0924*** 0.160*** 0.148*** 0.109*** 0.189***
(39.2) (16.5) (38.5) (21.1) (24.2) (23.0)
ISCO_3 0.178*** 0.0818*** 0.143*** 0.134*** 0.0731*** 0.150***
(46.6) (14.1) (41.7) (22.6) (18.4) (19.8)
ISCO_4 0.137*** 0.0615*** 0.125*** 0.0957*** 0.0619*** 0.0956***
(34.7) (12.2) (33.9) (14.5) (16.0) (11.1)
ISCO_5 0.123*** 0.0515*** 0.0969*** 0.0806*** 0.0515*** 0.0553***
(31.4) (9.68) (27.4) (13.7) (15.8) (7.92)
ISCO_6 0.0592*** 0.00449 0.0440*** 0.0314** 0.0466*** 0.0204
(6.57) (0.37) (7.05) (2.19) (4.63) (1.42)
ISCO_7 0.0753*** 0.0156*** 0.0574*** 0.0427*** 0.00150 -0.0315***
(19.3) (3.12) (18.1) (6.35) (0.50) (-4.26)
ISCO_8 0.0474*** 0.00371 0.0241*** -0.0230*** 0.0141*** -0.0411***
(10.6) (0.74) (7.08) (-3.18) (3.87) (-5.22)
QUARTER_2 0.00726*** 0.000385 0.00214 -0.0153*** -0.00499* 0.0154
(3.82) (0.16) (1.25) (-4.14) (-1.92) (1.48)
QUARTER_3 -0.0518*** -0.0548*** -0.0193*** -0.109*** -0.0470*** -0.0913***
(-29.9) (-28.6) (-12.4) (-29.9) (-24.2) (-9.87)
QUARTER_4 0.00978*** -0.00338 0.00415** 0.0284*** 0.00108 0.0351***
(5.12) (-1.48) (2.45) (7.42) (0.42) (3.17)
YEAR_2006 0.00344** 0.00240 -0.00543** 0.00917*** -0.00727*** -0.0144*
(2.06) (1.11) (-2.01) (2.70) (-3.99) (-1.76)
YEAR_2005 0.00128 0.0157*** 0.000872 -0.0107*** -0.0790*** -0.0143*
(0.77) (7.00) (0.42) (-3.17) (-40.1) (-1.76)
YEAR_2004 -0.0129*** 0.0197*** -0.00251 -0.0440*** -0.0703*** -0.00728
(-4.29) (5.04) (-1.05) (-7.65) (-34.8) (-0.89)
YEAR_2003 -0.0596*** 0.0103*** -0.0214*** -0.112*** -0.0857***
(-25.0) (2.66) (-9.67) (-20.9) (-11.4)
Observations’ 
number
278230 124061 445534 111689 173556 74209
PseudoR2 0.218 0.093 0.324 0.128 0.170 0.116
t statistics in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1128
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Table 4.16: Marginal effect estimates. Dependent variable: EDUC4WN (on-the-job training indicator)
(7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
Country: France Italy Netherlands Sweden United Kingdom
FEMALE -0.00275* -0.000184 -0.0280*** 0.0703*** 0.0508***
(-1.95) (-0.25) (-16.4) (50.1) (20.3)
AGE_17 0.564*** 0.208*** 0.541*** 0.332*** 0.422***
(64.1) (33.7) (94.6) (55.1) (70.2)
AGE_22 0.136*** 0.0579*** 0.177*** 0.124*** 0.0950***
(28.1) (22.7) (41.3) (33.1) (16.9)
AGE_27 0.0497*** 0.0195*** 0.0555*** 0.0587*** 0.0212***
(15.0) (11.2) (17.9) (19.4) (4.44)
AGE_32 0.0272*** 0.00429*** 0.0151*** 0.00372 -0.00223
(9.78) (3.17) (5.89) (1.48) (-0.53)
AGE_37 0.00967*** 0.00126 0.00434* -0.00848*** 0.00303
(3.89) (1.04) (1.82) (-3.60) (0.76)
AGE_47 -0.00786*** -0.00325*** -0.0136*** -0.0114*** -0.00848**
(-3.37) (-2.72) (-5.71) (-4.73) (-2.09)
AGE_52 -0.0219*** -0.0140*** -0.0384*** -0.0223*** -0.0280***
(-9.20) (-11.5) (-15.7) (-9.21) (-6.67)
AGE_57 -0.0484*** -0.0281*** -0.0816*** -0.0462*** -0.0578***
(-20.4) (-22.3) (-32.7) (-19.3) (-13.4)
AGE_62 -0.0664*** -0.0356*** -0.126*** -0.0795*** -0.106***
(-16.7) (-19.8) (-36.0) (-31.6) (-19.8)
MARITAL_W_S_D 0.0102*** 0.00112 0.0138*** -0.00112 0.00221
(3.78) (0.71) (4.54) (-0.48) (0.54)
MARITAL_SINGLE -0.00204 -0.0141*** -0.0282*** 0.00221 -0.0258***
(-1.30) (-15.1) (-15.7) (1.42) (-8.47)
EDUCATION_HIGH 0.0458*** 0.0862*** 0.0597*** 0.108*** 0.138***
(19.4) (41.2) (24.0) (38.6) (38.4)
EDUCATION_MED. 0.0237*** 0.0443*** 0.0484*** 0.0425*** 0.0799***
(13.5) (46.0) (25.2) (20.0) (27.7)
URBAN_INTERM -0.000781 -0.00606*** -0.0127*** 0.00750*** -0.00202
(-0.57) (-8.21) (-9.19) (3.59) (-0.74)
URBAN_THIN -0.0121*** -0.00726*** -0.00555 -0.000166 -0.0132***
(-6.55) (-8.59) (-1.38) (-0.10) (-4.53)
NATIONAL_FOREIG. -0.0151*** -0.0187*** 0.0197*** -0.0154*** 0.0437***
(-4.87) (-10.9) (4.14) (-4.65) (8.70)
TENURE 0.00315*** 0.00113*** -0.00355*** 0.00281*** -0.00165***
(12.0) (7.84) (-13.0) (12.5) (-3.90)
TENURESQ -0.0000489*** -0.0000143*** 0.0000734*** -0.0000447*** 0.0000442***
(-6.82) (-3.47) (9.36) (-7.57) (3.44)
HWUSUAL -0.000112 -0.000634*** -0.00188*** -0.00552*** -0.00152***
(-1.32) (-13.0) (-13.6) (-44.4) (-10.7)
PARTTIME 0.0221*** 0.0182*** 0.00475* -0.0408*** 0.0333***
(9.64) (13.0) (1.92) (-18.9) (8.12)
TEMPORARY 0.0852*** 0.0209*** 0.0261*** 0.00979*** 0.0340***
(32.6) (17.4) (10.1) (4.69) (7.03)
LOOKOJ -0.00710** 0.00316** 0.00533* 0.0122*** 0.0224***
(-2.47) (2.22) (1.91) (5.03) (5.11)
HOMEWRK_USUAL. 0.00605** 0.0587*** -0.0208*** 0.0291*** 0.0116
(2.42) (14.2) (-3.29) (5.29) (1.16)
HOMEWRK_SOMET. 0.0226*** 0.0270*** 0.0469*** 0.0922***
(8.35) (6.10) (15.8) (30.1)
ISCO_0 0.0656*** 0.0578*** 0.189*** 0.108*** 0.242***
(8.56) (12.0) (17.0) (8.01) (12.1)
ISCO_1 0.117*** 0.119*** 0.116*** 0.114*** 0.0777***
(19.7) (24.0) (23.9) (23.0) (14.9)129
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(7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
Country: France Italy Netherlands Sweden United Kingdom
ISCO_2 0.115*** 0.0937*** 0.141*** 0.105*** 0.139***
(23.6) (28.4) (32.0) (27.6) (24.7)
ISCO_3 0.0991*** 0.0727*** 0.126*** 0.0839*** 0.145***
(25.1) (32.2) (30.8) (24.2) (27.2)
ISCO_4 0.0595*** 0.0376*** 0.0671*** 0.0458*** 0.0829***
(15.5) (17.2) (16.4) (12.6) (17.0)
ISCO_5 0.0538*** 0.0455*** 0.0659*** 0.0421*** 0.119***
(14.3) (19.9) (15.9) (13.0) (24.8)
ISCO_6 0.00443 -0.00853* 0.0234*** -0.0142** 0.0301
(0.67) (-1.75) (3.15) (-2.05) (1.64)
ISCO_7 0.0305*** -0.0112*** 0.0418*** -0.0108*** 0.0418***
(8.02) (-6.71) (9.89) (-3.01) (6.87)
ISCO_8 0.0197*** -0.00966*** 0.0150*** -0.0258*** 0.000741
(5.25) (-5.25) (3.41) (-7.65) (0.12)
QUARTER_2 0.00176 -0.000286 -0.00300 -0.0413*** -0.0377***
(0.90) (-0.32) (-1.45) (-22.1) (-13.7)
QUARTER_3 -0.0364*** -0.0239*** -0.0474*** -0.109***
(-21.0) (-29.0) (-24.5) (-65.1)
QUARTER_4 0.00862*** 0.00483*** 0.00148 -0.00519***
(4.31) (5.28) (0.71) (-2.75)
YEAR_2006 -0.000222 -0.00136* -0.0169*** -0.00300* 0.0592***
(-0.087) (-1.71) (-6.69) (-1.93) (17.8)
YEAR_2005 -0.00743*** -0.00347*** -0.000127 -0.000399 0.0641***
(-3.78) (-4.37) (-0.062) (-0.23) (18.3)
YEAR_2004 -0.00637** 0.00802*** 0.188*** 0.133***
(-2.46) (2.74) (57.9) (36.4)
YEAR_2003 -0.0105*** 0.0143*** 0.168*** 0.00820**
(-4.12) (4.68) (52.9) (2.47)
Observations’ number 231346 529218 352370 418708 173585
PseudoR2 0.119 0.114 0.083 0.096 0.106
t statistics in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1131
CHAPTER 5 
ICT, regulation and productivity
5.1.  Introduction
Since the mid-1990s considerable attention has focused 
on the productivity effects associated with the adop-
tion of Information and Communications Technologies 
(ICT). During a period in which US productivity growth 
exceeded that of most European countries, the impact 
of assets incorporating the latest technologies, such as 
ICTs, has proved to be significant in explaining these dif-
ferences (O’Mahony and van Ark 2003)105.
A number of possible drivers have been put forward to 
explain the constraints the EU faces compared with the 
US, which are preventing large-scale exploitation of ICT 
technology or, for example, the lack of complementary 
assets such as suitable skills (O’Mahony et al, 2008) and 
appropriate management systems (Basu et al. 2003). Oth-
ers identify the slower pace of adjustment to a new indus-
trial structure as a key driver in the disparity between the 
US and EU, highlighting the inhibitive institutional and 
regulatory environment as the chief cause in preventing 
a reallocation of productive resources (van Ark 2006). 
Regulation can have both positive and negative effects 
on productivity (BERR, 2008). For example, regulation can 
have a positive effect on productivity and economic wel-
fare by supporting competitive markets and protecting 
intellectual property or by correcting for some forms of 
market failure. However, the extent to which productivity 
gains for individual firms translate into aggregate produc-
tivity gains is regarded as depending largely on features 
such as the degree of competition in an economy (BERR, 
2008). Regulations can distort firm and market behaviour, 
and they do not always result in a more efficient or desir-
able allocation of resources. While recognising the essen-
tial role that certain types of regulation can have on the 
105  For a summary of main results, see recent i2010 Benchmarking Reports at and 
the economic note respectively:
http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/eeurope/i2010/key_documents/index_
en.htm
http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/eeurope/i2010/docs/high_level_group/
note_on_economic_impact_of_ict.pdf
functioning of markets, this study focuses on the detri-
mental impact that anti-competitive regulation can have 
on ICT investment and productivity growth.
The negative impacts of regulation can be direct or   indirect 
(Crafts 2006). Direct negative effects are associated with 
resources being diverted away from the creation of pro-
ductive output. In relation to these effects, the aim of 
administrative reforms is to “eliminate those no longer 
needed, streamline and simplify those that are needed and 
improve the transparency of the application” (1997 OECD 
Regulatory Reform). Indirect effects involve regulations 
that create entry barriers, impose rigidities in the labour 
market and affect wider incentives to innovate or accu-
mulate human capital. 
The 1997 OECD Regulatory Reform Report stresses the 
need to undertake economic reforms aimed to “increase 
economic efficiency by reducing barriers to competition 
and innovation, often through de-regulation and use of 
efficiency-promoting regulation and by improving regu-
latory frameworks for market functioning and prudential 
oversight”. Economic reforms have been central to the 
European Union’s Single Market Programme, as it was 
thought that economic gains would result from intensi-
fication of competition in markets, lowering of trade bar-
riers, and economies of scale brought about by expan-
sion of the market (Nicodeme and Sauner-Leroy 2007). 
More recently, economic reforms have been central to 
the Lisbon Strategy launched in 2000, where one of the 
aims is to use product market reforms to increase pro-
ductivity in the EU. 
The purpose of the study
The purpose of this study is twofold: firstly, to explore 
the extent to which restrictions imposed by regulations 
of both product and labour markets have affected the 
uptake of ICT investments and, secondly, to investigate 
whether excessive regulation may also have hindered the 
effective conversion of these investments into productiv-
ity gains. The aim of this study is to provide a comprehen-132
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sive account of how ICT affects productivity and the role 
that regulation characteristics may play in this process. 
The analyses in this chapter will draw attention to both 
product and labour market regulations, acknowledging 
the importance of promoting competitiveness in both 
product and factor markets. The Lisbon Agenda empha-
sises the importance of freeing labour and product mar-
kets from uncompetitive restrictions, in order to increase 
employment and productivity growth in the European 
Union and to sustain long-term growth. 
Additionally, this chapter contains analyses of how 
regulation can affect investment and productivity in 
particular industries. Many European countries have 
seen little improvement in productivity performance 
in recent years, despite the new opportunities offered 
by globalisation and new technologies – especially the 
information and communication technologies (ICT). The 
analyses of the impact of anti-competitive regulation in 
several industries will shed further light on the question 
of why Europe has not been able to reap the benefits of 
developments in ICT technologies to the same extent as 
the US. These analyses aim to contribute to the under-
standing of the factors affecting multifactor productivity 
growth in the long run, which is an issue that continues 
to challenge academics and policy makers. It is essential 
to increase understanding of whether barriers to compe-
tition significantly affect the adoption and dissemination 
of ICT technologies, which have been regarded as one of 
the motors of economic growth over the last decade.
5.2.  Literature review
5.2.1.  Theoretical background
In neoclassical theory, firms are seen as profit maximiz-
ing agents that make their input and output decisions in 
response to price signals under the assumptions of per-
fectly competitive markets and constant returns to scale. 
Technological progress is exogenous in these kinds of 
models. Within this framework, the argument in favour of 
policy interventions is to correct for some types of market 
failure, externalities, spillovers or public goods that pre-
vent an efficient allocation of resources, such as barriers 
to entry in natural monopolies or screening procedures 
for start-ups. However, in practice, distortions in the way 
markets are regulated can result in inefficiencies, such as 
an excessive administrative burden for start-ups. 
The literature highlights three channels by which 
reforms that improve the functioning of the markets can 
affect productivity, both directly and indirectly: through 
impacting on allocative efficiency, productive efficiency 
and dynamic efficiency (Nicodeme and Sauner-Leroy 
(2007); Griffith and Harrison (2004)).
Allocative efficiency arises from reallocation of resources 
between surviving firms and through the entry and 
exit of firms. Certain product market regulations may 
reduce the number of firms and provide firms with 
market power, or they may introduce barriers to entre-
preneurship, making it difficult to set up new firms and 
create new jobs. These types of regulations often take 
the form of screening procedures and affect small and 
medium-sized enterprises, especially those which have 
been identified as key drivers of competition, growth 
and job creation. Regulations which limit entry may also 
have a negative impact on the adoption of existing tech-
nologies by reducing competitive pressures, technology 
spillovers or the entry of new highly innovative firms.
Productive efficiency is related to improvements in the 
utilisation of factors of production by firms. This type 
of efficiency is related to reallocation of resources and 
the introduction of new or better production processes 
within the firm, such as organisational change. Related 
to this type of efficiency is the principal-agent literature 
with asymmetric information, according to which com-
petitive firms have incentives to reduce slack in man-
agers and workers. Despite the fact that the impact of 
managerial slack is difficult to evaluate empirically, there 
is some evidence to indicate that the productivity of 
individual firms is higher in more competitive environ-
ments (Nickell, 1996). 
Dynamic efficiency refers to the incentives to innovate, 
which is a crucial determinant of competitiveness and 
long-run growth. The idea that an increase in compe-
tition is positively related to innovation challenges 
Schumpeterian models that suggest a positive associa-
tion between innovation and market power. In reality, 
the effects of product market competition on innovation 
can be diverse, depending on factors such as the tech-
nological characteristics of the industries, or the distance 
of a country from the technological frontier. Recently, 
the idea that the relationship between intensity of com-
petition and innovation may be non-linear has been 
favoured (Aghion et al. 2005). 
According to Aghion et al. (2005), in sectors where lev-
els of competition are low, pre-innovation rents can be 
reduced by competition, thereby encouraging innova-
tive investments to “escape competition”. However, in 
sectors with high levels of competition, product market 
competition will mainly affect post-innovation rents, and 
therefore an increase in competition is likely to discour-
age innovation. In reality, many innovations are made 
by firms with dominant market positions, as they have 
stronger incentives to invest in the latest technologies. 
For example, in an analysis of British manufacturing firms, 
Blundell et al. (1999) found that a monopolist’s large size 
resulted in higher levels of investment in research and 
development. Although different theoretical models 
identify different incentives to innovate associated with 133
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an increase in competition, at an empirical level there is 
a consensus that, at least in the long run, some degree of 
product market competition is beneficial for innovation. 
One of the channels by which regulation can affect pro-
ductivity indirectly is capital investment. Regulations 
influence the costs that existing firms face when expand-
ing their capital stock, and may divert resources from 
productive uses such as capital accumulation. However, 
de-regulation initiatives, such as privatisation of public 
enterprises which may have been heavy investors, may 
reduce overall investment. In principle, the effects that 
regulatory reform in product markets can have on over-
all capital formation are uncertain. Theoretical models, 
however, offer no clear explanation of how institutional 
and policy settings may be affecting the adoption and 
dissemination of ICT in particular. The decision to invest 
in innovative activities can be heavily influenced by the 
environment in which they operate, where uncertainty 
may be a determining factor (BERR, 2008). 
Bartelsman et al. (2004) argue that barriers to the real-
location of capital and labour inputs may have a signifi-
cantly negative impact on the successful adoption and 
dissemination of innovative technologies like ICT. 
Labour market institutions may affect the incentives 
of an economy to invest, mainly via firing and hiring 
rules and the industrial relations regime (Bassanini and 
Ernst, 2002). In theory, the effects that regulations in the 
labour market have on incentives to invest in productiv-
ity-enhancing innovative activities are ambiguous, and 
most of the empirical evidence is inconclusive. 
Theory also formulates a hypothesis regarding the com-
plementarity of product and market regulations. Inef-
ficient product market regulations can generate eco-
nomic rents that also contribute to additional labour 
market rigidities (Nicoletti et al, 2000). In countries 
where product markets are highly regulated, workers 
tend to be highly protected, but the ability of workers to 
appropriate rents from firms is thought to depend on a 
number of other institutional factors, such as the degree 
of unionisation and the level of collective wage bargain-
ing. Minimum wages and generosity of unemployment 
insurance can play a role through their impact on wage 
structure and workers’ bargaining power (Acemoglu and 
Shimmer, 1999). Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003) demon-
strate that product market deregulation, by decreasing 
total rents, reduces the incentives for workers to appro-
priate a proportion of these rents and is likely to facili-
tate labour market deregulation.
Given the existence of trade-offs between static and 
dynamic efficiency, as well as the wide heterogene-
ity in the array of regulatory interventions, evidence of 
economic outcomes is quite disparate in the literature, 
usually highlighting a number of ambiguities in the 
magnitude and direction of the effects. The next section 
reviews empirical findings on these issues.
5.2.2.  Empirical evidence
This section contains a review of relevant studies which 
have analysed the relationship between the stringency 
of regulation and productivity and ICT investments. The 
review focuses on studies which have analysed the influ-
ence that deregulation in product markets can have in 
fostering investment and productivity growth. In par-
ticular, cross-country empirical research conducted with 
policy indicators developed by the OECD are of interest. 
Additionally, existing evidence on the microeconomic 
impacts of labour market institutions and regulations 
will be reviewed.
With regard to productivity performance, Nicoletti and 
Scarpetta (2003) find evidence of a negative relation-
ship between total factor productivity growth and three 
economy-wide measures of regulation, with the highest 
correlation for the indicators of administrative burdens, 
which represent a uniform barrier to entry for business 
in most industries. They also find evidence that regula-
tory reform in terms of privatisation and entry liberalisa-
tion in certain services sector have had a positive influ-
ence on total factor productivity growth for a number of 
OECD countries. More recently, Inklaar et al. (2008) have 
found that liberalisation of entry in markets has been 
beneficial for productivity growth in telecommunica-
tions, but not in other services industries. 
With regard to investment, Griffith and Harrison (2004) 
conclude that regulatory reform which stimulates com-
petition in a market is likely to increase factor demand. 
However, this is only observed for the services sectors. 
On industry-specific regulations, Alesina et al. (2005) find 
evidence that liberalisation, particularly on barriers to 
entry, is likely to spur investment in network industries. 
Other papers have investigated the effects of regulation 
on FDI (Nicoletti et al. 2003) and the presence of foreign 
affiliates (Conway et al. 2006).
Using firm-level data for the Czech Republic, Arnold et 
al. (2007) find links for improved productivity in manu-
facturing sectors from non-manufacturing regulatory 
reform, particularly with regard to reforms of trade 
regulations. Loayza et al. (2004) stress the importance of 
considering the time dimension in any analysis, showing 
that both product market and trade reforms have signifi-
cant positive effects on growth, even though these may 
take some time to materialise. 
Most empirical research so far has looked at the impact 
of regulation on productivity growth, on investment or 
innovation outcomes, but has focused less on the links 
between regulation, ICT investments and productivity. 134
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Gust and Marquez (2004) argue that IT expenditures may 
be an important factor in explaining cross-country differ-
ences in productivity growth in the 1990s. They suggest 
that regulatory barriers, particularly employment pro-
tection legislation and several administrative burdens 
on businesses, have hindered the adoption of ICT out-
side the US. Focusing on the comparison between the 
US and the UK, they point out that lower competitive 
pressures in the UK may have lowered incentives to cut 
costs through ICT or any other kind of investment.
Nicoletti and Scarpetta (2003) provide additional evi-
dence to suggest that countries and industries experi-
encing slow changes to their regulatory environment are 
suffering from technology gaps in their ICT industries in 
particular. Recently, Arnold et al. (2008) have argued that 
the differences in the timing of the technological boom 
in ICT technologies and the regulatory reform process in 
Europe were key factors in hindering the effective accu-
mulation of ICT capital, in particular in services industries, 
where deregulation has been much slower to take place. 
Moreover, other studies show that the detrimental effect 
of anti-competitive regulation on productivity during the 
1990s was especially large in those sectors producing or 
using ICT intensively (Conway et al. 2006). This is attributed 
to the fact that regulatory barriers for diffusion tend to be 
higher in these sectors than in the rest of the economy. 
When there are rapid improvements in productivity, the 
positive effects of pro-competition regulations are ampli-
fied, which increases the dispersion of productivity levels 
across countries with different regulatory regimes. Gains 
from market reform should therefore be higher in ICT-
intensive sectors, where product market reform is found 
to have a direct impact on labour productivity growth.
The impact of employment protection legislation has 
been investigated recently by Bassanini et al. (2009), 
using aggregate data on the stringency of the dismissal 
regulations and industry data on productivity. Their find-
ings indicate that mandatory dismissal regulations have 
a detrimental effect on productivity in those industries 
where layoff restrictions are more likely to be binding.
In summary, there is a wealth of evidence in the litera-
ture that regulatory reform is likely to improve compe-
tition and productivity at the market level, as well as 
innovation and investment at the firm level. These are 
the main channels through which productivity is likely 
to be affected by regulation. One should bear in mind 
that regulation is multifaceted and affects different sec-
tors differently. It is also important to consider the start-
ing point in terms of the level of regulation in any given 
country or industry, since this appears to be an impor-
tant determinant in terms of the effect that reforms are 
likely to have. As Alesina et al. (2005) point out, “small 
changes in a heavy regulated environment are not likely to 
produce much of an effect” (p. 792). The lack of time series 
data on regulation has traditionally been highlighted in 
the literature as a limitation. The increasing availability 
of such data in conjunction with harmonised data on 
output and inputs provided by EU KLEMS makes it pos-
sible to undertake the type of analysis that follows. 
5.3.  Regulations and ICT investments
The empirical analysis begins by considering the effect 
that the various dimensions of product and labour mar-
ket regulations can have on aggregate capital formation, 
focusing on the ICT investment of the aggregate econo-
mies. This analysis is complemented by industry-level 
data in order to further investigate the potential harmful 
effect of anti-competitive regulation on ICT investments.
The importance of ICT for economic growth has been 
highlighted in the literature. Work carried out at the 
OECD suggests that investments in ICTs are positively 
correlated with uptake and dissemination of innovation. 
In particular, the use of ICT is closely linked to the ability 
of firms to innovate (OECD, 2004).
5.3.1.  Impact of regulations on aggregate investments 
As reviewed in the previous section, regulation is a broad 
concept and encompasses many dimensions in which 
citizens and businesses operate. Most of the empirical 
analyses of regulation and performance focus either on 
specific industries where regulation is heaviest or on 
firm-level studies. Investigation of the effects for overall 
economies has been generally overlooked (OECD, 1997), 
and the influence of different types of regulations is typi-
cally limited by a lack of data.
This section examines the influences that several features 
of the product and labour markets have on ICT invest-
ment performance at national level. It provides an insight 
into how individual regulations may promote or restrict 
resources spent on innovative technologies, and makes it 
possible to assess whether a high degree of State control 
of business enterprises is good or bad for investment, as 
well as establishing the extent to which legal and admin-
istrative burdens and barriers to international trade and 
investments are deterring capital formation. 
The EU KLEMS Productivity Accounts database for the 
years 1990-2005 is used for this purpose106 107. This data-
106  In the empirical exercise it has been assumed that the value taken by the 
OECD indicators in 1998 applies also to the period 1990-2000, and that the value 
taken by the indicator in 2003 applies to the period 2000-2005; this approximation 
enables the regulation to be matched with economic data, which is available on an 
annual basis. A similar approach has been used previously in the empirical litera-
ture (Nicoletti and Scarpetta, 2003). Whilst a new release of data has been recently 
published by the OECD for the year 2008, this cannot be fully incorporated into the 
model due to the lack of EU KLEMS data for the same years.
107  http://www.EU KLEMS.net.135
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base contains harmonised data on output, inputs and 
productivity for European countries and the US. It is 
supplemented by the OECD Product Market Regulation 
indicators database for the years 1998 and 2003, and by 
the OECD-CEP database on labour institutions for the 
period 1960-2004.
The OECD Product Market Regulation Indicators (OECD 
PMR)108, which embrace the whole economy, are cardi-
nal measures that increase in relation to the degree of 
restriction they impose on market mechanisms. Most 
of these restrictions relate to barriers to market access, 
which are inherently anti-competitive, and to govern-
ment interference with market mechanisms in areas 
such as price controls. 
The OECD PMR indicators are available for OECD coun-
tries for the years 1998, 2003 and 2008, and cover an 
extensive range of regulatory areas within both the eco-
nomic and administrative environments. At the most dis-
aggregated level, 16 detailed indicators of regulation are 
provided (Low-Level Indicators), which are further classi-
fied into three broad regulatory domains: State control 
over business enterprise; Barriers to entrepreneurship; 
and Barriers to trade and investment (Medium-Level 
Indicators). At the top level, the indicators summarise 
the degree of strictness of the overall regulatory envi-
ronment (High-Level Indicators). The aggregate meas-
ures of regulation are likely to impose strong restrictions 
on the way individual regulations can affect productivity 
growth. Therefore, this study investigates which specific 
108  See Appendix for a description of sources and descriptive statistics.
regulations have the greatest effects by using the indica-
tors at different levels of disaggregation.
The properties of the OECD PMR indicators are desirable 
for cross-country comparisons of regulatory structures 
and for analyses of the effects of differences in regula-
tion on performance. They are policy-focused and not 
based on opinion surveys or market outcomes; this 
makes them a useful tool for empirical research linking 
policy and performance109.
Additionally, the OECD-CEP labour market institutions 
(CEP LMR) dataset is used. This dataset provides relevant 
indicators in the various areas of the labour market, such 
as employment protection legislation, trade union, wage 
bargaining and minimum wage or active labour market 
policies.
Descriptive analyses
Graphic exploration of investment rates110 shows that, 
up to the mid-1990s, ICT investment rates showed con-
siderable disparities between from countries. From that 
point onwards, the ICT investment rates across coun-
tries have followed a similar trend, increasing between 
1995 and 2000, decreasing between 2000 and 2003, 
and increasing again for the period 2004-2005. Despite 
the similarities in the trend of investment over the past 
few years, there are still major differences in investment 
109  See Wolfl et al. (2009) for a more thorough description of this source.
110  Investment rates are defined as gross fixed capital formation over stocks of 
capital.
Figure 5.1:   ICT investment rates across countries, 1970-2005 
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l  evels. The countries with higher than average ICT invest-
ment rates in the period 1995-2000 – measured as gross 
ICT capital formation over stock of ICT capital – are Den-
mark, Ireland, Australia, United States, United Kingdom 
and Portugal. The countries with lower ICT investment 
rates are Spain, Austria, Italy and Germany. Of the new 
Member States in the EU, the Czech Republic shows a 
high investment rate (0.37), which is above the average 
for all countries in the reference period, while Slovenia 
has an investment rate below the average. In the sub-
period 2000-2005, ICT investment rates were generally 
lower in the EU countries and the US.
The descriptive analysis of the OECD PMR summary indi-
cators points to a general trend towards lower regulation 
(see Figure 5.2). However, it also reveals a great deal of 
variety in the extent of regulation across the countries 
covered by the study. This is true for both the initial val-
ues of the dataset in 1998 and the most recent update to 
the data in 2008, which suggests that there is more room 
for further deregulatory measures in some countries 
than in others. The countries that are the most liberal 
in terms of the functioning of their product markets are 
the United States, Australia and some European coun-
tries, such as the United Kingdom, Ireland and Denmark. 
At the other end of the scale, the countries which have 
more restrictions on their operation in the product mar-
kets include continental European countries such as Italy, 
France and Spain, and some new Member States such as 
the Czech Republic. This cross-country variation will help 
Figure 5.2:   OECD PMR, 1998, 2003 and 2008 
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us to investigate the extent to which deregulation may 
promote investment and affect performance111.
The OECD PMR indicators mask a considerable variation 
in the way countries have implemented reforms in sev-
eral dimensions of the business environment. The lev-
els of state control are lower in those countries which 
present lower restrictions in the product markets over-
all (Figure 5.3). Although there has been a general ten-
dency towards a decrease in participation by the State in 
economic activity, the level in many European countries 
remains high.
Figure 5.4 shows a high variation as regards the indica-
tors for “Administrative barriers to start-up”. EU countries 
such as Ireland, Denmark and the United Kingdom show 
lower levels of administrative burdens for start-ups than 
does the United States. At the other end of the scale, the 
countries with the highest levels include Czech Republic, 
Austria, Spain and Italy, with the last two having reduced 
the level of regulatory burden dramatically during the 
period under review. 
A third important aspect of the product markets is for-
ward-oriented, and refers to the extent to which barriers 
to trade and investment with other countries represent 
significant restrictions to economic activity. Figure 5.5 
shows that the lowest barriers are found in countries 
such as the United Kingdom, Ireland, Denmark and Swe-
den. Compared to these, the barriers to trade and invest-
111  The term “performance” refers to how a country, industry or firm fares with 
regard to different economic outcomes.137
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Figure 5.4:   OECD PMR, Administrative barriers on start-ups, 1999, 2003 and 2008 
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Figure 5.3:   OECD PMR, Degree of State control, 1999, 2003 and 2008 
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ment are found to be higher in the US. Although barriers 
to trade and investment remain higher in the bigger EU 
countries such as Germany, France and Italy, restrictions 
have been significantly reduced during the period from 
1998 to 2008. 
As regards job protection, the level of Employment 
Protection Legislation (EPL) is a proxy for rigidity of the 
labour markets. The US is undoubtedly the country with 
the lowest level of EPL, and the UK and Ireland are the 
two European countries that rank closest to it. The coun-
tries with the strictest job protection are Portugal, Spain, 
France and Germany (cf. figure 5.6). 138
European Competitiveness Report 2009
Figure 5.5:   OECD PMR, barriers to trade and investment,1999, 2003 and 2008
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Source: OECD International Regulation Database.
Figure 5.6:   OECD Indicators of Product Market Regulation, employment protection legislation, 1999, 
2003 and 2008 
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Source: OECD International Regulation Database.
Figure 5.7 below reveals the existence of a negative cor-
relation between ICT investment rates112 and the degree 
of product market regulation at the economy level. A 
similarly negative relationship is observed between ICT 
investment rates and the degrees of employment pro-
tection legislation, as one would expect given the high 
existing correlation between the degree of product mar-
112  Defined as gross fixed capital formation in constant terms divided by real 
capital stocks.
ket regulation and the level of employment legislation 
(Figures 5.8 and 5.9). These graphs show that, in gen-
eral, those countries with a more restrictive product and 
labour market regulation spend less of their resources 
on ICT investment. In the next section, an econometric 
analysis is undertaken in order to investigate whether 
the divergent ICT investment rates can be explained by 
the regulatory restrictions. The analysis also addresses 
the causality of the relationship, as well as the possible 
influence of other factors. 139
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Figure 5.8:   Scatter Plot of EPL and ICT Investment Rate (Sources: EU KLEMS and OECD) 
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Note: Spearman rank correlation = -0.49 (P-value = 0.01).
Figure 5.7:   Scatter Plot of PMR and ICT Investment Rate (Sources: EU KLEMS and OECD)
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Figure 5.9:   Scatter Plot of Product Market Regulation (OECD) and Employment Protection Legislation 
(CEP-OECD) for 1998 and 2003 
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Methodology
The assessment of how regulatory environment can 
shape capital formation is based on a general model of 
investment by Hasset and Hubbard (1997), where the 
outcome variable is the gross fixed capital formation of a 
particular asset, scaled by its stock of capital. The follow-
ing equation is employed to estimate the influence that 
the level of regulation can have on investment in asset a 
in country i in time t. A lagged dependent is introduced 
to take account of dynamics of the investment process, 
as in Alesina et al. (2005). 
GFCF
K
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ 
it
a
=
GFCF
K
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ 
it−1
a
+ REGit + Zit + uit  (1)
Equation (1) is estimated separately for ICT assets and 
non-ICT assets as in Oliner and Sichel (2000). Note that, 
in the above equation, GFCF represents gross fixed capi-
tal formation in constant terms, K represents real capital 
stock113,  REG  is a vector of regulatory variables, OECD 
PMR or CEP LMR, Z is a vector of control variables and u  
represents the standard error term. 
The vector  Z consists of a set of country-specific, time-
varying control variables that can affect country-level 
investment. This includes the ratio of the deflator for 
asset k  relative to the value added deflators. Despite 
the predictions of the neoclassical model that firms use 
prices as signals for their investment decisions, there is 
113  In the EU KLEMS database it is assumed that all investment in year t takes 
place at the beginning of the year and that the stock of capital in year t corre-
sponds to the stock available at the end of the prior period or t-1. 
not much evidence that investment can be explained by 
the cost of capital. 
The inclusion of the price of ICT assets as a control vari-
able is appropriate here, given that the ICT investment 
boom in the second half of the 1990s was linked to the 
sharp fall in the relative price of computers.114 Although 
the user cost of capital consists of a price component 
and a non-price component, the downward trend has 
been mainly related to the fall in prices of ICT capital 
goods (Bakhshi et al. 2003). A measure of the profitability 
of capital is also included in order to gauge the possibil-
ity that investment may react to changes in the desired 
capital stock, which can be determined by demand/out-
put conditions. All control variables are available within 
the EU KLEMS database for the total economy.
Econometric results 
This section presents the econometric results of evalu-
ating the impact of product and labour market regula-
tions on country-level investment rates. Equation (1) is 
estimated for the period 1990-2005, including a variety 
of indicators. An OLS estimation technique115 with time 
dummies to control for common macroeconomic effects 
114  EU KLEMS take account of rapidly falling prices in their capital input calcula-
tions by using constant-quality price indices for each asset type, which is particu-
larly important for those assets that are subject to rapid technological change and 
improvements in quality, such as IT assets.
115  Ordinary least squares (OLS) is a technique for estimating the unknown 
parameters in a linear regression model. The OLS method minimises the sum of 
squared distances between the observed responses in a set of data, and the fitted 
responses from the regression model. 141
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is employed116. Country dummies are not included in the 
specification since the identification strategy used here 
relies mainly on cross-country variation in the levels of 
regulation117.
The main drawback with the use of OECD PMR indicators 
is the lack of time-series data on regulatory conditions at 
country level, which makes it difficult to establish cau-
sality between regulation and investment. Caution is 
therefore advised as other country-specific unobserv-
able characteristics which are correlated with the restric-
tiveness of the regulatory environment may influence 
the investment decisions of firms. Despite this draw-
back, the association between regulation indicators and 
investment performance will offer an invaluable insight 
into how different cross-country patterns of regulation 
may be relevant in explaining differences in ICT invest-
ment outcomes. Some additional tests that evaluate the 
robustness of the results are also presented. 
116  Given that the efficiency of the standard OLS estimation relies on the homo-
skedasticity (or constant variance) of the residuals, standard errors are adjusted to 
allow for within-country and within-industry correlation.
117  An ANOVA analysis shows that country effects absorb more than half of the 
variation in the investment rates. 
The role of product market regulations
OECD High and Medium Level Indicators of Product Market 
regulation 
The results of estimating equation (1) using the High 
and Medium level indicators of regulation are shown in 
Table 5.1. The High Level indicator comprises the overall 
degree of product market regulation in an economy, col-
umn 1, as well the degree of restrictions in the economic 
and administrative, column 2, and in the inward and out-
ward-oriented policy areas, column 3. Robust standard 
errors are shown in brackets118. The coefficient of the lagged 
dependent variable is displayed in row 1 of Table 5.1. 
The results show a negative and significant effect for the 
aggregate indicator of product market regulation on ICT 
investments (column 1). The coefficient of the adminis-
trative regulation indicator is negative and significant, 
while the coefficient of economic regulation is not signif-
icantly different from zero (column 2). It can also be seen 
that inward-oriented policies have an adverse impact on 
118  The statistical significance of the coefficients is indicated by a series of stars, 
with “*” indicating that the results are significant at the 10 per cent level, “**” at the 
5 per cent level, and “***” at the 1 per cent level.
Table 5.1:   Impact of product market regulation on ICT investment at the economy-wide level plus control 
variables 1990-2005, OECD economy-wide indicators (Medium- and High-Level Indicators)
Dependent variable: log 
(GFCF ICT/Capital stock ICT)
High Level Product 
Market regulation. 
Economic and 
Administrative 
Inward and Outward 
policies
Medium Level 
Indicators
Laged dependent variable 0.828*** 0.778*** 0.814*** 0.804***
(0.0415) (0.0423) (0.0412) (0.0414)
Product market regulation -0.0357**
(0.0144)
Administrative regulation -0.0364***
(0.0101)
Economic regulation -0.00266
(0.0112)
Inward-oriented policies -0.0447***
(0.0121)
Outward-oriented policies 0.0198
(0.0170)
State control -0.0128
(0.00832)
Barriers to entrepreneurship -0.0385***
(0.0142)
Barriers to trade and investment 0.0198
(0.0150)
Gross Operating Surplus/ICT capital 0.00551 9.57e-06 0.0121 0.00542
(0.0183) (0.0182) (0.0187) (0.0184)
ICT deflator/VA deflator -0.0475** -0.0612*** -0.0508** -0.0526**
(0.0206) (0.0206) (0.0206) (0.0206)
Observations 206 206 206 206
R-squared 0.906 0.911 0.906 0.910
Year dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 142
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ICT investment (column 3), while the coefficient on the 
outward policies indicators is not significantly different 
from zero. 
The Medium-Level Indicators represent the extent to 
which “Barriers to entrepreneurship”, “State control” and 
“Barriers to trade and investment” have an influence on 
the adoption of ICT by an economy. The coefficient of 
the “Barriers to entrepreneurship” indicator is the only 
coefficient which has a negative sign at conventional 
levels of significance. 
With regard to the coefficients of the control variables, 
prices of the ICT assets have a significant negative 
impact on investment, while the measure of profitabil-
ity, namely gross operating surplus119 over capital, does 
not appear to have a significant impact on this type of 
capital formation. Equation (1) was estimated both with 
and without the set of control variables. The inclusion 
of other potential determinants of investment did not 
alter the finding that the degree of regulation, particu-
larly of an administrative nature, has a significant nega-
tive impact on ICT capital accumulation. 
OECD Low Level Indicators of Product Market Regulation 
Indicators 
Next, the results for the ICT investment equation (1) 
with the OECD Low-Level Indicators are presented, see 
table 5.2. The results presented in table 5.1 showed 
that restrictions of an administrative nature are likely to 
adversely affect the adoption of ICTs for aggregate econ-
omies. However, the question is whether it is possible to 
identify which areas of the administrative environment 
can have the most deterrent effect when decisions are 
being taken to invest in new technologies such as ICTs. 
The availability of detailed regulatory indicators makes it 
possible to distinguish between the specific regulatory 
areas that are driving the results. 
The results in table 5.2 indicate that “Administrative 
burdens to start-ups” have a significant negative influ-
ence on ICT investment – see column 1 – which is also 
the case for the “Licences and permits system”. Within 
the areas of “Administrative burdens to start-ups”, the 
indicator for “Administrative burdens for sole proprie-
tor firms”, column 2, has a major negative influence on 
ICT, as does “Sector-specific administrative burdens”, 
column 3, although to a lesser extent than the former. 
On the other hand, the “Administrative burdens for cor-
porations”, column 4 indicator, does not seem to have a 
significant negative impact on this type of investment. 
The results in table 5.2 also show that neither the degree 
of state control, nor the size or scope of the public 
119  Gross operating surplus is defined as value added at basic prices minus com-
pensation of employees minus taxes net of subsidies. 
enterpris  e sector or the degree of direct control over 
business enterprise has a significant influence on the 
aggregate ICT investment of the economies. 
Instead, it is observed that “Antitrust exemptions” have 
a significant positive impact on ICT investment, while 
“Barriers to trade and investment” have no significant 
influence. 
Table A.2 in the appendix shows the set of results for 
non-ICT investment. While this is not the prime objec-
tive of this analysis, it does present an interesting com-
parison with respect to the investment behaviour of ICT 
assets. 
The group of non-ICT assets conceals a highly hetero-
geneous situation, including a diversity of assets such 
as machinery and other equipment and residential con-
structions. The coefficient of the lagged dependent vari-
ables is higher than in the case of ICT investment. This 
reflects the lower depreciation rates of non-ICT assets, 
which make the investment rate, as it has been defined, 
more persistent120. In other words, non-ICT investment is 
explained by investment in previous periods to a larger 
extent than ICT assets, consistent with a priori expecta-
tions. 
Table A.3 and A.4 provide further detail on the effect of 
product market regulation and detailed asset level121. 
Robustness Analysis 
In this section, an additional check is conducted to 
assess the robustness of the relationship between the 
strictness of the regulatory settings and ICT investment.
The robustness test that is carried out relies on the 
use of an aggregate indicator of regulatory conditions 
in seven non-manufacturing sectors, known as OECD 
ETCR indicators.122 This indicator was used to interpolate 
economy-wide regulation information described in the 
previous section, OECD PMR, which is available for the 
years 1998, 2003 and 2008, to the period 1990-2005. 
An interpolation technique known as the Kalman filter 
120  The investment rate is defined as  I/K ; capital stocks are constructed fol-
lowing the PIM method as  Kt = Kt−1(1−δ)+ It , therefore a higher depreciation 
rate, ceteris paribus, would encompass more persistence in the investment rate. 
121  Results in table A.3 and A.4 show that product market regulation has a nega-
tive and significant effect upon investment in IT, Software and Other Machinery 
and Equipment, while the effects on other assets are not significant. Looking spe-
cifically at IT, it appears that the effects of regulation are being driven by inward, 
economic regulation. Using more disaggregated indicators, the only significant 
variable is “Barriers to entrepreneurship”, which falls within the grouping of admin-
istrative regulation. With regards to Software, both economic and administrative 
regulation have important parts in restricting investment, with “Barriers to entre-
preneurship” as well as “State control” driving the results. Finally, a look at “Other 
Machinery” reveals “State control” again as the main barrier to investment. The 
indicator for “State control” has a significant and negative effect upon transport 
equipment, while “Barriers to entrepreneurship” has an effect upon investment in 
residential structure. 
122  The OECD ECTR data is not available for New Member States. See Conway et 
al. (2006) for information on this data source.143
Chapter 5 — ICT, regulation and productivity
Table 5.2:   Impact of product market regulation on ICT investment at the economy-wide level, 1990-2005, 
OECD economy-wide level (Low-Level indicators)
Dependent variable: log 
(GFCF ICT/Capital stock ICT)
Aggregate Barriers 
to entrepreneuship
Administrative 
burden for sole 
proprietors
Sector specific 
burdens
Administrative 
burden for 
corporations
Lagged dependent variable 0.794*** 0.729*** 0.791*** 0.835***
(0.0439) (0.0536) (0.0424) (0.0404)
Size of public enterprise sector 0.00481 0.000674 0.00618 0.00408
(0.00576) (0.00556) (0.00577) (0.00589)
Scope of public enterprise sector -0.00865 -0.00567 -0.0112 -0.0123
(0.00858) (0.00851) (0.00841) (0.00879)
Direct control  
over business enterprise
0.00216 0.00163 0.00180 6.02e-05
(0.00345) (0.00312) (0.00334) (0.00378)
Price controls 0.00151 -0.00257 0.00137 -0.00255
(0.00802) (0.00741) (0.00782) (0.00873)
Use of command  
& control regulation
-0.000128 0.00120 0.000142 -0.00332
(0.00457) (0.00466) (0.00439) (0.00426)
Licence and permits system -0.00655** -0.00913*** -0.00679** -0.00522*
(0.00314) (0.00333) (0.00313) (0.00307)
Communication and simplification 
of rules and procedures
0.00351 0.0114 0.00541 0.00171
(0.00951) (0.00921) (0.00944) (0.0103)
Administrative burdens on startups -0.0215**
(0.00906)
Administrative burdens  
for sole proprietor firms
-0.0282***
(0.00861)
Sector specific  
administrative burdens
-0.0179***
(0.00647)
Administrative burdens for 
corporation
-0.00509
(0.00709)
Legal barriers -0.00754 -0.0159** -0.00861 -0.00675
(0.00684) (0.00760) (0.00693) (0.00700)
Antitrust exemptions 0.0202** 0.0191** 0.0220** 0.0186*
(0.00929) (0.00912) (0.00923) (0.00947)
Barriers to trade and investment 0.0237 0.0234 0.0230 0.0224
(0.0181) (0.0173) (0.0180) (0.0192)
Observations 221 221 221 221
R-squared 0.913 0.916 0.913 0.910
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
was used to form smoothed estimates of the aggregate 
OECD PMR indicators. Although it is not feasible to incor-
porate the latest 2008 information into the econometric 
analysis, this additional information is useful as a way of 
obtaining smoothed estimates of the product market 
regulation for the period 1990-2005. 
The ETCR summary measures provide a summary of reg-
ulatory conditions in telecoms, electricity, gas, post, rail, 
air passenger transport and road freight, on an annual 
basis, for the period 1975-2007. 
Definitions and descriptions of how these indicators are 
constructed can be found in an OECD working paper, 
Conway & Nicoletti (2006) where the purpose and scope 
of the indicators are provided: “The overarching crite-
rion on which this paper surveys and addresses regula-
tions is their effect on competition where competition is 
viable. Therefore, each of the OECD sectoral indicators 
reflects regulations that curb efficiency-enhancing com-
petition, whereas regulations in areas in which competi-
tion would not lead to efficient outcomes (e.g. natural 
monopolies) are not considered. All of these indicators 144
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are constructed from the perspective of regulations that 
create barriers to entrepreneurship and restrict competi-
tion in domestic markets where technology and demand 
conditions make competition viable. It is important to 
note from the onset that the sole objective of the indi-
cators is to quantify the degree to which regulatory set-
tings in a given sector are anti-competitive.”
The ETCR indicators are often used as a proxy for overall 
economy-wide regulation, given the high level of cor-
relation between the ETCR indicator and the indicator at 
country level, OECD PMR indicators, in the two years dur-
ing which they overlap (Conway et al. 2006). The implicit 
assumption for the validity of the smoothed estimates is 
that the trend of the overall product market regulation is 
similar to the regulation in non-manufacturing sectors. 
The introduction of the interpolated series as the alter-
native indicator of regulation, i.e. the estimation of the 
baseline equation (1), shows the significant negative 
impact of the level of product market regulation on ICT 
investment, with a coefficient of -0.0730. The coefficient 
on the non-ICT investment is insignificant, see table 5.3.
The results of estimating equation (1) with the interpo-
lated series appear to be consistent with the evidence 
presented so far, but again care has to be taken in infer-
ring causality from these results, for two reasons. Firstly, 
the slow evolution of product market regulation implies 
that identification is still likely to come mainly from vari-
ation in the cross-section dimension rather than through 
changes in regulation over time. Secondly, all interpola-
tion techniques are likely to be subject to measurement 
error. The interpolated series provide additional time 
series variation on the regulation variable and make it 
possible to check for unobservable characteristics in the 
country that affect investment decisions123. 
Complementarities between product and labour 
market regulations
The analysis in this section goes a step further by exam-
ining whether the impact of product market regulations 
on ICT adoption could depend on one feature of the 
labour market institutional arrangements – the degree 
of employment protection legislation – which is often 
used in the empirical literature as a proxy for market 
rigidity. Several studies find that product market regula-
tion appears to be linked to employment protection leg-
islation (Nicoletti, Scarpetta and Boylaud, 2000), which 
raises the question of whether policies in the two regu-
123  In order to quantify how important the country fixed effects are in determin-
ing investment, an ANOVA analysis was carried out which makes it possible to 
attribute the observed variation in ICT-intensity to factors that both change over 
time, and factors that change between countries. For ICT assets, over 50% of the 
variation in ICT intensity is accounted for by country effects and almost 25% by 
time effects. The unexplained residual accounts for 20% of the variation in the ICT 
investment rate; so there is still a significant part of the variation to be explained 
by variables that vary by country and over time (e.g. regulation). 
Table 5.3:   ICT and non-ICT investment using 
interpolated series for product market 
regulation, 1990-2005 
Dependent variable:  
GFCF ICT/ICT capital stock
ICT capital Non-ICT 
capital
Interpolated Product Market 
Regulation
-0.0730***
(0.0166)
-0.00109
(0.00266)
Gross operating surplus/ICT 
capital stock
-0.0189
(0.0340)
0.102*
(0.0524)
ICT Deflator/VA deflator -0.0956** -0.0807**
(0.0437) (0.0382)
Lagged dependent variable No No
Country dummies Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes
Observations 162 159
R-squared 0.901 0.984
latory areas are “politically complementary” (Conway 
et al. (2005)). The complementarities highlighted in the 
literature between product and labour market regula-
tions provided the inspiration for the analysis of these 
interactive effects. 
Using cluster analysis techniques, the sample of coun-
tries was divided into three groups according to the 
average level of employment protection legislation from 
the CEP-LMR dataset. The countries that are character-
ised by a low level of employment protection legislation 
include the United States, Australia, Ireland and United 
Kingdom; the countries with a medium level include 
Austria, Denmark, Finland, Netherlands, Japan and Swe-
den; and the countries with a high level of employment 
protection legislation include Italy, Germany, Portugal, 
Spain and France. The CEP-OECD institutional data set 
does not cover the new EU Member States. 
Equation (1) is now estimated subject to the inclusion 
of an additional interaction term: namely the product 
of the aggregate product market regulation indica-
tor, OECD PMR, and two dummies characterising the 
High and Medium Employment Protection Legislation 
regime.124 Additionally, results for a further breakdown 
of ICT assets, namely computers, software and commu-
nications equipment, are presented. The estimation of 
the coefficient on the interaction terms will provide an 
indication of the additional impact that product market 
regulation has on investment in countries with higher 
levels of job security. 
Results in table 5.4 below show a significant nega-
tive coefficient for the interaction term of the product 
124  The dummy for countries with Low Employment Protection Legislation is 
omitted in the estimation to avoid multicollinearity problems. 145
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Table 5.4:   Effect of general product market regulation on ICT investment according to level of 
employment protection legislation 
Dependent variable: GFCF asset/Capital stock asset IT CT Software
Prodreg*Medium EPL -0.00658* -0.00274 -0.000140
(0.00391) (0.00371) (0.00273)
Prodreg*High EPL -0.00588 -0.00286 -0.00231
(0.00360) (0.00311) (0.00219)
Ecreg*Medium EPL -0.00336 -0.00234 0.000660
(0.00314) (0.00288) (0.00225)
Ecreg*High EPL -0.00325 -0.00210 -0.00153
(0.00287) (0.00238) (0.00177)
Adreg*Medium EPL -0.00723** -0.00199 -0.00144
(0.00323) (0.00299) (0.00210)
Adreg*High EPL -0.00624** -0.00262 -0.00256
(0.00300) (0.00259) (0.00177)
Lagged dependent variable Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes
Observations 206 206 206
market regulation indicator and the dummy variable 
representing Medium EPL in the case of Information 
Technology assets. It can also be seen that the negative 
impact of product market regulation on IT investment 
arises mainly from the restrictions in the administrative 
environment. This is shown by the significant negative 
impact of such investment on the interaction between 
administrative regulation and the dummies charac-
terising both high and medium employment protec-
tion regimes. The interpretation of this finding is that 
a restrictive product market regulation is likely to have 
had a greater deterrent effect on investment in comput-
ers in countries with high employment protection legis-
lation than in countries with a low level of employment 
protection legislation. These results are consistent with 
the view that product regulation and labour market reg-
ulation are complementary.
These results are in tune with recent empirical evidence 
which finds that the benefits from deregulating one mar-
ket increase as the level of regulation in the other mar-
ket decreases (Nicoletti and Scarpetta, 2005 and Griffith, 
Harrison and McCartney 2006). Although these results 
appear promising, further research would be needed to 
understand the dynamics involved, the direction of the 
effects, and how the interactions are bound to depend 
on the role played by other variables, such as turnover 
and employment.
5.3.2.  Impact of anti-competitive regulation on 
industry ICT investments
This section addresses the issue of whether anti-com-
petitive regulation of an economic nature has had an 
impact on ICT investment performance at the indus-
try level. Competition has been highlighted as one of 
main drivers of economic growth (Aghion and Griffith, 
2005), but more research is needed in order to under-
stand the mechanisms underpinning the links between 
competition forces and several dimensions of economic 
growth.
The analysis is relevant from a policy perspective, given 
that a large proportion of the productivity gap expe-
rienced by the European countries can be attributed 
to the productivity trends in a few industries. Further 
understanding of why Europe lags behind in productiv-
ity can be of prime interest for policy makers. 
The usual way to examine the link between competition 
and economic outcomes is to relate some indicators of 
market structure, e.g. price cost margins and concentra-
tion indices to variables such as productivity, innovative 
activity, employment etc. However, this work follows 
Nicoletti and Scarpetta (2003) by assessing the relation-
ship between productivity growth and several indica-
tors that measure the restrictiveness of regulatory con-
ditions. The availability of time series basis data will be 
helpful for assessing dynamic effects on the relationship 
between regulation and productivity, such as the short-
term versus the long-term effects.
In this section we explore how anti-competitive regula-
tion has affected ICT investment in what are traditionally 
heaviest-regulated sectors of the economy (electricity, 
gas, air passenger transport, rail transport, road freight, 
postal services and telecommunications)125. For this 
purpose, the OECD ETCR indicators for the period 1975-
125  Conway & Nicoletti (2006) constructed the ETCT indicator in order to cover 
“some of the non-manufacturing industries in which anti-competitive regulation 
has traditionally been heaviest in OECD countries”.146
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2007 are used126. For this part of the analysis the newly 
released data from the GGDC-EU KLEMS have also been 
used (see Inklaar and Timmer, 2008). 
The OECD ETCR indicators measure regulation on a scale 
from 0 to 6, with 0 being the least restrictive, reflecting 
regulations that curb efficiency-enhancing competi-
tion.127 Four main areas are covered: “Public ownership” 
(prevailing ownership structure); “Barriers to entry” (e.g. 
number of competitors in markets and choice of sup-
plier for consumers); “Vertical integration” (available for 
the electricity, gas and rail industries only and refer to 
whether activities such as generation of electricity, pro-
duction of gas and supply of both to the final consumers 
are separated from natural monopoly activities, such as 
national grid or local distributions, or the assessment of 
economies of scale vs. unbundling in the transport sec-
tors); and “Market structure” (available for the gas, rail 
and communications industries only, and refers to the 
shares of the largest companies). These measures do not 
cover regulation areas in which competition does not 
yield efficient outcomes, such as natural monopolies.
In order to match the OECD ETCR regulation data to the 
EU KLEMS list of industries, the regulation indices for 
the seven sectors were aggregated into three broader 
sectors: utilities (including electricity and gas); commu-
nication (including telecommunication and post); and 
transportation (including airlines, road freight, and rail-
ways). This analysis builds on the analysis developed by 
Alesina et al. (2005), using more recently released data 
and focusing on ICT assets. 
Short-run versus long-run effects
Despite widespread regulatory reforms in recent years, 
significant differences remain across countries and 
industries in terms of their regulatory settings, as well 
as in the pace at which countries are implementing eco-
nomic reforms. In general, the levels of anti-competitive 
regulation in these sectors remain high. Given that the 
changes over time in the OECD ETCR indicators used 
here are small, and that the data show a high degree 
of country-specific variation, it is useful to distinguish 
between the impact of the level and the changes in the 
degree of regulation. 
In this section, the effect of anti-competitive regulation 
is estimated using an error correction methodology 
(ECM). This methodology offers an insight into the “lev-
els effect” (or long-run effect) and “differences” effects 
126  Conway & Nicoletti (2006), “ The sole objective of the indicators is to quantify 
the degree to which regulatory settings in a given sector are anti-competitive.” 
Conway and Nicoletti (2006) also provide a detailed explanation of sources and 
construction of the indicators see.
127  The description of the ETCT indicators follow closely Conway and Nicoletti 
(2006).
(short-run effect). The expression for the error correction 
estimation is the following128:
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In this model, the long-run effect is given by the level 
of regulation lagged by one period, γ 1(1–α) , and the 
short-run effect by the coefficient of the change in the 
regulation indicator,  β 1 . 
The results of estimating equation (2) using indicators 
for the “Overall regulatory conditions”, “Public owner-
ship”, “Barriers to entry”, “Vertical integration” and “Mar-
ket structure”, are displayed in Table 5.5 for ICT assets 
(See Appendix table A.7 for non-ICT assets). The results 
in Table 5.5 show the coefficients on the “lagged” and 
“differences” terms of the several indicators, which 
gives an indication of short and long-run effects. Fixed 
effects by time, industry and country were added in the 
regression. 
The coefficient of the error correction term or - (1–α) in 
table 6 is between zero and minus one, which shows that 
this modelling strategy is consistent with the existence of 
an error mechanism that ensures convergence towards 
equilibrium. The estimates show a significant negative 
coefficient for “Vertical integration” in the long run. The 
magnitude of the impact is -(0.00397/0.330)=0.0102. This 
means that ICT investment will increase by slightly more 
than one percentage point if the indicator of regulatory 
conditions decreases in one unit (note that the average 
ICT investment rate for the period 1975-2005 is 0.26). 
This finding is consistent with the literature on the topic, 
where cross-industry studies conclude that “Vertical 
integration” is negatively associated with ICT investment 
(Dewan et al. 1998; Acemoglu et al. 2004). 
The results reveal that regulatory reforms in the utili-
ties, transport and communications sectors have had 
a greater impact on non-ICT investment than on ICT 
investment. The impact of public ownership in these sec-
tors is found to be non-significant for both ICT and non-
ICT investment. The short-term effects, which are related 
to changes in regulatory conditions, appear more rele-
vant for non-ICT investment than for ICT investment.
A word of caution is in order when interpreting the 
results. The analysis of the impacts of regulation on 
investment only refers to anti-competitive regulation. 
The impacts of pro-competitive regulation of network 
industries which are implemented to foster competi-
tion, for instance by facilitating access to the network 
for competing companies, are not analysed here.
128  See Appendix for derivation of the ECM equation.147
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Anti-competitive regulation and investment across 
the economy
This section examines the extent to which restrictions 
of competition have a detrimental effect on ICT invest-
ment in different sectors of the economy. It is very dif-
ficult to obtain direct measures of prevailing competi-
tive conditions that can be compared across industries. 
Therefore, the OECD regulation impact indicators for 
the period 1975-2003 are used as a proxy (Conway et 
al. 2006). These indicators measure the extent to which 
restrictions of competition in key services sectors impact 
on other sectors of the economy. Given the increasing 
role of the services sectors as a supplier of inputs, this 
is considered to be a useful proxy for quantifying the 
stringency of competitive conditions. The value that the 
regulation impact indicators take for a particular sector 
will depend on two main factors: the level of regulatory 
conditions in the electricity, communications and trans-
port industries, ETCR indicators, as well as in the retail 
Table 5.5:   ICT Investment and Regulation in non-manufacturing sectors, 1975-2005
Dependent variable:∆(Log GFCF 
ICT/ICT capital stock)
Aggregate 
indicator
With barriers 
to entry
With public 
ownership
With market 
structure
With vertical 
integration
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Lagged dependent variable -0.316*** -0.331*** -0.332*** -0.330*** -0.331***
(0.0374) (0.0363) (0.0365) (0.0471) (0.0362)
Lagged regulatory conditions 0.000160
(0.00223)
Lagged public ownership 0.000786
(0.00153)
Lagged barriers to entry 0.00221
(0.00188)
Lagged vertical integration -0.00397*
(0.00218)
Lagged market structure 0.000377
(0.00142)
∆ Regulatory conditions -0.00142
(0.00575)
∆ Public ownership -0.00133
(0.00546)
∆ Barriers to entry -0.000241
(0.00376)
∆ Vertical integration -0.00312
(0.00390)
∆ Market structure -0.00515
(0.00384)
Gross operating surplus/ICT Capital 0.00958*** 0.0102*** 0.00998*** 0.0119*** 0.0102***
(0.00212) (0.00205) (0.00203) (0.00384) (0.00204)
ICT deflator/VA deflator -0.0102 -0.00914 -0.00908 -0.00708 -0.00910
(0.00685) (0.00675) (0.00678) (0.00833) (0.00677)
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 971 997 997 670 997
R-squared 0.237 0.246 0.247 0.238 0.247
and the finance sector; and, secondly, the weight of the 
inputs from this sector in the total input requirements.
ICT Taxonomy
Given the wide sectoral variation in the rates of ICT 
investment and the regulation impact measures, the 
industries are grouped according to a number of com-
mon features for the industries. The aim is to investigate 
whether the relationship between anti-competitive 
regulation and ICT investment differs for industries that 
make intensive use of ICT, as compared with those that 
do not (OECD 2002)129. According to Inklaar et al. (2003), 
129  The ICT sector is defined by the OECD as a combination of manufacturing and 
services industries that capture, transmit and display data and information electroni-
cally. One important feature of this definition, based on an international standard 
classification of activities (ISIC Rev. 3), is that it breaks the traditional ISIC dichotomy 
between manufacturing and services activities. While the production or distribu-
tion of ICT products can be found everywhere in the economy, the identification of 
sectors whose main activity is to produce or distribute ICT products constitutes a 
first-order approximation of the ICT sector.148
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an ICT taxonomy is used to classify industries according 
to whether they are producers or users of ICT.
From a policy perspective this analysis is likely to be 
highly significant, given that some of the sectors at the 
heart of the differences in productivity between the US 
and the EU, such as wholesale and retail, business serv-
ices and financial intermediation, were heavy users of 
ICT130. Stiroh (2002b) showed that the acceleration in 
productivity growth in the US was entirely accounted 
for by ICT-Producing and ICT-Using sectors. 
Econometric results 
Equation (2) was estimated using OLS. Time and sector 
dummies were added to check for common macroeco-
nomic effects. While country fixed effects are not explic-
itly included in the estimation, the estimated standard 
errors are clustered to account for within-country cor-
relation in the residuals131. Standard errors are shown in 
brackets132.
The results for ICT investment are shown in table 5.6. 
They reveal a negative and significant long-run effect of 
regulation on ICT investment in the ICT-producing man-
ufacturing sector and the non-ICT manufacturing sec-
tors133. A short-run effect is found for the ICT-producing 
services sector, which relates to the post and telecom-
munications sectors, consistent with the idea that liber-
alisation and ex-ante regulation implemented in previ-
ous public monopolies have boosted ICT investment. 
With regard to the coefficients of the control variables, 
the ratio of gross operating surplus relative to the stock 
of ICT capital is – as one would expect – positive and 
significant, while the estimate of the price of ICT yields 
no significant results. The coefficient of the error correc-
tion term, which is given by the level of ICT investment 
lagged by one period, (1– – α) , is between zero and 
minus one, as expected.
These findings suggest that restrictions to competition 
in the markets are potentially harmful in the long run 
for those manufacturing sectors that are not considered 
heavy users of ICT, such as the traditional manufactur-
ing sectors. No significant effect is found for services or 
130  See Table A.8 in the Annex.
131  This increases the reliability of the estimates, given that OLS technique relies 
on the assumption of the independence between residuals and the explanatory 
variables.
132  The statistical significance of the coefficients is indicated by a series of stars, 
with “*” indicating that the results are significant at the 10 per cent level, “**” at the 
5 per cent level, and “***” at the 1 per cent level.
133  When country effects are included, the estimation yields ambiguous results 
for non-ICT manufacturing sectors, with counteracting short-run and long-run 
effects. Given this, and the fact that regulation largely varies by country, the coun-
try fixed effects are excluded from the estimation. This provides more intuitive 
results on how economies that differ in their regulatory settings may fare in terms 
of investment. The results for the other groups of sectors were not altered signifi-
cantly by the inclusion of country fixed effects. 
manufacturing sectors that are more intensive users of 
ICT. A cautious approach should be taken in interpreting 
these effects. This is due to the fact that the regulation 
impact indicator only serves as a proxy for competitive 
conditions in the sectors, because of the lack of data on 
sector-specific regulations.
5.4.  Regulations and productivity growth 
The analysis in this section attempts to explore whether 
regulatory restrictions have had an effect not only on the 
accumulation of ICT capital, as investigated in previous 
sections, but also on its productivity impact. A flexible 
econometric approach is employed to assess whether 
the realisation of the returns to ICT across countries and 
industries may depend on the strictness of regulatory 
regimes. Evidence for both labour productivity and mul-
tifactor productivity will be provided. This will present a 
comprehensive picture of direct and indirect gains asso-
ciated with the use of ICT. The multifactor productivity 
analysis provided at the industry level will be of particu-
lar interest in determining the role of spillover effects, 
since these cannot be captured using a growth account-
ing methodology.
5.4.1.  Impact of regulations on ICT contributions to 
aggregate productivity growth 
The aim of the analysis in this section is to investigate 
the extent to which different dimensions of the regu-
latory environment can hinder the realisation of the 
returns to ICT. Economy-wide indicators of restrictions 
in the product market indicators are used: OECD PMR 
and the EU KLEMS database for the total economies for 
the period 1990-2005. 
Methodology 
A standard Cobb-Douglas production function, includ-
ing ICT capital as a separate input of production, is used 
to estimate the contribution of ICT capital to output and 
the role that regulation can play in terms of realising 
these returns, Hempell (2002): 
Y = AK
αL
1−α
  (3)
Dividing by employment and taking logs, a linearised 
version of the production function in terms of labour 
productivity is obtained: 
ln
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(4)
The dependent variable is value added relative to labour 
input. ICT capital, non-ICT capital and labour input are 149
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right-hand side or explanatory variables. The aggre-
gate production function set out in (4) is augmented 
by indicators of product/labour market regulation and 
estimated for a sample of EU countries and the US for 
the period 1990-2005. The advantage of an economet-
ric approach relative to the growth accounting method 
is its flexibility to evaluate further influences on labour 
productivity that are not fully captured by the use of 
inputs.
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Y denotes value added in real terms, L denotes hours, 
KICT denotes the stock of ICT capital and KNICT the 
stock of non-ICT capital. 
The sign on the coefficients of the regulation variables in 
(5), β3 , will reveal whether restrictions to competition in 
the product markets affect labour productivity directly. 
The coefficient of the interaction of regulation with ICT 
capital,  β4 , will indicate whether regulation affects pro-
ductivity indirectly, by hindering the returns to ICT. This 
may be a reflection of the fact that labour productivity is 
not constant across all values of the regulation indicator. 
Equation (5) is estimated using OLS in levels with robust 
standard errors and including time effects to check for 
common macroeconomic developments, e.g. the high 
growth rate in ICT capital stocks since the second half 
of the 1990s. Estimating the level will provide an insight 
into the long-run relationship between the variables, 
which seems appropriate at the economy level, as the 
impact of ICT on the production process is more likely to 
materialise in the long run (Venturini, 2008). 
Although OLS is a suitable econometric technique, it is 
useful to keep in mind some issues that can potentially 
bias the estimated coefficients, including the endogene-
ity of the right-hand side variables, such as input and 
regulation variables. Given that richer countries are in 
a position to devote more resources to reforming their 
regulatory environment, it is not unrealistic to think that 
the effect of productivity on the state of regulation itself 
can be reflected in the values shown by the indicators. 
Despite this acknowledgement, the potential endogene-
ity of the regulation variables is likely to be minor, given 
the lack of time variation of the regulation indicators and 
its slow response to reflect changes in economic condi-
tions. The use of regulation indicators rather than other 
measures used in the literature, such as mark-ups or 
concentration ratios, is therefore intended to minimise 
endogeneity problems.150
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The role of product market regulations
The results of estimating equation (5) are shown in 
Table 5.7134. The indicators for “Administrative barriers 
to start-up”, column 1, the indicators on “Administrative 
burdens for sole proprietors” column 2, “Sector-specific 
administrative burdens”, column 3 and “Administrative 
burdens for corporations”, column 4 all have a negative 
and significant influence on productivity. The coefficient 
for the indicator on “Barriers to trade and investment” is 
also negative and significant. Other indicators that nega-
tively influence productivity include “Legal barriers” and 
“Communication and simplification of rules and pro-
cedures”. Some regulatory areas within the economic 
regulation areas, such as “Direct control over business 
enterprises”, on the other hand, display a positive influ-
ence on productivity.
With regard to the coefficient of the interactive terms in 
equation (5), the interaction between “Barriers to start-
134  Estimation was carried out with and without interaction terms. The results of 
the main effects of the regulation indicators when one includes interactions are 
close to those in the model without interactions. 
Table 5.7:   Labour Productivity and OECD PMR, Low-Level Indicators 
Dependent variable: Log value added/hour With aggregate 
barriers to start-ups
With barriers 
sole proprietors
With sector-
specific barriers
With barriers 
corporations
Log ICT capital/hour 0.0548 -0.00796 0.0422 0.0785
(0.0714) (0.0729) (0.0713) (0.0832)
Log non-ICT capital/hour 0.578*** 0.507*** 0.511*** 0.631***
(0.0623) (0.0671) (0.0573) (0.0618)
Size of public enterprise sector -0.0108 -0.0275** -0.0114 -0.00333
(0.0130) (0.0131) (0.0140) (0.0135)
Scope of public enterprise sector 0.0922*** 0.0978*** 0.0811*** 0.0799***
(0.0180) (0.0211) (0.0188) (0.0186)
Direct control over business enterprise 0.0237*** 0.0190** 0.0215*** 0.0293***
(0.00819) (0.00838) (0.00791) (0.00789)
Price controls -0.0323 -0.0505** -0.0376* -0.0340*
(0.0202) (0.0203) (0.0208) (0.0179)
Use of command & control regulation 0.00247 -0.00409 -0.00658 -0.00902
(0.0136) (0.0150) (0.0119) (0.0104)
Licence and permits system -0.00502 -0.000848 -0.000639 -0.00152
(0.0103) (0.0125) (0.0105) (0.00786)
Communication and simplification of rules and 
procedures
-0.0935***
(0.0209)
-0.112***
(0.0206)
-0.103***
(0.0197)
-0.0771***
(0.0251)
Administrative burdens on startups -0.103***
(0.0298)
Administrative burdens for sole proprietor firms -0.0422*
(0.0228)
Sector specific administrative burdens -0.0461**
(0.0196)
  Administrative burdens for corporation -0.104***
(0.0255)
Legal barriers -0.0661*** -0.0445** -0.0530*** -0.0636***
(0.0186) (0.0211) (0.0182) (0.0152)
ups” and ICT capital shows a negative and significant 
coefficient. This is the case when the overall indicator 
of “Administrative burdens on start-up” is included (col-
umn 1) and also when more disaggregated indicators of 
barriers to start-ups are used; here, the largest negative 
impact is for “Administrative barriers to corporations” 
(column 4)135. The coefficient of the interaction between 
“Barriers to trade and investment” and ICT capital also 
presents a negative coefficient. When interactions are 
introduced, the main effects of the regulation indicators 
remain negative and significant. 
The results presented above suggest that the more 
restrictive the product market regulation, particularly 
as regards barriers to start-up and barriers to trade and 
investment, the lower the impact of ICT on productivity 
for the aggregate economy, ceteris paribus. This finding is 
in line with evidence that demonstrates the crucial role of 
regulations for the establishment of new business in the 
dissemination of ICTs (Bassanini and Scarpetta, 2002).
135  When interaction effects are not included in the specification, the “Barriers to 
start-ups” indicator did not have a significant impact on labour productivity. 151
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Table 5.7:   Labour Productivity and OECD PMR, Low-Level Indicators (continued)
Dependent variable: Log value added/hour With aggregate 
barriers to start-ups
With barriers 
sole proprietors
With sector-
specific barriers
With barriers 
corporations
Antitrust exemptions -0.0230 -0.0160 -0.00696 -0.0340*
(0.0226) (0.0238) (0.0232) (0.0204)
Barriers to trade and investment -0.178*** -0.248*** -0.223*** -0.133**
(0.0639) (0.0622) (0.0647) (0.0579)
Interaction size public*ICT 0.0231 0.0134 0.0307* 0.0410**
(0.0170) (0.0178) (0.0176) (0.0173)
Interaction scope public*ICT 0.0247 0.0189 -0.00419 0.0396
(0.0232) (0.0260) (0.0237) (0.0245)
Interaction control business enterprise*ICT 0.00479 0.00398 0.00299 0.0166
(0.00954) (0.00922) (0.00944) (0.0115)
Interaction price controls*ICT -0.0392 -0.0186 -0.0143 -0.0502*
(0.0261) (0.0248) (0.0240) (0.0303)
Interaction command control*ICT -0.00362 -0.00745 -0.0238 -0.0368
(0.0256) (0.0294) (0.0246) (0.0248)
Interaction licences and permits*ICT 0.0129 0.0228 0.0226 0.0135
(0.0153) (0.0165) (0.0167) (0.0154)
Interaction communication and simplification*ICT 0.115** 0.0413 0.0728* 0.176**
(0.0499) (0.0421) (0.0400) (0.0719)
Interaction barriers to start-up*ICT -0.125***
(0.0240)
Interaction Barriers sole proprietors*ICT -0.0639***
(0.0224)
Interaction sector-specific barriers*ICT -0.0470**
(0.0191)
Interaction barriers corporations*ICT -0.136***
(0.0251)
Interaction legal barriers*ICT 0.0642** 0.0843*** 0.0615** 0.0395
(0.0249) (0.0258) (0.0264) (0.0267)
Interaction antitrust exemptions*ICT 0.0495* 0.0638** 0.0645** 0.0364
(0.0265) (0.0258) (0.0277) (0.0287)
Interaction barriers to trade and investment*ICT -0.0475 -0.0850* -0.0841* -0.0564
(0.0437) (0.0442) (0.0464) (0.0386)
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country dummies No No No No
Observations 242 242 242 242
The role of labour market regulations
Table 5.8 shows the results of estimating equation (5) 
using institutional characteristics of the labour market as 
indicators. Owing to a high correlation across the indica-
tors, the estimation strategy is based on introducing the 
indicators sequentially. 
The institutional features of the labour market summarised 
by the indicators include: the strictness of employment 
legislation, union coverage, the degree of bargaining coor-
dination, the degree of bargaining centralisation, benefit 
replacement rates and the share of GDP spent on active 
labour market policies. The interaction of the labour mar-
ket indicator variables with ICT capital reveals that employ-
ment protection legislation may have a negative impact on 
productivity. This may however also indicate insufficient 
training opportunities provided by companies. Moreover, 
one can also find evidence of positive interaction effects 
of specific variables, such as the degree of union coverage, 
bargaining centralisation, gross benefit replacement rates 
and labour market policies per unemployed. 
With regard to the coefficients of the inputs of the pro-
duction function, the coefficient of the non-ICT capital 
is positive and significant, while the coefficient of the 
ICT capital is small or non-significant. These results are 
in line with most of the empirical evidence on the mag-
nitude of the returns to ICT.
5.4.2.  Impact of anti-competitive regulations on ICT 
contributions to industry productivity growth 
In this section, an industry perspective to investigate 
whether a regulation that is anti-competitive hinders 
the translation of ICT capital into multifactor productiv-
ity gains is adopted.152
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Table 5.8:   Labour Productivity and Labour Market Institutions, OECD-CEP
Dependent variable: log (VA/hour)
Log (ICT capital/hour) 0.0818 0.179** 0.00557 0.0363
(0.0708) (0.0738) (0.0624) (0.0678)
Log (Non-ICT capital/hour) 0.436*** 0.423*** 0.412*** 0.410***
(0.0427) (0.0461) (0.0479) (0.0522)
EPL* (ICT capital/hour) -0.103*** -0.0641* -0.299*** -0.275***
(0.0344) (0.0376) (0.0594) (0.0591)
Union coverage* (ICT capital/hour) 0.184** 0.251** 0.133 0.0853
(0.0929) (0.107) (0.0906) (0.0875)
Bargaining coordination* (ICT capital/hour) -0.0956* -0.0896** -0.111**
(0.0507) (0.0407) (0.0442)
Bargaining centralisation* (ICT capital/hour) 0.163*** 0.161***
(0.0379) (0.0407)
Benefit replacement rates* (ICT capital/hour) 0.298*** 0.360**
(0.0788) (0.156)
Active labour market policies* (ICT capital/hour) 0.0256
(0.189)
Observations 220 220 220 206
R-squared 0.585 0.597 0.634 0.632
Anti-competitive regulation and the returns to ICT in key 
service sectors
This section explores the links between anti-competitive 
regulation, ICT capital and multifactor productivity for 
non-manufacturing sectors during the period 1975-
2005. The ETCR indicators and the EU KLEMS database 
are used for this analysis.
A specification of the regression equation similar to 
equation (5) is used, but with multifactor productivity 
as the dependent variable (Stiroh, 2002a). Multifactor 
productivity is regressed on ICT capital, non-ICT capi-
tal, labour, indicators of regulation and the interaction 
between the ICT capital and the regulation indicators in 
equation (6):
ΔMFPijt =α+β 1ΔKICTijt + Δβ2KNIT + Δβ3LAB+ Δβ4REG+
β5 REGijt *ΔKICTijt ( )+ Tt + Ii +εijt  
(6)
Multifactor productivity is defined as the change in out-
put after taking into account the growth of capital and 
the quantity and quality of labour input. It is calculated 
using the growth accounting assumptions of constant 
returns to scale and remuneration of inputs according 
to their marginal productivities. In the neoclassical set-
ting, capital deepening contributes directly to labour 
productivity growth, but not to total factor productivity 
growth, and it therefore fails to account for the interac-
tion between different inputs to production, particularly 
human capital or ICT capital. Multifactor productivity, i.e. 
efficiency gains associated mainly with the use of ICT, 
are not fully captured in that framework. The hypothesis 
that ICT has an impact on multifactor productivity on 
top of capital deepening is tested. 
The results from the estimation of equation (6) are pre-
sented in table 5.9. They show a negative coefficient for 
the indicators of aggregate regulatory conditions. This 
finding is consistent with the idea that liberalisation in 
these sectors has led to increases in multifactor pro-
ductivity growth, as in Nicoletti and Scarpetta (2003). 
A similar impact is observed when the measures for 
“Public ownership” and “Vertical integration” are used, 
which suggest that fewer restrictions regarding vertical 
integration and more privatisations are associated with 
increases in multi-factor productivity in these sectors. In 
turn, the role of the barriers to entry appears insignifi-
cant in terms of productivity in these sectors. 
The coefficient of the interaction term between regula-
tion and ICT capital is negative and significant for the 
specification with the aggregate regulatory conditions 
indicator, as well as for the indicators for “Public owner-
ship” and restrictions on “Market structure”. 
Short vs. long run effects
The econometric analysis in this section provides evi-
dence of short- and long-run effects between regulation 
and productivity for the most heavily regulated sectors 
of the economy. The results of estimating the model 
in an error correction form are set out in the equation 
in table 5.10. The results reveal a significant negative 
impact of the aggregate regulatory conditions on multi-
factor productivity growth in the short- and longer-run. 
The results for the detailed indicators point to the exist-
ence of a fairly long-term negative correlation between 
concentration in the industry, barriers to entry and 153
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  prevalence of public ownership. Estimates were made 
using OLS, with country, industry and year dummies136. 
A multi-factor productivity equation in error correction 
form is given by: 
ΔMFPijt
k =γ0–(1–α)MFPijt?1
k +β 1ΔREGijt +γ 1(1–α)REGijt?1 + Zijt + uijt  (7)
Anti-competitive regulation and multifactor productivity 
across the economy
The analyses in this section focus on the direct and indi-
rect effects that the regulation burden has had on the 
productivity performance of the economy. Although 
the analysis covers both manufacturing and services 
136  The inclusion of country dummies in this analysis did not alter the main findings. 
Table 5.10:   Error Correction Model for ICT vs. non-ICT sectors, multi factor productivity, 1975-2003 
∆MFP Regulatory 
conditions
Barriers to entry Public 
ownership
Vertical 
integration
Market 
structure
ecm -0.0269*** -0.0286*** -0.0271*** -0.0319*** -0.0269***
(0.00562) (0.00566) (0.00550) (0.00588) (0.00549)
∆(ICT Capital) 0.101*** 0.0970*** 0.100*** 0.109*** 0.0909***
(0.0289) (0.0287) (0.0291) (0.0343) (0.0277)
Lagged ICT capital -0.00610*** -0.00667*** -0.00687*** -0.00223 -0.00762***
(0.00229) (0.00230) (0.00228) (0.00301) (0.00231)
∆(Non-ICT Capital) -0.284*** -0.281*** -0.278*** -0.204 -0.288***
(0.0897) (0.0842) (0.0892) (0.152) (0.0843)
Lagged non-ICT capital 0.0166 0.0219** 0.0145 0.00457 0.0158
(0.0107) (0.0108) (0.0107) (0.0164) (0.0105)
∆Regulatory conditions -0.0150** -0.00729
(0.00740) (0.00787)
Lagged regulatory conditions -0.00796***
(0.00307)
∆Barriers to entry -0.00253
(0.00438)
Lagged barriers to entry -0.00465**
(0.00211)
∆Public ownership -0.0122
(0.00828)
Lagged public ownership -0.00717***
(0.00194)
∆Vertical integration -0.00677
(0.00435)
Lagged vertical integration -0.00181
(0.00299)
∆Market structure 0.00396
(0.00751)
Lagged market structure -0.00638***
(0.00194)
Observations 1038 1059 1038 706 1059
R-squared 0.337 0.331 0.343 0.440 0.337
sectors, particular attention is devoted to industries that 
are regarded as a key source of productivity gains. 
The OECD Regulation Impact indicators data from OECD 
are used, together with data on output, inputs and pro-
ductivity from EU KLEMS for the period 1975-2005. The 
industry detail and the time series dimension of the data 
are useful for analysing differences in the impact of reg-
ulation on productivity across groups of industries, while 
also checking for common industry effects. Additionally, 
the time dimension is valuable for disentangling short- 
versus long-run effects – something which is likely to be 
of prime interest given the longstanding productivity 
problems experienced by many European countries. 
First, equation (5) is estimated at the industry level, 
including the regulation impact indicators and their 
interaction with ICT capital. The objective is to show 
what effects the regulatory barriers to competition may 
have on productivity, both directly and indirectly. The 155
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interaction of the ICT capital with the level of regulation 
impact is designed to capture how the level regulatory 
playing field may restrict the impact of ICT in produc-
tion137. A negative coefficient indicates that the lower 
the level of regulation, the stronger the contribution of 
ICT capital to productivity growth.
The results from equation (5) are shown in table 5.11. 
While specification in differences are often estimated 
without fixed effects, the introduction of industry-, coun-
try- and time-fixed effects is aimed to control for sector 
and country specific factors that can have an impact on 
labour productivity growth. Standard errors corrected for 
clustering on country are shown in brackets138. 
The results show that the coefficient of the ICT capital 
input is positive and significant, and the interaction term 
between ICT capital and regulation is negative and signif-
icant. These results demonstrate the potential efficiency 
gains associated with the use of ICT and show that such 
gains can be restricted by stringent regulatory conditions. 
These results will be able to withstand the introduction 
of other variables, such a squared term of regulation, 
which are intended to capture the importance of non-
linearities, and a technology gap to gauge the influence 
of the catch-up effects. The influence of labour input on 
137  In an alternative version, ICT capital was interacted with the growth in regula-
tion. A negative coefficient in this case would indicate that the impact of ICT on 
capital has increased (decreased) with a decrease (increase) in the magnitude of 
the change in the regulation impact. The coefficient on this interaction term was 
not significantly different from zero. 
138  The statistical significance of the coefficients is indicated by a series of stars, 
with “*” indicating that the results are significant at the 10 per cent level, “**” at the 
5 per cent level, and “***” at the 1 per cent level.
multifactor productivity growth is negative, although this 
did not alter the significance of the other variables. 
By introducing a squared term of the regulation vari-
ables into the productivity equation, evidence of a non-
linear relationship between regulation and productivity 
in the services sectors can be found. The coefficient of 
the regulation impact variable remains negative and sig-
nificant in the services sectors, while the coefficient of 
the square term is positive and significant at a 5% level 
of significance. This suggests that the marginal effects 
of the regulatory reform from a very high level are zero, 
and that the marginal effects are positive when starting 
from a less regulated environment. 
The technology gap variable is used as a direct measure 
of the potential for technology transfer, and it is defined 
as the difference between the local level of multifactor 
productivity and the level of multifactor productivity of 
the leader country in each industry for each year. The 
technology gap variable is positive at conventional lev-
els of significance. As expected, this shows that coun-
tries which are further behind the technological frontier 
show higher rates of productivity growth. The effect of 
the regulation indicator interacting with the technol-
ogy gap variable shows that restrictions to competition 
may affect technology transfer in manufacturing sectors 
more than in services sectors. 
ICT Taxonomy
The relationship between regulation and multifactor 
productivity at the industry level is further explored 
Table 5.11:   Impact of regulation on multifactor productivity, 1975-2003, Differences estimation 
Dependent variable: ∆MFP Manufacturing Services
∆(ICT capital) 0.305*** 0.305*** 0.254*** 0.254***
(0.110) (0.110) (0.0463) (0.0463)
∆Labour -0.247* -0.250* -0.375*** -0.375***
(0.129) (0.129) (0.0424) (0.0426)
Interaction ∆ICT*Regimpact -1.393* -1.422* -0.361*** -0.361***
(0.840) (0.837) (0.0906) (0.0907)
Regulation impact 0.0535 0.799 -0.0960* -0.0963
(0.539) (0.602) (0.0541) (0.0939)
Regulation impact squared 1.604 0.937 0.130** 0.130**
(1.759) (1.777) (0.0530) (0.0581)
Techology gap 0.00266*** 0.00912*** 0.00613*** 0.00612***
(0.000737) (0.00212) (0.00127) (0.00191)
Technology gap*Regulation impact -0.0597*** 2.42e-05
(0.0153) (0.00461)
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 3298 3298 2037 2037
R-squared 0.175 0.178 0.526 0.526156
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by estimating productivity equations (6) for different 
industries in the ICT taxonomy – see table 5.12. Previous 
research has highlighted the relevance of this group-
ing, as these industries differ not only in their ICT inten-
sity, but also in their productivity developments (Stiroh 
2002a). The table 5.13 shows the results of regressions 
of the growth in multifactor productivity on ICT capital 
and labour, and a measure of regulation and dummies 
for ICT groups139. The results show that, on average, ICT-
producing manufacturing industries have experienced 
the highest multifactor productivity growth rates. The 
other groups displaying a high multifactor productivity 
growth are ICT-producing services and non-ICT services, 
which include network industries such as transport and 
storage, and electricity, gas and water. The coefficient 
for the ICT-using services group is not significantly differ-
ent from zero. When ICT group dummies are interacted 
with the level of regulation impact, the results show a 
negative and significant impact for the ICT-using serv-
ices group, while the main effect for ICT-using services 
becomes positive and significant. These findings sug-
139  The omitted category is the Non-ICT Manufacturing group.
Table 5.12:   Multifactor productivity and Regulation Impact, ICT and non-ICT sectors, 1975-2003 
Dependent variable: ∆MFP
∆(ICT capital) 0.145*** 0.146***
(0.0304) (0.0305)
∆Labour -0.273*** -0.269***
(0.0895) (0.0898)
∆Regimpact -0.0568 -0.0535
(0.0425) (0.0456)
Technology gap 0.00318*** 0.00319***
(0.000622) (0.000622)
Dummy ICT Producing Manufacturing 0.0297*** 0.0794***
(0.00610) (0.0270)
Dummy ICT Producing Services 0.0241*** 0.0476***
(0.00560) (0.0154)
Dummy ICT Using Manufacturing 0.00113 -0.00199
(0.00522) (0.0115)
Dummy ICT Using Services -0.00772 0.0270**
(0.00787) (0.0119)
Dummy Non-ICT Services 0.0114* 0.0104
(0.00594) (0.0123)
Regimpact*Dummy ICT Producing Manufacturing -0.427**
(0.202)
Regimpact*Dummy ICT Producing Services -0.0480*
(0.0266)
Regimpact*Dummy ICT Using Manufacturing 0.0246
(0.0752)
Regimpact*Dummy ICT Using Services -0.107***
(0.0241)
Regimpact*Non- ICT Services 0.00188
(0.0181)
Observations 5335 5335
R-squared 0.233 0.235
gest that while ICT-using services sectors may have the 
potential to achieve high rates of productivity growth, 
the strictness of the regulatory environment may be sig-
nificantly hampering the achievement of those produc-
tivity gains. These findings are again robust to the inclu-
sion to the technological distance to the frontier which 
controls for catch-up effects. 
Firstly, difference models discard all information regard-
ing the levels of the variables. Recognising that dynamic 
effects can be very important in evaluating the impact 
of ICT and regulation on productivity, an error correction 
model was estimated in order to allow flexibility in the 
analysis of the relationship. The multifactor productivity 
equation in error correction, equation (7), is estimated 
for the sectors in the ICT taxonomy, see Table 5.13. 
Standard errors corrected for within-country correlation 
are shown in brackets140.
140  The statistical significance of the coefficients is indicated by a series of stars, 
with “*” indicating that the results are significant at the 10 per cent level, “**” at the 
5 per cent level, and “***” at the 1 per cent level.157
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The results show a negative and significant long-run 
impact of regulation on productivity in ICT-producing 
manufacturing, ICT-using manufacturing, ICT-using 
services and non-ICT services. No significant impact 
of regulation on productivity can be found in the 
non-ICT manufacturing sectors. These results suggest 
that less regulation boosts productivity not only in 
sectors that use ICT intensively, but also in some non-ICT   
services sectors, which include network industries. 
However, it has been suggested in the literature that 
this could be due to reductions in employment caused 
by privatisation initiatives in these sectors (Faini et al., 
2006). No evidence of short-run effects is found, which 
suggests that year-on-year changes in regulation are not 
related in any significant way to changes in multifactor 
productivity. 
As regards the coefficient of the other variables in equa-
tion (7), a positive and significant long- and short-run 
impact of ICT capital is observed, in particular for the 
ICT-using manufacturing sectors, while the labour term 
displays a negative coefficient. The coefficient of the 
error correction term,  (1– – α) , is negative and signifi-
cant as expected, but it is rather small considering the 
high persistence of the productivity series.
The results are consistent with findings in the literature. 
Conway et al. (2006) find that product market regula-
tions slow the process of adjustment by which positive 
productivity shocks spread across borders and new tech-
nologies are incorporated into the production processes. 
They find no direct effect of anti-competition regulation 
on productivity growth for all industries, but when the 
coefficient of the direct effect is estimated separately for 
the ICT intensive sectors, a negative effect is observed. 
Table 5.13:   Error Correction Model for manufacturing and non-manufacturing, 1975-2003 
ICT producing ICT using Non-ICT
∆MFP Manufacturing  Services Manufacturing  Services Manufacturing  Services
ecm -0.0151 -0.0231 -0.0477*** -0.0544*** -0.0388*** -0.0377***
(0.0208) (0.0148) (0.00920) (0.0109) (0.00948) (0.00792)
∆Regulation Impact 0.967 0.0681 0.397 1.482 1.486 -0.109
(3.282) (0.137) (0.841) (1.415) (1.722) (0.0756)
Lagged Regulation Impact -1.091*** -0.0610 -0.643** -0.157* -0.156 -0.149**
(0.328) (0.0617) (0.211) (0.0830) (0.257) (0.0508)
∆ICT Capital 0.272** 0.0417 0.138* 0.139 0.216 0.236
(0.114) (0.0587) (0.0751) (0.116) (0.132) (0.152)
Lagged ICT capital 0.00457 0.00323 0.0147** 0.0166 0.0143** 0.0172*
(0.00547) (0.00350) (0.00600) (0.0117) (0.00654) (0.00951)
∆Labour -0.108 -0.345** -0.159* -0.264** -0.195 -0.196
(0.146) (0.118) (0.0865) (0.0907) (0.144) (0.114)
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 264 264 792 792 2368 1056
R-squared 0.325 0.164 0.365 0.373 0.123 0.349
5.5.  Summary
The analyses consider the links between regulation, 
ICT investment and productivity for the EU and the US. 
First, the focus is on the impact that the stringency of 
the regulatory function has had on ICT capital accumula-
tion. After that, the focus is on the indirect impact that 
ICT has on productivity, and the extent to which this is 
hindered by restrictive regulatory regimes. 
The findings suggest that, at the aggregate economy 
level, restrictive regulatory regimes hinder ICT invest-
ment and have a negative effect on productivity141. The 
regulatory dimensions that are regarded as being more 
important are those of an administrative nature, such as 
barriers to start-ups. On the productivity side, barriers to 
trade and investment play a significant role. 
At the more detailed industry level, while restrictions to 
competition in the product markets do not appear to 
have a big influence on the rate of ICT capital accumula-
tion for most of sectors, they do hinder investment in the 
less ICT-intensive manufacturing industries. The results 
for key services industries sectors, such as the network 
industries, show that restrictive regulation conditions – 
particularly barriers to entry and the degree of vertical 
integration – harm capital accumulation and productivity 
growth. More importantly, the knock-on effects on other 
sectors of the economy are widespread, and it is possible 
to see negative long-run effects of regulation on multi-
factor productivity in most ICT-intensive using sectors, 
141  Regulations can however have other positive effects in terms of safety and 
security, for example. These effects may be difficult to quantify, but are nonethe-
less important welfare effects.158
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whether in manufacturing or services. Maintaining com-
petitive conditions in these sectors – which are a proxy 
for competition throughout an economy – is essential if 
long-term productivity growth is to be achieved across 
all sectors of the economy. On the one hand, restrictions 
to competition are found to restrict the realisation of ICT 
capital into productivity gains in both manufacturing and 
services sectors. On the other hand, it is observed that 
the potential for harming sustained productivity growth 
is greater in those sectors that use ICT more intensively.
For the overall economy, there is consistent evidence of 
a negative relationship between ICT investment and the 
strictness/stringency of the product markets. The results 
are robust to alternative specifications, and the inclu-
sion of other potential determinants of ICT investment. 
The dimensions of the product market that appear more 
detrimental to ICT investment tend to be administrative 
in nature, such as barriers to start-up, especially for sole 
proprietors, and sector-specific barriers. These findings 
support the idea that, in a more competitive environ-
ment where barriers to start-up are lower, there are 
more incentives to invest in ICT technologies to catch up 
with technology leaders or to maintain market shares. 
Regarding productivity, barriers to start-up are mani-
festly hindering the translation of ICT capital into pro-
ductivity gains. Additionally, there is evidence that barri-
ers to trade and investment are not only having a direct 
impact on productivity, but also impeding the successful 
contribution of ICT capital to productivity.
With regard to the labour market, since ICT often requires 
more skilled labour, it is important to ensure that com-
petitive conditions are maintained, so that the firm can 
allocate their factors of production in an optimal manner 
including through an enhanced training of their employ-
ees. The influence of other labour market characteristics 
appears more ambiguous, revealing a complex combina-
tion of effects. The active labour market policies appear 
positively related to productivity. There is also some 
evidence that the benefits of deregulating product mar-
kets in terms of ICT investment could be greater if labour 
markets had a degree of flexibility that allowed firms to 
reorganise their factors of production more efficiently.
Care must be taken when interpreting economy-wide 
results. While the analysis has attempted to check for a 
number of other characteristics that vary across coun-
tries and over time, identification is mainly based on 
cross-sectional data. Sufficient time series variation in 
product and labour market regulation data to identify 
the changes in product and labour market regimes has 
not been observed. Despite this, the evidence is persua-
sive and consistent with most of the concerns raised in 
the empirical literature.
The role of sector specific barriers to entry has been fur-
ther explored in the industry analysis, where detailed 
information on regulation measures on a time series 
basis is available for electricity gas and water, post 
and telecommunications and transport and storage. In 
these network industries, barriers to entry are found to 
be a determinant of non ICT investment, although their 
impact on ICT investment is not particularly significant. 
The only restrictions that appear to adversely affect the 
adoption of ICT are related to vertical integration issues, 
reflecting the potential harmful effects of anti-competi-
tive behaviour along the supply chain.
In the short run there is not much evidence to show that 
de-regulation has boosted ICT investment across sectors 
of the economy, with the exception of the ICT-Producing 
service sector: post and telecommunications. This sector 
has seen profound developments in regulatory reform 
over the last decades. However, the results of the analysis 
show that there is strong evidence that regulation in key 
non-manufacturing sectors has long-run negative effects 
on some non-ICT intensive manufacturing sectors, which 
are traditional sectors that do not make intensive use of 
these technologies in their production processes.
The effects on productivity as a result of de-regulating 
non-manufacturing sectors seem to be more widespread 
across the economy. A stringent regulatory environment 
prevents ICT capital being translated into productivity 
gains, in both the manufacturing and services sectors. 
Moreover, a long-run negative effect of regulation on 
productivity growth is found in sectors that use ICT and 
network sectors. The above results give rise to a number 
of policy implications, particularly as regards the role 
played by structural reforms in promoting both the 
adoption of ICT and in establishing the best framework 
conditions for ICT to have an impact on productivity and 
growth (Barrios and Burgelman, 2007).
The results also demonstrate the importance of taking 
into account the dynamics of the relationship between 
regulatory reforms, ICT and productivity. On the one 
hand, the analysis of the impact of ICT capital on pro-
ductivity is not straightforward, and many studies have 
stressed that it takes time for the returns on ICT to mate-
rialise. On the other hand, the relationship between the 
level of, and changes in, the regulatory conditions and 
many economic outcomes requires an analysis of short-
run and long-run effects. While short-run effects of de-
regulation are found in some highly regulated sectors, 
more significant long-run effects of maintaining compe-
tition are found to be fundamental for sectoral produc-
tivity performance.
As regards policy implications, the importance of reduc-
ing administrative burdens, introducing flexibility in 
the labour markets, upgrading training capacities and 
impact, and liberalising key sectors in the economy 
has been highlighted. On the product market side, 
the industry analysis reveals that liberalisation of non-159
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manufacturing sectors can stimulate productivity gains 
in ICT-using industries in particular, where spillover and 
network effects can be sizeable and where most of the 
post-1995 differences in productivity growth between 
the Unites States and Europe are to be found. On the 
labour market side, there is evidence of a negative rela-
tionship between employment protection and produc-
tivity growth. The empirical literature concludes that it 
is the flexibility of the US economy in adapting to major 
changes (such as the IT revolution) that has given it a 
temporary productivity advantage, and predicts that 
Europe will start to see enhanced IT-enabled productiv-
ity growth over the next few years. 
However, the empirical evidence put forward from other 
studies on these relationships is not as straightforward 
Box 5.1 – The error correction model
The relationship between regulation and investment and productivity is modelled using an error correction frame-
work (ECM), a technique that combines the long-run or co-integrating relationship between the level variables 
with the short-run relationship. The aim is to capture both short and longer-term effects of regulatory conditions 
on an outcome variable. The estimation of models in ECM is also considered suitable as it reduces measurement 
errors, endogeneity and omitted variable problems. 
yijt
k = yijt−1
k + Xijt + Zijt + uijt   (A.1)
where the y is a dependent variable, X a vector of explanatory variables and Z a vectors of control variables and 
u is the standard error terms. Assuming a richer dynamic structure for the explanatory vector of variables X an 
equation like (A.1) can be re-written as: 
  Δyijt
k =γ0 +β 1Δ ijt−(1–α)[yijt?1
k –γ 1Xijt–1]+ Zijt + uijt   (A.2)
The long-run relationship in the model is captured by the term in brackets which represents the deviation of the 
dependent variable from is long-run equilibrium values. If these levels terms were omitted, all of the variables 
would be in first differences and one would only pick up short-run effects. As long as α is less than 1, a model 
in first differences is inadequate from the point of view of the estimation, as the levels term may play a key role. 
Suppose that the term in brackets becomes positive because investment or productivity has increased above its 
equilibrium values. Since  (1–α) is negative the overall effect is to slow down short-term growth in investment or 
productivity. This term is therefore said to be the error correction mechanism of the model. 
Re-arranging equation A.2 can be expressed as: 
Δyijt
k =γ0−(1−α)yijt–1
k +β 1ΔXijt+γ 1(1−α)Xijt–1 + Zijt + uijt   (A.3)
The coefficient  β 1 measures the short-term impact of changes of variable x on the growth rate of variable y, the 
coefficient γ measures the long-term impact and uit  is the standard error term. Although the short-term impact 
cannot be obtained directly from the linear estimation, it can be derived by dividing the coefficient on Xijt–1 , 
γ 1(1–α), by the adjustment coefficient, represented by (1– – α) . 
as it may appear. Nickell et al. (1999) find no evidence 
between EPL and productivity growth. Scarpetta et al. 
(2002) find a significant negative impact on productivity 
from EPL only in countries with an intermediate degree 
of centralisation and coordination in wage bargaining. 
Autor et al. (2007) find that EPL increases labour produc-
tivity by raising capital-labour productivity, but also find 
that EPL lowers multifactor productivity. The issue of 
whether to increase flexibility in the labour market is a 
controversial one, particularly at the present time when 
major economies are focusing their policies on recover-
ing from a situation of job losses and negative growth. 
Even in recessionary periods, however, consideration 
should be given to policies and reforms in Europe that 
can not only help maintain employment, but have the 
potential to boost long-term growth.160
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Box 5.2 – The role of ICT Deflators
The conclusions drawn in part II (Regulation and investment) are not likely to be biased by the choice of ICT deflators, 
given that EU KLEMS provides adjusted measures of inputs; investment is measured in constant-quality efficiency 
units, which is determinant for assets subject to rapid technological change and improvements in quality, such as IT 
assets. Many countries have followed the US in adopting hedonic prices for computers, and recently this approach 
has been adopted by other National Statistical Institutes (Netherlands, Slovenia, Sweden, Germany, France, United 
Kingdom), and other countries base their national deflators on the US hedonics, adjusting for international price 
or exchange rate movements. For the countries using IT deflators that are not adjusted for quality, EU KLEMS uses 
the harmonisation procedure introduced by Schreyer (2002). Bartelsman et al. (2004) emphasize that differences in 
industrial specialisation across countries complicate the harmonisation of deflators. However, EU KLEMS does not 
harmonise the output deflators. In the sector that includes ICT equipment manufacturing, 30t33, the fall in value 
added deflators in the US is considerably greater than in the EU (-9.4% against -1.6% per annum (Sectoral Growth 
Drivers, 2008). While this difference is influenced by the greater relative size of the sub-sector “Office, accounting 
and computing machinery” in the US (NACE 30), it is mostly driven by the deflators for this sub-sector. To the extent 
that the industries are producing similar outputs in the two regions that are traded in international markets, this 
difference might reflect a measurement assumption rather than any real differences. In the industry analysis in sec-
tion 5.4 (Regulation, ICT and productivity), the breakdown of sectors employed enables this effect to be accounted 
for by modelling the ICT-producing manufacturing sectors (30t33) separately. At an aggregate level, for the whole 
manufacturing sector or the total economy, this potential source of bias is likely to be minor. 
ICT Deflator – Electrical and Optical Equipment
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Box 5.3 – The role of Regulation in times of crisis
The general initial response to the current financial crisis has been to cut interest rates and extend the role of the 
State in the banking sector: guaranteeing personal savings, injecting funds into the banking system (quantitative 
easing) and state control/interests in the commercial banking sector. While this wholesale support of the banking 
sector seems counter-productive to structural reform, Lyons (2009) argues that the banking sector is unique in 
requiring this degree of intervention because of the underlying essential element of confidence that is required 
in order for the bank to survive. In addition, banks perform a central role in the economy, “oiling the wheels” of 
industry. Fundamentally, this difference in the banking sector means that intervention is necessary. The initial EU 
response to the crisis entailed a number of actions, starting in 2007/2008, including:
*  coordinating action by the Member States to raise minimum deposit guarantee levels,
*    adopting a number of different initiatives on financial services policy (Capital Requirements Directive, deposit 
protection schemes, credit rating agencies),
*  starting the process towards a reform of the European financial supervisory system,
*  issuing guidance to clarify the application of State aid rules,
*  launching a European recovery plan,
*  initiating international discussions, in the G-20 framework, on policies to strengthen the financial services sector.
In this paper the issues are about whether regulatory reforms actually have a role to play in facilitating recovery 
and what is the likely impact of the current recession and subsequent recovery on ICT investment in the medium 
to long term?
Economic downturns are likely to result in firm overcapacity, and thus investments from within the firm are likely 
to be lower. In terms of regulation, one might think that regulatory reform in such economic circumstances would 
become less of a priority, and yet the OECD (2009) highlights the fact that many structural reforms have been 
implemented in times of economic crisis. In an overview that considers the role for structural reform in dealing 
with financial crises, OECD (2009) points to the fact that, at such times, institutional weaknesses are revealed and 
solutions are generally more palatable to a nervous electorate, who want to see governments find solutions. 
The OECD (2009) gives four examples of growth-enhancing structural reform policies that might make a positive 
contribution to recovery:
*  introducing infrastructure projects – e.g. improvements in education;
*  increasing expenditure on active labour market policies through training;
*  reducing tax on labour income;
*  reforming anti-competitive product market regulation, particularly barriers to entry.
It is argued that this last point should encourage the innovation of new products and make new business entry 
easier in the short run and raise competition in the longer run.
Short run negative effects from structural reform policies that affect demand:
*  easing of entry barriers may lead to greater firm turnover – exits and unemployment;
*    relaxing employment protection is likely to reduce job security, as firing costs are cut, although there is some 
evidence of employment rising when the costs are reduced – e.g. Italy and temporary contracts. 
However, in unfavourable economic conditions, there is a temptation to extend the role of the State in a number 
of directions, counteracting the structural reform policies, particularly with regard to trade. Commentators sug-
gest this has not happened yet, but there is some evidence that it might occur, and history shows that a move 
to more protectionist policies is counter-productive and can extend the scope and the duration of the downturn 
(Cole and Ohanian, 2004 – cited in Lyons, 2009).162
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Appendix tables
Table A.1:   Availability and coverage of data sources 
Source Period Sectoral Detail Main Regulatory Measures Countries Covered
EU KLEMS Country 
Performance Data
1970-2005 Economy-level data and 
industry level data for 
22 sectors
Performance Data only 
(investment, productivity, etc)
EU15 (not BE, LU, EL) and 
CZ, SL, AU, JA, US
OECD Product Market 
Regulation Indicators
1998, 2003 Available at economy-level 
only
State Control; Barriers to 
Entrepreneurship; and Barri-
ers to Trade and Investment
EU15 (not BE, LU, EL) and 
CZ, SL, AU, JA, US
CEP-OECD Labour 
Market Institutions 
Data
1970-2004 Available at economy-level 
only
Employment Protection 
Legislation; Unions, 
Bargaining and Minimum 
Wage; Income Support for 
Unemployed; Active Labour 
Market Policies; and Labour 
Market Taxation
EU15 (not BE, LU, EL) and US
Fraser Insitute 
Business & Labour 
Indicators
1970-2005 Available at economy-level 
only
Firing and Hiring Legislation; 
Minimum Wage; Centralised 
Bargaining; Unemployment 
Insurance; and Conscription
EU15 (not BE, LU, EL) and 
CZ, SL, US
OECD Regulation 
Impact Indicators
1975-2003 Industry-level data for 22 
sectors
Regulation Impact data EU15 (not BE, LU, EL) and US
OECD ECTR 
Regulation Indicators
1975-2005 Telecoms, Electricity, Gas, 
Post, Rail, Air Passenger 
Transport and Road Freight
Entry Conditions; Public 
Ownership; Vertical 
Integration; and Market 
Structure
EU15 (not BE, LU, EL) and US
Table A. 2:   Impact of product market regulation on non-ICT investment at the economy-wide level,  
1990-2005, OECD economy-wide level (Low-Level indicators) 
Dependent variable:  
log(GFCF Non-ICT/Capital stock Non-ICT)
Aggregate 
Barriers to 
entrepreneuship
Administrative 
burden for sole 
proprietors
Sector specific 
burdens
Administrative 
burden for 
corporations
Lagged dependent variable 0.999*** 0.995*** 0.996*** 1.013***
(0.0201) (0.0205) (0.0201) (0.0185)
Size of public enterprise sector -0.00515 -0.00806 -0.00433 -0.00354
(0.00533) (0.00573) (0.00536) (0.00559)
Scope of public enterprise sector 0.0229*** 0.0243*** 0.0215*** 0.0184***
(0.00670) (0.00770) (0.00650) (0.00610)
Direct control over business enterprise 0.00217 0.00101 0.00204 0.00112
(0.00294) (0.00275) (0.00278) (0.00317)
Price controls 0.00280 1.91e-05 0.00324 -0.000923
(0.00823) (0.00759) (0.00777) (0.00845)
Use of command & control regulation 0.00664* 0.00615* 0.00693** 0.00508
(0.00367) (0.00367) (0.00345) (0.00354)
Licence and permits system -0.00108 -0.00190 -0.00133 -6.79e-05
(0.00238) (0.00253) (0.00237) (0.00233)
Communication and simplification of rules and procedures -0.0322*** -0.0302*** -0.0311*** -0.0315***
(0.00982) (0.0101) (0.00961) (0.00961)
Administrative burdens on startups -0.0155**
(0.00714)
Administrative burdens for sole proprietor firms -0.0127**
(0.00622)166
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Dependent variable:  
log(GFCF Non-ICT/Capital stock Non-ICT)
Aggregate 
Barriers to 
entrepreneuship
Administrative 
burden for sole 
proprietors
Sector specific 
burdens
Administrative 
burden for 
corporations
Sector specific administrative burdens -0.0135**
(0.00527)
Administrative burdens for corporation -0.00647
(0.00604)
Legal barriers -0.00959* -0.0133** -0.0105* -0.00801
(0.00557) (0.00594) (0.00562) (0.00569)
Antitrust exemptions -0.00207 -0.00497 -0.00127 0.00127
(0.00696) (0.00758) (0.00687) (0.00684)
Barriers to trade and investment -0.0360*** -0.0380*** -0.0365*** -0.0348***
(0.0113) (0.0111) (0.0117) (0.0107)
Observations 219 219 219 219
R-squared 0.970 0.970 0.970 0.969
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Table A. 3:   Impact of Product Market Regulations on the share of ICT investment, 1990-2005,  
(OECD Low Level Indicator) 
Dependent variable: GFCF ICT/Total GFCF Aggregate 
barriers to 
entrepreneurship
Administrative 
burden for sole 
proprietors
Sector specific 
burdens
Administrative 
burden for 
corporations
Lagged dependent variable 0.880*** 0.877*** 0.880*** 0.884***
(0.0452) (0.0443) (0.0452) (0.0456)
Size of public enterprise sector 0.000463 -2.23e-05 0.000693 0.000378
(0.00157) (0.00154) (0.00163) (0.00157)
Scope of public enterprise sector -0.00400* -0.00336 -0.00441* -0.00472*
(0.00238) (0.00239) (0.00233) (0.00240)
Direct control over business enterprise 0.00103 0.000979 0.000963 0.000828
(0.000702) (0.000594) (0.000678) (0.000795)
Price controls -0.00338 -0.00364* -0.00342 -0.00397*
(0.00218) (0.00196) (0.00221) (0.00231)
Use of command & control regulation -0.000759 -0.000710 -0.000699 -0.00126
(0.00130) (0.00116) (0.00138) (0.00124)
Licence and permits system -0.00207** -0.00232*** -0.00208*** -0.00195**
(0.000799) (0.000829) (0.000796) (0.000796)
Communication and simplification of rules and procedures 0.00245 0.00285 0.00267 0.00274
(0.00196) (0.00185) (0.00191) (0.00219)
Administrative burdens on startups -0.00218
(0.00188)
Administrative burdens for sole proprietor firms -0.00264*
(0.00144)
Sector specific administrative burdens -0.00166
(0.00149)
Administrative burdens for corporation -0.000626
(0.00170)
Legal barriers 0.000505 -0.000489 0.000503 0.000674
(0.00141) (0.00157) (0.00141) (0.00147)
Antitrust exemptions 0.00419** 0.00371** 0.00435** 0.00443**
(0.00187) (0.00186) (0.00189) (0.00190)
Barriers to trade and investment 0.00860* 0.00843* 0.00857* 0.00877*
(0.00467) (0.00467) (0.00466) (0.00474)
Observations 204 204 204 204
R-squared 0.985 0.985 0.985 0.985
Yes dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes167
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Table A. 4:   Impact of product market regulation on different capital assets at the economy-wide level 
1990-2005, OECD economy-wide level indicators (High-Level Indicators)
Dependent variable: 
GFCF asset/Capital 
stock asset
IT CT Software Transport 
Equipment
Other 
Machinery
Residential 
structure
Other 
Construction
Other
Lag dependent variable 0.642*** 0.762*** 0.556*** 0.808*** 0.826*** 1.047*** 0.860*** 0.735***
(0.0642) (0.0645) (0.0584) (0.0418) (0.0478) (0.0231) (0.0243) (0.0600)
Product market regulation -0.0143* 0.00199 -0.0135** -0.00584 -0.00265* -0.000997 0.000431 -0.000152
(0.00798) (0.00699) (0.00532) (0.00468) (0.00149) (0.000639) (0.000587) (0.00285)
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 206 206 206 206 206 191 206 169
R-squared 0.724 0.725 0.619 0.849 0.814 0.964 0.965 0.629
Table A. 5:   Impact of product market regulation on different capital assets at the economy-wide level 
1990-2005, OECD economy-wide level indicators (High- and Medium-Level Indicators)
Dependent variable: 
GFCF asset/Capital 
stock asset
IT CT Software Transport 
Equipment
Other 
Machinery
Residential 
structure
Other 
Construction
Other
Administrative 
regulation
-0.00493 -0.00103 -0.00763** -0.00521* -0.00229** -0.000262 0.00102** 0.000550
(0.00649) (0.00429) (0.00308) (0.00277) (0.00106) (0.000771) (0.000445) (0.00184)
Economic regulation -0.0129* -0.00162 -0.0104*** -0.00630* -0.00255** -0.000759 0.000423 0.00153
(0.00682) (0.00425) (0.00318) (0.00321) (0.00116) (0.000593) (0.000435) (0.00212)
Inward-oriented 
policies
-0.0129* -0.00162 -0.0104*** -0.00630* -0.00255** -0.000759 0.000423 0.00153
(0.00682) (0.00425) (0.00318) (0.00321) (0.00116) (0.000593) (0.000435) (0.00212)
Outward-oriented 
policies
-0.00904 0.00956 -0.0111 0.000509 -0.00101 -0.000914 2.18e-05 -0.00435
(0.00735) (0.0100) (0.00861) (0.00568) (0.00201) (0.000673) (0.000803) (0.00338)
Barriers to 
entrepeneurship
-0.0191*** -0.00402 -0.00916** -0.00521 -0.00236 -0.00219*** -0.000159 0.00266
(0.00718) (0.00388) (0.00373) (0.00369) (0.00145) (0.000598) (0.000495) (0.00282)
State control -0.00477 -0.000274 -0.00728*** -0.00388* -0.00180** 8.87e-05 0.000469 0.000614
(0.00468) (0.00329) (0.00224) (0.00206) (0.000821) (0.000503) (0.000325) (0.00138)
Barriers to trade 
and investment
-0.00745 0.0103 -0.00927 0.00176 -0.000414 -0.000847 -0.000115 -0.00507
(0.00686) (0.00989) (0.00866) (0.00538) (0.00207) (0.000673) (0.000781) (0.00328)
Lag dependent variable Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes168
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Table A. 6:   Impact of labour market institutions on aggregate ICT investment, CEP-OECD institutions 
dataset, 1990-2004 
Dependent variable: log 
(GFCF Non-ICT/Non-ICT Capital stock)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Lagged dependent variable 0.871*** 0.871*** 0.848*** 0.859*** 0.854***
(0.0288) (0.0290) (0.0312) (0.0320) (0.0305)
employment protection legislation -0.0112 -0.0115 0.0286 0.0418* 0.0595**
(0.0188) (0.0207) (0.0229) (0.0243) (0.0287)
Union coverage 0.0413* 0.0414* 0.0761** 0.0644** 0.0502
(0.0223) (0.0226) (0.0296) (0.0314) (0.0322)
Union density -0.000253 -0.000255 -3.54e-05 2.17e-05 0.000163
(0.000191) (0.000194) (0.000172) (0.000172) (0.000193)
Degree of bargaining coordination 0.000201 0.00680 0.00212 0.00186
(0.00718) (0.00779) (0.00883) (0.00964)
Degree of bargaining centralisation -0.0361** -0.0446*** -0.0551***
(0.0163) (0.0166) (0.0188)
Benefit Replacement rates across 5 first 
years of unemployment (%)
0.0795* 0.151***
(0.0409) (0.0443)
Expenditure on active labour market 
policies (per unemployed)
-0.0639
(0.0477)
Gross Operating Surplus/ICT Capital 
stock
0.110*** 0.110*** 0.143*** 0.157*** 0.176***
(0.0245) (0.0246) (0.0297) (0.0310) (0.0294)
Non-ICT deflator/Value added deflator -0.416*** -0.416*** -0.476*** -0.451*** -0.417***
(0.129) (0.139) (0.133) (0.133) (0.120)
Observations 158 158 158 156 146
R-squared 0.965 0.965 0.967 0.968 0.969169
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Table A. 7:   Non-ICT Investment and Regulation in non-manufacturing sectors, 1975-2005 
Dependent variable:∆(Log GFCF  
Non-ICT/Non-ICT capital stock)
Aggregate 
indicator
With barriers to 
entry
With public 
ownership
With market 
structure
With vertical 
integration
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Lagged dependent variable -0.266*** -0.259*** -0.257*** -0.230*** -0.255***
(0.0565) (0.0500) (0.0499) (0.0370) (0.0505)
Lagged regulatory conditions -0.00206**
(0.000835)
Lagged public ownership -0.000502
(0.000452)
Lagged barriers to entry -0.00157*
(0.000811)
Lagged vertical integration -0.000769
(0.000467)
Lagged market structure -0.000256
(0.000398)
∆ Regulatory conditions -0.00414**
(0.00183)
∆ Public ownership -0.00115
(0.00187)
∆ Barriers to entry -0.00131
(0.00114)
∆ Vertical integration -0.00125*
(0.000741)
∆ Market structure -0.00368***
(0.00116)
Gross operating surplus/Non-ICT Capital 0.00354** 0.00373*** 0.00339*** 0.00380** 0.00377***
(0.00138) (0.00126) (0.00125) (0.00174) (0.00124)
Non-ICT deflator/VA deflator -0.000476 0.000423 -0.000826 0.00432 0.000875
(0.00263) (0.00256) (0.00261) (0.00334) (0.00254)
Observations 966 991 991 666 991
R-squared 0.199 0.202 0.207 0.205 0.209
Table A. 8: ICT Groupings of Industries (following Inklaar et al. (2003) and Conway et al. (2006) 
ICT category Sector Code (ISIC Revision 3)
ICT Producing Manufacturing 30t33
Non-Manufacturing 64
ICT Using Manufacturing 21t22, 29, 36t37
Non-Manufacturing 50t52, J, 71t74
Non-ICT Manufacturing 15t16, 17t19, 20, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27t28, 34t35
Non-Manufacturing 55, 40-41, 45, 60t63170
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CHAPTER 6 
STATISTICAL ANNEX
6.1.  Sectoral competitiveness indicators
Explanatory notes
Geographical coverage: all indicators refer to EU-27
Production index142: The production index is actually an 
index of final production in volume terms.
Labour productivity: this indicator is calculated by com-
bining the indexes of production and number of persons 
employed or number of hours worked143. Therefore, this 
indicator measures final production per person of final 
production per hour worked.
Unit Labour Cost: it is calculated from the production 
index and the index of wages and salaries and measures 
labour cost per unit of production. “Wages and salaries” 
is defined (Eurostat) as “the total remuneration, in cash 
or in kind, payable to all persons counted on the payroll 
(including homeworkers), in return for work done during 
the accounting period, regardless of whether it is paid 
on the basis of working time, output or piecework and 
whether it is paid regularly wages and salaries do not 
include social contributions payable by the employer”. 
Relative Trade Balance: it is calculated, for sector “i”, as 
(Xi-Mi)/(Xi+Mi), where Xi and Mi are EU-27 exports and 
imports of products of sector “i” to and from the rest of 
the World.
Revealed Comparative Advantage (RCA): 
The RCA indicator for product “i” is defined as follows:
142  The data are working-day adjusted for production.
143  The data are working-day adjusted for hours worked.
∑
∑
=
i
i XW
i W
i
i EU
i EU
i X
X
X
RCA
,
,
,
,
where: X=value of exports; the reference group (“W”) 
is the EU-27 plus 38 other countries (see list below); 
the source used is the UN COMTRADE database. In the 
calculation of RCA, XEU stands for exports to the rest of 
the world (excluding intra-EU trade) and XW measures 
exports to the rest of the world by the countries in the 
reference group. The latter consists of the EU-25 plus 
the following countries: Algeria, Argentina, Australia, 
Bangladesh, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, 
Costa Rica, Croatia, Egypt, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, 
Israel, Japan, Kazakhstan, South Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, 
Morocco, New Zealand, Norway, other Asian countries 
n.e.s., Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Romania, South Africa, 
Singapore, Sri Lanka, Switzerland, Thailand, Tunisia, Tur-
key, United States, Venezuela.
Statistical nomenclatures: the indicators in tables 6.1 to 
6.6 are presented at the level of divisions of the statisti-
cal classification of economic activities in the European 
Community (NACE Rev.2144), while those in tables 6.7 and 
6.8145 are presented in terms of divisions of the statistical 
classification of products by activity (CPA). Data sources: 
tables 6.1 to 6.6 are based on Eurostat’s short-term 
indicators data. Tables 6.7 and 6.8 are based on United 
Nations’ COMTRADE and Eurostat’s COMEXT databases.
144  Compared to the statistical annexes of the previous publications, the new 
activity classification is used: NACE REV 2. The correspondance tables from NACE 
Rev. 2 – NACE Rev. 1.1 and from NACE Rev. 1.1 to NACE Rev. 2, are available on 
Eurostat: http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/nace_rev2/intro-
duction
145  Data in tables 6.7 and 6.8 have not been updated since the last report (Euro-
pean Competitiveness Report 2008).172
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6.2.  Microeconomic Data – Country Fiches
The country fiches present the performance of each 
Member State in the policy areas covered by the micro-
economic pillar of the Strategy for Growth and Jobs (the 
Lisbon agenda). The EU average is given as a benchmark. 
Providing a common framework for all Member States, 
the integrated guidelines for growth and jobs specify the 
overarching objectives to be pursued in each policy area. 
The main policies constituting the microeconomic pillar 
(guidelines 7 to 16) are: Research, Innovation, encourag-
ing investments in ICT, Industry, internal market, competi-
tion, encouraging the sustainable use of resources and the 
synergies between environmental protection and growth, 
creating a more attractive business environment, promot-
ing entrepreneurship and expanding infrastructure. The 
link between these policies and competitiveness – taken 
here as the “capacity to grow” – is well established (for 
example, see Competitiveness Report 2007 for a review 
of empirical evidence). Higher productivity growth is 
the main channel through which these policies improve 
competitiveness. In this context, the country fiches give 
a snapshot picture of the competitiveness profile of the 
Member States.
The source and a short description of the indicators used 
in the country fiches are presented at the end of the docu-
ment. Readers wishing a more complete picture may refer 
to the EUROSTAT’s Structural Indicators database. Internet 
links are provided to sources other than EUROSTAT.181
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Information on the indicators:
–  Gross domestic expenditure on R&D (GERD), and
–  Business sector R&D expenditure
Source: EUROSTAT. Short description: Both indicators 
are expressed in a percentage of GDP. R&D is defined 
according to the Frascati Manual (OECD).
–  Tertiary graduates in Science and Technology
Source: EUROSTAT. Short description: The indicator 
includes new tertiary graduates in a calendar year from 
both public and private institutions completing graduate 
and post graduate studies compared to an age group that 
corresponds to the typical graduation age in most coun-
tries. It does not correspond to the number of graduates 
in these fields who are available in the labour market in 
this specific year. The levels and fields of education and 
training used follow the 1997 version of the International 
Standard Classification of Education (ISCED97) and the 
Eurostat Manual of fields of education and training (1999). 
Expressed as per 1000 of population aged 20-29 years.
–  Summary Innovation Index (SII)
Source: European Innovation Scoreboard. Short descrip-
tion: The SII is a composite indicator summarising the 
various indicators of the European Innovation Score-
board. It gives an “at a glance” overview of aggregate 
national innovation performance. More information can 
be obtained at: http://www.proinno-europe.eu/EIS2008/
website/docs/EIS_2008_Final_report.pdfInnovative 
SMEs as % of all SMEs
–  Innovative SMEs
Source: EUROSTAT (Community Innovation Survey). 
Short description: SMEs (which are enterprises up to 249 
persons employed) are considered as innovative if they 
introduce new or significantly improved products (goods 
or services) to the market or if they implement new or 
significantly improved processes. All types of innovating 
SMEs are considered in the nominator, namely product 
innovators, process innovators, as well as SMEs with only 
on-going and/or abandoned innovation activities.
–  ICT expenditure as a percentage of GDP
Source: EUROSTAT. Short description: Annual data on 
expenditure for IT and telecommunication hardware, 
equipment, software and other services as a percentage 
of GDP.
–  Broadband performance index
Source: European Commission (Directorate General 
Information Society). Short description: Close monitor-
ing of broadband markets, taking into account all rele-
vant va    riables, is crucial to provide a fair, reliable picture 
of how the broadband market is e  vol  ving in each Mem-
ber State and in the European Union. The Broadband 
per  for    mance index benchmarks the overall perform-
ance of the Member States on a range of factors, which 
include speeds, rural coverage, affordability, innovation 
and other so  cio-economic dimensions. Specific informa-
tion on the components of the in  dex may be obtained 
at: http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/eeurope/
i2010/docs/fu  ture_internet/swp_bpi.pdf
–  High-tech exports
Source: EUROSTAT. Short Description: This indicator is cal-
culated as share of exports of all high technology products 
in total exports. High technology products are defined as 
the sum of the following products: Aerospace, computers, 
office machinery, electronics, instruments, pharmaceuti-
cals, electrical machinery and armament. The total exports 
for the EU do not include the intra-EU trade.
–  Value added share of high an medium-high industries
Source: EU KLEMS and own estimates of Directorate 
General Enterprise and Industry National Accounts and 
Structural Business Statistics of Eurostat. Short descrip-
tion: High-tech industries are defined according to their 
notable value of R&D intensity. High-tech manufacturing 
comprises, for example, manufacturers of pharmaceuti-
cals and medicinal products, communication equipment 
and computers whereas high-tech knowledge-intensive 
services cover activities relating to post and telecom-
munications, computer and related activities, as well as 
research and development. More information may be 
found at the following website:
http://www.EU  KLEMS.net/,http://epp.eurostat.
ec.europa.eu/cache/ITY_OFFPUB/KS-EM-08-001/EN/KS-
EM-08-001-EN.PDF
–  Member State transposition deficit
Source: European Commission, Internal Market Score-
board. Short description: the percentage of Internal 
Market Directives for which the implementation dead-
line has passed are not currently written into national 
law. More information can be found in: http://ec.europa.
eu/internal_market/score/index_en.htm
–  Comparative price levels
Source: EUROSTAT. Short description: the ratio com-
pares the price levels of final consumption by private 
households including indirect taxes of each Member 
State to the EU average. Comparative price levels are 
the ratio between Purchasing power parities (PPPs) and 
market exchange rate for each country. PPPs are cur-209
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rency conversion rates that convert economic indicators 
expressed in national currencies to a common currency, 
called Purchasing Power Standard (PPS), which equalises 
the purchasing power of different national currencies 
and thus allows meaningful comparison.
–  Openness of the economy
Source: EUROSTAT data and DG Enterprise and Industry 
calculations. Short description: the indicator compares 
the sum of total (i.e. intra and extra-EU) external trade of 
goods and services of each country as % of GDP with the 
total (i.e. intra and extra-EU) external trade of goods and 
services of an average EU-Member State. 
–  State aid
Source: EUROSTAT. Short description: The numerator 
is the sum of all State aid granted to specific sectors 
(agriculture, fisheries, manufacturing, coal, transport 
except railways and other services), State aid given on 
an ad-hoc basis to individual companies e.g., for rescue 
and restructuring, and State aid for horizontal objec-
tives such as research and development, safeguarding 
the environment, energy saving, support to small and 
medium-sized enterprises, employment creation, the 
promotion of training and aid for regional development. 
The denominator is GDP.
–    Share of aid to horizontal objectives as % of total aid 
for industry and services 
Source: European Commission, State Aid Scoreboard, 
autumn 2008 update. Short description: State aid for 
horizontal objectives, i.e. aid that is not granted to spe-
cific sectors, is usually considered as being better suited 
to address market failures and thus less distortive than 
sectoral and ad hoc aid. R&D&I, safeguarding the envi-
ronment, energy saving, support to SMEs, employment 
creation, the promotion of training and aid for regional 
economic development are the most prominent hori-
zontal objectives pursued with State aid.
–  Overall product market regulation 
Source: OECD. Short description: the new “integrated 
product market regulation indicator” enhances and 
brings together previously separate economy-wide 
and sectoral indicators into a single, more comprehen-
sive measure of product market regulation. Detailed 
information on this composite index can be obtained 
at the following website: http://www.oecd.org/datao-
ecd/29/41/42779045.pdf 
–  e-Government usage by enterprises
Source: EUROSTAT. Short Description: Percentage of 
enterprises using the internet to interact with public 
authorities (i.e. having used the Internet for one or more 
of the following activities: obtaining information, down-
loading forms, filling-in web-forms, full electronic case 
handling).
–  Dealing with Licenses – number of procedures
Source: World Bank, Doing Business project. Short 
description: the World Bank Doing Business project 
provides measures of business regulations and their 
enforcement so as to make their business environ-
ment comparable. This particular indicator records all 
procedures necessary to build a standardised ware-
house. These procedures include submitting all relevant 
project-specific documents (for example, building plans 
and site maps) to the authorities; obtaining all necessary 
clearances, licenses, permits and certificates; complet-
ing all required notifications; and receiving all necessary 
inspections. Doing Business also records procedures for 
obtaining all utility connections. Proce  dures necessary 
to register the property so that it can be used as collat-
eral or transferred are also counted. More information 
can be obtained from: http://www.doingbusiness.org/
–  Starting a business – number of days
Source: European Commission, DG Enterprise and Indus-
try. Short description: the data are obtained through the 
network of National Start-up Coordinators. According 
to the Spring European Council conclusions 2006, Mem-
ber States should establish, by 2007, a one-stop-shop, 
or arrangements with equivalent effect, for setting up 
a company in a quick and simple way. Member States 
should take adequate measures to considerably reduce 
the average time for setting up a business, especially an 
SME, with the objective of being able to do this within 
one week anywhere in the EU by the end of 2007 (start-
up fees should be as low as possible).
–  Birth rates
Source: Eurostat. Short description: the indicator covers 
enterprise births of year n, as a percentage of the popu-
lation of active enterprises of year n. Data on enterprise 
births are obtained from the statistical business regis-
ters. Using a specific methodology, ge  nu  ine enterprise 
births are distinguished from creations or cessations 
which may reflect only changes in ownership, activity or 
legal form.
–  Venture capital investments –early stage
Source: EUROSTAT. Short description: Venture capital 
investment is defined as private equity raised for invest-
ment in companies; management buyouts, manage-
ment buy-ins and venture purchase of quoted shares are 
excluded. Data are broken down into two investment 
stages: Early stage (seed + start-up) and expansion and 210
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replacement (expansion and replacement capital). Here, 
only early stage investments are considered, as a per-
centage of GDP.
–  Total greenhouse gas emissions
Source: EUROSTAT. Short description: Emissions of the 
6 greenhouse gases covered by the Kyoto Protocol are 
weighted by their global warming potentials (GWPs) 
and aggregated to give total emissions in CO2 equiva-
lents. The total emissions are presented as indices, with 
the base year = 100. In general, the base year is 1990 
for the non-fluorinated gases (CO2, CH4 and N2O), and 
1995 for the fluorinated gases (HFC, PFC and SF6). Data 
exclude emissions and removals due to land use change 
and forestry (LUCF).
–  Energy intensity of the economy
Source: EUROSTAT. Short description: This indicator is the 
ratio between the gross inland consumption of energy 
and the GDP for a given calendar year. It measures the 
energy consumption of an economy and its overall 
energy efficiency. The gross inland consumption of 
energy is calculated as the sum of the gross inland con-
sumption of five energy types: coal, electricity, oil, natural 
gas and renewable energy sources. The GDP figures are 
taken at constant prices to avoid the impact of the infla-
tion, base year 1995 (ESA95). The energy intensity ratio is 
determined by dividing the gross inland consumption by 
the GDP. Since gross inland consumption is measured in 
kgoe (kilogram of oil equivalent) and GDP in 1 000 EUR, 
this ratio is measured in kgoe per 1 000 EUR.
–  Electricity generated from renewable sources
Source: EUROSTAT. Short description: This indicator rep-
resents the electricity produced from renewable energy 
sources as a percentage of gross electricity consumption 
for a given calendar year. It measures the contribution 
of electricity produced from renewable energy sources 
to the national electricity consumption. Electricity pro-
duced from renewable energy sources comprises the 
electricity generation from hydro plants (excluding 
pumping), wind, solar, geothermal and electricity from 
biomass/wastes. Gross national electricity consumption 
comprises the total gross national electricity generation 
from all fuels (including auto-production), plus electric-
ity imports, minus exports.
–  Density of motorways
Source: EUROSTAT. Short description: This indicator 
represents the density of motorways in terms of km per 
100000 inhabitants.
–  Interconnection capacity for electricity
Source: European Regulators’ Group for Electricity and 
Gas (ERGEG). Short description: This indicator repre-
sents for each country the import capacity (net transport 
capacity) as % of all installed generation capacities.211
ANNEX – List of background studies  
to the European Competitiveness Report 2009
Some parts of the European Competitivenss Report 
2009 are based on, or use, material prepared by a con-
sortium led by WIFO, the Austrian institute for economic 
Research:
Chapter 1 – “Competitiveness Report and the crisis” 
has benefited from helpful comments and suggestions 
from Jozef Konings, Josefina Monteagudo, Dominique 
Simonis, Ian Vollbracht and Stephen White. The discus-
sion on the EU-US differences in R&D benefited sub-
stantially from comments by colleagues at the Research 
Directorate-General.
Chapter 2 – “EU and BRICs: Challenges and Opportu-
nities for European competitiveness” is based on the 
background study “EU and BRICs: Challenges and oppor-
tunities for European Competitiveness and Coopera-
tion” by Peter Havlik, Roman Stöllinger, Olga Pindyuk, 
Gábor Hunya, Bernhard Dachs, Carolina Lennon, Marcos 
Poplawski Ribeiro, Jayati Ghosh, Waltraut Urban, Vas-
ily Astrov and Edward Christie under the responsibil-
ity of the Vienna Institute for International Economic 
Studies (wiiw) and the Centre d’Etudes Prospectives et 
d’Informations Internationales (CEPII).
Chapter 3 – “Migration, skills and productivity” is based 
on the background study “Migration, skills and produc-
tivity” by Peter Huber, Michael Landesmann, Catherine 
Robinson and Robert Stehrer, and also with Robert Hier-
länder, Anna Iara, Mary O’Mahony, Klaus Nowotny and 
Fei Pong. The study is coordinated by WIIW in Vienna 
and carried out in collaboration with WIFO and NIESR.
Chapter 4 – “Training, education and productivity” is 
based on the background study “Training, education 
and productivity” by Fiona Carmichael, Marco Ercolani, 
Lili Kang, Yasheng Maimaiti, Mary O’Mahony, Fei Peng 
and Catherine Robinson.
Chapter 5 – “Regulation, ICT and productivity” is based on 
the background study “ICT, Regulation and Productivity: 
an analysis using EU KLEMS” by Ana Rincon-Aznar, NIESR.European Commission
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